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Abstract
This thesis studies one of the fundamental features of international financial markets: the
limited mechanisms for enforcement of government debt (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, p.
53). Specifically, I analyze if sovereign debt can be legally enforced, and which impact
creditor rights have for bond markets. Much of the sovereign debt literature assumes that
legal enforcement mechanisms play an irrelevant role. This thesis provides new evidence
which sheds doubt on this premise.
I introduce and analyze new datasets on lawsuits filed by private investors against
foreign governments in courts in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK),
and combine these with existing data on prices and yields of sovereign bond markets.
Based on five self-contained chapters, the thesis deals with two central questions: first,
which role do lawsuits play as a cost of default? Second, how do bond markets develop in
crisis situations? With respect to the first question, my co-authors and I find that since the
early 1990s, an increasing share of sovereign defaults are subject to lawsuits in national
courts in the US and the UK, although the numbers are still relatively small. Lawsuits
are especially likely if governments impose large losses on their creditors (chapter
2). However, litigation can have significant repercussions on governments’ financial
markets and trade relations. Hence, even though the numbers are limited, it can create
considerable nuisance value (chapter 3). Studying the 2001/02 Argentine default in depth,
I furthermore show that contract design of sovereign bonds is significantly correlated with
creditor participation and litigation in sovereign default workouts, and that especially
distressed debt investors are likely to file and advance lawsuits (chapter 4). With respect
to the second question, we find that pricing on sovereign bond markets reflects these
developments. Government debt is predominantly traded on over-the-counter markets
rather than on centralized exchanges. These markets become increasingly illiquid during
debt crises, increasing the trading costs for creditors. This opens up opportunities for
investors specializing in illiquid distressed debt (chapter 5). Furthermore, sovereign
bonds with stronger legal protection against ex-post contract amendments by the debtor
government trade at higher prices during financial crises. This implies that investors
value legal enforcement opportunities, at least in distressed markets (chapter 6). Taken
together the results indicate that legal enforcement plays an important role in sovereign
debt markets.
Keywords: Sovereign debt; Legal enforcement; Litigation; Creditor coordination; Bond
markets; Market liquidity
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit einem der zentralen Merkmale globaler Finanz-
märkte: den begrenzten Möglichkeiten der Durchsetzung von Staatsschulden (Reinhart
und Rogoff, 2009, S. 53). Sie analysiert ob Staatsschulden rechtlich durchgesetzt werden
können, und welche Effekte Gläubigerrechte auf Anleihemärkte haben. Ein Großteil
der ökonomischen Literatur zu Staatssschulden geht von der Annahme aus, dass diese
nicht rechtlich durchgesetzt werden können. Die vorliegende Arbeit präsentiert neue
Erkenntnisse, die diese Sichtweise in Frage stellen.
Die Dissertation stellt neue Datensätze zu Gerichtsverfahren von privaten Gläubigern
vor Gerichten in den USA und Großbritannien gegen ausländische Regierungen vor und
kombiniert diese mit umfassenden Daten zu Preisen und Zinsen auf Staatsschulden-
märkten. Die fünf eigenständigen Kapitel behandeln Aspekte zweier grundlegender
Fragestellungen: Erstens, welche Rolle nehmen rechtliche Gläubigerklagen als Sanktion-
smechanismus für Staatsbankrotte ein? Zweitens, wie entwickeln sich Staatsschulden-
märkte in Krisensituationen? Meine Ko-Autoren und ich zeigen, dass seit den frühen
1990er Jahren Staatsschuldenkrisen zunehmend häufiger von Gläubigerklagen begleitet
sind, auch wenn die absolute Zahl nach wie vor relativ gering ist. Klagen treten insbeson-
dere in großen Umschuldungen mit hohen Verlusten für Investoren auf (Kapitel 2). Diese
Gerichtsverfahren können jedoch einen materiellen Einfluss auf den Kapitalmarktzugang
einer Regierung oder die Handelsbeziehungen eines Landes haben. Daher können selbst
wenige klagende Gläubiger erhebliche Kosten eines Staatsbankrotts verursachen (Kapitel
3). In einer detaillierten Fallstudie der argentinischen Schuldenkrise zeige ich zudem,
dass die Ausgestaltung von Anleiheverträgen einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Teil-
nahmeraten in Umschuldungen sowie Klagequoten von Gläubigern haben, und dass vor
allem auf Krisen spezialisierte Investoren Klagen anstreben (Kapitel 4). Im Hinblick auf
die zweite Frage zeige ich, dass diese Entwicklungen sich in den Preisen gehandelter
Anleihen widerspiegeln. Regierungsanleihen werden größtenteils auf außerbörslichen
Märkten gehandelt. Diese werden in Krisenszenarien zunehmend illiquide und erhöhen
damit die Handelskosten für Investoren. Somit ergeben sich potentiell Möglichkeiten
für auf Krisensituationen spezialisierte Investoren (Kapitel 5). Zudem finden wir, dass
Staatsanleihen mit stärkeren rechtlichen Schutzklauseln gegen ex-post Vertragsänderun-
gen durch die Schuldnerregierung während Krisen mit einem Preisaufschlag gehandelt
werden. Dies bedeutet, dass Investoren durchaus rechtliche Durchsetzungsmöglichkeiten
wertschätzen, zumindest in riskanten Marktumgebungen (Kapitel 6). Zusammenfassend
findet diese Arbeit, dass rechtliche Durchsetzung von Staatsschulden heute eine wichtige
Rolle für dieses Marktsegment einnimmt.
Schlagwörter: Staatsschulden; Rechtliche Durchsetzung; Zivilklagen; Gläubigerkoordi-
nation; Anleihenmärkte; Marktliquidität
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The most notable feature of sovereign debt is that it exists at all (Bulow and Rogoff,
1989a; Shleifer, 2003). For centuries, international relations rested on the premise that
governments are sovereign actors which cannot be held accountable to the rulings of legal
institutions. This principle of sovereign immunity also includes financial transactions.
A government which is unable or unwilling to repay its contractually due debt is not
subject to a supranational authority that could enforce penalties against such contract
violations. No other relation on financial markets is subject to a similar power asymmetry.
The only viable legal recourse for investors is to turn to the courts of global financial
markets for enforcement of contractual rights, where the principle of sovereign immunity
applies only to a restricted set of government actions. The determinants and effects of
sovereign debt enforcement in national courts form the core of this thesis.
The unique legal situation of sovereign debt becomes clear in comparison to private
business or household borrowers. A private debtor who does not repay either has to come
to a voluntary agreement with its creditors about a reduction in her liabilities, or face
court-organized bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court will oversee negotiations
to distribute the remaining assets among creditors. An agreement accepted by the
majority of creditors becomes binding for all creditors, even if they would not voluntarily
agree to the terms. These conditions are also binding for the debtor, unpleasant as
they may be, and will be enforced – if necessary, by means of the state’s monopoly of
force.1 That is not the case for sovereign borrowers. There is no international bankruptcy
court which could liquidate a country, and no international marshall service, police,
or military force exists that could back up its authority by enforcing a hypothetical
agreement. Despite notable policy efforts at establishing an international regime which
1Bankruptcy laws often distinguish between reorganization and liquidation. The former has the purpose of
satisfying a reasonable share of the creditor’s claims, but at the same time giving the debtor the opportunity
to reduce her liabilities and continue her operations. It can therefore be applied to individuals, businesses,
and (in the US) municipalities. Liquidation, on the other hand, implies the sale of a debtor’s remaining assets
and means that the enterprise cannot be continued afterwards. It is hence only applicable to businesses. In
the US, bankruptcy procedures are codified in Title 11 of the United States Code, with different chapters
for liquidation (Chapter 7), reorganization (Chapter 11), individual insolvency (Chapter 13), and public
insolvency (Chapter 9). In Germany, bankruptcy is governed by the Insolvenzordnung, implemented in 1999.
For a summary of the historical development of bankruptcy laws, see Skeel (2003) or Wood (2007).
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could coordinate and govern the workout of sovereign defaults (Rogoff and Zettelmeyer,
2002; Krueger, 2002), the institutional framework has remained virtually unchanged.
1.1 Contribution to the literature
It is therefore commonly understood that legal enforcement plays no role in sovereign
debt markets, or represents a minor nuisance at best (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Aguiar
and Amador, 2013; Moody’s, 2013). In the absence of legal enforcement, alternative
default penalties must give the government incentives to repay if borrowing can be
maintained in equilibrium. The most well-known theoretical default penalties include
reputation on financial markets (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Kletzer and Wright, 2000;
Arellano, 2008), direct punishments such as trade interference or military intervention
(Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a), the signaling value of default on other aspects of the economy
(Cole and Kehoe, 1998; Sandleris, 2008), or negative effect on domestic creditors such as
banks or voters (Guembel and Sussman, 2009; Broner et al., 2010; Gennaioli et al., 2014).
Although most often quoted for contributing the argument that disruptions to trade
flows can be a direct default penalty, Bulow and Rogoff (1989a, p. 158) explain that
the underlying channel “for repayment is the threat of direct sanctions that lenders can
impose by going to creditor country courts [...] For example, if a country repudiates its
foreign loans, it will be forced to conduct its trade in roundabout ways to avoid seizure.”
More recently, Bolton and Jeanne (2009) and Pitchford and Wright (2012) revived the idea
that even small numbers of litigating creditors can have significant effects on the debtor
country’s economy if they are veto players who can prevent the default from being cured.
Empirical tests of this proposition (Rose, 2005; Martinez and Sandleris, 2011) focused
on the correlation of default with trade flows, without taking into account that legal
sanctions in creditor countries are a necessary condition for this mechanism.
The findings of this thesis provide new empirical evidence on legal enforcement of
government debt in foreign courts. Two main results stand out. First, my co-authors
and I find that since the early 1990s, an increasing share of sovereign defaults are subject
to lawsuits in national courts in the US and the UK. Lawsuits are especially likely
if governments impose large losses on their creditors (chapter 2). Besides – in some
cases – being highly profitable to distressed investors, litigation can have significant
repercussions on governments’ financial markets and trade relations (chapter 3). Based
on an in-depth case study of the Argentine 2001/02 default, I furthermore show that
contract design of sovereign bonds is significantly correlated with creditor participation
and litigation in sovereign default workouts (chapter 4).
Second, pricing on sovereign bond markets reflects these developments. Government
debt is predominantly traded on over-the-counter markets rather than on centralized
exchanges. These markets become increasingly illiquid during debt crises, increasing
the trading costs for creditors. This opens up opportunities for investors specializing in
illiquid distressed debt (chapter 5). Furthermore, sovereign bonds with stronger legal
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protection against ex-post contract amendments trade at higher prices during financial
crises (chapter 6). This implies that investors value legal enforcement opportunities, at
least in distressed markets. If sovereign debt contracts and legal provisions were truly
irrelevant, bond prices should be invariant to them.
1.2 Summary of chapters
Chapter 2: What Explains Sovereign Debt Litigation?
With Christoph Trebesch and Henrik Enderlein
Over the course of the 20th century, many countries moved away from a doctrine of
absolute sovereign immunity towards a more restrictive interpretation, allowing lawsuits
against foreign governments for an increasing number of reasons (Weidemaier, 2014).
Since the late 1970s, it became possible to sue foreign defaulting states in the US and the
UK which continue to be the most important global capital markets (Das et al., 2012).
This chapter analyzes in which conditions creditors have resorted to legal enforcement of
sovereign debt in these jurisdictions.
By drawing on a newly collected dataset of all lawsuits filed between 1976-2010
in the US and the UK, we find that the absolute number and likelihood of creditor
litigation has indeed strongly increased over this period. However, there is a considerable
variation between debt crises, with a few defaults triggering dozens of lawsuits, while
the majority could be resolved without a single case. This chapter therefore analyzes
the determinants of lawsuits by private creditors. We estimate the probability that
a country’s debt restructuring is affected by litigation conditional on a set of crisis-,
country-, and global-level variables. We find that crisis-characteristics can explain the
variation reasonably well. Debt restructurings involving large volumes are more likely to
be accompanied by litigation, as are deals with high net present value losses for investors.
In addition, country-characteristics play a significant role. States that are more dependent
on international trade and have weaker bureaucracies are more often subject to lawsuits.
We rationalize these empirical findings through a simple model in which governments
can make a single offer to creditors who are heterogeneous in their costs of going to court.
Depending on a country’s characteristics, the government’s optimal offer will change;
this will result in different degrees of creditor litigation across debt crises.
Chapter 3: Sovereign Defaults in Court
With Christoph Trebesch and Henrik Enderlein
Models of direct default penalties such as those by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), Bolton
and Jeanne (2009), or Pitchford and Wright (2012) rely on the assumption that creditors
can impose costs on foreign governments through their national judicial institutions.
Possible realizations of such costs are the legal exclusion from capital markets, the seizure
of trade revenues, or blocking a restructuring agreement with other investors. This
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chapter empirically tests these possibilities as effects of creditor litigation.
Using the new dataset, we test three hypotheses with respect to the possible impact
of creditor litigation: (i) countries subject to litigation are less likely to issue new debt,
(ii) bilateral trade flows between countries decline if one trade partner is affected by
litigation, (iii) debt restructuring negotiations take longer to be settled if some creditors
are litigating against the country. In these three tests, we rely on established data and
methods from the literature, and enhance the existing empirical models by our litigation
measures as an additional dimension of default (for market access, see Gelos et al. 2011;
for trade, see Rose 2005; for delay, see Trebesch 2010). We find that investor lawsuits
significantly decrease the likelihood of market access, and significantly increase the
duration of restructuring negotiations. The effects for trade are ambiguous and depend
on the specification of the empirical model. To improve the causal interpretation of the
empirical correlations, we rely on qualitative case studies for each hypothesis. We find
ample evidence of cases in which creditors interfered with financial market access, trade
flows (especially in natural resources), and restructuring negotiations.
Chapter 4: Coordination Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Holdouts and
Litigation in Argentina
Argentina’s 2001/02 default and 2005 restructuring is widely regarded as the debt
crisis most strongly affected by creditor litigation (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006;
Moody’s, 2013). This is also the result from the new cross-sectional dataset on creditor
litigation used in chapters two and three. Argentina’s exchange had the lowest participa-
tion rate of all bond exchanges since the late 1970s, and was subject to an exceptionally
high share of litigation, including not only institutional creditors, but also retail investors.
The cases culminated in a 2012 injunction based on the pari passu clause prohibiting
Argentina from making payments on a large number of bonds exchanged in the 2005/10
restructurings. These stylized facts suggest considerable variation between different
types of creditors, as well as between different bond contracts. This chapter exploits
the within-country variation to uncover the determinants of creditor participation and
litigation.
The core of the chapter is a newly coded dataset on the Argentine restructuring,
consisting of two parts. First, a systematic overview of all lawsuits filed in New York
courts. Second, bond-by-bond data on non-participation (holdout) and litigation rates.
Two main descriptive findings emerge from the data. With respect to litigation, the
majority of lawsuits (measured by debt volume) were filed by a small number of special-
ized distressed debt hedge funds. These funds were also the plaintiffs driving the pari
passu litigation, forcing Argentina into a new default in 2014. With respect to holdouts,
however, bonds especially designed to appeal to retail investors were particularly likely
to have low participation rates. I rationalize these findings with a highly stylized model
of heterogeneous valuation, where retail investors are more optimistic about the value of
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defaulted bonds, but have relatively high costs of filing a lawsuit.
Chapter 5: Sovereign Debt Crises and Bond Market Liquidity
After the sovereign debt crises of the 1980s especially in many Latin American
countries, governments borrowing from international capital markets increasingly turned
to issuing bonds to investors, rather than obtaining loans from banks (IMF, 2004; Tanaka,
2006; Hale, 2007). With this shift towards marketable debt, trading of bonds between
investors on secondary markets became possible. Government bonds are mostly traded
in over-the-counter markets (see for instance Duffie et al., 2007; Bai et al., 2012; Pelizzon
et al., 2013), meaning that market makers (dealers) take an intermediary role by bridging
temporary imbalances in supply and demand. The spread between dealers’ purchase
(bid) and sales (ask) prices is a widely used measure of the liquidity in these markets,
as it approximates the trading costs for investors. Since liquidity is a priced risk factor
(Duffie et al., 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005), increasing illiquidity may contribute to
vicious circles of reinforcing borrowing and trading costs (Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2009; He and Milbradt, 2014). This chapter estimates the liquidity of sovereign bond
markets during financial crises.
Using a comprehensive dataset of bond-by-bond pricing data, I run event studies
of crisis events and panel regressions in a sample of defaulting and non-defaulting
emerging market countries. The main result of this chapter is that increasing credit
risk is indeed correlated with wider bid-ask spreads. Sovereign bond markets become
especially illiquid once a payment default has occured or been announced. In such
market conditions, specialized distressed investors discounting illiquidity may play a
particularly important role. Furthermore, liquidity risk contributes negligibly to yield
spreads in calm times, but significantly increases spreads in crisis episodes, both for
defaulting and non-defaulting countries. This is in line with findings from Eurozone
bond markets (Beber et al., 2009; De Pooter et al., 2014). Taken together, these results
suggest that a possible negative feedback effect from liquidity risk to yield spreads exists.
Chapter 6: Foreign Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?
With Marcos Chamon and Christoph Trebesch
Governments sometimes discriminate between their domestic and foreign creditors.
While a number of models assume that domestic investors are generally preferred
(Guembel and Sussman, 2009; Broner et al., 2010), the evidence in emerging markets is
mixed: in numerous instances, governments have treated external creditors more favorably
than domestic residents (Erce, 2012). This is in line with the notion of “hard-to-restructure
debt” suggested by Bolton and Jeanne (2007, 2009). A particularly well-known example
of such discrimination is the Greek 2012 bond exchange. While the restructuring imposed
a haircut of circa 65% on domestic law bonds, participation for foreign law bondholders
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was voluntary (Zettelmeyer et al., 2013). Those investors who did not tender their bonds
subsequently received full and timely repayments according to the original terms. This
chapter analyzes if foreign law bonds of Eurozone governments are priced at a premium
relative to their domestic law counterparts, reflecting that the market is aware of possible
discrimination.
Foreign law bonds are usually denominated in different currencies than domestic law
bonds, which makes it difficult to disentangle a currency premium from a legal premium.
Using a sample of Eurozone bond markets provides a unique setting to deal with this
problem, since Germany issues credit risk-free bonds in the same currency as more risky
countries. Using the difference between the yield curves of the US, the UK, Switzerland
and Japan, and the yield curve of Germany to approximate currency risk, we compute
hypothetical domestic law yields of Eurozone countries in foreign currencies. We can
then compare the actually observed yields on the foreign law bonds with the theoretical
domestic law yields in these currencies to derive a foreign law premium. We find that a
significant premium for risky European issuers exists, but only during times when their
credit risk is high, as measured by credit default swap (CDS) premia. This implies that
while “hard-to-restructure-debt” exists, its ex-ante benefits for lowering borrowing costs
in non-crisis times are likely to be limited.
1.3 Historical origins of legal sovereign debt enforcement
Legal enforcement of sovereign debt is not a completely new phenomenon, even though
it has come to greater public attention in recent decades. Notable early examples of
sovereign debt enforcement in court were related to the repudiation of US state debts
in the mid-19th century (English, 1996; Waibel, 2011).2 Allen (1933) provides numerous
examples of creditor litigation against national and sub-national foreign governments in
courts in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland in the early 20th century. But
one of the first legal battle between bondholders and a defaulting government involved a
bond placed by the Republic of Bolivia in London in 1872.3 Besides including notable
contractual innovations,4 the case provides an exemplary illustration of the causes and
consequences of sovereign debt litigation.
In 1868, the Bolivian government approached a US engineer, George Earl Church,
2The American states had sold their debt abroad, notably in the UK, and as a result of their defaults
faced “long and persistent litigation maintained by the council [Council of Foreign Bondholders] in the
Federal courts.” (New York Times, “The Old Dominion’s Debt”, 19 December 1891) Bondholders sued,
among others, the states of West Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi. The litigation against
West Virginia, for instance, proceeded to the US Supreme Court in 1915 (238 U.S. 202) before a settlement
was reached in 1920. The settlement prompted the Council of Foreign Bondholders to conclude that West
Virginia had “now only done so under compulsion, and after the most determined efforts to evade the
judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States.” (Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, 1921, p.27)
3The following paragraphs rely on the extensive summary in Wilson v. Church, Court of Appeal 1878 W.
81., except where otherwise noted. See also Gulati and Scott (2012) for a brief summary of the case and the
legal innovations in the bond prospectus.
4Weidemaier et al. (2013) argue that the bond was the first sovereign bond containing a pari passu clause.
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for an infrastructure project to connect Bolivia to the Amazon river (Craig, 1907). The
plan involved a complex web of companies incorporated specifically for this project in
the US and the UK, government concessions granted by the Republic of Bolivia and the
Republic of Brazil, and multiple subcontractors.
Importantly, however, the funding for the project should be almost entirely provided
through a secured bond placed by Bolivia in London in 1872 (the newly set up companies
were incorporated with almost no equity). The bond (see Figure 1.1) with a principal of
GBP 1.7m, to be repaid through annual payments of 2% into a sinking fund, carried a
coupon of 6% (National Bolivian Navigation Company, 1873) and promised a yield at
issuance of 8.8%.5 The bond included considerable safeguards: first, it explicitly pledged
the future revenues from the newly constructed railway. Second, GBP 600,000 (the total
estimated construction costs) of the GBP 1.7m were not transferred directly into the
hands of the Bolivian government, but rather administered by an English trustee in an
account with the Bank of England. And third, the trustee also retained enough money to
cover the coupon and sinking fund payments until 1874, when the railway was planned
to be completed.
Nevertheless, the bond quickly went into arrears. The original subcontractor failed to
achieve any meaningful progress on the railway until 1874, and subsequent contractors
did no better. Bolivia never made any payments, so that a payment default occurred in
1875 when the funds which had been retained and deposited with the trustee at issuance
were exhausted (Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, 1876).
In January 1874, bondholders filed suit against the Republic of Bolivia, the trustee,
and the railway companies. Although Bolivia was in default, the country could not be
forced to fulfill its obligations. The legal battle hence quickly turned to the question what
should be done with the remaining trust funds that were earmarked for construction
expenses. Bondholders wanted the funds distributed pro rata among them;6 the Bolivian
government claimed them for herself; the engineers and the companies wanted them
disbursed for further construction efforts.
After years of litigation, the creditors prevailed. While the bondholders were not able
to receive their due payments, they successfully negotiated an agreement with Bolivia
in 1876/77, according to which the government waived its claim on the trust funds and
consented to have them distributed among the bondholders (Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders, 1878). The trust fund, which had been invested in US treasuries by the
trustees in the meantime, was sufficient for an estimated recovery value of between 48%
(Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, 1882) and 52% (Craig, 1907, p. 450) of face value.
Figure 1.2 shows the affirmation that the judgment was satisfied, invalidating the original
claim of the bond.
Notably, for a specific set of bondholders, the settlement meant a highly profitable
5The bond was priced at 68% (Craig, 1907; Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, 1882, p.54); the yield
reported here is for bonds held to maturity in January 1897, when the final sinking fund payment was due.
This implied a spread of 5.6% over UK Gilts at the time of issue.
6This was one of the first applications of the pari passu clause, see Weidemaier et al. (2013).
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outcome. Buyers who had purchased the bonds at the all-time low price of 16% of face
value were able to more than triple their investments. Decried as “an unscrupulous body
of commercial pirates” (Craig, 1907, p. 449), they were also seen as the driving force
behind the abandonment of the railway project and distribution of funds among the
bondholders.
Why did Bolivia settle with its creditors, despite the fact that the English court
judgments could not be enforced on its sovereign assets? One possible reason is that
an unresolved conflict with creditors prevented the country from re-accessing the UK
capital market. A regulation by the London Stock Exchange (LSE), at the time the most
important global financial center (Alquist, 2010), provided that a country could only
issue new bonds in England if a “satisfactory arrangement” with the holders of defaulted
bonds could be found (Wright, 2011). This meant that until the creditor lawsuits were
abandoned, Bolivia was effectively excluded from global capital markets. Indeed, the 1877
agreement provided that the defaulted bonds should be exchanged for new certificates
that could be traded again at the LSE; as of 1880, about 87% of creditors had tendered
their claims in this manner (Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, 1881).
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Figure 1.1: Republic of Bolivia bond, 1872
A GBP 100 bond of the GBP 1.7m loan issued in London.
Source: Original on file with the author.
Figure 1.2: Satisfaction of judgment, 1880
The creditor litigation after the default on the bond resulted in dis-
tributing the trust funds among the creditors. Once the judgment sum
was repayed to the bondholder, the original bonds were invalidated by
judicial stamp on the bond document.
Source: Original on file with the author
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1.4 Conclusion
Why should we care about a railway project which failed almost 150 years ago? The story
of the “ill-fated expedition” (Craig, 1907) holds more than just historical entertainment
value. It exemplifies two central features of the enforcement of sovereign debt that are
still prevalent today and are supported by the results of the subsequent chapters in this
thesis.
First, legal enforcement is a difficult challenge for creditors. Even if debtors pledge
collateral, or designate payment streams, the opportunities for the enforcement of such
terms, or even judgments, are limited. Sovereign governments typically keep few assets
abroad, and many are protected by legal immunity even today. This is one reason
why sovereign debt litigation is, with some exceptions, a relatively rare phenomenon.
However, creditor lawsuits can still be rewarding: The “nuisance value” (Bulow and
Rogoff, 1989a) of a pending lawsuit in global financial centers can mean distortions
to international financial and trade relations far exceeding the claims at stake. That is
why sovereign debt litigation, though limited as a means of direct enforcement, plays a
significant role in disciplining governments to repay.
Second, today’s bond markets for distressed sovereign debt exist, and can be attractive
for specialized distressed debt investors. Increasingly risky bond markets become illiquid,
opening opportunities for distressed investors. As the Argentine experience shows, these
are particularly likely to aggressively litigate for a better deal. Their investments seem to
be reflected in the market prices during financial crises, though their impact on borrowing
costs in normal times is possibly limited.
From “commercial pirates” in the early days of sovereign bond markets to “vulture
funds”, as distressed hedge funds are sometimes described today, the aggressive enforce-
ment of sovereign debt is seen by some observers as making defaults excessively costly
(e.g. Stiglitz, 2013; Stiglitz and Guzman, 2014). Many others, however, emphasize the
ex ante benefits of legal enforcement as a commitment device for governments (Dooley,
2000; Shleifer, 2003; Scott, 2006). In either case, the results of this thesis provide evidence
that legal enforcement is an important factor to be considered when analyzing sovereign
debt markets.
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What Explains Sovereign Debt
Litigation?1
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We study the occurrence of holdout litigation in the context of sovereign defaults. The
number of creditor lawsuits against foreign governments has strongly increased over
the past decades, but there is a large variation across crisis events. Why are some
defaults followed by a “run to the courthouse” and others not? What explains the
general increase in lawsuits? We address these questions based on an economic model of
litigation and a new dataset capturing the near-universe of cases filed against defaulting
sovereigns. We find that creditors are more likely to litigate in large debt restructurings,
when governments impose high losses (“haircuts”), and when the defaulting country is
more vulnerable to litigation (open economies and those with a low legal capacity). We
conclude that sovereign debt lawsuits can be predicted reasonably well with a simple
framework from the law and economics literature.
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2.1 Introduction
On 3 October 2012, a subsidiary of the US hedge fund Elliott Associates succeeded in
seizing a flagship of the Argentine navy in a Ghanaian port, the vessel ARA Libertad
with 300 sailors on board.4 The hedge fund attempted to use the ship for enforcing claims
from Argentina’s defaulted government bonds. This drastic legal maneuver is just one of
the many repercussions of the Argentine default of 2001. Over the past decade, creditors
have tried countless strategies to legally force the country to repay the debt it defaulted
on. This paper is an attempt to better understand the occurrence of creditor litigation
against sovereign debtors. We study situations in which banks or investment funds
refuse to participate in a sovereign debt exchange offer and, instead, sue a defaulting
government for full repayment in New York or London courts.
Legal disputes are now a standard ingredient of sovereign debt renegotiations, in-
cluding the 2012 Greek debt exchange.5 It is also well-known that litigation can be costly
and disruptive. Countries like Argentina devote substantial resources to defend against
lawsuits and attachment attempts, despite the fact that sovereign assets are very difficult
to seize. Moreover, litigious creditors can cause considerable externalities, such as a
disruption of international trade flows, or by blocking government access to international
capital markets (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006; Alfaro et al., 2010).
The rise of creditor litigation has triggered an international debate and many policy
initiatives. Governments have advocated against litigious creditors6 and concerns about
holdouts have motivated proposals on introducing collective action clauses (CACs) or
a new bancruptcy regime such as the IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
(SDRM) (see Rogoff and Zettelmeyer, 2002; IMF, 2003; Bolton, 2003).7 The European debt
crisis has revived the debate on litigation and related creditor coordination problems
(see Gianviti et al., 2010; Roubini, 2010; Weder Di Mauro and Zettelmeyer, 2010; Tirole,
2012; Mody, 2013). Buchheit et al. (2013b), for example, argue that the threat of holdout
litigation is a main explanation for the large scale bailouts of Eurozone countries. Because
governments want to avoid a “messy” default as in Argentina, they may have become
less prone to impose (high) haircuts on their private creditors. Also, the recent reports by
4See “Argentine navy ship seized in asset fight”, Financial Times, 3 October 2012.
5“Fund threatens to sue over Greek bond losses”, Financial Times, 15 December 2011; “Bet on Greek
Bonds Paid Off for ‘Vulture Fund”’, New York Times, 15 May 2012; and “Slovak bank sues Greece over 2012
bond swap”, Kathimerini, 9 May 2013.
6In a speech to the United Nations, the former UK finance minister Gordon Brown called creditor
litigation by distressed debt funds “morally outrageous” (BBC, 10 May 2002), while Hank Paulson, his
former US colleague, said that he “deplore[s] what the vulture funds are doing” (Bloomberg, 8 January
2008). The World Bank, the Paris Club, and the IMF, as well as NGOs such as Jubilee also warned of the
dangers of holdout litigation (see Alfaro et al., 2010), and they have recently been joined by the European
Commission (2012).
7Additional initiatives include a 2010 law passed in the UK to ban creditor lawsuits against the poorest
countries undergoing debt relief. Two Channel Islands, Jersey and Guernsey, are currently preparing
legislation that resembles the UK bill, while Belgium passed a bill to prevent the seizure of assets by litigious
creditors in 2008. The African Development Bank has also recently set up the “African Legal Support facility”
to support debtor countries facing litigation.
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the IMF (2013) and Buchheit et al. (2013a) suggest that creditor litigation has become a
serious stumbling block for sovereign debt restructurings.
Others do not necessarily see creditor holdouts and litigation as a reason for concern.
Shleifer (2003) and Scott (2006) argue that stronger creditor rights could have a positive
effect on sovereign debt markets, because governments will be less likely to overborrow
and default.8 A similar argument is made by Dooley (2000) and Pitchford and Wright
(2007), who conclude that it can be welfare-reducing to make debt renegotiation less
costly ex-post, e.g. by reducing holdout litigation. More generally, Bolton and Jeanne
(2007) analyse the welfare effects of “easy” versus “hard” sovereign debt restructuring.
This study is motivated by the fact that there is only little empirical knowledge on
the phenomenon of sovereign debt litigation and related creditor coordination problems,
despite the many policy initiatives and a large body of related theoretical work. The
existing literature has predominantly focused on a few high profile litigation cases, like
Elliott v. Peru or Argentina, while systematic evidence has been missing.
Our analysis builds on a new dataset by Schumacher et al. (2014) that comes close
to a census of all debt-crisis related lawsuits filed between 1978 and 2010 in the US and
the UK, the two most relevant jurisdictions for international sovereign debt disputes.9
The data are hand-coded from electronic court records from the comprehensive PACER10
database as well as from documents from Lexis Nexis Law, Westlaw, Casetrack, Justis,
and BAILII. Altogether, we evaluated more than 10,000 pages of legal documents and
verified each data entry across all sources available, including previous data collections
and academic research.11 This coding approach allows us to tackle one of the main
hurdles in quantitative legal research: sample selection bias. For the US, we are able to
identify the universe of initiated lawsuits following a default or restructuring, including
those that are settled out-of-court or those which remain unresolved. The data reveal
new insights:
• Stylized Fact 1: The probability of litigation has strongly increased.
We find that the total number of lawsuits is only 121 (not counting multiple lawsuits
by the same creditor), but more than half of these cases have been filed since the
year 2000. The likelihood that a debt crisis is accompanied by creditor litigation has
increased from less than 10% in the 1980s to more than 40% in recent years.
• Stylized fact 2: There is a large variation across debt crisis cases.
We find that some defaults trigger dozens of lawsuit in foreign courts, others
8Similarly, Fisch and Gentile (2004) suggest that holdout creditors can foster the functioning of credit
markets in distress and thereby facilitate the restructuring process.
9Recent research confirms the continued dominance of English and New York law in cross-border bond
and loan markets, see IMF (2002), Das et al. (2012), and Gulati and Scott (2012).
10Public Access to Court Electronic Records, http://www.pacer.gov.
11In particular, the cases identified in the HIPC initiative reports by the IMF and the World Bank (various
issues), and those listed in Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton and Clifford Chance (1992), Buchheit (1999),
EMTA (2009), IIF (2009) and in the academic literature (Singh, 2003; Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006;
Alfaro et al., 2010; Trebesch, 2010).
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none. Overall, litigation affected only 31 of the 174 sovereign debt restructurings
with foreign banks and bondholders between 1978 and 2010 (18 % of all cases).
Similarly, we find that only 26 debtor governments were affected, out of a total of
69 defaulters.
The aim of this paper is to rationalize the above stylized facts on litigation occurrence.
Why are some debt crises followed by a veritable “run to the courthouse”, while most
cases see no litigation at all? Is it true that poorer countries are more likely to be sued, as
often suggested in the policy debate? And what explains the general rise in litigation
occurrence over the past decades? We address these questions with a standard model
from the law and economics literature and by estimating probit and count models using
litigation measures as our dependent variable. The resulting framework is a first attempt
to develop an “early warning system” of creditor lawsuits in the context of sovereign
defaults.
To guide the econometric analysis, we draw on an established framework on the
economics of litigation that goes back to Coase (1960), Landes (1971) and Posner (1973)
and is surveyed by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989). The model predicts litigation to be
determined (i) by the expected probability of winning a lawsuit (landmark judgments
and changes in legal doctrine), (ii) by the cost of litigation to creditors and debtors, and
(iii) by the scope of damage suffered by creditors. Moreover, we draw on theories from
international finance and international trade disputes to further discipline our choice of
explanatory variables. The seminal paper by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) suggests that
banks can impose legal sanctions on defaulting sovereigns and that the resulting asset
seizures will disrupt international trade. If this is true, economies that are more open will
be more vulnerable to litigation. We therefore include measures of trade and financial
openness as a proxy for the creditor’s probability of winning. We also account for the
characteristics of each debt restructuring. First, we include the amount of restructured
debt, as a proxy for the number of creditors. This is in line with the model by Pitchford
and Wright (2012a), which predicts that more creditors increase negotiation delays and
the probability of litigious holdouts. Second, we include the size of haircuts, which is in
line with the related paper by Bi et al. (2011). High creditor losses make it more attractive
to reject the exchange offer and instead sue for repayment of 100% of face value (see also
Buchheit, 1999; Roubini and Setser, 2004). Finally, we control for the legal capacity of
debtor governments, the cost of litigation to creditors, and for the existence of liquid
secondary markets.
The results are in line with the theoretical priors. Landmark judgments are important
in explaining the observed number of lawsuits. But legal factors become less relevant
once we control for economic and financial variables. In particular, we find that trade
openness, deal size (amounts restructured), and the scope of creditor losses (“haircuts”)
are economically and statistically significant predictors of creditor litigation after a
sovereign default. A one standard deviation increase in haircut size or in the amount
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restructured more than doubles the probability of litigation (from 6% to more than 12%).
These findings are robust to including time fixed effects, restricting the sample to the
2000s, and excluding outliers (Argentina, Brazil, Peru). The results also hold when
estimating IV regressions that account for the potential endogeneity of haircut size. We
conclude that both legal and economic variables help to explain the occurrence and rise
of sovereign debt litigation in the past decades.
Related literature: The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First and
foremost, we conduct the first broad-based empirical analysis on the occurrence of
sovereign debt litigation, an issue that has received considerable attention in economic
research. Many recent theory papers have analyzed creditor holdouts, litigation, and
the legal framework of sovereign restructurings, including Miller and Zhang (2000),
Ghosal and Miller (2003), Weinschelbaum and Wynne (2005), Gai et al. (2004), Haldane
et al. (2005), Bolton and Jeanne (2007), Pitchford and Wright (2007, 2012a), Engelen and
Lambsdorff (2009), Bi et al. (2011), Lanau (2011), and Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2013).
Our paper differs from these contributions in that we use a modeling framework from
law and economics which has proven successful in many fields, but has so far not been
used to study litigation in sovereign debt markets. More importantly, we expand the
empirical literature on creditor litigation, which has been lagging behind theory and
remains scarce. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) summarize the history of sovereign
debt law, Miller and Thomas (2007) analyze the Argentine litigation episode, Alfaro et al.
(2010) and Bradley et al. (2010) test the impact of major court decisions on sovereign bond
prices, while Schumacher et al. (2014) study the consequences of litigation on government
access to capital markets, trade, and delays in crisis resolution.12 We are not aware of any
previous paper that tests under which circumstances litigation is most likely to occur.
Second, we expand the literature on the general economics of litigation (e.g. Lanjouw
and Lerner, 1997; Lerner, 2010). We are among the first to empirically analyze litigation
in the context of financial distress and default. Methodologically, we avoid the “tip of the
iceberg” problem, a central obstacle in the quantitative analysis of litigation (Priest and
Klein, 1984). Researchers on litigation typically only observe cases brought to court, but
not the underlying sample of harmful events, such as the total pool of car accidents. In
contrast, we observe the full sample of sovereign debt restructurings that could potentially
have resulted in legal action by using the data collections by Enderlein et al. (2012), Das
et al. (2012), and Cruces and Trebesch (2013). This allows us to draw unbiased inference
on the decision to litigate.
Third, we add to a literature on international economic disputes involving sovereign
states. Many recent papers have studied trade litigation and related enforcement problems
(e.g. the models by Maggi and Staiger, 2011, 2013; Beshkar, 2013). Unlike in the sovereign
12There are also dozens of legal studies on the implications of individual cases or on the development of
legal doctrine in the field, e.g. Hurlock (1984a,b), Goldman (2000), Wheeler and Attaran (2003), Fisch and
Gentile (2004), Gelpern (2005), Blackman and Mukhi (2010), Broomfield (2010), Waibel (2011), and many
others.
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debt context, however, theory work in this field has been accompanied by a rich body of
empirical papers on the determinants and effects of trade disputes, mostly using WTO
data (e.g. Bown, 2004, 2005a,b; Busch and Reinhardt, 2006; Grinols and Perrelli, 2006;
Davis and Bermeo, 2009). Here we exploit previously unavailable data to add empirical
insights on sovereign debt litigation – an increasingly important type of cross-border
disputes.
2.2 Background and stylized facts
This section describes the legal framework and characteristics of sovereign debt litigation
over the past decades. We summarize insights from the legal literature and present
stylized facts from our new database, which captures the near-universe of lawsuits filed
by institutional investors in the US and the UK in the context of sovereign defaults and
restructurings since 1978 (Schumacher et al., 2014). We focus on the period after 1978,
since this is the year in which the UK implemented the State Immunity Act, which
followed the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976. It was thus only in
the late 1970s that sovereign debt lawsuits became possible in these two countries.
2.2.1 Sovereign immunity and creditor litigation: past and present13
Historically, private creditors had no legal device to force foreign governments to repay
in the event of a default. Unlike corporations, governments cannot be liquidated and
sovereign debt is typically not backed by collateral. In addition, debtor governments
were protected from litigation and asset seizures by the doctrine of “absolute” sovereign
immunity, which states that a government cannot be sued in foreign courts.
Since the 1950s, however, sovereign immunity has eroded and lawsuits against
defaulting governments in foreign jurisdictions have become possible (Weidemaier, 2014).
In the second half of the 1970s, however, both the US and the UK implemented the
above mentioned legislation that allowed private individuals to take foreign governments
to court over commercial disputes. These reforms opened the gate for today’s era of
sovereign debt litigation, which was shaped by four main court decisions.
The first benchmark case on sovereign debt litigation was Allied Bank v. Costa Rica14
in 1982, when a group of banks went to court in the US after refusing to accept a haircut
in Costa Rica’s debt restructuring. The New York court granted a ruling in favor of
Allied and established that Costa Rican government assets could in principle be subject
to attachment in the US. The case significantly weakened the classic debtor defense
of sovereign immunity, as well as further prominent defenses such as the act of state
13This section is largely based on Fisch and Gentile (2004), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), Foster
(2008), Alfaro et al. (2010), Blackman and Mukhi (2010), Waibel (2011), and Weidemaier (2014). Parts are also
taken from Schumacher et al. (2014), who provide a more detailed overview.
14Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516.
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doctrine and the principle of international comity (see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer,
2006).
A second landmark decision was Weltover v. Republic of Argentina15 in 1992, when the
US Supreme Court interpreted the issuance of external sovereign debt as a commercial
activity. This decision was fundamental, since it effectively granted US courts jurisdiction
over sovereign debt issued under US governing law. Three years later, CIBC v. Banco
Central do Brazil16 achieved the first major litigation success by a professional distressed
debt investor. The fund owned by the Dart family acquired USD 1.4 bn of Brazilian debt,
refused to participate in Brazil’s Brady deal of 1992, received a favorable judgment in
court, and then sold the debt again at a substantial profit. The case demonstrated the
possibly large rewards of holdout litigation. It also weakened the so called champerty
defense, which prohibited the purchase of debt with the primary intent of filing a lawsuit.
The demise of champerty set the stage for litigation by distressed debt funds, which
buy debt at depressed prices in the secondary market and then sue for full repayment
in court. Our data show that hedge funds are now the dominant player in this market,
accounting for more than 75% of lawsuits filed since 2000.
Elliott v. Peru17 in 2000 marks a fourth landmark decision in this field of law. The case
is in many ways representative for the past two decades of sovereign litigation, which can
be described as a “hunt for assets”. The main challenge for litigious creditors today is not
to achieve a favorable judgment, but to execute it and to collect assets. This is because
US law only allows attachments on government property that is both located in the United
States and used for commercial purposes.18 In the lawsuit against Peru, Elliott argued that
the pari passu clause forces Peru to pay all creditors on an equal basis, including holdout
creditors who refused to participate in a past restructuring. Based on this strategy, Elliott
succeeded in blocking an interest payment on Peru’s Brady bonds. To avoid a default,
Peru then quickly settled at face value. The same pari passu interpretation has been
invoked in numerous other cases, most notably in 2011 by a subsidiary of Elliott which
eventually led to Argentina’s 2014 default.19 As of early 2015, however, no other plaintiff
has succeeded in blocking interest or principal debt payments on sovereign bonds.20
The challenge of enforcing sovereign debt judgments has led distressed debt funds
to attempt a variety of attachment strategies – including on assets such as government
airplanes, oil tankers, export revenues, or central bank assets and social security funds
in overseas accounts. Many of these seizure attempts are primarily aimed at disrupting
a country’s trade and capital flows, so as to increase the pressure on governments to
negotiate a favorable out of court settlement.
15Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc, 504 U.S. 607.
16CIBC Bank and Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105.
17Elliott Associates L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR192 (Ct. App. of Brussels)
18Similar constraints apply in the UK, France, or Germany (Foster, 2008).
19NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 08 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y.)
20Another recent case based on pari passu, led by Export-Import Bank of China v. Grenada, 13 Civ. 1450
(S.D.N.Y.), was settled in January 2015 before a similar injunction had been made (“Grenada cuts loan deal
with Taiwan”, International Financing Review, 7 January 2015).
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Besides these spillover costs, governments and creditors are also faced with direct
legal fees. While systematic data on the cost of litigation is missing, anecdotal evidence
suggests that they can be very high.21 In the context of the 2006 Iraq restructuring,
which involved large-scale litigation, the government paid reportedly USD 6.5m in fees
to its legal advisor,22 while Greece is said to have paid USD 8.5m for legal counsel in
the context of the 2012 debt restructuring, including for advice against holdouts and
litigation.23 Even higher fees are reported for Argentina, which is estimated to have
paid about USD 400m for its defense.24 On the creditor side, the hedge fund Elliott
claims to have paid “tens of millions of in legal fees” to sue Argentina over the past
12 years,25 initiating “over 900 seizure attempts over Argentine assets”.26 Similarly, the
investment fund FG Hemisphere claims to have spent USD 20m in its legal dispute with
the Democratic Republic of Congo (Brown Rudnick, 2012).
2.2.2 Stylized facts: a puzzling variation across crises
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of sovereign debt litigation 1978-2010, in two ways. First,
by counting the total number of cases pending in each year (left axis).27 This data series
is obviously influenced by individual crises, in particular the large number of cases filed
against Argentina. We therefore also match the litigation cases to the related debt crisis
events and show the share of restructurings affected, i.e. the subset of restructurings
which involved at least one sovereign debt lawsuit (as five year moving average, right
axis). Both ways to cut the data confirm that the prevalence of litigation has strongly
increased since the 1980s.
A further key insight from the data is the large variation across crises, as shown in
Table 2.5. Only 18% of restructuring events since 1978 were affected by litigation. The
majority of crises involve only a single lawsuit, while others are followed by a veritable
‘run to the courthouse’. Argentina faced lawsuits by 41 institutional creditors after its
2001 default, as well as dozens of suits by retail investors (which are not considered
here).28 Other restructurings with large-scale litigation were Peru’s Brady debt exchange,
which triggered 13 lawsuits in the US, as well as Iraq 2006, Liberia 2009 and Congo 2007,
which involved 10, 9 and 7 cases, respectively. Generally, we find that most cases are
21Pitchford and Wright (2012a) provide a detailed overview on the cost of sovereign debt renegotiations,
including legal expenses.
22“Cleary Plays Key Role in Easing Iraq’s Private Debt”, New York Law Journal, 14 April 2006.
23“Greece Discloses Fees Paid to Cleary During Sovereign Debt Crisis”, The American Lawyer Daily, 22
March 2012; “Greece Details Payments to Advisers Used in Debt Restructuring”, Bloomberg Business, 22
March 2012.
24“Buitres: el país gastó en abogados unos USD 400 millones”, La Nacion, 2 November 2014.
25“Last Tango in Buenos Aires”, Times Magazine, 14 August 2014.
26“Argentina and hedge fund NML Capital ratify their commitment to keep fighting”, Mercopress, 6
November 2014.
27We merge multiple suits by the same creditor against the same country into one observation, so that the
data are structured in creditor-debtor conflict pairs.
28Retail investors typically sue for small amounts and are typically not successful in achieving favorable
settlements (or in attaching assets).
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filed against middle-income countries in the emerging market world, albeit a third of all
cases targeted highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs).
What explains the startling variation in litigation across restructuring events? Before
conducting our own analysis below, we review the existing literature in search for
explanations. We find no systematic study on the drivers of sovereign debt litigation, but
various hints:
• A study on sovereign debt litigation by the financial sector groups IIF and EMTA
emphasizes that investors will be likely to agree to a restructuring if the offer
contains “mutually acceptable terms”. Litigation is supposedly least likely in
“cooperative agreements performed in good faith” that are considered as “fair by
the parties involved” (IIF, 2009, p. 3). This suggests that unilateral defaults with
high haircuts may be more prone to litigation. Similarly, engaging in talks with a
representative creditor committee is regarded as helpful to prevent legal disputes.
• In her proposal for an SDRM, Anne Krueger (2002) famously suggests that “the in-
creasingly diverse and diffuse creditor community poses coordination and collective
action problems” in sovereign debt restructurings, including litigation. Restructur-
ings with a large number of diverse creditors could therefore be more affected by
litigation.
• Moreover, in a memorandum to the IMF, Buchheit (1999) explains that litigious
creditors partly select their “target” country based on the following criteria: (i) it
must be easy to purchase and sell the country’s debt on secondary markets, (ii) the
debt must be in default and available at a deep discount, and (iii) the restructuring
must involve debt issued under New York or English law, or in other ways be
potentially subject to jurisdiction in New York or England.
Neither of these propositions, however, has been tested or brought to the data. We
therefore have only limited empirical knowledge on what drives sovereign debt litigation.
The next sections will try to shed new light on the issue.
2.3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses
This section proposes a theoretical framework to structure our empirical analysis. We
start with a standard litigation model as reviewed by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) and
Spier (2007) but apply it to the context of sovereign default and restructurings. The
central trade-off in this framework is that creditors will only start a lawsuit if the expected
value of going to court exceeds the expected value of not doing so.29 More specifically,
29Coase (1960) famously suggested that a conflict between two negotiating parties is most likely to
result in a private settlement instead of a lawsuit in order to avoid the unnecessary costs of a legal battle.
This assertion is reflected in sovereign debt markets as well: Most debt exchange offers achieve creditor
participation of more than 90% (see Das et al., 2012).
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we view a creditor’s decision to file suit as a function of three terms: First, the full
value of the claim in case she wins the case, multiplied by the expected probability of
success. Second, the recovery value that she will be left with if she loses, multiplied by
the expected probability of losing. And third, the costs associated with conducting a trial,
which occur independently from the trial’s outcome. Since the government can influence
this trade-off by setting the terms of the restructuring offer, our model consists of a single
period two-stage game, which we solve by backward induction.
Suppose the government owes debt to external creditors and for some exogenous
reason, e.g. a negative income shock, it decides to fully default or restructure this debt.
This implies an exchange offer on the entire stock of outstanding debt, which is reduced
by a haircut h ∈ [0, 1]. A government has some discretion in its choice of h, but it is also
subject to external pressure, in particular if it has requested official sector bailout money,
which is the case in the vast majority of debt crises (Marchesi, 2003). The IMF and the
Paris Club, for example, can demand a minimum haircut on commercial creditors to
reduce the risk of a future default and to assure fair burden-sharing between the private
and the official sector (Erce, 2013). We thus assume that the overall haircut h has two
components: first, an exogenous part he, which is determined by ability-to-pay constraints
and external pressure. Second, an endogenous component δ ∈ [0, 1− he], which is freely
chosen by the government and can be interpreted as the willingness-to-pay variable. The
lower δ, the more “creditor friendly” the offer, so that the overall haircut is given by
h = he + δ.
The government faces a trade-off when it decides about δ: increasing the haircut
reduces the payment to the creditors who accept the restructuring, but at the same time
induces more investors to litigate by reducing the recovery value. If the government
cannot find a haircut which allows repayment out of its available resources, it will go into
full default, without any repayments to foreign creditors. This outside option implies
that an increase in the creditors’ legal rights can become detrimental if too many choose
to hold out and litigate instead of accepting the offer.
Importantly, we assume that the government cannot discriminate among creditors.
The haircut offer h is identical for all investors. This implies that the universal (one-size-
fits-all) offer can trigger different reactions among heterogeneous creditors.
2.3.1 Creditor decision
The market consists of n creditors, each of which holds an identical claim against the
government equal to d, such that the aggregate debt the government owes is given by
D = nd. Creditors are heterogeneous in the costs they face when going to court. For
instance, highly specialized distressed investors are more experienced in suing debtor
governments and in locating attachable assets and could thus face lower costs of litigating
(rejecting the offer). We therefore denote creditor litigation costs c with a subscript
i, where each ci is a realization of c ∈ [0, c¯]. f (c) and F(c) describe the density and
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cumulative distribution functions of c, respectively. We assume that f ′(c) > 0 in order to
describe a cost distribution with fewer creditors with low costs of litigating than creditors
with high costs. This is in line with the relatively limited number of creditors engaging
in litigation that we observe in the data.30
After receiving the restructuring offer, creditors decide whether to accept or not.
Accepting implies that the debt claim is reduced by the size of the haircut to (1− h)d.
This claim will be paid out for sure. The alternative choice is to reject the offer and go to
court to demand full repayment. This litigation decision is denoted by a binary variable
Li = {0, 1}, where L = 0 if the creditor participates in the restructuring and L = 1 if she
litigates instead.
Litigating is risky, because the full claim will only be recovered with success probabil-
ity p ∈ [0, 1]. The lawsuit will thus fail with probability (1− p), in which case the creditor
receives nothing. As in Spier (2007), we assume that the plaintiff’s probability of winning
p increases in the opportunity cost of the defendant. In the sovereign debt context, one
can think of p as a function of the strength of creditor rights at the time of default lt,
and the government’s cost of facing litigation, denoted as cg, so that p ≡ p(lt, cg), with
∂p
∂lt > 0 and
∂p
∂cg > 0. We assume that both lt and cg are exogenously given. Government
costs will arise due to legal fees but also due to litigation externalities such as the cost of
losing access to international capital markets or due to asset seizures abroad. Changes in
legal doctrine also play a crucial role. As we discuss above, landmark judgments have
strengthened creditor rights since the 1980s, thus pushing up lt.
Creditors maximize profits subject to a budget constraint. Their profits consist of
income from the recovery value of defaulted government debt if they participate in
the restructuring, (1− h)d, and cash savings, si. Creditors will thus invest their full
endowment wi into savings or into expenses for litigation ci, so that:
max
Li
Πi = si + Li(pd) + (1− Li)(1− h)d
s.t. wi = si + Lici
(2.1)
Combining objective and constraint yields Πi = wi + Li(pd − ci) + (1 − Li)(1 − h)d.
Hence, the individual expected value of litigating is pd− ci. Creditor i will only choose
Li = 1 and litigate if this expected value exceeds the return of accepting the exchange
offer, (1− h)d:
pd− ci ≥ (1− h)d (2.2)
Conditional on h and p, there can be a creditor for which eq. (2.2) holds with equality.
This marginal creditor i∗ is indifferent between litigating and accepting the haircut so
30We do not make a specific assumption about the cost distribution in order to keep the analysis general.
However, it is reasonable to think about the distribution of litigation costs as having a small mass of creditors
with low costs, and a relatively large mass with high costs. An example would be a beta distribution with
parameter specification α > β.
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that:
c∗i = (p− (1− h)) d (2.3)
The intuition is that for this marginal creditor, the probability of winning has to exactly
offset the loss from accepting the offer, so that she is indifferent between her two options.
In case c∗i < 0, it is not optimal for any existing creditor to file suit, resulting in full
participation. However, if there is a c∗i ≥ 0 such that eq. (2.3) is fulfilled, there will be a
non-negative share of litigating creditors. This creditor group, with costs smaller than
the marginal creditor i∗, is equal to Prob(ci ≤ c∗i ) = F(c∗i ) ≡ Φ. Put differently, Φ is
the share of creditors that will reject the restructuring offer and litigate instead, while
(1−Φ) = Prob(c∗i ) is the share of creditors that accept the haircut. We denote the density
at the marginal creditor f (c∗i ) as ϕ.
2.3.2 Government decision
The government can choose to offer a debt restructuring with a haircut h and receive
its income less repayments, VR, or go into full default and refuse any payments to its
creditors (this is equivalent to the government’s problem in Bolton and Jeanne, 2007,
2009). Going into full default represents the government’s outside option with value VFD.
If the government chooses this option, creditors receive nothing. The outside option
presents essentially a participation constraint limiting the government’s willingness to
repay more than its available resources (see e.g. Aguiar and Amador, 2013; Sandleris,
2012, for a detailed exposition of such a framework). The government’s payoff is given
by:
V = max{VR,VFD} (2.4)
We normalize VFD = 0 for simplicity, although assuming a different autarky payoff
does not affect the results. If the government chooses to make an exchange offer, it can
anticipate the creditors’ reaction to the haircut h. Moreover, we follow previous work
and assume that a default causes an additional output cost κ, which increases in the
magnitude of the discretionary haircut, κ′(δ) > 0, κ′′(δ) > 0 (a similar assumption is
made e.g. by Calvo, 1988; Bolton and Jeanne, 2007; Bi et al., 2011). This additional output
cost can be thought of as other costs of default considered in the literature, for example
reputational costs, trade sanctions, or damages to the domestic banking system. The
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government’s payoff from offering a restructuring is thus given by:
VR = max
δ
y− D
( ∫ c∗i
0
f (c)p dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repayment to holdouts
−
∫ c∗i
0
f (c)cg dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gov’t cost of litigation
−
∫ c¯
c∗i
f (c)(1− h) dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repayment to participants
)
− κ(δ)
= y− D
(
Φ(p+ cg) + (1−Φ)(1− h)
)
− κ(δ) (2.5)
where y ∈ [yL, yH ] denotes the government’s uncertain exogenous income. The govern-
ment will choose to make a restructuring offer as long as the sum of the second and third
term in (2.5), the expected repayments and additional costs, do not exceed the realized
income. Let y¯ denote the income equal to these costs of a restructuring offer. Then the
probability of full default is given by the probability that y ≤ y¯, which can be written as
pi =
∫ y¯ f (y)dy. An implication of the full default outside option is that a change in the
variables increasing the expected repayments is beneficial for investors only as long as
the government does not go into full default. But an increase in the expected repayments
also increases the probability pi. For instance, stronger legal creditor rights may increase
the probability of successful litigation p, and thus raise expected repayments. However,
this can also lead to a higher pi by making an inorderly full default more attractive than
a debt exchange whose costs could exceed the government’s resources.
Empirically, the latter case is an unlikely situation. In our sample period, all defaulting
countries restructured their debt rather than going into complete autarky. We are therefore
more concerned with predictions about the share of creditors litigating, conditional on a
debt restructuring.
In designing the terms of a debt exchange, the government can anticipate the share of
litigating investors. Maximizing VR with respect to δ yields the first order condition as:
Γ ≡ ∂V
R
∂δ
= D
(
ϕd(1− h− p− cg)− (1−Φ)
)
− κ′(δ) (2.6)
This simple setup helps rationalizing the occurrence of creditor litigation in sovereign
debt restructurings, especially when complemented with insights from the international
finance literature. The comparative statics on Φ from (2.6) lead us to three testable
hypotheses about the share of litigation, which are presented in the next section.31
2.3.3 Hypotheses
First, we expect an increase in p to increase the likelihood of litigation.
H1 : ∂Φ∂p > 0. The higher the creditor probability of winning a lawsuit (or favorable
settlement), the higher the risk of litigation.
As explained above, we think of the probability of winning as a function of the legal
environment lt and the government’s cost of litigation cg. We control for the legal
31See the appendix for a derivation of the comparative statics.
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environment by including variables capturing the effect of the four benchmark decisions
outlined in section 2.2. Our main proxy for cg is the openness of the debtor economy,
which is motivated by the seminal paper by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a). Their model
assumes that creditors can impose legal sanctions on a defaulting country by “seizing” a
portion of its exports and lowering its gains from trade (see also Rose, 2005; Mendoza
and Yue, 2012). In line with this argument, we expect open economies to be particularly
vulnerable to the disruptive effects of debt litigation on trade and capital flows. As
an additional proxy for sovereign litigation costs, we use a measure of legal capacity.
We expect a poor, developing country to be ill-prepared for a protracted legal dispute
in New York or London, and also to be less able to shield its assets from attachment
by experienced distressed investors. This intuition is in line with Davis and Bermeo
(2009), who argue that developing countries face high fixed costs in WTO disputes,
as well as Maggi and Staiger (2013) and Busch and Reinhardt (2003), who find that
poorer countries tend to settle their trade disputes earlier and are also less successful in
extracting concessions. Accordingly, we expect an increase in debtor legal capacity to
lower cg and thereby p, resulting in less litigation.
Second, we focus on those parameters that vary across debt crises, in particular the
haircut and the scope of the restructuring D.
H2 : ∂Φ∂he > 0,
∂Φ
∂D > 0. Higher exogenous haircuts and larger restructurings increase
the risk of litigation.
It is intuitive that a higher haircut increases the incentives to reject an exchange offer
and litigate for full repayment, i.e. for 100% of face value. The higher the haircut, the
lower the break-even cost of going to court. A similar rationale applies when investors
buy defaulted debt on the secondary market, because the wedge between face value and
market value of traded debt is likely to increase in the (expected) haircut on that debt.
In line with Bi et al. (2011), we therefore expect a higher haircut to increase litigation
occurrence. Since the endogenous haircut is the choice variable of the government, in
the empirical analysis we will allow haircuts to be both exogenously and endogenously
determined.
Furthermore, we expect larger debt restructurings to be more affected by litigation.
One reason is that larger restructurings typically affect a larger number of creditors.32
More creditors make coordination more difficult and increase the probability that at least
some creditors hold out and litigate. This simple rationale is consistent with the model of
Pitchford and Wright (2012a,b), which predicts that a higher number of creditors results
in longer delay in sovereign debt renegotiation. Another potential reason why larger
deals involve more litigation are economies of scale. To see this, recall that we have
assumed a fixed cost of litigation for creditors, meaning that ci is independent of the size
32Trebesch (2010) codes the number of creditors for a sample of 90 sovereign bank debt exchanges in the
“London Club” era, i.e. between 1980 and 1997. He finds a close relationship between deal size (amount
restructured in USD) and the number of banks affected by the exchange (the correlation coefficient is 0.46).
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of debt involved. A larger D will then translate into a higher share of litigating creditors
because the ratio of cost to potential return (full repayment of d) decreases.
Third, we expect litigation to decrease in c¯.
H3 : ∂Φ∂c¯ < 0. Higher legal costs for creditors decrease the risk of litigation.
To account for this, it is useful to think of ci as the opportunity costs of holding out.
When credit is cheap for all investors (and the distribution of creditor costs bound by a
low c¯), it is less costly to buy and hold non-performing debt for litigious purposes. In
contrast, holdout litigation is a costly activity in times of high borrowing cost (high c¯),
such as the high-yield period of the 1980s.
In the next section, we bring these theoretical predictions to the data.
2.4 Empirical approach and results
2.4.1 Estimation strategy and data
Empirically, we do not observe the marginal creditor’s cost c∗i . However, we do observe
the actual occurrence of litigation in debt restructurings, Y. For this purpose, we use
the full list of sovereign restructuring events between 1978 and 2010 from Cruces and
Trebesch (2013), and match it with our dataset on litigation events, accounting for lawsuits
filed either before or after the respective debt exchange. This leaves us with a cross-section
of 174 restructuring events, of which 31 involved creditor litigation.33
As a baseline we estimate the probability of a restructuring being affected by legal
disputes. Put differently, we are looking for debt crises in which c∗i ≥ 0, so that the
marginal creditor’s cost of litigation is within the bounds of c (non-negative), resulting in
at least one lawsuit. Translated into a standard latent variable model, this implies that
Y =
1 if c∗i ≥ 00 if c∗i < 0 (2.7)
where Y switches from 0 to 1 if one or more creditors file suit in London or New
33The original dataset by Cruces and Trebesch (2013) listed 180 debt exchanges. We use their recently
updated version, which includes four previously omitted cases (Congo 1988, Mozambique 2007, Nicaragua
2007 and Liberia 2009,) and drops two deals which turned out to not have been implemented (Mozambique
1987 and Cameroon 2002). Note also that a few countries saw two debt restructurings in the same year. In
case the court documents do not allows us to uniquely match a litigation case to one of the two events, we
merge them into one observation per country and year. This yields a final sample of 174 cases.
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York. We thus estimate the following reduced-form model:
Prob(Y = 1|X) = (2.8)
Φ
(
β1Landmark Judgments︸ ︷︷ ︸
Legal Environment
+ β2Trade Openness+ β3Legal Capacity︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debtor Costs
+ β4Haircut+ β5Debt Amount+ β6Bond Exchange︸ ︷︷ ︸
Restructuring Characteristics
+ β7Borrowing Costs︸ ︷︷ ︸
Creditor Costs
+ β8GDP per capita+ β9Sec. Market+ β10Share US/UK debt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Controls
)
In our main model we use a dummy on litigation occurrence as dependent variable,
because this approach is least likely to suffer from measurement error. However, we also
propose two alternative approaches. First, we show results of a count model that uses the
number of lawsuits filed as dependent variable. For this purpose, we assume Y to follow
a mixed Poisson-gamma (negative binomial) distribution, since the number of cases per
debt crisis is naturally restricted to positive integers (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986).34 In
addition, we compute the debt under litigation as a share of total restructured debt (in
%) and use this “share litigated” as our dependent variable. Specifically, we estimate a
generalized linear model with a probit link function, a method best suited for fractional
dependent variables that vary between 0 and 1. Unfortunately, the data on the number
of litigating creditors and on litigation amounts are noisy, so that the results from these
two alternative models should be taken with care.35
Methodologically, a further important step is to account for the possibility that haircut
size is endogenous in our model. We do so by instrumenting the haircut measure with
the country’s debt/GDP ratio in the year prior to the restructuring. With a view to
our model, debt/GDP can be thought of as an ability-to-pay variable that exogenously
determines a part of the government’s offered haircut. More formally, our exclusion
restriction is that the level of indebtedness will only affect creditor litigation through its
effect on haircut size (after controlling for the amount restructured, and per capita GDP).
As we confirm below, we find that the debt/GDP ratio is an important determinant of
haircut size, but not significantly correlated with litigation occurrence.
The ordering of the explanatory variables follows our theoretical discussion above.
As before, we start with proxies for p, the creditor’s expected probability of winning,
in particular measures for the legal environment and the cost of litigation for debtor
countries. To account for changes in legal doctrine, we follow a similar approach
34We consider likelihood ratio tests, AIC statistics, and Vuong test results for model selection between the
negative binomial model, the Poisson model, and variants accommodating zero-inflation.
35We do not have information on amounts for 24% of the lawsuits, resulting in a downward bias in this
measure. Also, the number of lawsuits can be biased upwards or downwards. Multiple creditors can unite
behind one lawsuit (e.g. Allied v. Costa Rica), while in other cases the same creditors can file multiple actions
under different names and we cannot always identify these instances.
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as Bradley et al. (2010) and use time dummies on particularly important landmark
judgments and their aftermath. The first dummy captures the period after the first
significant sovereign litigation case Allied Bank v. Costa Rica, and takes the value 1 for
each year between 1985 and 1991. The second indicator captures the time after Weltover
v. Argentina (1992-1994), a decision that paved the way for US-based creditor litigation.
The third dummy covers 1995-1999, the period after CIBC v. Brazil, which was the first
major “vulture” success against a defaulting sovereign. Finally, we include a dummy
for the year 2000 onwards, when Elliott v. Peru set a precedent on how judgments could
actually be enforced. Our reference category is the time pre-1985, which means that we
expect the coefficient of each dummy to be positive. To proxy for debtor litigation cost,
we include measures of trade openness, in particular (Imports+Exports)/GDP, for which
we use data from the World Bank and the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. In addition,
we measure financial openness based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and compute
(Foreign Assets+Foreign Liabilities)/GDP. With a view to the above, we expect more open
economies to be more prone to litigation. The same is true for those debtor countries
with a weak bureaucratic and legal capacity. To proxy for legal capacity, we draw on a
standard measure from the World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010),
because there is no cross-country measure of actual legal capacity. Specifically, we use the
“Government Effectiveness” subindicator, which captures the sophistication of a country’s
public administration and its institutional and bureaucratic effectiveness.36
The second set of explanatory variables vary across debt restructurings, in particular
proxies for h and D. We rely on the data on haircuts (creditor losses) and restructuring
amounts as coded by Cruces and Trebesch (2013) for all deals since the 1970s. In
our benchmark regressions, we use the present value (PV) haircut estimates where
h = 1− PVnewPVold , but the results are very similar when using haircuts in face value terms
(reduction in principal). The amount of debt restructured is computed in real 2005 USD.
In line with the arguments outlined above, we expect larger restructurings and those with
higher haircuts to trigger more litigation. Figure 2.2 provides preliminary indication that
this is indeed the case. For completeness, we also include a dummy indicating whether
the restructuring involved sovereign bonds, as opposed to deals that only involved bank
debt. In line with the literature on creditor coordination problems, we expect bond
exchanges to affect a more dispersed creditor population, resulting in more holdouts.
Third, we introduce a proxy for creditor litigation costs. We use Barclays’ US Corpo-
rate High Yield Bond Index, a measure of corporate borrowing costs which goes back to
the late 1970s. Since higher borrowing costs decrease the returns to litigation, we expect
a negative relationship between this yield index and the probability of lawsuits.
Finally, we aim to account for additional heterogeneity across countries and default
cases. First, we include per capita GDP in 1980.37 Second, we construct a dummy variable
36For reasons of data availability and to reduce potential endogeneity, we use average government
effectiveness over the entire sample period.
37We use beginning-of-sample values instead of time-varying GDP data in order to avoid endogenous
31
for the presence of secondary market debt trading. It takes the value 1 if a country’s
sovereign bonds or loans are actively traded on secondary markets.38 However, the
role of secondary markets trading in our context is not straightforward. Buchheit (1999)
argues that liquid secondary markets make it easier for specialized investors to buy
defaulted bonds and then litigate for full repayment. In contrast, Pitchford and Wright
(2010) show that the effects of secondary markets on debt renegotiation are ambiguous.
The impact of secondary market trading is therefore an empirical question. As a last
control, we account for the legal characteristics of a country’s sovereign debt portfolio, by
measuring the share of outstanding external debt that was issued under either US/New
York or English law. We construct this measure from Dealogic whenever possible, using
the information on the legal characteristics of more than 20,000 sovereign bonds and
loans issued in international primary markets.39 In line with Buchheit (1999), we expect
a higher ratio of US or English law debt to increase the probability of litigation in US
and UK courts. Table 2.1 provides an overview of all variables used in the analysis, their
sources, as well as their respective summary statistics.
2.4.2 Main results
Table 2.2 reports our main results, displayed as average marginal effects. All main
explanatory variables have the expected sign. Landmark judgments are clearly significant,
with a large quantitative effect on the propensity of litigation (column 1). This finding is
consistent with our theoretical prediction that a higher creditor probability of winning
results in more lawsuits. The erosion of sovereign immunity since the early 1980s was
an important precondition for the strong increase in litigation which we observe in
the data. Our other proxies of creditors’ winning probability are economic openness
and government legal capacity. As shown in column (2) both variables are significant
and have the expected sign. The more open the country and the weaker its legal and
administrative capacity, the more likely a restructuring will be accompanied by litigation.
Next, we show results for the role of restructuring characteristics, in particular the
amount restructured and haircut size (column 3). Both are positively correlated with
the probability of litigation. This is consistent with our own theoretical argument
above, as well as with the models by Pitchford and Wright (2012a,b) and Bi et al. (2011).
Surprisingly, however, we do not find a statistically significant coefficient for the bond
effects of debt crises on GDP. The results, however, are robust to using yearly lags of GDP per capita.
38For the 1990s and 2000s we check whether a country’s bonds are included in the JP Morgan Emerging
Market Bond Index, which was launched in 1993 and only includes debt instruments that meet a range
of liquidity conditions. For the late 1980s and early 1990s we account for secondary market trading of
sovereign loans using data by Sawada (2001). The data show that during the 1980s only 15% of the countries
in our sample had a liquid debt market. This number rises to over 40% for restructurings during the 1990s
and 2000s.
39Specifically, we use the sample average share of sovereign bonds issued under US or UK law relative
to the total amount of externally issued bonds. For countries with missing observations, we use data on
governing laws of corporate bonds. Finally, for the subset of countries for which we do not have any data,
we interpolate the variable from countries with the same legal origins according to Glaeser and Shleifer
(2002).
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restructuring dummy. Corporate borrowing costs, on the other hand, have a significant
negative correlation with litigation (column 4), although this finding is not robust to all
changes in model specifications that we attempt later on.
Column (5) shows our full model including all main explanatory variables and
additional country-specific factors. As expected, we find countries with a higher share of
debt issuances under US or UK governing law to be more likely to be sued in New York
or London, but we do not find a significant effect of secondary market trading or GDP
per capita. Arguably, the most notable insight from our full model is that the dummies
on landmark judgments are now clearly insignificant, both individually and as a group,
as confirmed by a standard Wald test for joint significance. Taken at face value, this result
suggests that the legal environment is only a weak predictor of creditor litigation during
debt crises. However, we are fully aware that our approach to capture legal doctrine is
imperfect. What we can say with some confidence is that it does not suffice to account
for legal factors only. Instead, we find that economic fundamentals and restructuring
characteristics are surprisingly powerful predictors of litigation occurrence.
In terms of effect size, the variables on trade openness, haircuts, and restructuring
volume seem to be particularly relevant. To see this, we refer to the marginal effect
estimates in column (6), which shows how a one standard deviation increase in each of
the variables (around their sample mean) changes the predicted probability of litigation,
while holding all other variables constant at mean values. A one standard deviation
increase in haircut size around the sample mean of 38% (from 24% to 52%) is associated
with an increase in the probability of litigation of 7 percentage points, i.e. from 7 to 14%.
Similarly, we find that an increase in deal size by one standard deviation increases the
probability of litigation by 12 percentage points, while increasing the trade to GDP ratio
from 45% to 83% raises the litigation probability by 5 percentage points.
The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar when using our alternative
dependent variables and estimation techniques. This is evident in columns (7) and (8),
which use the number of lawsuits filed and the amount under litigation (in % of total
restructured debt), respectively. One notable change is that the coefficient for bond
restructurings turns significant, suggesting that a more dispersed group of creditors
increases case numbers and the amount under dispute. In addition, we now find the
dummy for secondary market trading to be significant, although with a negative sign.
There are considerable time trends in our explanatory variables through the sample
period. The predicted probability of litigation at the sample means for all variables is
9.7%. However, this value disguises significant changes over time. For example, global
average trade openness has increased from 38% during the average 1980s to 52% since
2000. Using the 1980s trade openness value and keeping all other variables constant
at their sample mea), the predicted probability of litigation is 6.6%. Using the average
2000s trade openness value, on the other hand, results in a predicted litigation risk
of 8.2%. This means that the change in global trade openness over the sample period
corresponds to a two-percentage point increase in the estimated risk of litigation. Similar
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to the developments in trade openness, there has been an upward trend in haircuts.
The average haircut size has increased from 26% in the 1980s to 62% in recent years.
Comparing the predicted probability at these two values implies a 10 percentage point
increase in the predicted probability of litigation (from 7.0% to 16.7%, again keeping
the other variables at their sample mean). Finally, borrowing rates for high-yield debt
have dropped from an average of about 15% during the 1980s to less than 10% in the
2000s. According to our baseline estimates, this drop in borrowing costs is associated
with a 13 percentage point increase in the predicted risk of litigation (from 6% to 19%).
Considering these three variables together, the predicted probability of litigation at the
average 1980s values amounted to only 3%, compared to 27% at the average 2000s values.
Importantly, however, we find that time trends do not appear to drive our main find-
ings. Column (3) of Table 2.3 shows that the estimates are stable in a post-2000 sample, i.e.
after the landmark Elliott judgment and during the ‘modern’ era of sovereign borrowing,
featuring bond debt and increasing secondary market trading. The findings are also
similar in the pre-2000 sample and when including decade fixed effects. We therefore
conclude that the results discussed above are not spurious, and that our empirical model
is robust to changes in market structure or global economic developments.
2.4.3 Performance as “Early Warning System”
How does the model perform as an early warning tool of creditor litigation? As a
first assessment, we can apply the customary binary classification rule with a predicted
probability threshold of 0.5. This shows that our benchmark model of column (5) in
Table 2.2 correctly predicts litigation occurrence in 88% of restructuring events since the
1970s. However, litigation is a rare event, with an unconditional probability of just 18%
(base rate=82%), so that the 88% number masks the true model performance. Moreover,
it is not clear a priori, whether the 0.5 threshold is appropriate for the data at hand: we
face the classic trade-off between maximizing the sensitivity of the model (by trying to
correctly predict each observed litigation case) or maximizing the model’s specificity (by
avoiding false positives, i.e. litigation predictions when it did in fact not occur).
A more objective evaluation tool is to estimate a receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve, which does not require choosing an (arbitrary) classification probability
cut-off, as illustrated for financial crisis prediction in Schularick and Taylor (2012). The
ROC curve plots the true positive rate against the false positive rate for all possible
probability cut-offs between 0 and 1. The area under the curve (AUROC) can thus be
interpreted as a generalized measure of model performance. An AUC value of 0.5 means
that the model does not perform any better than tossing a coin for prediction (45-degree
line), while a value of 1 indicates perfect classification. Thus, intuitively, the ROC curve
illustrates how well the model predicts the outcome of interest compared to a random
classification.
Figure 2.3 shows the ROC curve for our full benchmark model. The AUROC is
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0.86 and it outperforms the benchmark coin-toss model at the 1% significance level.
The AUROC is also notably higher than in any of the crisis prediction classifications
in Schularick and Taylor (2012), who explain that values above 0.75 can be regarded as
high, e.g. in medical trials. The second ROC curve shown is based on column (1) and
includes only the legal era variables, i.e. the court decision time dummies, to account
for the rising trend in litigation. The legal-only model also does well, with an AUROC
statistic of 0.77, but our full model has a statistically significantly higher AUROC value.
We thus conclude that our main specification with legal and economic variables performs
reasonably well in explaining litigation events across the debt crises of the past decades.
2.4.4 Robustness
In Table 2.3 we conduct a series of robustness checks. For this purpose, we depart from
our most conservative specification (column 5 of Table 2.2), which is the model that also
shows the highest log likelihood. Overall, our main results remain stable.
Column (1) replaces trade openness with financial openness, which also turns out to
be a statistically and economically significant predictor of litigation. Column (2) includes
an indicator that captures whether the debt renegotiations were coordinated with a
recognized creditor committee, as during most exchanges in the “London Club” era (data
on creditor committees is taken from Trebesch (2010) and Das et al. (2012)). This dummy
does not have a significant correlation with litigation risk and including it does not affect
the results in any meaningful way.
The results also hold if we exclude the main outlier cases, in particular Argentina
2005 (column 4), or additionally Brazil 1994 and Peru 1997, which together account
for more than two-thirds of the restructured debt in our sample period alone (column
5). Likewise, we find all main results to be stable when controlling for regional effects,
i.e. dummies for Latin American and African countries, which are the two continents
with most sovereign debt litigation cases (column 6). In column (7) we exclude cases of
strictly pre-emptive restructurings based on a new dataset by Asonuma and Trebesch
(2014). Strictly pre-emptive deals are those in which no payments are missed during
the restructuring process. The results remain stable when dropping these non-default
cases. The same is true when we consider the forum where litigation takes place. Of the
121 lawsuits in our sample, 104 were filed in the US, 14 in the UK, and 3 were brought
to international arbitration tribunals. Column (8) presents results when restricting the
sample only to lawsuits filed in US courts. While the marginal effect on the government
effectiveness variable is no longer significant, the effect direction does not change and its
size remains at a considerable level.
The effect of our main variables could change in the size of the debt restructuring,
in particular if there is a fixed cost of litigation. In case of fixed costs for the sovereign,
small countries would be more affected by litigation given the smaller size of their debt.
This could make them more likely to settle lawsuits at favorable terms, resulting in more
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creditor lawsuits. In contrast, fixed costs for the creditors would imply that larger debt
restructurings are more likely to be affected by legal action, since creditors can leverage
their legal cost by buying larger volumes of debt. In either of these cases, the effect of
our variables would change depending on the volume of debt restructured.40
We therefore interact our main variables of interest with the deal size (restructuring
amounts). Because the estimated coefficients in non-linear interaction models cannot be
meaningfully interpreted (Greene, 2010), we display our results in form of Figure 4. The
underlying regression results are shown in the appendix.
Regarding debtor country variables, i.e. our proxies for the vulnerability to litiga-
tion like trade openness and government effectiveness, we find little or no interaction
effects. The marginal effect of these measures does not change importantly in the size of
restructurings. The same is true for the bond restructuring indicator. However, when
focusing on the creditor side, restructuring amounts show significant interaction effects.
We find that haircut size is insignificant for small debt restructurings (less than USD
200m) but matters importantly in large ones, with a strongly increasing marginal effect.
For large debt exchanges of more than USD 3bn, a one standard deviation increase in
haircuts is associated with a more than 16 percentage points increase in the predicted
risk of litigation (from 13 to 29%). Similarly, we find that the marginal effect of higher
corporate borrowing costs changes from almost zero for small debt restructurings, to
more than -2.5 for debt restructurings exceeding USD 1bn. We interpret this as evidence
that in larger deals, litigating creditors are more sensitive to their costs and losses.
Finally, we account for endogeneity of the haircut. In line with our theoretical frame-
work, haircuts could be partly endogenous, because governments anticipate creditors to
file suit when facing high losses. This would result in a downward bias in the estimated
haircut coefficient, since our main result is based on a sample of debt restructurings with
high haircuts that were imposed despite the threat of creditor litigation. Table 2.4 shows
results when running instrumental variable regressions using the lagged debt/GDP
ratio as an instrument for haircut size, for both probit and linear probability models in
the second stage. The results indicate that our baseline haircut coefficients are indeed
downward biased. The average marginal effect of haircut size is about twice as large
compared to our benchmark model. The instrument performs well with respect to
standard specification statistics. We are able to reject the null of a weak instrument,
which further increases our confidence in the regression results.41
40We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
41We also considered using IMF programs at the time of restructuring as an instrument, to capture the
effect of IMF pressure on haircut size. The instrument performed very weakly, which is why we do not
show the results. However, including both the debt/GDP ratio and the IMF indicator as instruments allows
testing the exclusion restriction. Based on the resulting Hansen’s J statistic, we could not reject the null of
valid instruments, which supports our choice of the debt/GDP ratio as an instrument for haircuts.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies a prominent type of creditor coordination problems in the context
of sovereign debt defaults: holdout litigation. We find that litigation against defaulting
sovereigns can be explained reasonably well within a simple framework from the law
and economics literature. Similar to other fields of law, sovereign debt lawsuits are more
likely (i) when the damage is large, i.e. in case of high haircuts and larger restructuring
amounts, (ii) when litigation costs are low for the plaintiffs, i.e. when borrowing costs
are low, and (iii) when the defendant is vulnerable, e.g. when the defaulting country has
a high degree of financial and trade openness. These insights may be relevant for the
ongoing reform debate on sovereign debt and default, for theory work in international
finance, and for scholars working on litigation in other fields.
Looking forward, our findings suggest that creditor litigation will remain relevant and
potentially increase further. Most debtor countries are open economies, which facilitates
attachments and increases the chance of creditors to achieve a favorable settlement.
Borrowing costs continue to be low, which means that holding out is relatively cheap.
Moreover, we are witnessing an increase in government indebtedness worldwide, which
makes it likely that future debt restructurings may involve large debt amounts and also
result in high haircuts, thus raising the probability of creditor litigation. Besides these
economic trends, recent litigation successes against Argentina and Ireland have arguably
strengthened creditor rights further, and may thus encourage more distressed debt funds
to hold out and litigate in future debt exchanges (see Buchheit et al., 2013b). At the same
time, the issuance of debt under New York and English law could become an increasingly
relevant commitment device for sovereigns, since defaults on these types of bonds can
have costly legal consequences. This has already happened in Greece, which issued its
new bonds under English law to signal its willingness to pay (Gulati and Zettelmeyer,
2012).
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Figures
Figure 2.1: The rise of creditor litigation
The bars show the number of outstanding creditor lawsuits against sovereigns in US and UK courts for
each year between 1978 and 2010 (pending cases, left axis). The orange line represents the share of debt
restructurings per year which saw at least one creditor filing a lawsuit (5-year moving average, right axis).
The figure shows a strong increase in case numbers and litigation risk over the past decades.
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Figure 2.2: The role of deal sizes and haircuts
The figure shows restructurings with and without litigation in the full sample 1978-2010, where red colored
deals are those involving at least one creditor lawsuit. The bubble size reflects the volume of restructured
debt in real USD (indexed to 2005), while the vertical axis shows the size of haircuts, based on the preferred
estimates by Cruces and Trebesch (2013). The figure suggests that recent restructurings were more often
affected by litigation, especially those with high haircuts and large debt amounts (high creditor numbers).
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Figure 2.3: ROC curves of model performance
This figure shows estimated ROC curves based on the models of column (1) (legal only) and (6) (full model)
from Table 2.2. The horizontal axis shows the false positive rate, i.e. the probability of diagnosing litigation if
there is none, against the true positive rate (vertical axis) for all possible probability cut-off levels. Intuitively,
the curve illustrates how well the model performs as a predictor tool compared to a random classification
model (“coin toss”, represented by the 45-degree line). A curve closer to the upper left corner indicates
better model fit, which will also be captured by the area under the ROC curve (AUROC) statistic. This
ranges from 0.5 for a coin toss model to a value of 1 for a model with perfect classification.
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Figure 2.4: Interactions of main variables with debt volume
This figure shows the average marginal effects of the main variables from interactions with the restructured
debt volume (in logs). The dark grey line represents the marginal effect, and the light grey lines mark the
95% confidence interval around the estimate. The red vertical lines mark the median deal size (USD 1bn).
Note that the marginal effect is a non-linear function of the other variables in the model.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Variable definition, sources, and summary statistics
Variable Definition Source Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Litigation Dummy (1 if at least one investor filed suit) This dataset 0.18 0.38 0 1 174
Litigation (sum of cases) Number of filed cases in connection with restructuring This dataset 0.70 3.47 0 41 174
Litigation (share of restruc-
tured debt)
Ratio of principal in litigation to total restructured debt This dataset 0.01 0.03 0 0.22 172
Openness to trade Exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP World Bank WDI, IMF Direction of
Trade Statistics
0.64 0.38 0.09 2.8 174
Government effectiveness “Government Effectiveness” index measuring multiple
dimensions of bureaucratic and legal capacity
World Bank Governance Indicators,
Kaufmann et al. (2010)
-0.36 0.64 -1.78 1.2 174
Haircut (PV) Creditor losses in the restructuring in percent, com-
puted in present value terms (following Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer (2008))
Cruces and Trebesch (2013) 0.38 0.28 -0.10 0.97 174
Debt restructured (log) Log of amount of dollars restructured (in 2005 USD) Cruces and Trebesch (2013) 0.08 2.04 -4.39 4.52 174
Bond restructuring Dummy (1 for restructurings of sovereign bonds) Cruces and Trebesch (2013) 0.10 0.30 0 1 174
Corporate high yield Average yield of Baa rated corporate bonds in the US Barclays / Lehman Brothers 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.18 174
GDP per capita (log) Log of 1980 GDP per capita United Nations National Accounts 7.54 1.20 4.22 10.58 174
Secondary market Dummy (1 if a liquid secondary market for debt existed) JP Morgan EMBI; Sawada (2001) (for
1980s)
0.28 0.45 0 1 174
US, UK/Total external debt External debt issued under US or UK law as percentage
of total external debt
Dealogic Bondware 0.45 0.31 0 1 174
Financial openness Assets plus liabilities as a percentage of GDP Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 1.45 1.24 0.18 9.96 162
Creditor Committee Dummy (1 if the debt renegotiations were conducted by
a recognized creditor committe of banks and/or bond-
holders)
Trebesch (2010); Das et al. (2012) 0.93 0.25 0 1 173
Debt/GDP (Log, Lag) Gross general government debt scaled to nominal GDP Abbas et al. (2010) -0.3 0.61 -1.77 2.06 154
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Table 2.2: Main results: Creditor litigation in sovereign debt restructurings 1978–2010
Columns (1) to (5) show average marginal effects, derived from a probit estimation using a dummy for the occurrence of litigation as the dependent variable. The sample includes all
sovereign debt restructuring events between 1978 and 2010. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Column 6 (“Prob. Change”)
displays changes in the probability of observing litigation based on the full model, obtained by calculating Φ([X¯expl + 12σXexpl ]βexpl + X¯
′
ctrlfictrl)−Φ([X¯expl − 12σXexpl ]βexpl + x¯′ctrlfictrl),
where X¯expl denotes the mean of the variable of interest, σXexpl its standard deviation, and X¯ctrl is a vector capturing all the other variables included in the regression. Column 7 (“Count
Model”) reports coefficients from a negative binomial model estimating the number of creditors litigating. This model is estimated in a log-level form, so that a one-unit increase in the
independent variable is related to a (100× β)% change in the number of litigation cases, counted as the number of creditors filing suit before or after the debt exchange. The last column
(“Share litigated”) uses the share of litigated debt to total restructured debt (in %) as the dependent variable. This is estimated by a generalized linear model with a probit link function.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Legal Con-
trols only
Probability of
Success
With Restruct.
Charact.
Creditor Cost Full Model w/
Controls
Prob.
Change
Count Model Share Liti-
gated
Post Allied (’85-’91) 0.027 -0.042 -0.040 -1.627 -0.005
(0.095) 0.094) (1.066) (0.007)
Post Weltover (’92-’94) 0.297*** 0.072 0.022 -1.381 -0.012
(0.092) 0.134) (1.088) (0.010)
Post CIBC (’95-’99) 0.257*** -0.003 -0.003 -1.353 -0.010
(0.095) 0.136) (1.044) (0.010)
Post Elliott (’00-’10) 0.312*** 0.000 0.000 -1.629 -0.017**
(0.093) 0.142) (1.087) (0.008)
Openness to trade 0.163** 0.136** 0.051 0.864*** 0.010***
(0.066) 0.057) (0.294) (0.003)
Gov. effectiveness -0.085** -0.101*** -0.063 -0.949*** -0.003
(0.041) 0.039) (0.334) (0.003)
Haircut (PV) 0.478*** 0.248** 0.068 3.748*** 0.038***
0.087) 0.119) (1.161) (0.009)
Debt restruct. (log) 0.034** 0.062*** 0.125 0.847*** 0.003*
0.014) 0.015) (0.175) (0.001)
Bond restructuring 0.119 0.022 0.023 0.871* 0.014**
0.083) 0.098) (0.496) (0.006)
Corporate high yield -4.433*** -2.493* -0.071 -28.630*** -0.216**
(0.862) 1.386) (9.921) (0.107)
GDP per capita (log) -0.007 -0.008 -0.027 0.004**
0.027) (0.222) (0.002)
Secondary market -0.099 -0.083 -0.975** -0.017***
0.070) (0.454) (0.006)
US, UK/Total ext. debt 0.256*** 0.079 2.728*** 0.025***
0.078) (0.769) (0.008)
Constant -0.657
(2.677)
AUROC 0.772 0.643 0.780 0.758 0.863
s.e. 0.045 0.057 0.047 0.047 0.036
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.06 0.17 0.14 0.33 0.28 0.28
Log Likelihood -67.07 -76.89 -67.58 -69.80 -55.03 -104.68 -5.04
Obs 174 174 174 174 174 174 172
Chi2 32.61 8.67 24.77 26.32 95.66 183.63 107.89
p>Chi2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Significance levels indicated by ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.3: Robustness checks
This table shows results from variations of the benchmark model in Table 2.2, expressed as average marginal effects. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on country are
reported in parentheses. The first two columns add variables to the benchmark model, in particular the degree of financial openness (Foreign Assets+Liabilities/GDP) and the existence
of a negotiating creditor committee. Column (3) restricts the sample to debt restructurings which took place in the 2000s. Column (4) excludes the Argentina 2005 restructuring, and
column (5) excludes the Argentina 2005, Brazil 1994, and Peru 1997 restructurings. Column (6) excludes pre-emptive restructurings without a payment default based on the classification
by Asonuma and Trebesch (2014). Column (7) includes regional controls for Africa and Latin America. Column (8) considers only the 104 lawsuits filed in US courts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Financial
openness
With creditor
committee
Post-2000 (af-
ter Elliott)
Exclude ARG Exclude ARG,
BRA, PER
Exclude pre-
emptive deals
Region fixed
effects
US lawsuits
only
Post Allied (’85-’91) -0.048 -0.079 -0.035 -0.042 -0.109 -0.024 -0.124
(0.099) (0.092) (0.093) (0.094) (0.102) (0.097) (0.086)
Post Weltover (’92-’94) 0.100 0.050 0.093 0.073 -0.015 0.102 -0.047
(0.141) (0.124) (0.131) (0.134) (0.150) (0.124) (0.121)
Post CIBC (’95-’99) 0.040 -0.001 0.023 -0.002 -0.111 0.025 -0.137
(0.142) (0.122) (0.134) (0.136) (0.147) (0.126) (0.125)
Post Elliott (’00-’10) 0.031 -0.027 0.028 0.001 -0.047 0.026 -0.110
(0.151) (0.129) (0.140) (0.141) (0.153) (0.133) (0.136)
Gov. effectiveness -0.097** -0.078** -0.329* -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.098** -0.142*** -0.049
(0.041) (0.034) (0.199) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.054) (0.034)
Openness to trade 0.120** 0.107 0.135** 0.136** 0.129** 0.112** 0.102**
(0.052) (0.256) (0.056) (0.057) (0.062) (0.053) (0.040)
Haircut (PV) 0.217* 0.316*** 0.727* 0.220* 0.248** 0.276** 0.233** 0.247**
(0.123) (0.105) (0.427) (0.125) (0.119) (0.139) (0.117) (0.121)
Debt restruct. (log) 0.054*** 0.065*** 0.142** 0.059*** 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.053***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.059) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Bond restructuring 0.003 0.191 0.002 0.022 -0.058 0.017 -0.000
(0.095) (0.238) (0.103) (0.098) (0.104) (0.092) (0.082)
Corporate high yield -2.436 -2.416* -12.322* -2.235 -2.495* -3.286** -2.403* -3.067**
(1.526) (1.358) (6.369) (1.370) (1.387) (1.471) (1.331) (1.269)
GDP per capita (log) -0.008 0.017 0.051 -0.008 -0.007 -0.001 -0.014 0.008
(0.027) (0.020) (0.072) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.022)
Secondary market -0.091 -0.121* -0.652* -0.095 -0.100 -0.023 -0.112 -0.043
(0.072) (0.063) (0.333) (0.072) (0.070) (0.071) (0.069) (0.060)
US, UK/Total ext. debt 0.217** 0.277*** 1.196*** 0.255*** 0.256*** 0.236*** 0.185** 0.226***
(0.086) (0.077) (0.397) (0.077) (0.078) (0.080) (0.094) (0.069)
Financial openness 0.045**
(0.018)
Creditor committee -0.100
(0.087)
Region fixed effects Yes
AUROC 0.859 0.882 0.832 0.864 0.863 0.852 0.873 0.840
s.e. 0.036 0.034 0.042 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.035 0.044
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.37 0.51 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.34
Log Likelihood -53.37 -50.38 -7.93 -54.72 -55.04 -48.99 -53.10 -44.99
Obs 162 173 24 173 174 152 174 174
Chi2 71.87 78.03 26.21 80.64 95.89 89.65 85.09 48.24
p>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Significance levels indicated by ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
50
Table 2.4: Instrumental variable regressions
The table shows instrumental variable (IV) regression results using ln(debt/GDP) as an instrument for haircut
size. The first column shows the first stage regression on the determinants of haircuts. The second and third
column show second-stage results on litigation occurrence using an OLS and probit model, respectively. The
sample size is somewhat smaller due to the lack of data on debt/GDP for some countries during the 1980s
and early 1990s, but all our main results above hold in this subsample as well. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors clustered on country are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3)
Instrument: Debt/GDP
1st stage: 2nd stage:
Haircut OLS Probit
Post Allied (’85-’91) 0.111*** -0.153 -0.115
(0.034) (0.096) (0.106)
Post Weltover (’92-’94) 0.346*** -0.083 -0.096
(0.079) (0.220) (0.172)
Post CIBC (’95-’99) 0.429*** -0.180 -0.215
(0.079) (0.195) (0.173)
Post Elliott (’00-’10) 0.640*** -0.265 -0.300
(0.083) (0.265) (0.213)
Openness to trade -0.111** 0.174** 0.154***
(0.051) (0.079) (0.058)
Haircut (PV) 0.924*** 0.693***
(0.318) (0.258)
Gov. effectiveness -0.058** -0.036 -0.069
(0.023) (0.049) (0.044)
Debt restruct. (log) -0.029** 0.076*** 0.070***
(0.011) (0.021) (0.017)
Bond restructuring -0.321*** 0.127 0.162
(0.065) (0.202) (0.142)
Corporate high yield 1.785** -2.899* -3.297**
(0.859) (1.670) (1.409)
GDP per capita (log) -0.027* 0.011 0.009
(0.014) (0.036) (0.028)
Secondary market 0.060 -0.101 -0.109
(0.046) (0.083) (0.074)
US, UK/Total ext. debt 0.014 0.221** 0.214***
(0.063) (0.107) (0.079)
Debt/GDP (Log, Lag) 0.178***
(0.026)
Constant 0.228 0.049
(0.192) (0.372)
Anderson Rubin Wald 8.45
p-Value 0.01
Cragg-Donald F 43.74
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F 46.96
Obs 154 154 154
Significance levels indicated by ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5: Case list: Litigation across sovereign debt restructurings
This table shows our new sovereign debt litigation data matched to the list of restructurings and haircuts by
Cruces and Trebesch (2013) (Data in columns designated with ∗ are also taken from the Cruces/Trebesch
dataset). All amounts are in 2005 USD.
Country Year∗ Restructured debt∗ Haircut∗ Litigation No. cases Litigation volume
(USD m) (USD m)
Albania 1995 611.2 80.4% no 0 -
Algeria 1992 1,897.3 8.7% no 0 -
Algeria 1996 3,833.8 23.5% no 0 -
Argentina 1985 15,893.3 30.3% no 0 -
Argentina 1987 45,290.1 21.7% yes 2 2.0
Argentina 1993 36,218.7 32.5% no 0 -
Argentina 2005 60,572.0 76.8% yes 41 2,855.0
Belize 2007 487.7 23.7% no 0 -
Bolivia 1988 701.3 92.7% no 0 -
Bolivia 1993 217.5 76.5% yes 1 1.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997 1,531.3 89.6% no 0 -
Brazil 1983 7,637.6 -9.8% no 0 -
Brazil 1984 8,028.5 1.7% no 0 -
Brazil 1986 10,497.8 19.2% no 0 -
Brazil 1988 92,067.8 18.4% no 0 -
Brazil 1992 11,937.0 27.0% no 0 -
Brazil 1994 53,871.8 29.3% yes 1 1,743.5
Bulgaria 1994 9,851.0 56.3% yes 1 14.9
Cameroon 2003 844.1 85.5% yes 2 13.6
Chile 1983 3,721.0 0.7% no 0 -
Chile 1984 1,921.8 8.4% no 0 -
Chile 1986 9,452.9 31.7% no 0 -
Chile 1987 9,055.0 14.3% no 0 -
Chile 1990 8,936.8 17.0% no 0 -
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1980 832.4 29.6% no 0 -
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1983 99.5 38.2% no 0 -
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1984 106.0 30.1% no 0 -
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1985 97.9 37.0% no 0 -
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1986 102.3 35.4% no 0 -
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1987 93.6 26.8% no 0 -
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1989 87.1 50.6% yes 1 12.3
Congo, Rep. 1988 321.7 42.3% yes 1 -
Congo, Rep. 2007 1,984.7 90.8% yes 7 148.5
Costa Rica 1983 1,044.8 39.4% yes 2 77.5
Costa Rica 1985 706.4 35.6% no 0 -
Costa Rica 1990 1,904.6 71.9% no 0 -
Cote d’Ivoire 1998 7,530.0 62.8% yes 1 9.3
Cote d’Ivoire 2010 2,672.2 55.2% no 0 -
Croatia 1996 1,027.9 11.0% no 0 -
Cuba 1983 223.0 42.9% no 0 -
Cuba 1984 170.6 44.2% no 0 -
Cuba 1985 144.5 49.5% no 0 -
Dominica 2004 148.6 54.0% yes 1 11.7
Dominican Republic 1986 1,295.1 49.9% no 0 -
Dominican Republic 1994 1,353.7 50.5% no 0 -
Dominican Republic 2005 1,280.0 8.0% no 0 -
Ecuador 1983 1,664.1 6.3% no 0 -
Ecuador 1984 579.9 5.7% no 0 -
Ecuador 1985 6,781.1 15.4% no 0 -
Ecuador 1995 8,747.0 42.2% yes 4 44.5
Ecuador 2000 7,526.4 38.3% yes 2 5.6
Ecuador 2009 2,934.5 67.7% no 0 -
Ethiopia 1996 270.8 92.0% no 0 -
Gabon 1987 59.8 7.9% no 0 -
Gabon 1994 232.9 16.2% no 0 -
Gambia, The 1988 28.2 49.3% no 0 -
Grenada 2005 210.0 33.9% yes 1 20.3
Guinea 1988 63.8 26.1% no 0 -
Guinea 1998 151.5 87.0% no 0 -
continues on next page
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Table 2.5: Case list: Litigation across sovereign debt restructurings (continued)
Country Year∗ Restructured debt∗ Haircut∗ Litigation No. cases Litigation volume
(USD m) (USD m)
Guyana 1992 121.1 89.2% yes 1 18.4
Guyana 1999 64.3 91.0% yes 1 12.0
Honduras 1989 188.4 73.2% no 0 -
Honduras 2001 14.3 82.0% no 0 -
Iraq 2006 17,181.8 89.4% yes 10 168.9
Jamaica 1978 154.0 2.2% no 0 -
Jamaica 1979 336.4 3.5% no 0 -
Jamaica 1981 168.6 15.2% no 0 -
Jamaica 1984 273.4 18.1% no 0 -
Jamaica 1985 592.4 31.7% yes 1 16.1
Jamaica 1987 437.3 32.8% no 0 -
Jamaica 1990 456.9 44.0% no 0 -
Jordan 1993 1,639.5 54.6% no 0 -
Kenya 1998 106.0 45.7% no 0 -
Liberia 1982 53.5 35.7% no 0 -
Liberia 2009 1,175.5 97.0% yes 9 46.4
Macedonia, FYR 1997 269.7 34.6% no 0 -
Madagascar 1981 278.4 19.0% no 0 -
Madagascar 1984 323.1 41.3% no 0 -
Madagascar 1987 92.1 13.7% no 0 -
Madagascar 1990 67.4 52.7% no 0 -
Malawi 1983 97.8 28.5% no 0 -
Malawi 1988 51.9 39.2% no 0 -
Mauritania 1996 63.5 90.0% no 0 -
Mexico 1983 32,252.0 -0.2% no 0 -
Mexico 1985 78,182.2 3.8% no 0 -
Mexico 1987 80,253.2 18.1% no 0 -
Mexico 1988 5,442.5 56.3% no 0 -
Mexico 1990 74,725.8 30.5% no 0 -
Moldova 2002 43.3 36.9% no 0 -
Moldova 2004 118.7 56.3% no 0 -
Morocco 1986 846.6 23.5% no 0 -
Morocco 1987 3,750.3 21.3% no 0 -
Morocco 1990 4,403.7 40.3% no 0 -
Mozambique 1991 165.2 90.0% no 0 -
Mozambique 2007 144.6 91.0% no 0 -
Nicaragua 1980 1,205.1 26.1% no 0 -
Nicaragua 1981 363.6 48.5% no 0 -
Nicaragua 1982 178.3 56.3% no 0 -
Nicaragua 1984 240.2 41.7% no 0 -
Nicaragua 1995 1,341.9 92.0% yes 4 299.1
Nicaragua 2007 1,323.1 95.5% yes 1 8.8
Niger 1984 44.7 37.4% no 0 -
Niger 1986 81.8 45.8% no 0 -
Niger 1991 147.8 82.0% no 0 -
Nigeria 1983 3,319.6 1.6% yes 3 144.8
Nigeria 1984 1,532.5 -2.8% no 0 -
Nigeria 1987 6,520.0 19.3% no 0 -
Nigeria 1988 1,798.4 41.5% no 0 -
Nigeria 1989 8,318.5 30.1% no 0 -
Nigeria 1991 7,835.4 40.1% no 0 -
Pakistan 1999 1,593.5 13.3% yes 1 0.3
Panama 1985 929.5 12.0% no 0 -
Panama 1994 562.9 15.1% no 0 -
Panama 1996 4,715.6 34.9% yes 2 34.4
Paraguay 1993 25.4 29.2% yes 1 -
Peru 1980 704.0 -4.6% no 0 -
Peru 1983 651.9 6.3% no 0 -
Peru 1997 12,485.8 63.9% yes 13 31.9
Philippines 1986 5,101.8 42.6% no 0 -
Philippines 1987 14,869.1 15.4% no 0 -
Philippines 1990 2,917.5 42.8% no 0 -
Philippines 1992 5,822.0 25.4% no 0 -
Poland 1982 7,457.5 51.7% no 0 -
continues on next page
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Table 2.5: Case list: Litigation across sovereign debt restructurings (continued)
Country Year∗ Restructured debt∗ Haircut∗ Litigation No. cases Litigation volume
(USD m) (USD m)
Poland 1983 2,044.9 52.5% no 0 -
Poland 1984 2,302.8 26.9% no 0 -
Poland 1986 3,100.1 37.5% no 0 -
Poland 1988 12,514.4 24.4% no 0 -
Poland 1989 294.0 12.0% no 0 -
Poland 1994 16,851.4 49.0% yes 1 4.5
Romania 1982 2,849.6 32.9% no 0 -
Romania 1983 972.7 31.7% no 0 -
Romania 1986 1,258.9 12.3% no 0 -
Russian Federation 1997 35,926.2 26.2% no 0 -
Russian Federation 1999 5,667.3 46.0% no 0 -
Russian Federation 2000 37,350.9 51.2% no 0 -
Sao Tome and Principe 1994 12.5 90.0% no 0 -
Senegal 1984 127.6 28.8% no 0 -
Senegal 1985 32.1 31.3% no 0 -
Senegal 1990 50.9 35.7% no 0 -
Senegal 1996 95.8 92.0% no 0 -
Serbia 1983 1,629.8 6.5% no 0 -
Serbia 1984 2,070.9 -7.5% no 0 -
Serbia 1985 5,779.4 14.5% no 0 -
Serbia 1988 10,222.3 19.7% no 0 -
Serbia 2004 2,786.6 70.9% no 0 -
Seychelles 2010 290.8 56.2% no 0 -
Sierra Leone 1995 286.7 88.6% no 0 -
Slovenia 1996 990.6 3.3% no 0 -
South Africa 1987 16,725.8 8.5% no 0 -
South Africa 1989 10,703.1 12.7% no 0 -
South Africa 1993 6,359.5 22.0% no 0 -
Sudan 1985 1,477.0 54.6% no 0 -
Tanzania 2004 161.0 88.0% no 0 -
Togo 1988 72.6 46.0% no 0 -
Togo 1997 88.3 92.3% no 0 -
Trinidad and Tobago 1989 636.5 15.5% no 0 -
Turkey 1979 6,090.6 20.9% no 0 -
Turkey 1981 189.4 8.6% no 0 -
Turkey 1982 4,046.2 17.0% no 0 -
Uganda 1993 194.6 88.0% no 0 -
Ukraine 1998 616.4 13.3% no 0 -
Ukraine 1999 187.3 -8.3% no 0 -
Ukraine 2000 1,795.1 18.0% no 0 -
Uruguay 1983 986.4 0.7% no 0 -
Uruguay 1986 3,081.2 24.3% no 0 -
Uruguay 1988 2,624.2 20.3% no 0 -
Uruguay 1991 2,144.3 26.3% no 0 -
Uruguay 2003 3,315.8 9.8% no 0 -
Venezuela, RB 1986 31,956.0 9.9% no 0 -
Venezuela, RB 1987 30,152.6 4.3% no 0 -
Venezuela, RB 1990 26,952.2 36.7% no 0 -
Vietnam 1997 921.1 52.0% yes 1 1.8
Yemen, Rep. 2001 666.6 97.0% yes 1 9.0
Zambia 1994 709.9 89.0% yes 3 76.6
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Appendix
A Comparative statics
The following section derives the comparative statics guiding the hypotheses. Note that
since Φ = F(c∗i (p, he, δ, d)), we can use the shorter notation
∂Φ
dδ =
∂Φ
∂c∗i
∂c∗i
∂δ = ϕd. Thus
equation (2.6) gives the first-order condition of the government’s optimization problem
in a debt restructuring as
Γ ≡ ∂V
R
∂δ
= D
[
ϕd(1− h− p− cg) + (1−Φ)
]
− κ′(δ) (A1)
First, we show that the government chooses a discretionary haircut δ which maximizes
its payoff of the restructuring VR. To see this, consider the second derivative of VR with
respect to δ:
∂Γ
∂δ
= D
[
ϕ′d2(1− h− p− cg)− 2ϕd
]− κ′′(δ) (A2)
where ϕ′ = ∂ϕ/∂c∗i . Eq. (A2) is negative if
−cg − 2 ϕ
ϕ′d
− κ
′′(δ)
ϕ′d2D
< p− (1− h) (A3)
The left-hand side of (A3) is clearly negative since cg > 0, the probability density function
ϕ > 0 by definition, and we have assumed ϕ′ > 0 in order to represent a creditor
distribution with an increasing mass of creditors with high costs of litigation. The right-
hand side of (A3) is positive in all cases where a litigating creditor exists (see eq. 2.3).
Hence, (A3) ensures that the haircut δ chosen by the government which solves the value
function (A1) is the haircut which maximizes the government’s payoff.
Lemma 2.1 (Hypothesis 1). The equilibrium share of litigating creditors is increasing in the
probability of success p.
Proof. To see the effect of a change in the success probability on the share of litigating
creditors, we need to take into account both the direct effect on the creditors’ decision, as
well as the indirect effect through the government adjusting its optimal haircut. We start
with deriving the indirect effect. First, take the derivative of (A1) with respect to p,
∂Γ
∂p
= D
[
ϕ′d2(1− h− p− cg)− 2ϕd
]
(A4)
Since the value function (A1) must be zero at the optimal haircut, and we have established
that (A3) is negative, we can apply the implicit function theorem to get
∂δ
∂p
= − D(ϕ
′d2(1− h− p− cg)− 2ϕd)
D(ϕ′d2(1− h− p− cg)− 2ϕd)− κ′′(δ) (A5)
Because the common term in the numerator and denominator is negative and κ′′(δ) > 0,
we have −1 < ∂δ∂p < 0. This means that the government will react to an increase in the
success probability with decreasing the haircut in order to induce less creditors to hold
out. But the reaction will be somewhat inelastic, such that the change in the success
probability is not completely offset through the haircut.
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To see the impact of a change in the probability of success on the litigation rate, we
can therefore look at its total derivative:
dΦ
dp
=
∂Φ
∂c∗i
dc∗i
dp
= ϕ
(
∂c∗i
∂p
+
∂c∗i
∂δ
∂δ
∂p
)
= ϕd
(
1+
∂δ
∂p
)
> 0 (A6)
where the sum in brackets is positive but less than 1. The implication is that the
government will stem against an increase in the litigation rate by lowering the haircut,
but will not completely offset this effect due to the additional costs which the haircut
implies.
Lemma 2.2 (Hypothesis 2a). The equilibrium share of litigating creditors is increasing in the
exogenous haircut he.
Proof. The derivation is analogous to Hypothesis 1. An increase in the exogenous haircut
will have a direct effect on the creditors’ decision, increasing the litigation rate; but the
government will counter this to some extent by lowering the endogenous part of the
haircut. First, see that
∂Γ
∂he
= D
[
ϕ′d2(1− h− p− cg)− 2ϕd
]
(A7)
which can be combined with (A2) to get the indirect effect
∂δ
∂he
= − D(ϕ
′d2(1− h− p− cg)− 2ϕd)
D(ϕ′d2(1− h− p− cg)− 2ϕd)− κ′′(δ) (A8)
The total derivative of Φ for a change in the exogenous haircut is thus positive:
dΦ
dhe
= ϕd
(
1+
∂δ
∂he
)
(A9)
again, because the elasticity of the endogenous haircut is less than 1.
Lemma 2.3 (Hypothesis 2b). The equilibrium share of litigating creditors can increase in the
restructured debt volume.
Proof. The derivation is analogous to Hypothesis 1 and 2a. The total derivative of Φ for a
change in the debt volume is:
dΦ
dD
=
∂Φ
∂c∗i
dc∗i
dD
= ϕ
(
p− (1− h)
n
+ d
∂δ
∂D
)
(A10)
The elasticity of the haircut with respect to a larger debt volume is negative, meaning the
government will choose a smaller loss if the restructured debt is high. This is due to the
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fact that we assume a fixed cost of litigation for creditors, and hence an increase in the
debt volume will make litigation relatively more profitable by allowing greater leverage.
Hence, the direct effect of a greater debt volume (first term in brackets) is positive, and
the second term is negative. Under a positive relationship between the debt volume and
the share of litigating creditors, ∂δ/∂D > 1−h−pD must be true.
First, the derivative of (A1) with respect to D is given by
∂Γ
∂D
= (1− h− p− cg)
[
2ϕd+ ϕ′d2(p− 1+ h)]+ 1−Φ− ϕd(p− 1+ h) (A11)
Hence the condition for the total effect to be positive can be expressed as
∂Γ
∂D
>
p− 1+ h
D
∂Γ
∂δ
(p− 1+ h)κ
′′(δ)
D
+ 1−Φ > (p− 1+ h+ 2cg)ϕd (A12)
Since both sides are positive, the direction of the effect will depend on the other parameter
values. In the empirical part, we therefore consider interaction effects between the main
variables and the debt size.
Lemma 2.4 (Hypothesis 3). : The equilibrium share of creditors can decrease in the upper bound
of creditor litigation costs.
Proof. The elasticity of the haircut to changes in creditor cost distribution is given by:
∂δ
∂c¯
= − D(
∂ϕ
∂c¯ d(1− h− p− cg)− ∂Φ∂c¯ )
D(ϕ′d2(1− h− p− cg)− 2ϕd)− κ′′(δ) (A13)
Since ∂ϕ∂c¯ > 0 and
∂Φ
∂c¯ > 0, the elasticity of the haircut with respect to an increase in the
upper bound of the creditor cost distribution is positive. If creditor costs increase, the
government will choose a higher discretionary haircut, anticipating that it will lead to
a smaller share of litigating creditors. To see the total effect, we need to combine this
indirect effect with the direct effect:
dΦ
dc¯
=
∂Φ
∂c¯
+
∂Φ
∂c∗i
(
∂c∗i
∂c¯
+
∂c∗i
∂δ
∂δ
∂c¯
)
=
∂Φ
∂c¯
+ ϕd
∂δ
∂c¯
(A14)
Plugging in (A13) and rearranging, we see that there exist solutions where the total
derivative is negative as long as:
∂Φ
∂c¯
<
D ∂ϕ∂c¯ d
2ϕ(1− h− p− cg)
Dϕ′d2(1− h− p− cg)− κ′′(δ)− ϕd(2D− 1) (A15)
If (A15) holds depends on the other parameters’ values. But in the limit for the debt
volume increasing, the right hand side of the equation will approach a negative constant,
making the statement true for large debt volumes. In the empirical section, we therefore
interact the creditor cost variable with the debt volume.
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B Interaction effects
Table B1: Interaction effects
This table shows the results from a model with interactions of the main variables of interest with the
debt volume restructured in each case. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on country are
reported in parentheses. Consistent with the results in the other tables, the results are expressed as average
marginal effects, thus the coefficient on the interaction term is not explicitly included. In non-linear models
with interactions between independent variables, the marginal effect of the interacted variables depends non-
linearly on the level of the other variable. This implies that the coefficient on the interaction term cannot be
meaningfully interpreted, see the discussion by Greene (2010). Specifically, the marginal effect for a change
in Z is given by ∂Pr(Y=1)∂Z = φ(β1Z+ β2Debt Amount+ β3Z×Debt Amount+ X′β)(β1 + β3Debt Amount),
where φ represents the p.d.f. of the probit function.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Openness to
trade
Gov. effective-
ness
Haircut (PV) Bond restruc-
turing
Corporate
high yield
Post Allied (’85-’91) -0.043 -0.043 -0.020 -0.048 -0.023
(0.094) (0.092) (0.091) (0.096) (0.095)
Post Weltover (’92-’94) 0.069 0.071 0.091 0.076 0.092
(0.135) (0.135) (0.130) (0.137) (0.134)
Post CIBC (’95-’99) -0.003 -0.003 0.025 -0.002 0.018
(0.136) (0.136) (0.128) (0.139) (0.135)
Post Elliott (’00-’10) 0.001 0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.029
(0.141) (0.141) (0.136) (0.146) (0.140)
Gov. effectiveness -0.105*** -0.101*** -0.082** -0.109*** -0.091**
(0.041) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039)
Openness to trade 0.126** 0.138** 0.122** 0.134** 0.131**
(0.056) (0.062) (0.058) (0.058) (0.054)
Haircut (PV) 0.247** 0.247** 0.273** 0.274** 0.228*
(0.120) (0.120) (0.111) (0.127) (0.121)
Debt restruct. (log) 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.063***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
Bond restructuring 0.024 0.023 0.005 0.031 0.022
(0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.099) (0.097)
Corporate high yield -2.511* -2.505* -2.227 -2.246 -2.482*
(1.365) (1.388) (1.398) (1.379) (1.361)
GDP per capita (log) -0.007 -0.008 -0.012 -0.006 -0.011
(0.027) (0.030) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Secondary market -0.100 -0.100 -0.107 -0.100 -0.116
(0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.067) (0.074)
US, UK/Total ext. debt 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.264***
(0.079) (0.077) (0.073) (0.076) (0.076)
AUROC 0.863 0.863 0.870 0.866 0.864
s.e. 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.035 0.036
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.33
Log Likelihood -54.97 -55.04 -53.16 -54.66 -54.46
Obs 174 174 174 174 174
Chi2 93.47 100.04 113.82 98.15 99.34
p>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Significance levels indicated by ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Sovereign Defaults in Court1
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Sovereign debt is widely seen as non-enforceable and immune from legal action. This
paper takes a different perspective, by documenting the changing environment for
sovereign debt enforcement in courts. We construct a comprehensive dataset of lawsuits
filed by creditors against defaulting governments since 1976 and find a strong increase
in case numbers, volumes, and attachment attempts. In recent years, almost 50% of
sovereign debt restructurings involved litigation abroad. Our empirical analysis also
suggest that legal disputes have negative spillover effects on (i) government access to
international credit markets, (ii) international trade, and (iii) delays in crisis resolution.
We conclude that the legal remedies against sovereign defaults have greatly increased –
with high costs inside and outside the courtroom.
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3.1 Introduction
One of the central notions in international macroeconomics is that sovereign debt cannot
be enforced – and that governments can therefore not commit to honor their obligations.4
Unlike corporations, a defaulting government cannot be liquidated and its debt is
not backed by collateral, so that creditors have few options to force a government to
repay. Recent developments, however, undermine this textbook view of (non-enforceable)
sovereign debt. Since the 1970s, sovereign immunity has eroded and lawsuits against
sovereigns abroad have become possible. This has been particularly visible in the case
of Argentina, which defaulted in 2001 and has since fought a legal battle with holdout
creditors. In October 2012, Argentina suffered a notable defeat, when the New York
Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of NML, a subsidiary of the US hedge
fund Elliott, turning the case into the “sovereign debt trial of the century”.5
This paper shows that Argentina is no exception but part of a more general trend.
The environment of sovereign debt enforcement has undergone fundamental changes
over the past decades. We document these trends by analyzing cases of creditor litigation
against sovereigns, meaning situations in which banks or so-called “vulture funds” sue a
defaulting government for repayment in courts in New York or London. Based on a new
dataset of sovereign debt lawsuits, we then assess the direct and indirect consequences of
these legal disputes.
Our main result is that creditor litigation is increasingly common and costly for
defaulting sovereigns. Most importantly, the data suggest that litigation in London and
New York undermines a sovereign’s access to international capital markets (as modeled
by Benjamin and Wright, 2009; Pitchford and Wright, 2012). In years with legal action,
external issuance drops close to zero and borrowing shifts to domestic markets. We
also find that attempts to seize a country’s assets abroad are associated with a decline
in international trade of the debtor country, over and above the default effect per se
(in line with Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a). Moreover, the data show that sovereign debt
restructuring take longer to conclude once creditors start legal action.
These results bridge two classic strands of the sovereign debt literature, namely
reputation models (in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) and those models
emphasizing sanctions and other direct means of enforcement. In this paper, we show
that lawsuits are increasingly common in sovereign debt markets, in line with the
sanctions view of Bulow and Rogoff (1989a). But we also find that litigation disrupts
4Recent surveys by Panizza et al. (2009), Wright (2011) and Aguiar and Amador (2013) all describe limited
enforceability as the defining feature of sovereign debt. This unique characteristic of sovereign debt has
motivated a large body of research (why do countries ever repay?) and proposals for a new international
financial architecture. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), for example, see the lack of an enforcement mechanism
against foreign sovereigns as “perhaps the most fundamental ‘imperfection’ of international capital markets”
(p. 53).
5See, for example, Financial Times, 22 November 2012, “Argentina angry at hedge fund court win.”
Although the outcome of Argentina’s appeal is uncertain, the government may eventually be forced to repay
USD 1.4bn to litigating creditors, or default again. See http://ftalphaville.ft.com/tag/pari-passu-saga/ for
detailed information on the case.
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international credit market access and may result in market exclusion, which is a channel
traditionally emphasized in the reputation literature. The two dominant explanations for
why sovereign debt can exist (sanctions vs. reputation) may thus be less disparate than
previously thought.
The results also relate to a large policy debate, which has been ongoing for more
than 20 years. For example, litigation has been a main motivation behind proposals for a
statutory insolvency regime such as the IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
(SDRM), which envisaged an “automatic stay” on legal action, as is already the case for
corporations undergoing bankruptcy (see e.g. Rogoff and Zettelmeyer, 2002; Krueger,
2002; IMF, 2003; Bolton and Skeel, 2004). In the wake of the European debt crisis, the
discussion on debt restructuring and an international bankruptcy court has returned
(Gianviti et al., 2010; Roubini, 2010; Weder Di Mauro and Zettelmeyer, 2010; Tirole, 2012;
UNCTAD, 2012; Buchheit et al., 2013a; IMF, 2013; Mody, 2013). In addition, Eurozone
governments agreed to introduce collective action clauses (CACs) in all sovereign bond
issues from 2013 onwards, partly to “deter disruptive litigation by minority bondholders”
in future crises (ECB, 2011, p. 81).6 Against this backdrop, it is surprising that there is
only little empirical research on litigation and debt enforcement. Much of the debate
keeps referring to a few well-known anecdotes, while a comprehensive picture has
been missing. One reason for this lack of evidence is that no institution is responsible
for collecting representative data. This stands in contrast to other areas such as trade
disputes, where case information is readily available from the WTO (and much more
research exists).
In the first part of the paper, we summarize new facts on sovereign debt litigation over
the past four decades: How frequent are legal disputes between creditors and sovereigns?
Which countries are most affected? Who are the creditors filing suit? What amounts are
involved? What is the outcome of these lawsuits? And how often do creditors attach
sovereign assets? To answer these questions we code a comprehensive new dataset, which
comes close to a census of all debt-crisis related lawsuits filed between 1976 and 2010
in the two most relevant jurisdictions: the US and the UK. Indeed, until this day, New
York and London continue to be the primary locations for external sovereign borrowing
and related legal disputes.7 To minimize coding errors and sample selection bias, we
evaluated more than 10,000 pages of case material from electronic court records such as
6Further related policy initiatives include a 2010 UK law that bans creditor lawsuits against poor countries
undergoing debt relief. Similar legislation has been implemented in Belgium and two Channel Islands, while
US Congresswoman Maxine Waters initiated the “Stop Vulture Funds Act” in 2009. In addition, the African
Development Bank established a “African Legal Support Facility” in 2009, to assist debtor governments
facing litigation, while the Commonwealth Secretariat has set up a “Legal Debt Clinic” to serve the same
purpose.
7Recent research confirms the continued dominance of English and New York law in foreign bond
and loan markets. The IMF (2002) shows that about 80 percent of international bonds were issued under
New York law as of 2002, with English law accounting for less than 20 percent. Das et al. (2012) provide
similar figures for selected countries as of 2010, while Gulati and Scott (2012) show similar data based on a
comprehensive historical overview of legal provisions in international sovereign borrowing.
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PACER8, and verified each data entry across all sources available, including in previous
data collections and research. For the US, this allowed us to identify the full set of
initiated lawsuits following a default or restructuring, including those that are settled
out-of-court or those which remain unresolved.
The coding results show the rise of creditor litigation in several dimensions. The total
number of lawsuits is only 120 (not counting multiple lawsuits by the same creditor), but
more than half of these cases have been filed since the year 2000. The likelihood that a
debt crisis is accompanied by creditor litigation has increased from less than 10% in the
1980s to 50% in recent years. Since the mid-1990s the total amount under litigation has
more than doubled, to more than USD 3 bn in 2010. On average, from 2000 to 2010, the
claims under litigation corresponded to 3% of total debt restructured or 1.5% of debtor
country GDP (averages from 2000 to 2010).
The duration of cases has also increased, to an average of 6.2 years, and we observe
more and more attachment attempts, meaning strategies to seize sovereign assets abroad.
A main reason behind these trends is the proliferation of distressed debt funds or “vulture”
funds, which typically sue for longer periods of time, initiate more attachment attempts,
and litigate for larger amounts than other types of creditors, such as banks. Between
2000 and 2010 “vultures” filed nearly 75% of all lawsuits against foreign governments.
Taken together, we observe a significant increase in both the occurrence and intensity
of sovereign debt litigation. At the same time, we find that the legal enforcement of
sovereign debt claims via courts remains very difficult.
Litigious creditors have therefore increasingly relied on indirect enforcement tactics
that disrupt a country’s trade and capital flows. They seize oil tankers, export revenues,
presidential airlines, or financial assets such as a country’s social security accounts held
abroad or interest payments to other creditors. Bolton and Jeanne (2009) explain that the
resulting externalities can be much larger than the value of the litigated claims. Creditors
anticipate this and hope that the “nuisance value” of their legal action will force the
government into an out-of-court settlement.
In the second part of the paper, we assess the potential spillover effects of litigation
systematically. Building on established theory work, we test the three hypotheses of
how legal disputes affect (1) international borrowing, (2) international trade flows, and
(3) the resolution of debt crisis (negotiation duration). Empirically, we follow widely
cited papers such as Gelos et al. (2011) and Rose (2005) and extend their models by one
previously omitted dimension: litigation.
Our results provide strong support for Hypotheses (1) and (3), on bond market access
and negotiation delay. Legal disputes are associated with a significantly lower likelihood
of issuing bonds internationally, after controlling for country and year fixed effects,
macroeconomic and political conditions, and accounting for the fact that governments
can abstain from borrowing voluntarily. Remarkably, between 2000 and 2010, we could
not find a single instance in which a government facing litigation in London or New York
8PACER stands for Public Access to Court Electronic Records (http://www.pacer.gov).
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also placed a sovereign bond in these jurisdictions. With regard to negotiation duration,
we find strong indication that litigation causes delay. The likelihood for successful debt
settlement (crisis exit) is 40% lower in months with ongoing legal disputes. We find
somewhat weaker support on trade spillovers (Hypothesis 2): in the empirical model
of Rose (2005), litigation is associated with a 11% decline in bilateral trade, over and
above the default effect per se. However, this finding is not robust to including time fixed
effects.
Related literature: The paper contributes to several literatures. First and foremost,
we add to research on the “elusive” costs of sovereign default (surveyed by Panizza
et al., 2009). Until this day, “estimates of the costs of sanctions are few and necessarily
imprecise” (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a, p. 175). This paper is an attempt to improve on
this, by conducting the first broad-based test on the legal consequences of default, which
have been a matter of debate since at least Alexander (1987). The results suggest that
legal disputes with foreign creditors can trigger substantial direct and indirect costs for
defaulting countries. Thus, the legal consequences of default seem to be more important
than generally recognized. Our case studies and estimates therefore provide empirical
support for a small group of theory papers that assume legal sanctions and costly creditor
litigation such as Bulow and Rogoff (1989a,b); Schwartz and Zurita (1992) and, more
recently, Bolton and Jeanne (2007, 2009); Adam and Grill (2013); Pitchford and Wright
(2012), and Arellano et al. (2013). We should emphasize, however, that our results do not
necessarily imply that litigation reduces welfare. We do not explore the ex-ante effects of
stronger or weaker creditor rights.9 This is not a general equilibrium analysis.10 Instead,
we show that the “legal threat" to sovereign debt restructuring is increasingly relevant
ex-post, which may affect the incentives to default or to settle with potential holdouts
ex-ante (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006).
Second, we contribute to the debate on sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms and
creditor coordination problems in times of distress. Many recent theory papers have
analyzed the legal framework of sovereign debt restructurings and the implications of
holdouts and litigation, in particular Miller and Zhang (2000), Ghosal and Miller (2003),
Weinschelbaum and Wynne (2005), Gai et al. (2004), Haldane et al. (2005), Bolton and
Jeanne (2007), Pitchford and Wright (2007, 2012), Engelen and Lambsdorff (2009), Bi et al.
(2011), Lanau (2011) and Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2013). In contrast, the empirical
evidence has been limited. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) provide a historical
overview on the development of sovereign debt law and litigation. Miller and Thomas
(2007) analyze the Argentine litigation episode from an economic perspective, while
Alfaro et al. (2010) and Bradley et al. (2010) assess the market reaction to important court
decisions. There is also a vast legal literature with detailed studies on prominent cases,
9Eaton (1990) and Scott (2006) argue that better enforcement may have a positive ex-ante effect, since
governments will be less likely to overborrow and default. A similar argument is made by Dooley (2000),
Shleifer (2003), and Pitchford and Wright (2007).
10Nevertheless, in Appendix C we discuss why litigation can occur in equilibrium.
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such as Elliott v. Peru, and a discussion on their judicial implications.11 Our contribution
is to provide the first representative dataset on the issue, which may help to discipline
future theoretical work and may facilitate an informed policy debate.
Third, we contribute to research on international economic disputes and enforcement
problems involving sovereign states more broadly. There is a large body of work on trade
disputes and litigation within the GATT and WTO, which shows interesting parallels
to the debate on sovereign debt enforcement. For example, the recent paper by Maggi
and Staiger (2011) assesses the role of an international court to enforce trade agreements,
while Limão and Saggi (2008) propose the issuance of bonds as collateral against potential
trade disputes. Importantly, the theoretical work in this area been accompanied by a
rich empirical literature on the determinants and effects of trade disputes and trade
related litigation (e.g. Bown, 2004a,b; Grinols and Perrelli, 2006). In contrast, research on
sovereign debt disputes has so far remained almost exclusively theoretical.12
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the
legal context and history of sovereign debt litigation based on the existing literature.
Section 3 presents our database and main stylized facts. Section 4 develops and tests
three hypotheses on the consequences of creditor litigation for market access, trade and
restructuring delays. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 What do we know about sovereign debt litigation?
3.2.1 Historical background – The decline of sovereign immunity13
For most of history, private creditors lacked a direct enforcement device against foreign
governments. It is difficult to force a government to repay, and sovereigns hold most of
their assets domestically, which shields them from access by foreign creditors. In addition,
there are legal principles protecting debtor governments, in particular the doctrine of
“absolute” sovereign immunity, which states that a government cannot be sued in foreign
courts. Lacking legal remedies, creditors had few other choices than to accept unilateral
defaults and restructurings, or to seek support from their own governments, e.g. by
lobbying for trade sanctions or for military interventions.14
A far-reaching shift in legal doctrine occurred after World War II, when the United
States and a number of European countries started to adopt a more restrictive view on
sovereign immunity, which excluded commercial activities like cross-border investment
11See Hurlock (1984a,b), Goldman (2000), Wheeler and Attaran (2003), Fisch and Gentile (2004), Gelpern
(2005), Blackman and Mukhi (2010), Broomfield (2010), Waibel (2011), and many others.
12Mitchener and Weidenmier (2010) take a historical perspective on sovereign debt enforcement, by
analyzing military interventions (“gunboat diplomacy”) to enforce repayments prior to World War I.
13This section is largely based on Fisch and Gentile (2004), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), Foster
(2008), Alfaro et al. (2010), Blackman and Mukhi (2010) and Waibel (2011).
14Buchheit (2005) and Waibel (2011) explain that creditors have often asked their governments to intervene
on their behalf, especially in the 19th and early 20th century. These attempts were often fruitless, however,
except for a few prominent examples of “supersanctions” in the era of gunboat diplomacy, 1880-1913 (see
the debate between Tomz (2007) and Mitchener and Weidenmier (2010)).
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Figure 3.1: Stylized evolution of litigation environment
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and trade.15 The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was codified into US law
through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). Shortly thereafter, the
United Kingdom passed a similar law, the State Immunity Act in 1978, and many other
countries followed suit. As a result, states and their public entities could now be held
legally accountable for breach of commercial contracts, that is, they could be sued in
foreign commercial courts.
The history of sovereign debt litigation since the FSIA can be described as a gradual
erosion of government immunity. Debtor defenses collapsed, one after the other, making
creditor remedies in court more effective, at least at the margin. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
evolution of the legal environment for sovereign debt litigation in a stylized form. We
roughly categorize three main “eras” since 1976, which are structured around a set of
high-profile decisions.
The first era of sovereign debt litigation was triggered by the 1980s debt crisis in
developing countries. Lawsuits were mostly filed by banks and other buy-and-hold
investors who aimed at enforcing better terms than those negotiated in the London Club
process. The first well-known case that built on the FSIA was filed in 1982, when Allied
Bank refused to participate in the debt restructuring agreement with Costa Rica. After
several rounds of hearings, the New York Second Circuit eventually ruled in favor of
Allied, but the US government pressured the bank to settle out of court, at the same terms
as the other syndicate banks. Despite this outcome, the success of Allied set an important
precedent: it showed that holdout strategies could work and that classic defenses such
as sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine or the principle of international comity
were insufficient to protect a sovereign from lawsuits (see Fisch and Gentile, 2004, and
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006, for a detailed explanation). In addition, the case
confirmed that Costa Rican government assets in the US were attachable, because the
15One of the reasons for restricting sovereign immunity was that governments and their state-owned
enterprises were becoming increasingly active in cross-border investment and trade during the 1940s and
1950s. Their legal immunity gave public firms an undue competitive advantage over private firms. In
addition, Western governments were concerned that Soviet firms could not be held legally accountable for
their commercial activities abroad (see McNamara, 2006).
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government had explicitly waived its immunity.
During the remainder of the 1980s only about a dozen further creditor lawsuits
were filed. The most prominent case was Weltover v. Republic of Argentina, decided in
1992, which gave a definitive blow to the defense of sovereign immunity. The Supreme
Court confirmed the plaintiff’s argument that issuing sovereign debt on international
capital markets qualifies as a commercial activity, and that a subsequent suspension of
payments causes a direct effect in the United States according to the provisions of the
FSIA. Effectively, this decision granted US courts the jurisdiction over any sovereign loans
or bonds issued under US law and concluded the demise of debtor defenses from suits.
From the early 1990s on, the sovereign debt litigation regime reached a watershed
with the entrance of a new type of plaintiff: specialized distressed debt funds, or, as they
would later be called, “vulture funds”. “Vulture funds” are often based in tax havens,
such as Liechtenstein or the British Virgin Islands, and often act as temporary vehicles,
being established solely to pursue a specific case. CIBC v. Banco Central do Brazil was the
first major litigation success by a “vulture fund” against a sovereign debtor. The case was
launched by the Dart family, which had acquired USD 1.4 bn of Brazilian long-term debt
in the secondary market but refused to participate in Brazil’s Brady deal of 1992, going
to court instead. After a favorable judgment, Brazil agreed to settle a part of the past due
interest, and the Dart family was able to sell its entire debt stake at a substantial profit.
The CIBC case gave an early example of how rewarding holdout strategies could
be. In addition, CIBC played an important role for case law development because it
weakened the so called champerty defense, which, until then, prohibited the purchase
of debt with the primary intent of filing a lawsuit. Champerty could have undermined
the key business model of “vulture funds”: buying debt on secondary markets at a
steep discount and then suing for full repayment. But the defense continued to be
rejected in most subsequent cases and was effectively eliminated in 2004 (Blackman and
Mukhi, 2010). This set the stage for the modern era of sovereign debt enforcement, in
which “vulture” creditors can easily obtain favorable judgments, but devote most of their
resources to seize attachable sovereign assets.
3.2.2 The current litigation environment - A hunt for assets
The current sovereign debt litigation environment is perhaps best described as a hunt
for assets. Since 1992, immunity from suits is no longer the main hurdle. Instead, the
legal battleground has moved to immunity from attachment, as creditors continue to face
serious difficulties in executing judgments and collecting assets. The main legal obstacle
from a creditor perspective is that sovereign immunity laws, like the FSIA, continue to
protect many government assets from attachments. Recent court decisions in the US have
confirmed that sovereign assets are only attachable if they are located in the United States
and used for commercial purposes.16 This narrows down the number of potential assets to
16Similar constraints apply in the UK, France or Germany (Foster, 2008).
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seize considerably.
The heyday of debt enforcement seemed to have arrived in the late 1990s, when
the hedge fund Elliott used a novel interpretation of the pari passu clause that could
have rendered any further asset searches unnecessary (Elliott v. Republic of Peru). Pari
passu is a standard clause contained in most sovereign debt contracts, although its exact
meaning and relevance remains controversial until today. In corporate bond contracts,
the clause is meant to ensure equal treatment of creditors in case of a liquidation. Since
this situation does not arise in the sovereign context, the clause’s interpretation has been
subject to an ongoing debate (see Gulati and Scott, 2012). Back in the 1990s, Elliott argued
that the clause prohibited Peru from paying its restructured creditors without making
a payment to holdouts as well. Based on this strategy, Elliott succeeded in blocking an
interest payment that Peru was about to make via the settlement provider Euroclear in
September 2000. Rather than risking a default on its entire stock of Brady debt, Peru
quickly settled at face value, transferring about USD 58 m to Elliott. Not surprisingly, the
case encouraged a wave of similar pari passu litigation.17 Ultimately, however, no other
plaintiff succeeded in attaching interest or principal debt payments, at least until 2013.18
As a consequence, judgment creditors were back searching for non-immune, attachable
assets – and they have done so actively.
Since the early 2000s and Argentina’s debt default, “vulture funds” have stepped up
their collection efforts by trying to seize a variety of assets around the globe. Amongst
other, “vultures” have attempted to seize Argentina’s government airplane, its central
bank assets and social security funds in the US, a sailing ship of the Argentine Navy (ARA
Libertad), and even dinosaur fossils on exhibition in Europe (see Blackman and Mukhi,
2010; Foster, 2008). So far, however, most of these attempts have been unsuccessful, in
the sense that attachments were ultimately rejected by US and European courts.
3.3 The dataset: sovereign debt litigation 1976-2010
3.3.1 Data sources and case selection
To identify the set of relevant cases we start with the list of 180 sovereign debt restructur-
ings assembled by Cruces and Trebesch (2013). Their dataset captures the full sample
of restructurings of medium and long-term sovereign debt owed to foreign commercial
creditors, including banks and bondholders, by 69 debtor countries worldwide, between
1970 and 2010.19 For each debt crisis event we then searched for litigation cases filed in
foreign courts by commercial creditors. We focus on cases initiated in the US or the UK
17In particular, Red Mountain Finance v. Democratic Republic of Congo, LNC Investments v. Nicaragua,
Kensington International v. Republic of Congo, Export-Import Bank of China v. Grenada, and the argument has
also been prominently invoked in the lawsuits following Argentina’s 2001/02 default.
18The pending Argentine pari passu case(s) might turn out as a creditor success eventually.
19We update this list by three recently completed HIPC buyback operations, namely Mozambique 2007,
Nicaragua 2007 and Liberia 2009, and include the Congo 1988 restructuring as an additional case.
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and cover the time period after the enactment of the FSIA, from 1976 until 2010.20
The database excludes litigation cases filed in domestic courts. We also exclude suits
filed by retail investors, including class action suits, as these differ in many respects
from suits filed by professional investors. Retail cases involve small amounts and mainly
played a role in a single case: the recent Argentinean default. Furthermore, we are not
aware of one single case in which retail creditors were successful in attaching assets or
receiving a favorable settlement.21
Our aim is to analyze litigation related to sovereign bonds and loans in default. As a
consequence, we disregard lawsuits on sovereign liabilities that are not related to a debt
crisis or restructuring as well as public liabilities that are detached from sovereign debt
markets, such as procurement bills or unpaid checks by embassies abroad.22 Our focus
on debt crisis events implies that we drop a number of litigation cases that do not go
back to a sovereign default or restructuring (one example is Noga v. Russia).23 Relatedly,
we exclude lawsuits by investors seeking compensation for expropriation or otherwise
perceived foul treatment by foreign governments.
For the statistical analysis, we organize the information in a creditor-debtor conflict
pair dataset. This implies combining multiple legal actions between identical plaintiffs
and defendants into one observation, even if these actions took place in multiple court
actions or jurisdictions. As an example, NML Capital, a subsidiary of Elliott Management,
filed more than 10 individual actions against Argentina in the Southern District of New
York court, plus lawsuits in multiple other US federal district courts. These actions
are at times consolidated (merged), or abandoned when new proceedings are initiated.
For the purpose of analyzing the determinants of legal disputes, it does not appear
sensible to treat these cases of “jurisdiction shopping” as separate observations. The
creditor-debtor pair NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina therefore enters our database as
a single observation only. This approach allows us to analyze the drivers of litigation
without biases arising from the legal complexities of any specific case, or due to the
tactics of individual maverick creditors.
20For completeness, we also include three related arbitration proceedings, since arbitration tribunals are
supra-jurisdictional in nature and usually have repercussions in US or UK courts for enforcement reasons;
all of our results are robust to excluding these cases.
21In the US, we identify more than 70 lawsuits filed by groups or individual retail investors against
Argentina, as well as 13 class action suits. Most of the individual cases involved negligibly small sums
and did not move beyond the recognition of claims. After years of unsuccessful efforts, a large number of
these lawsuits were abandoned after Argentina’s second exchange offer in 2010. A separate search revealed
that 13 retail cases were filed in Italian courts, while 648 individual retail investors filed suit in Germany
(on a total of EUR 270m in claims - the German legal system does not allow for groups or classes filing
suit). Anecdotal evidence suggests that German retail investors were able to recover small amounts, see
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 April 2005).
22Besides lawsuits on sovereign bonds and loans we add a few cases in which trade credit or letters of
credit were restructured into medium- and long-term loans or bonds as part of a formal sovereign debt
exchange. Nigeria, for example, restructured letters of credit into sovereign medium-term loans during the
1980s, while Guyana exchanged debt of nationalized industries into long-term government bonds in 1992.
23Noga’s claim has little to do with a default or restructuring of sovereign debt. Instead, it goes back to a
bilateral commercial transaction outside of sovereign loan or bond markets – the delivery of foodstuffs to
Russia in exchange for oil in 1991.
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Our main sources are electronic legal databases. For the United States, we relied on
the comprehensive PACER archive maintained by the US court system, which allows
identifying all cases filed against any given person or entity, even for those cases that
are discontinued or resolved through out-of-court settlements, thus mitigating concerns
of sample selection. To verify the set of US cases we also applied systematic searches
in the more standard legal database Lexis Nexis and the press database Factiva.24 For
the United Kingdom, there is no official court record archive comparable to PACER. We
therefore relied on a broad range of available UK-specific legal databases, including Lexis
Nexis UK, Westlaw, Casetrack, Justis, and BAILII, and again applied our standardized
search algorithms.
To complement and cross-check the information retrieved in these electronic databases
we draw on the case details provided in policy reports and the academic literature. In
particular, we rely on the annual survey of litigation cases conducted by the IMF and
World Bank in up to 40 HIPCs since 2002 (see IMF and World Bank, 2000-2011), as well as
the case list by Singh (2003). Both were very helpful points of departure, but many of the
cases in these lists turned out to be unrelated to sovereign debt crises and cross-checking
with court records revealed inaccuracies and omissions. Further important case lists
include the reports by Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton and Clifford Chance (1992),
Buchheit (1999), the Emerging Market Traders Association (EMTA, 2009), the Institute
for International Finance (IIF, 2009) and the case lists compiled by Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer (2006), Alfaro et al. (2010) and Trebesch (2010).
3.3.2 Coding results: stylized facts on creditor litigation 1976-2010
Table 3.1 summarizes main results from our database. Overall, we identify 120 instances of
litigation by commercial creditors against 25 debtor countries that restructured sovereign
debt vis-à-vis their foreign private creditors. Of these, 102 cases were filed in the United
States, mostly in the Southern District of New York court. Only 15 cases were filed in
England and 3 are the arbitration cases mentioned above. The dominance of US cases is
partly due to the fact that most Latin American defaulters issued their debt under New
York law. Interestingly, we find that some creditors file suit in more than one jurisdiction.
15% of cases are brought forward in more than one jurisdiction: 4 plaintiffs filed a case in
English courts that had already been initiated in New York, while another 4 cases started
in the UK and were later continued in the US.
Case numbers: A first notable pattern in the data is the strong increase in litigation
occurrence over time. This becomes particularly evident in Figure 3.2, which shows the
24For the legal databases, we employed a search for COUNTRY w/25 (debt OR bond OR loan) AND
(default OR payment OR insolvency OR attachment OR sovereign immunity OR FSIA). For Factiva,
we searched for COUNTRY near25 (debt and (vulture OR litigation OR lawsuit OR suit OR court
decision OR holdout creditor OR southern district of New York OR district court OR high
court OR ewhc OR default judgment OR summary judgment OR out-of-court OR out of court OR
attachment)).
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number of pending lawsuits for each year between 1976 and 2010.25 This number has
gone up from less than 5 throughout the 1980s, to more than 40 ongoing disputes in more
recent years. In parallel, there has been an increase in the total amount of principal under
litigation, from close to zero to nearly USD 3bn in 2010 (excluding accrued interest).
The picture is very similar when matching individual lawsuits to the respective debt
restructuring event.26 Figure 3.3 shows the total number of debt restructurings per year,
and the subset of these which were subject to at least one creditor lawsuit in the US or
the UK. The share affected by litigation has increased substantially. During the 1980s
about 5% of restructurings were accompanied by legal creditor action. This figure has
increased to more than 40% during the 2000s. The resulting picture is also very similar if
we construct the same graph using default years from Standard & Poor’s (S&P), instead
of the Cruces and Trebesch (2013) data on restructuring events.
A further notable pattern in the data is the strong variation across crisis events. In
total, only 30 out of the 176 restructurings were accompanied by a legal conflict (a share
of 16%). Of these 30 restructurings, 16 involve only a single lawsuit, while the remaining
suits are concentrated on a few crisis cases. Argentina accounts for a third of the case
universe, with 41 commercial creditor lawsuits filed after the default of 2001. Peru’s
Brady debt exchange in 1997 was also accompanied by an unusually high number of
court cases, triggering 13 lawsuits in the United States. Next come Iraq 2006, Liberia 2009
and Congo 2007 with 10, 9 and 7 cases, respectively, as well as Nicaragua 1995, Ecuador
1995, Nigeria 1983, and Zambia 1994 with three to four cases each. These numbers show
that a “run to the courthouse” could generally not be observed in the context of sovereign
debt crises, except for a few cases such as Argentina, Peru, Iraq and Liberia.
Countries and creditors involved: As to the type of countries, governments in Latin
America and Africa were most affected, accounting for 79 and 27 creditor lawsuits,
respectively. Most debt-crisis related cases are filed against middle-income countries in
the emerging market world. Nearly 30% of all lawsuits were launched against HIPCs,
or 34 out of 120 cases. Turning to creditor characteristics, the data show that distressed
debt funds are the dominant type of plaintiff filing suit, and increasingly so. For the
114 cases for which we have information on the creditor, 63 were filed by funds, 30
were filed by banks and the rest by other commercial creditors such as suppliers or
insurance companies. Since the year 2000, 75% of all cases were initiated by distressed
debt funds. Table 3.2 shows that most of these litigious funds are not well-known, also
because prominent creditors, such as Elliot or the Dart family, file suit through one of
their subsidiaries such as NML capital, CIBC or EM Ltd., respectively. This opaqueness
25The upward trend in case numbers is also clearly evident when showing the number of cases initiated in
each year between 1976 and 2010. The resulting figure is, however, much more volatile.
26Cruces and Trebesch (2013) identify 180 sovereign debt restructuring events since 1976. However, a few
countries implemented two sovereign debt restructurings in the same year. In case the court documents
do not allows us to uniquely match a litigation case to one of the two events, we merge them into one
observation per country and year. This leaves us with a final cross section of 176 relevant debt restructuring
events. Note that debt crisis related lawsuits have been filed both before or after a debt restructuring
operation is implemented.
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is a characteristic feature of “vulture” litigation.
Amounts: The volume of claims is not high compared to the volume restructured,
but it is strongly increasing. For those deals for which we could collect details on the
amounts litigated, the average claim is USD 60m, with a median of USD 10m. This
compares to an average restructuring volume of USD 6.5bn, with a median of USD 1.1bn.
Thus, on average, the litigated claims correspond to 3.1% of total debt restructured (with
a median of 1.1%), or 0.8% of debtor country GDP. Interestingly, the litigated amounts
shows a notable upward time trend, from 2.5% of restructured debt in the 1990s, to 4% in
the 2000s (the latter corresponds to 1.5% of GDP). In absolute numbers, the largest suits
were filed against Argentina after 2001, with a total of USD 3.7bn27(including arrears
and accrued interest), or about 5% of the 2005 debt exchange. Next comes CIBC v. Brazil,
with a total amount of USD 1.4bn. In relative terms, however, the scope of litigation
is most relevant for poorer and smaller countries. Two HIPC examples are Nicargaua
(in the 1990s) and Liberia (in the 2000s) where lawsuits amounted to 5.9% and 4.3% of
GDP, respectively. Similarly, the recent litigation cases against Dominica and Grenada
accounted for more than 3% of GDP in each case, or 8% and 10% of total amounts
restructured.
Case outcomes: We were able to code the process and outcome for 106 of the 120
lawsuits in the database. Regarding case outcomes, it is surprising that only 4 lawsuits
were outright failures, in the sense that the court rejected the claim and discontinued
the case. In contrast, creditor claims were full satisfied in 13 cases according to the legal
records. 48 lawsuits, or nearly half the sample, were settled out of court with little details
available, at least not from official sources.28 Nearly half of these out of court settlements
took place after creditors were granted an attachment order, which is when creditor
activism can be particularly disruptive for debtor countries.
Recovery rates and returns for creditors: We could not gather representative in-
formation on recovery rates and creditor returns. Data on settlement amounts is not
available from court documents – our most important and reliable source. Nevertheless,
for a few cases, we could gather (noisy) information on financial outcomes from policy
reports, the press and previous research. These case anecdotes should be taken with care,
because they are often based on rumors only. But they do provide suggestive evidence
that the recovery rates in out-of-court settlements are often high, at least as high as in the
original exchange offer. Appendix B provides a few examples of settlements that were
particularly lucrative for creditors, sometimes implying investment returns of more than
100%. In addition, we report anecdotes on a few failed litigation attempts. The available
evidence confirms that sovereign creditor litigation is a high-risk, high-return strategy.
Duration of lawsuits: We find that sovereign debt lawsuits have become significantly
27This figure is from Argentina’s 2011 SEC filing, which is available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/914021/000090342311000486/roa-18k_0928.htm. The face value under litigation amounts to
USD 2.87bn, see Table 3.2 (for comparability we use this amount in the econometric analysis).
28Sometimes we could find guesstimates on settlement amounts and investor returns from the financial
press or various policy reports, but these figures are hard to verify and often do not match across sources.
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more protracted since investors specializing in distressed government debt became more
active. During the 1990s the average case duration was 4.8 years, but this figure has
increased to 6.2 years during the 2000s. A more systematic way to assess the duration
of lawsuits across cases is to estimate an empirical survival function. The results of a
non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimation confirm that “vulture” lawsuits are particularly
protracted: after 5 years (60 months) the probability of case survival is still above 75%,
compared to less than 50% for other creditors. Even after 10 years, distressed debt
funds continue to litigate with a probability of more than 50%. The likelihood of early
settlement is generally low, particularly for cases initiated after the mid-1990s.
Attachment attempts: Finally, we identify an increasing number of attachment at-
tempts. The share of lawsuits with attempted asset seizures has increased from below
20% in the early 1990s to nearly 50% in recent years. As expected, “vulture” funds are
much more likely to initiate attachments: 56% of “vulture” cases involve at least one
attempt to seize assets, compared to just 21% of cases filed by other creditors.
Taken together, these procedural data strongly indicate that creditor strategies have
become more aggressive over time and that the direct costs of legal disputes have
increased.
3.4 The spillover effects of litigation: empirical evidence
This section implements three empirical tests to assess the externalities of creditor
litigation, that is, indirect costs beyond the immediate expenses such as settlement
payments and legal fees. We build on theoretical papers to derive three hypotheses on
the role of litigation for (i) government access to capital markets, (ii) international trade
flows and (iii) delays in sovereign debt renegotiations. For each hypothesis, we gather
case study evidence and test them systematically using cross-country panel regressions.
We opt for a very conservative approach in our econometric analysis and closely follow
the most influential empirical papers on the cost of default. More specifically, we use
existing estimates and add variables on the occurrence and scope of creditor litigation.
This facilitates the comparability of our results with the previous literature.
3.4.1 Theory and hypotheses
A widely discussed spillover effect of sovereign litigation is that it may disrupt gov-
ernment borrowing in international capital markets. The seminal paper by Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981) suggests that foreign creditors can retaliate against a defaulting country
by denying access to new borrowing. The assumption of financial exclusion has since
been widespread in the sovereign debt literature,29 but there is no agreement on the
29Exclusion is costly since it weakens a country’s ability to smooth consumption and to insure against bad
shocks. See also the debate in subsequent papers by Bulow and Rogoff (1989b), Kletzer and Wright (2000),
Amador (2003), Aguiar and Amador (2006), Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007), Arellano (2008), Sandleris (2008),
and Yue (2010).
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mechanism causing the observed loss of market access during debt crises (see Wright
(2011) for a review). One explanation are direct legal sanctions, as suggested by Pitchford
and Wright (2007, 2012), who generate prolonged exclusion in a debt bargaining game,
and not as a result of an exogenous process as in previous papers. In their 2012 model,
individual creditors can effectively veto a government’s attempt to tap foreign debt
markets, which results in a strategic hold-up effect: all creditors need to settle before
the government can borrow again. This reasoning is similar to Benjamin and Wright
(2009) and in line with Alfaro (2007), who argue that the threat of creditor attachment is
severe and effectively imposes a “virtual blockade” on capital flows to the country. Also
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) suggest that litigation can have adverse implications
for market access and investments, partly due to the reputational damage that legal
disputes can entail.
Appendix A exploits court documents and other sources to show how litigating
creditors disrupted market access in Panama, Peru and Argentina. In these and other
cases, creditors have succeeded in interfering with bond payments and other transactions
flowing through international financial centers. The attachment attempts curtailed
the planned issuance of new bonds or blocked contractually scheduled payments on
performing debt, thus potentially forcing the sovereign into a default. Litigating creditors
have also been lobbying for legislation that would deny foreign governments access to US
capital markets in case of outstanding judgments in US courts (Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2011). The anecdotes suggest that the disruption of market access has been
a deliberate strategy of distressed debt funds to extract favorable settlements. To our
knowledge, however, there has not yet been a systematic assessment on the link between
legal disputes and sovereign access to capital markets. We therefore formulate and test
the following hypothesis:
H1 Creditor litigation and attachment attempts results in a loss of access to international
capital markets.
A second potential externality of creditor litigation is the disruption of trade, as famously
proposed by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a). In their model, creditors react to a default by
imposing legal sanctions which reduce a country’s gains from trade in financial and
goods markets. Trade financing could be cut off and countries may need to trade in
roundabout ways to avoid seizures. Rose (2005) was the first to bring this idea to the
data, showing that defaults are indeed associated with decline in trade, although he does
not analyze the underlying channel.30
Case studies from Ecuador, the Republic of Congo, and Zambia in Appendix A
illustrate how sovereign debt lawsuits can disrupt international trade. A frequently
applied strategy by creditors was to seize or block the proceeds from commodity exports
such as oil and copper. Creditor threats of seizing trade shipments go back to the 1980s,
30Diaz Alejandro (1983) and Mitchener and Weidenmier (2010) provide evidence that sanctions and
military interventions (“supersanctions”) by creditor countries had adverse effects on international trade.
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when Brazil prepared its 1987 moratorium by ordering “Brazilian oil tankers to sail from
foreign ports to avoid sequestration” (Financial Times, 23 February 1987). A more recent
case is Iraq after 2003, when the country faced pending lawsuits on defaulted Saddam-era
debt in US courts. The threat of creditor attachments on its oil exports was perceived as
being so severe, that the UN Security Council issued a special resolution to make Iraq’s
petroleum exports immune from “any form of attachment, garnishment, or execution”
(UN Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003; Buchheit et al. (2013b)). Despite these examples, no
paper has yet studied the link between trade flows and legal disputes systematically. This
brings us to our second testable hypothesis:
H2 Creditor litigation and attachment attempts result in a decline in international trade.
The third potential externality studied is delay in crisis resolution. Creditor coordination
problems have been an important concern in the policy debate on sovereign debt over
the past 20 years (Roubini and Setser, 2004; Bolton and Jeanne, 2007). (Shleifer, 2003, p.
87), for example, emphasizes that creditor litigation may induce significant “delays [in]
settlement, possibly prolonging recessions and raising the cost of IMF programs”. Recent
policy reports such as Gianviti et al. (2010), Buchheit et al. (2013b) and IMF (2013) also
describe litigation and holdouts as a main stumbling block for quick and efficient debt
workouts. Pitchford and Wright (2007) and Pitchford and Wright (2012) formalize these
concerns in the framework of a dynamic bargaining model, in which delay arises because
holdout creditors refuse to settle in order to extract better terms. Here, we aim to shed
new light on whether this type of delay is empirically relevant.
Appendix A provides anecdotal evidence on how legal disputes contributed to delays
in debt restructurings of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. One explanation is that “vulture”
creditors often enter the scene only in the last stage of a restructuring process, just
before a final agreement is reached with banks or bondholder groups.31 The entry of
professional distressed funds can alter the bargaining setting and disrupt the closure
of the deal, even if such delays are not explicitly intended by the “vulture” investors
themselves. The case studies show that holdout litigation can cause delay for a variety
of reasons: (i) governments may refuse to continue negotiating if creditors litigate or
threaten to litigate; (ii) minimum participation threshold may no longer be reached if too
many investors decide to follow the strategy of “vulture” funds and other holdouts; (iii)
and creditor committees may no longer be sufficiently representative. The deadweight
losses resulting from these delays can be costly ex-post, both to the government and to
the majority of creditors. Based on these insights and the received literature, we therefore
formulate and test our third hypothesis:
H3 Litigation can result in delay in sovereign debt renegotiations and settlement.
31Jay Newman, a senior portfolio manager of the distressed debt fund Elliott, made clear that their
“approach has always been to look for countries with a good prospect of renegotiating debt” (The Sunday
Times, 15 June 2008).
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In the empirical analysis we rely on three measures of creditor litigation against sovereigns.
The first variable, denoted as “any litigation”, is a dummy capturing whether the gov-
ernment faced at least one sovereign debt lawsuit in a given year (in London or New
York). The second measure captures the scope of litigation, computed as the share of
litigated claims in total debt restructured. Third, we use an “attachment” dummy captur-
ing whether the sovereign faces ongoing attachment proceedings and, thus, immediate
threats of asset seizures.
3.4.2 Litigation and bond market access
Access: empirical approach and preliminary analysis
To test Hypothesis H1, we need a measure of government bond market access in inter-
national markets. For this purpose, we rely on the most comprehensive database on
sovereign primary market issuance, namely the Dealogic dataset (formerly Bondware),
which is used by the IMF and many other financial institutions to track global issuance
patterns.32
A key challenge for any empirical analysis of market access is to disentangle (i) supply
effects due to foreign credit rationing and (ii) demand effects, i.e. a lack of demand for
foreign credit by the government. It is difficult to judge whether a country is “excluded”
at a given point in time, or whether it freely chooses not to issue debt. As discussed
in Gelos et al. (2011), this identification problem can be mitigated by restricting the
sample to capital-scarce countries, for which neoclassical growth theory predicts a high
and continuous demand for foreign financing. We therefore focus on developing and
emerging market countries and drop advanced economies who do not usually face credit
constraints (at least before 2010).33 For further robustness, we also drop all developing
countries classified as “net creditors” by the IMF’s World Economic Outlook publication
of 2000 or 2010, which includes oil exporters and a few other resource-rich countries.
Moreover, we check the results if we exclude years with a budget surplus, since this will
reduce the government’s demand to borrow in international markets.
To measure debt issuance, we retrieve data on 4,091 international sovereign bonds
issued between 1980 and 2010 by central governments across 101 countries worldwide
(most issuances are in London or New York). For robustness, we also retrieve bonds
issued by public or publicly guaranteed firms (28,484 bonds worldwide), as well as on
sovereign loans syndicated in international markets (2,564 loans by central governments
and 12,192 loans by public or publicly guaranteed firms). We then aggregate the micro
data on an annual basis.
The main dependent variable for market access is a dummy which takes the value
1 if the government placed a bond in international financial markets in that year and
32Gelos et al. (2011), in their study on sovereign market access between 1980–2000, also use the Dealogic
dataset.
33Accordingly, we also drop territories in a union with an advanced country, e.g. Greenland (of Denmark),
Puerto Rico (of the USA) or French Polynesia (of France).
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0 otherwise.34 Table 3.4 shows summary statistics on sovereign bond issuance with
and without litigation. In non-crisis times, bond placements occur in only 13% of all
country-year observations between 1980 and 2010. This low ratio is partly due to the
fact that more than half of all sovereigns in our sample never tapped international bond
markets between 1980 and 2010.
The probability of issuing bonds internationally is significantly lower in years with
litigation, compared to years without lawsuits. In total, we observe litigation in 189
country-year events. Out of these, there are only 12 years with an external sovereign bond
placement, a ratio of 6.3%. The difference is even more pronounced if litigation exceeds
1% of the debt under renegotiation (three issuance years out of 107 events with significant
litigation) and in years with outstanding attachment proceedings (two issuance years
out of 109). There are interesting time trends in the data, too. External bond issuances
increase substantially in the recent decade, with a nearly 100% increase in the number of
access events. But this is only true in the absence of litigation. Indeed, between 2000 and
2010, we could not identify a single case in which governments tapped external bond
markets in a year in which they also faced creditor litigation.
We next look at post-crisis episodes, in particular on those 58 yearly cases in which
creditors continued to litigate (with attachment proceedings) after the debt crisis formally
ended. Out of the 58 post-restructuring spells with attachment attempts we find only one
case with a successful bond placement (1.7%).35 This is despite that fact that post-crisis
years are usually periods of heightened sovereign issuance activity, as shown in Table 3.4.
Indeed, the probability of issuing a sovereign bond in the three years following a debt
crisis is 18.4% in case of no litigation (excluding bonds issued in a debt restructuring).
This is more than 10 times the probability of bond issuance than in post-crisis years with
attachment litigation.
The stark differences in borrowing patterns with and without litigation are further
illustrated in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. Figure 3.4 plots the distribution of bond issuances for
the entire dataset, which shows that very few bonds have been issued while litigation was
pending, and those that could be observed were comparatively small in size. Figure 3.5
focuses on the case of Argentina after its 2001 default. The country was among the most
active emerging market sovereign bond issuers during the 1990s, but it has not placed a
single sovereign bond in international markets between its moratorium of January 2002
and December 2013, a spell of 12 years. The private sector, in contrast, has re-accessed
foreign bond markets on a regular basis starting in late 2003, when economic conditions
improved.
Did Argentina’s government voluntary abstain from foreign markets? Until the
34Contrary to Gelos et al. (2011), we explicitly include issuances that merely roll-over debt coming due
(evergreening), i.e. access years in which the country is effectively repaying and not borrowing. This is
because we are broadly interested in market access (and the loss of it) both for the purpose of refinancing as
for new borrowing. However, we do exclude all bonds and loans issued in the context of a debt restructuring.
35The event are two foreign bonds issued by Ecuador for a total of USD 500m in 1997, one year prior to its
default, at an interest rate above 10%.
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mid-2000s, the answer is probably yes. The country achieved substantial debt relief in
its 2005 debt exchange (involving a 75% haircut) and also succeeded in borrowing on
domestic markets as well as bilaterally, from countries such as Venezuela. But in recent
years, the government has run substantial deficits and repeatedly signaled its willingness
to return to foreign bond markets.36 Indeed, market observers, the financial press and US
officials all share the view that “holdout lawsuits have effectively barred the Government
of Argentina from international markets, just as its financing needs are expected to spike
during 2009-2011”.37
Summarizing, the descriptive evidence suggests a strong negative correlation between
sovereign bond issuances and the occurrence and intensity of sovereign debt litigation in
US and UK courts.
To account for country-specific effects as well as time-varying determinants of market
access, we next run fixed effects panel regressions following Gelos et al. (2011). As above,
our main dependent variable is an “access” dummy capturing whether the country
issued one or more sovereign bonds in a given year. In the robustness section, we
also create alternative access measures, in particular (i) a dummy that also accounts for
sovereign syndicated loans signed in that year (bond or loan placement), (ii) a dummy
also capturing bond issuance by public or publicly guaranteed firms (sovereign or public
sector access), (iii) a dummy measuring “full access”, defined as 1 for those years in
which sovereign bond issuances exceed 1% of GDP, and (iv) a continuous measure of
sovereign bond issuance to GDP (in per cent). We estimate the following equation:
logit(Prob(Accessit = 1)) = (3.1)
β1ShareLitit + β2log(GDP/capita)it−1 + β3Debt/GDPit−1 + β4Reserves/Importsit−1
+ β5Short/Totalit−1 + β5δGDPit−1 + β6Trade/GDPit−1 + β7PolRiskit−1 + β8 IMFit−1
+ β9De f aultit−1 + β10De f ault3Yrit + αi + θt + ϵit
where Prob(Access = 1) denotes the probability that government i had foreign bond
market access in year t. After a standard logit transformation we can estimate the
corresponding coefficients. Specifically, we include measures of solvency (Debt/GDP),
liquidity (share of short-term debt, reserves to imports), GDP per capita and the real
growth rate, a measure of economic openness (imports plus exports to GDP) a proxy for
political risk as well as crisis-related variables, in particular whether the country signed
an IMF rescue program and whether the country is (or has been recently) in default. In
addition, we include proxies for the severity of the debt crisis, in particular the size of
haircuts from Cruces and Trebesch (2013) and a continuous credit rating measure by the
Institutional Investor magazine (we use the rating residual to avoid multicollinearity).
Table 3.3 describes the set of time-varying control variables, which are all lagged by one
36See e.g. MercoPress, 4 August 2009, “Argentina pays bond and seeks to return to global capital markets”,
or Bloomberg, 5 December 2013, “Argentina’s return to bond market seen in Blejer road map”.
37US embassy cable, 23 September 2008, released by Wikileaks.
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year.
For reasons of data availability we drop small countries with a population of less than
one million (in 2010). This yields a final panel of 133 developing countries, of which only
66 issued a sovereign external bond in our sample. The inclusion of country fixed effects
implies that our analysis focuses on this subset of 66 market access countries, which
experience both spells of access and of non-access (exclusion) over our sample period.
We also include year fixed effects, to account for shocks such as the Mexican crisis of 1995
or the global financial crisis after 2008. Identification thus comes from the within-country
variation in litigation events after accounting for global trends.
Access: estimation results
Table 3.6 shows our main result: legal disputes are a significant negative predictor of
foreign bond market access by developing countries.38 The plain litigation indicator is
not significant, but the continuous measures of litigated claims to total debt restructured
and the dummy for attachment attempts are significant throughout. This is true after
controlling for country and year fixed effects, time varying macroeconomic and political
conditions and current and lagged default. Litigation thus appears to play a role above
and beyond the debt crisis effect per se. The relevance of our finding in non-crisis times
is further confirmed in column (4) which excludes all default years according to Standard
& Poor’s (2006, 2011). The main results also hold when we restrict the sample to the
period after 1992, when “vulture funds” entered the scene and bond issuance became the
main vehicle of sovereign lending (column 5). Moreover, our findings hold if we drop
resource-rich countries classified as “net creditors” (column 6), and if we drop years in
which the government had an overall budget surplus and may therefore not have wanted
to borrow abroad (litigation remains significant at the 10% level).
The estimated coefficients are economically large. The predicted probability of bond
market access in our benchmark models in column (2) and (3) drops from 19.1% to
0.7% once a country faces litigation with attachment attempts.39 At the average share
of litigated claims (3.3% of restructured debt in this sample), the predicted probability
of access is only 1.7% in a given year. This probability drops to virtually zero once we
increase the scope of litigation by half a standard deviation above the mean (to 6.5% of
restructured debt).
We next account for the fact that litigation may not occur randomly, but could be
correlated with “tough” defaults with high haircuts. Columns (7) and (8) address this
potential selection effect into litigation. Column (7) includes a credit rating residual
capturing creditworthiness beyond macroeconomic conditions, which we obtain by
regressing the Institutional Investor credit rating (ranging from 0 to 100) on the other
38 The empirical specification closely follows Gelos et al. (2011), except for the litigation measures and the
fact that we expand their panel by 10 years, until 2010. . We find very similar results, e.g. on Debt/GDP, the
default dummies and ratings.
39This translates into an average marginal effect of -0.42, assuming αi = 0.
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macroeconomic control variables contained in the model. In column (8) we then replace
the binary default dummies (current and lagged) with a variable that captures the size of
haircuts (in %), assigned for each year in the respective debt restructuring spell, as well
as a 3-year haircut lag. The results confirm the finding of Cruces and Trebesch (2013) in
that higher haircuts are associated with a lower probability of regaining market access.
Moreover, litigation remains significant with a slightly lower marginal effect. The same is
true if we account for the widely used country credit ratings by the Institutional Investor
magazine, which have the most comprehensive coverage in our sample.
For the regressions in columns (9)-(11), we use foreign bond placement data from
Bloomberg as an alternative source to Dealogic. We find our results to be very similar
when using Bloomberg, which suggests that our findings do not hinge on the data source
employed.
In Table 3.7, we use a set of alternative dependent variables. In column (1) we show
that the results hold when using an access dummy that accounts for issuances by public
or publicly guaranteed firms. This is important since sovereigns may issue debt via
state owned companies to reduce the risk of litigation and attachment. Column (2) also
considers bank loans to sovereigns in the form of syndicated lending agreements (based
on Dealogic data). Litigation remains significant, but only at the 10% level and with
a smaller marginal effect. Column (3) uses a dummy of “full access”, while columns
(4) and (5) use bond issuance to GDP as a dependent variable. In each case litigation
remains a significant predictor. This is also true when dropping the three main countries
affected by sovereign legal disputes: Argentina, Brazil and Peru.
For robustness, we also run a placebo test using private sector foreign bond issuance
to GDP, in the spirit of Figure 3.5. To construct this additional dependent variable,
we again rely on Dealogic and retrieve details on all 4,764 externally issued bonds by
corporations across 70 developing countries between 1980 and 2010, and counting only
issuances by domestic firms not owned by a foreign mother company. Column (6) shows
that our litigation measure is insignificant and has a much smaller coefficient than with
respect to government borrowing. We conclude that legal disputes over sovereign debt
matter only for the government’s market access, but not for external bond issuance of
the private sector.
Finally, we consider domestic debt placements, to understand the dynamics of where
governments borrow when facing litigation (at home or abroad). The left hand side
variable in columns (7)-(9) is the share of bonds issued domestically to total bond
borrowing, by country and year. Domestic borrowing is not threatened by creditor
litigation or seizure, since a government can always introduce legislation and immunize
its domestic debt against attachment. Thus, if litigation deters countries from issuing
debt abroad, we should see an increase in the share of domestic bond issuance relative
to foreign borrowing. Since this variable is a fraction bounded between 0 and 1, we
run a fractional response model as suggested by for instance Papke and Wooldridge
(2008). The results confirm our priors: we find a positive correlation of litigation with the
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share of domestic bonds to total bonds. The average marginal effects reported imply a
considerable quantitative effect: in years with litigation or attachment proceedings, the
predicted share of domestic bonds relative to foreign bonds rises from 20 to more than
80%. These findings further strengthen our conclusion that pending creditor litigation
deters governments from issuing debt abroad.
3.4.3 Litigation and international trade
Trade: empirical approach and preliminary analysis
To test Hypothesis H2, on the effects on international trade, we build on the widely-used
empirical framework by Rose (2005) and Martinez and Sandleris (2011).40 They employ
a standard gravity model of international trade using the average value of annual real
bilateral exports and imports (in logs) as the dependent variable and bilateral default
indicators as main explanatory variable. Specifically, Rose (2005) exploits information
on Paris Club renegotiations of official (government-to-government) debt between devel-
oping country debtors and about 20 creditor governments, which yields a country-pair
measure of default. To test for the general decline in trade after default, Martinez and
Sandleris (2011) control for an additional variable indicating if any Paris Club debt was
rescheduled in a given year, not only via-á-vis the bilateral trading partner. Both studies
find a strong and long-lasting negative correlation of sovereign defaults and trade, but
neither of the two tests for a channel underlying the decline in trade.
Here we test the proposition of Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) that litigating creditors
are capable of disrupting trade flows, thus contributing to the observed decline in trade
volumes after a default. In line with Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) we focus the analysis
on litigation cases that involve attempts to attach debtor country assets, also because
litigation without the threat of asset seizures should not matter for trade in goods.
Attachment attempts could disrupt trade directly, since they reduce the observable
payment and export flows, or indirectly, due to the anticipated effects of legal action
on future goods exchange. Empirically, we employ the same benchmark model as the
aforementioned studies, but augment it with indicators for legal creditor action:
ln(Tradeij,t) = γAttachLitij,t + βXij,t +
N
∑
n=0
φRestrij,t−m + ϵij,t (3.2)
where Tradeijt denotes the mean of the export and import flows between countries i and
j in year t, AttachLitij,t is coded as 1 if one of the countries faces creditor litigation with
attachment attempts in year t and 0 otherwise, Restrij,t is an indicator which captures
bilateral default (Paris Club restructurings) involving i and j, and N represents a number
of lags of the default indicator. Xij,t is a vector of the standard gravity controls used in
40Additional papers on the link between trade and default include Borensztein and Panizza (2009) and
Kohlscheen and O’Connell (2006) who focus on trade credits, as well as Borensztein and Panizza (2010) and
Zymek (2012) who use industry-level data.
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previous studies. ϵij,t is an error term containing a time-varying random part which is
zero in expectation and a country-pair specific constant.
The main coefficient of interest is γ, which captures the additional impact of creditor
attachment attempts. If attachments disrupt trade we expect γ to be negative and
significant.
As in section 3.4.2, we use the same data and estimations as previous papers. Specifi-
cally, we build on Rose (2005) and expand his dataset until 2007 for 207 countries and
territories (building on Agronovsky and Trebesch, 2009). Bilateral trade volumes come
from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (as of May 2008), while the data on restruc-
turings are taken from the Paris Club website (as of December 2008). We also include
a control variable for the onset of an IMF program (from the IMF website), real GDP
in levels and per capita from the World Development Indicators, colonial relationships
from the CIA World Factbook, currency unions from Glick and Rose (2002), and regional
trade agreements from the WTO (the latter three variables are taken from the original
Rose dataset). Country- and dyad-specific factors such as distance, common borders,
and further time-invariant variables are absorbed by the dyad fixed effects and thus not
explicitly included. Our main explanatory variable (AttachLit) indicates whether litigat-
ing creditors filed enforcement proceedings or launched attachment attempts against the
defaulting country in a given year.
Table 3.5 shows summary statistics on the relationship between litigation and in-
ternational trade, where trade is measured as average imports plus exports between
two countries (in per cent of their average GDP). In a first step, we divide the sample
into normal times (non-crisis years) and crisis years (with at least one country in the
dyad being in a debt crisis). For the sake of this Table, default is captured by Paris Club
restructurings and includes the immediate post-default episode (three year lag). In line
with Rose (2005) and Martinez and Sandleris (2011) we find that trade is significantly
lower during and after sovereign defaults. The mean bilateral trading volume in normal
times is ca. 0.5% of average GDP, compared to less than 0.2% in default episodes. In a
second step, we compare years with and without pending attachment proceedings by
litigating creditors. We find significant differences, as bilateral trade is less than half
during years with attachment attempts. This result, however, may be due to the fact that
most litigation cases occur during debt crises, when trade is generally lower. In a last
step, we therefore focus on post-crisis episodes (outside default) and compare years with
and without ongoing attachment attempts. The results confirm that trade is significantly
lower if creditors continue to litigate aggressively in the aftermath of debt crises.
Trade: estimation results
The results from equation 3.2 are reported in Table 3.8. All estimates include country-
dyad fixed effects, N = 10 lags for the restructuring indicator, and show standard
errors clustered on country-pair level. The main insight is that legal creditor action is a
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significant predictor of trade flows. While the plain litigation dummy is not significant
(column 1), the continuous measure on the share of debt litigated is significant with
a sizable negative coefficient (column 2). As expected, the results are strongest when
including the indicator of litigation with attachment attempts. Indeed, attachment
attempts are associated with a decline in bilateral trade of about 11 percent over and
above the impact of a default per se (column 3). This is an economically very large
effect. All other findings are similar to Rose (2005). In particular, we find that a debt
rescheduling between two countries is associated with a 6 percent reduction in trade
between these countries. Put differently, we find that legal disputes are a more important
factor to explain trade during crises than default events per se.
In Column (4) we show that the result is robust when following the model by Martinez
and Sandleris (2011), which includes a general restructuring indicator as well as the
bilateral dummy used by Rose. Like Martinez and Sandleris (2011) we find the general
restructuring variable and its lags to have more explanatory power, while the bilateral
restructuring dummy turns insignificant. However, the dummy for attachment attempts
is large and statistically significant in both models, so that we can confirm that countries
facing seizure proceedings see a decline in their trade of more than 10%.
As before, we also account for the possibility that litigation is itself the consequence
of particularly severe defaults with high haircuts. We therefore augment the specification
by including the size of haircuts in years with a restructuring with private (not Paris
Club) creditors as well as by adding a three-year haircut lag (using data by Cruces and
Trebesch (2013)). Column (5) shows that the results on litigation hold and that creditor
losses appear to be relevant: a one-percentage point increase in haircut size is associated
with a 0.6% decline in trade - over and above the Paris Club restructuring effect.
The remainder of Table 3.8 shows results of additional robustness checks: column (6)
includes decade fixed effects, column (7) restricts the sample to post 2000 years, column
(8) drops Argentina, Brazil and Peru, the debtor countries facing most creditor litigation
cases in our sample, while column (9) includes the Institutional Investor ratings (we again
use residuals to account for multicollinearity). Our main finding holds when dropping
the three most affected countries and when controlling for ratings, but we no longer
find attachment attempts to be significant once we control for time trends or year effects.
Nevertheless the sign and size of the coefficient remains large. In a final step, we check in
how far the results hold in various subsamples. We find the model to be rather sensitive
to the time period chosen. Most importantly, we find that the link between default and
trade is no longer significant in the 2000s. However, attachment litigation continues to
show a large marginal effect and remains significant, albeit only at the 10% level (column
7).
Overall, our results provide supportive evidence on H2, but the estimated coefficients
are less robust than with regard to market access. In particular, we find litigation to turn
insignificant once we account for time trends in the data.
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3.4.4 Litigation and restructuring delay
Delay: empirical approach and preliminary analysis
To analyze delays in debt crisis resolution (H3) we draw on a new monthly dataset by
Trebesch (2013), who codes the process of debt restructurings between sovereigns and
foreign commercial creditors in the period 1970-2010 (based on qualitative sources and
using the sample of Cruces and Trebesch 2013). Our main period of interest is the debt
renegotiation period - from the start of talks between creditors and the government41 until
the final debt restructuring, which is observed for 131 restructurings in our sample.42
We thus drop the starting phase of a debt crisis and, thus, years of unilateral default
without negotiation. This helps us in several respects. First, the starting phase of default
without negotiations can be very long (on average more than a third of total duration)
and these initial delays may be intended by debtor governments that have no ability
or willingness to resume payments.43 Dropping years of unilateral default will also
allow us to address concerns of reverse causality, since protracted defaults can motivate
creditor lawsuits in the first place. One such example is the case of Peru in the early
1990s, where creditors filed suit with the explicit purpose of forcing the government
to the negotiation table after five years of unilateral default.44 We therefore focus on
those (sub-)episodes in which both the government and creditor representatives clearly
signaled their willingness to engage in serious debt restructuring talks. Nevertheless, we
will also show that the results hold when using total restructuring duration, defined as
the month from the start of the crisis (default or the announcement of a debt exchange)
until the final restructuring.
When matching the duration data with our measures of litigation we automatically
constrain the analysis to pre-restructuring litigation, meaning lawsuits or attachment
proceedings that are initiated prior to the official closure of the debt restructuring. In
line with Hypothesis H3 we therefore disregard all lawsuits that are initiated only after
the conclusion of the restructuring (43% of all), since they can no longer cause delays in
concluding a debt settlement with the majority of creditors.
The resulting summary statistics show that negotiations take significantly longer to
conclude when creditors litigate in London or New York. On average, the period from
the start of negotiations until the key debt settlement takes 32 months without litigation,
but 74 months with litigation, more than twice as long. These patterns are confirmed
when plotting non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival estimates. The resulting statistic
41The start of debt negotiations is the month of the first formal meeting with the bank advisory committee
(for bank deals of the 1980s and 1990s) or the first meeting with bondholder representatives for the sake of
debt restructuring (for bond deals).
42the final debt restructuring date is defined as the month of the official debt exchange/settlement (for
bond deals) or the month of the final agreement (for commercial bank deals).
43Bi (2008) and Benjamin and Wright (2009) show that both countries and their creditors can benefit from
“waiting for a larger cake”, thus postponing debt renegotiations until the economy recovery.
44Between 1990 and 1993, the Fujimori administration refused to start debt negotiations or resume
payments, stating that it intended to wait until the economy had improved. The debt restructuring process
was initiated only in late 1993.
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reports the compound probability of not having finalized a restructuring for each month
after the start of negotiation. Figure 3.6 shows that, at each point in time, negotiations
involving creditor lawsuits show a lower probability of being concluded, with differences
significant at the 10% level.
To assess the determinants of restructuring duration more systematically, we next
estimate a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model which can deal with the
problems of censored observations and multiple events. For this model, the hazard rate
for the ith individual (or ith negotiation episode) can be written as
Hi(t) = h0(t)exp(βz) (3.3)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, z a set of covariates and β a vector of
regression coefficients. A main advantage of the Cox model is that it is not necessary
to specify a functional form of the baseline hazard rate h0(t). Instead, the shape of
h0(t) is assumed to be unknown and is left unparameterized. Accordingly, we estimate
reduced form models via partial likelihood and allow the functional form of the hazard
function to be explained by the data. To avoid misleading inference due to repeated
events (multiple restructurings of the same country), we rely on the variance correction
method proposed by Lin and Wei (1989).
The Cox model is also advantageous since it allows us to include time varying
litigation measures. The dummy variables on litigation and attachment proceedings
can be switched on (and off) in those months in which they are initiated (or ended).
More importantly, we can now measure the continuous “share of claims in total debt
restructured” at monthly frequency, thus capturing the scope of debt under litigation
at each point in time. We expect the scope of litigation to matter most for negotiation
delays, since more (expected) holdouts will reduce creditor participation and potentially
undermine any agreement reached between governments and creditor representatives.
The share of debt litigated is therefore our main variable of interest.
All specifications include year fixed effects and a set of control variables, which is
important since the same factors causing settlement delays could also cause litigation
to occur. Specifically, we account for creditor characteristics, in particular a dummy for
bond restructurings and a dummy capturing whether creditors organized themselves
into a committee that was officially recognized by the debtor government (both from
Trebesch, 2013). We also account for debtor country characteristics, in particular whether
restructuring was under the umbrella of the HIPC initiative or otherwise supported by the
World Bank’s debt relief initiative for the poorest countries, as well as a (monthly) dummy
variable capturing whether the country was currently under an IMF program (from the
IMF website). We also include a proxy for global interest rates for risky borrowers (using
the monthly Baa Corporate Bond Yield index by Moody’s) and a variable on the number
of previous restructurings since 1970 to explicitly account for restructuring experience.
Furthermore, in the robustness analysis, we control for the size of haircuts implied in
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each of the restructurings (from Cruces and Trebesch (2013)), for Institutional Investor
country credit ratings (available at semi-annual frequency), for per capita GDP (annually
at PPP, from the World Development Indicators) as well as for a monthly measure of
economic growth forecasts, namely the ICRG indicator on the “risk to real GDP growth”.
Table 3.3 describes each variable in detail.
Delay: estimation results
Table 3.9 shows the results for various specifications of the Cox proportional hazard
model. A positive coefficient indicates that higher values of that variable are associated
with quicker settlement relative to the baseline, while negative coefficients indicate longer
negotiation duration.
The main finding is that our litigation indicators show a negative and statistically
significant coefficient throughout. The baseline coefficient of -0.40 in column (3) implies
that a one percentage point increase in litigated claims (to total debt restructured) can be
associated with a 34% lower likelihood of successful renegotiation in any given month.
The occurrence of pre-restructuring litigation per se (column 1) appears to lower the
probability of settlement by 60%. Columns (4) and (5) show that litigation remains
significant when dropping the three main countries affected by litigation (Argentina,
Brazil and Peru) and when restricting the sample to crises starting after 1992 U˝ with a
somewhat higher quantitative effect.
The results are qualitatively similar when we account for potentially important
confounders. In column (6) we add the country credit rating variable, which has
little impact on the estimates. Column (7) shows that litigation remains significant
when controlling for haircut size, although the estimated litigation coefficient is notably
reduced. In contrast, the litigation coefficient actually doubles when we control for
income levels and growth prospects in column (8). This is surprising and may be due
to the considerably smaller sample in this specification.45 In a final step, we show that
litigation also remains significant when considering total duration instead of only the
duration of negotiations (see column (9)).
Taken together, the evidence supports Hypothesis H3 suggesting that legal disputes
do indeed result in delays in debt settlements. Nevertheless, our empirical approach
does not allow us to fully rule out the possibility of reverse causality or of a confounding
factor driving both delay and litigation intensity. Our main result should therefore not
be interpreted as a causal effect, but rather as a strong conditional correlation.
45If our empirical model is misspecified, this result might also be driven by multicollinearity. Indeed, we
find that the ICRG indicator of growth prospects is highly correlated with our measure of share litigated,
with a correlation coefficient of 0.43. This suggests that legal action is more likely in good times, which is in
line with the strategy of major distressed debt funds. Elliot manager Jay Newman, for example, explained in
a 2008 interview that “we do not acquire the debt of countries that have no means to pay.” (15 June 2008,
The Sunday Times).
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper shows that legal disputes between creditors and governments have become
an important ingredient of sovereign debt markets, in particular during crisis times.
Sovereign debt is still far from being easily enforceable in court, as attachment and
debt collection remains very difficult and costly for creditors. But our case studies and
econometric results indicate that legal disputes can cause significant economic costs for
the sovereign, by impeding government external borrowing, by disrupting international
trade, and by delaying crisis resolution. These findings stand in contrast to the view that
holdout litigation is nothing more than a minor nuisance (e.g. Roubini, 2002; Moody’s,
2013).
The empirical results have implications for theory. Most importantly, they are con-
sistent with the idea that creditors can retaliate against defaults via legal means and by
“throwing sand in the wheels” of the economy in defaulting countries. We thus provide
empirical support for models assuming legal sanctions or related deadweight costs of
default, e.g. Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), Bolton and Jeanne (2007). The findings also
suggest that litigation is one channel explaining why governments are excluded from
foreign credit markets during and after sovereign defaults (in line with Pitchford and
Wright, 2012). In the literature, it is commonly assumed that defaulters loose market
access, but there is little empirical evidence on the underlying channel. More generally,
if the trends we describe continue, and if our findings are confirmed in future research,
they could have important implications for sovereign borrowing. The threat of disruptive
litigation may give sovereigns a new commitment device, with repayment becoming
more credible when debt is issued under English or New York law (see the discussion in
Shleifer, 2003).
Looking forward, there are few reasons to assume that the ex-post cost of legal
disputes will decrease anytime soon. Collective action clauses, in particular, are unlikely
to prevent litigation and holdouts in future debt crises. For example, the newly introduced
Euro-CACs are no “wonder-clause”, but likely to disappoint the high hopes that some
place on them, as explained by Gelpern and Gulati (2013), IMF (2013) and Zettelmeyer
et al. (2013).46 We therefore see the need for more research on sovereign debt disputes.
Several questions remain open. What explains the rise of creditor litigation and the
variation across cases? What are the welfare effects of the developments we describe?
And has the “legal threat” affected sovereign lending or government willingness to pay?
Answering these questions is challenging and goes beyond the scope of this paper. What
we can say with some certainty, however, is that the risk of litigation has influenced
46Euro-CACs have high voting thresholds and their design will make it relatively easy for creditors to
reject a restructuring, hold out, or go to court. Despite these limitations, the International Capital Markets
Association (ICMA), an influential trade body, recently suggested to adopt a similar design as the standard
in sovereign bond issues worldwide. Besides, it takes time until any new contractual clause becomes effective
in the entire outstanding debt stock. Even if the Euro-CACs were to be modified, we will have to wait 5 to
10 years until the new bonds become the dominant type of sovereign debt outstanding in the Eurozone.
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the way debt crises have been resolved in recent years, in particular the design of
debt exchange offers and the treatment of holdout creditors. An important example
is the Greek debt restructuring of 2012. At the time of writing, Greece continues to
pay holdout creditors of ‘old’ English-law bonds in full and on time, i.e. 100% of face
value. Reportedly, concerns of litigation in the UK have been a main reason why Greece
decided not to impose a haircut on its English-law holdouts, thus foregoing EUR 4.1 bn
in additional debt relief (more than 2% of Greek GDP, see Zettelmeyer et al. (2013)). On a
broader level, Buchheit et al. (2013b) argue that the fear of litigation and holdouts is an
important explanation why we have seen so few sovereign debt restructurings in Europe.
To avoid a “messy” default à la Argentina, policymakers may have become more prone
to official sector bailouts.
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Figures
Figure 3.2: The rise of creditor litigation (case number and amounts)
The bars show the number of outstanding creditor lawsuits against sovereigns in US and UK courts for each
year between 1976 and 2010 (pending cases, left axis). The blue line reflects the total amount under litigation
in 2005 USD excluding accrued interest or penalty interest (face value, right axis). The figure shows a strong
increase in case numbers and case volumes over the past decades.
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Figure 3.3: Restructurings with and without litigation
The figure shows the number of sovereign debt restructurings implemented in each year (left axis, light
bars) and the subset of these restructurings that were affected by at least one creditor filing suit in a US or
UK court (dark bars). The red line depicts the five-year moving average of the ratio of debt restructurings
affected versus those not affected (share affected in %, right axis).
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Figure 3.4: Bond market access with and without litigation
The figure shows histograms on the frequency and amounts of sovereign external bond issuances. The
sample is divided into the subset of country-years with litigation (red bars, right axis) and without litigation
(blue bars, left axis). The figure shows statistics only for those years with bond issuance.. The data show
that only very few bonds are issued while governments face litigation (including crisis years and non-crisis
years).
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Figure 3.5: Foreign borrowing in Argentina: sovereign vs. corporate
The figure plots the volume of bonds placed by the Argentine government (dark bars) and private Argentine
companies (light grey bars) between 1997 and 2013. Both the government and private firms were active bor-
rowers in the 1990s. After the 2001 default, only the private sector returned to issuing bonds internationally.
The loss of market access by the Argentine government coincides with more than 40 lawsuits filed by private
creditors over the past decade.
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Figure 3.6: Duration of negotiations with and without litigation
This figure plots two survival functions of restructuring negotiations with and without creditor litigation. The
vertical axis shows the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for each function, which represents the unconditional
joint probability that negotiations continue for each month after the start of the negotiations (horizontal
axis). The estimates show that restructuring negotiations without creditor litigation are mostly concluded
after three years, while those involving litigation have a more than 25% probability of exceeding four years.
The differences are significant at the 10% level.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Litigation cases by decade, region and type of creditor
All Cases Cases excluding Argentina
2001-10
Total cases 120 79
Debtor countries 25 25
HIPC cases 21 21
Number Percent Number Percent
Decade
1970 2 1.7% 2 2.5%
1980 6 5.0% 6 7.6%
1990 51 42.5% 51 64.6%
2000 55 45.8% 16 20.3%
Region
Africa 27 22.5% 27 34.2%
Americas 79 65.8% 38 48.1%
Asia 12 10.0% 12 15.2%
Europe 2 1.7% 2 2.5%
Type of creditor
Bank 30 25.0% 28 35.4%
Fund 63 52.5% 26 32.9%
Other 21 17.5% 19 24.1%
Unknown 6 5.0% 6 7.6%
Jurisdiction
US 102 85.0% 61 77.2%
UK 15 12.5% 15 19.0%
Arbitration 3 2.5% 3 3.8%
Outcome
Judgment Satisfied 13 10.8% 13 15.5%
OCS 48 40.0% 47 59.5%
Failed 4 3.3% 3 3.8%
Pending 41 34.1% 2 2.5%
Unknown 14 11.7% 14 17.7%
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Table 3.2: List of creditor litigation cases, by restructuring event
Restruct.
Event
Debtor Plaintiff Type of
Creditor
Suit Filed Outcome Jurisdiction Face Value (Mn
USD)
2005 Argentina 41 institutional plaintiffs (plus 13 class action suits) fund, other 2002-2010 United States 2868.6
[For brevity, we omit the detailed information on the lawsuits filed against Argentina after its 2001/02 default.]
1987 Argentina Weltover, Springdale Enterprises, Bank Cantrada other 18/10/1989 OCS United States 1.3
1987 Argentina Sayal . 18/05/1992 OCS United States .
1994 Bulgaria A.I. Trade Finance other 15/03/1996 Judgment satisfied Arbitration 12.0
1993 Bolivia Woodstead Associates . 17/05/1993 OCS United States 0.9
1994 Brazil CIBC Bank And Trust Company fund 28/06/1994 OCS United States 1400.0
1998 Cote d’Ivoire Water Street Bank & Trust fund 04/04/1994 OCS United States 8.0
2003 Cameroon Del Favero other . . United Kingdom 2.9
2003 Cameroon Winslow Bank and Trust fund . OCS United Kingdom 9.9
1989 Congo, Dem. Rep. Red Mountain Finance fund 31/12/1997 OCS United Kingdom 8.6
1988 Congo National Union Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh other 15/07/1987 Judgment satisfied United Kingdom .
2007 Congo AF-CAP and Connecticut Bank of Commerce fund 1985 OCS United States 6.5
2007 Congo National Union Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh and C ITOH Middle East other 1990 OCS United States 10.4
2007 Congo Commisions Import Export other 2000 pending Arbitration 83.6
2007 Congo Water Street Bank & Trust fund 18/03/1994 OCS United States .
2007 Congo FG Hemisphere Associates fund 26/09/2001 OCS United States 35.9
2007 Congo Kensington International fund 14/10/2002 OCS United Kingdom 20.8
2007 Congo Walker International Holdings fund . OCS United States .
1983 Costa Rica Libra Bank, Banque Rotschild, National Bank of Washington, and 5 further banks bank 14/09/1981 OCS United States 40.0
1983 Costa Rica Allied Bank International bank 02/1982 OCS United States 5.2
2004 Dominica The Export-Import Bank of The Republic of China bank 07/2005 OCS United States 11.3
1995 Ecuador Weston Compagnie de Finance et D’Investissement fund 26/04/1993 OCS United States 20.8
1995 Ecuador Water Street Bank & Trust fund 14/07/1995 OCS United States 6.0
1995 Ecuador Banco del Pacifico and two further banks bank 12/03/1996 Judgment satisfied United States 9.7
1995 Ecuador Asociacion Fe Y Alegria, HSBC, and 11 further banks bank 07/12/1998 . United States .
2000 Ecuador Libra Bank bank 23/12/1998 OCS United States .
2000 Ecuador Bank of America bank 27/02/2001 unsuccesful United States 5.0
2005 Grenada The Export-Import Bank of The Republic of China bank 29/03/2006 pending United States 20.3
1992 Guyana Green Mining and Export Services other 1992 OCS United States 14.1
1999 Guyana Booker . 18/09/2001 OCS Arbitration 10.5
2006 Iraq First City, Texas-Houston bank 15/11/1990 OCS United States 49.9
2006 Iraq Commercial Bank of Kuwait bank 26/09/1991 . United States 33.0
2006 Iraq The Bank of New York bank 24/07/1992 . United States .
2006 Iraq National Bank of Kuwait bank 17/05/1993 . United States 20.0
2006 Iraq Alahli Bank of Kuwait, Lazard, and 14 further banks bank 22/09/1995 . United States .
2006 Iraq Arab American Bank bank 11/12/1995 Judgment satisfied United States .
2006 Iraq Midland Bank, Barclays, RBS, BNP, and 8 further banks bank 05/1996 . United Kingdom .
2006 Iraq Alahli Bank of Kuwait bank 04/09/1996 OCS United States 23.7
2006 Iraq Hyundai Corporation, Hyundai Engineering & Construction other 02/12/1997 unsuccesful United States .
2006 Iraq Agrocomplect other 23/01/2007 unsuccesful United States 47.5
1985 Jamaica A.I. Credit Corporation other . . United States 10.0
continues on next page
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Table 3.2: List of creditor litigation cases, by restructuring event (continued)
Restruct.
Event
Debtor Plaintiff Type of
Creditor
Suit Filed Outcome Jurisdiction Face Value (Mn
USD)
2009 Liberia Taiyo Kobe Syndicate bank 2008 OCS United Kingdom .
2009 Liberia Colonial Bank bank 2008 OCS United Kingdom 5.8
2009 Liberia Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Bank of Tokyo, UBS, and 10 further banks bank 12/12/1990 OCS United States .
2009 Liberia Meridien International Bank Limited bank 10/01/1991 OCS United States 12.1
2009 Liberia Liberian National Petroleum Company other 21/02/1991 . United States .
2009 Liberia Continental Grain Company other 30/06/1994 Judgment satisfied United States .
2009 Liberia Hamsah Investments and Wall Capital fund 15/02/2002 OCS United States 6.5
2009 Liberia Montrose Capital fund 07/01/2005 . United States 26.0
2009 Liberia JP Morgan Chase bank 18/05/2006 OCS United States .
1983 Nigeria Texas Trading & Milling Corp. other 1976 . United States 56.0
1983 Nigeria Verlinden other 1980 . United States 14.4
1983 Nigeria Trendtex Trading Corporation other 04/11/1975 . United Kingdom 14.0
1995 Nicaragua LNC Investments fund 22/08/1996 OCS United States 26.3
1995 Nicaragua International Bank of Miami, ANZ Banking Group, Swiss Bank, and 8 further banks and funds fund 22/07/1997 OCS United States 175.0
1995 Nicaragua GP Hemisphere Associates fund 06/10/1999 Judgment satisfied United States 30.9
1995 Nicaragua Van Eck Emerging Markets Opportunity Fund and Greylock Global Opportunity Fund fund 03/08/2000 Judgment satisfied United States 13.0
2007 Nicaragua 14 Octobar Krusevac, and 4 further commercial creditors other 04/04/2007 OCS United States 9.3
1996 Panama Water Street Bank & Trust fund 12/04/1994 unsuccesful United States .
1996 Panama Elliott Associates fund 15/07/1996 OCS United States 28.7
1997 Peru Bank of America, Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Bank of Tokyo, and 9 further banks bank 02/03/1990 OCS United States .
1997 Peru European American Bancorp bank 07/03/1990 OCS United States .
1997 Peru Financial Overseas Holding fund 08/03/1990 OCS United States .
1997 Peru Bankers Trust Company bank 09/03/1990 OCS United States .
1997 Peru Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of NY bank 15/03/1990 OCS United States .
1997 Peru Wells Fargo Bank, DG Bank, and two further banks bank 15/03/1990 OCS United States .
1997 Peru Mellon Bank bank 23/03/1990 OCS United States .
1997 Peru American Home Assurance Company, National Union Fire Insurance, and 8 further insurance companies other 30/03/1990 OCS United States .
1997 Peru International Commercial Bank . 18/05/1990 OCS United States .
1997 Peru American Security Bank bank 20/07/1990 OCS United States .
1997 Peru Pravin Banker Associates fund 07/01/1993 Judgment satisfied United States 1.4
1997 Peru Banco Cafetero (Panama) bank 16/05/1994 Judgment satisfied United States 5.0
1997 Peru Elliott Associates fund 21/10/1996 Judgment satisfied United States 20.7
1994 Poland Water Street Bank & Trust fund 04/06/1994 OCS United States 3.7
1993 Paraguay Banque de Gestion Privée-SIB bank 25/11/1991 OCS United States .
1997 Vietnam Abbotsford Investments fund 07/1995 OCS United Kingdom 1.5
2001 Yemen Cardinal Financial Investment Corporation fund 2000 OCS United Kingdom 8.2
1994 Zambia Camdex International fund 26/05/1995 OCS United Kingdom 61.5
1994 Zambia Plenum Financial and Investments fund 21/09/1995 OCS United States .
1994 Zambia AN International Bank bank 30/08/1996 . United Kingdom .
This table shows a list of creditor lawsuits, organized by plaintiff-defendant pairs from our database. The “type of creditor” (bank, fund, etc.) reflects the primary business activity of the plaintiff. “Suit filedŠŠ denotes the date when the plaintiff’s
action was filed with the court. “Outcome” shows the outcome of cases, distinguishing between out-of-court settlements (OCS), voluntary dismissals of the case, satisfaction of judgment, or rejections/discontinuations of the case. “Jurisdiction” is
classified according to where the primary suit was conducted, i.e. where the subject matter was tried, irrespective of potential further proceedings related to mere enforcement of a judgment. Face value gives the nominal value of the debt under
dispute in current USD, irrespective of potential accrued or past due interest or principal, penalties, legal costs etc.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics of variables used in the regressions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Source
Market access regressions
Sovereign Bonds Access (dummy) 0.13 0.34 0 1 Dealogic
Sovereign Debt (Bonds and Loans) Access (dummy) 0.26 0.44 0 1 Dealogic
Sovereign Debt Issuance to GDP 0.64 2.53 0 72.66 Dealogic
Private Bonds to GDP 0.16 0.9 0 25.71 Dealogic
Sovereign Debt Placement > 1% GDP (dummy) 0.14 0.34 0 1 Dealogic
Domestic Bonds/Total Bonds Issued 0.26 0.41 0 1 Dealogic
Sovereign Bonds Access (dummy) 0.12 0.32 0 1 Bloomberg
Any litigation (dummy) 0.04 0.2 0 1 Own dataset
Attachment attempt (dummy) 0.03 0.16 0 1 Own dataset
Litigation (claims to total debt restructured) 0.13 1.4 0 48.56 Own dataset
Debt/GDP 68.35 67.25 0.61 2092.92 Abbas et al. (2010)
Short term/total debt 21.8 53.74 0 1185 WDI
Reserves/Imports 83.36 1783.81 0 93981.02 WDI
GDP growth (real, yoy) 3.46 6.83 -51.03 106.28 WDI
Trade/GDP 63.93 49.76 4.95 986.65 WDI
Political Risk (ICRG) 58.79 13.34 8.5 89.12 ICRG
GDP/capita (log) 7.08 1.33 -1.25 11.37 WDI
IMF program (start) 0.15 0.36 0 1 IMF Website
Default (ongoing) 0.23 0.42 0 1 Standard & Poor’s (2006, 2011)
Haircut size (for entire default spell) 8.54 23.26 -9.8 97 Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
II Rating Residual 0 9.33 -25.54 40.08 Institutional Investor
Trade regressions
Real trade (Log, average) 14.02 3.77 -6.56 25.63 IMF Directory of Trade Statistics
Any litigation (dummy) 0.05 0.22 0 1 Own dataset
Litigation (average share of restructured debt) 0.1 0.87 0 32.39 Own dataset
Attachment attempt (dummy) 0.02 0.13 0 1 Own dataset
Debt restructuring (bilateral) 0.01 0.09 0 1 Paris Club
Debt restructuring (general) 0.11 0.31 0 1 Paris Club
IMF agreement pair 0.23 0.45 0 2 IMF Website
Real GDP (Log of product) 47.56 3.3 34.15 60.13 WDI
Real GDP/capita (Log of product) 16.27 1.93 9.04 21.67 WDI
Haircut (Average) 5.61 14.01 -5 94.85 Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
II rating (Residual, log of product) 0 0.52 -3.05 2.81 Institutional Investor
Current colony 0 0.02 0 1 Rose (2005)
Currency union 0.01 0.11 0 1 Rose (2005)
Regional trade agreement 0.02 0.13 0 1 Rose (2005)
Delay regressions
Duration of negotiations (months) 38.87 36.11 1 140 Trebesch (2013)
Any litigation (dummy) 0.1 0.3 0 1 Own dataset
Attachment attempt (dummy) 0.05 0.21 0 1 Own dataset
Litigation (claims to total debt restructured) 0.14 0.88 0 7.95 Own dataset
IMF program (ongoing) 0.64 0.48 0 1 IMF Website
Recognized Creditor Committee 0.93 0.25 0 1 Trebesch (2013)
Bond restructuring 0.07 0.26 0 1 Trebesch (2013)
Previous restructuring 1.4 1.68 0 7 Trebesch (2013)
HIPC and World Bank supported restructuring 0.1 0.31 0 1 Trebesch (2013)
Global interest rate (Moody’s corporate yields) 9.82 2.4 5.36 16.25 Moody’s
Haircut size 39.32 24.92 -9.8 92.7 Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
GDP growth forecast (ICRG monthly index) 4.6 1.49 0.5 10 ICRG
GDP/Capita (Log) 7.36 0.94 5 9.02 WDI
II Rating 22.34 8.75 5.2 62.8 Institutional Investor
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics on H1: Litigation and foreign credit
This table reports summary statistics on bond issuances by developing and emerging market borrowers between 1980-2010
in different subsamples. The second column reports the absolute number of observations in the subsamples denoted in
the leftmost column. The second and third column show the total number of country-year events with bond issuances,
and the mean amount of issuances, respectively. The fourth column reports the share of years with issuance for each
subsample. Stars indicate significance levels of t−tests of this share against the following benchmarks: row 1, observations
with litigation against observations without; row 2, observations with litigation exceeding 1% of the restructured debt
against observations without; row 3, observations with litigation against without since 2000; row 4, observations with
attachment against without; row 5, observations with attachment against without, excluding years in which a country
was in default. All tests indicate that the probability of issuing new bonds in any of the subsamples with litigation is
significantly smaller than in those observations without legal action. The lower part of the table reports summary statistics
for two benchmark samples without litigation proceedings.
Country-
Year
Events
(total)
Years
with
bond
issuance
Amount
bor-
rowed
(m USD,
average)
Share
of years
with
issuance
Bond market issuances with litigation:
Any Litigation 189 12 80.5 6.3%**
Share of litigation >1% of debt 107 3 32.7 2.8%***
Litigation in the 2000s (after 1999) 77 0 0.0 0.0%***
With attachment proceedings 109 2 10.1 1.8%***
Post-crisis years, with attachment 58 1 8.6 1.7%**
Benchmark years:
Post-crisis years (3 year lag), no attachment 223 41 193.8 18.4%
Normal times (no default or post-default years) 4005 522 206.9 13.0%
∗∗p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics on H2: Litigation and international trade
The table reports summary statistics on bilateral trade between 1970 and 2007. The second column shows the mean bilateral
trade to GDP between country pairs for each subsample denoted in the left column. Bilateral trade is significantly lower
during default episodes (years in default and three years after a restructuring). It is even lower in years with litigation
involving attachment attempts, both during and in the aftermath of debt crises. The right column reports the respective
t−tests.
Bilat. Trade/GDP (%) Difference > 0?
Outside default episode 0.053 44.454 t-statistic
In default episode 0.018 0.000 p
Without pending attachment case 0.038 9.572 t-statistic
With pending attachment case 0.014 0.000 p
Without pending attachment case (outside crisis episode) 0.053 5.459 t-statistic
With pending attachment case (outside crisis episode) 0.016 0.000 p
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Table 3.6: Estimation results on H1: Litigation and foreign credit (I)
This table shows results on the determinants of market access following equation 3.1 and including country and year fixed effects. The results presented are coefficients from a
logit fixed effects model using a bond issuance dummy as dependent variable (by year). Columns (1)-(3) show the baseline results with three different measures of creditor
litigation – a simple litigation dummy, a dummy for pending attachment attempts and the share of litigated claims to total restructured debt (in %). Column (4) focuses on
non-crisis years by dropping all years in default according to Standard & Poor’s (2006, 2011). Column (5) restricts the sample to the period after 1992, when distressed debt
investors entered the scene and bonds became the main vehicle for sovereign borrowing. Column (6) drops countries coded as “net creditors” by the IMF to mitigate concerns
about demand effects (voluntary abstention from borrowing). To account for the severity of default, column (7) includes the credit rating residuals and column (8) controls for the
size of haircuts for each year of the respective debt renegotiation spell. Columns (9)-(11) show results from the baseline model, using a binary access indicator based on issuance
data from Bloomberg.
Dependent variable: bond market access (dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Baseline
(dummy)
Baseline (at-
tachment)
Baseline
(share)
Normal
times
Post 1992 Without
creditor
countries
With credit
ratings
With hair-
cuts
Bloomberg
(dummy)
Bloomberg
(attach-
ment)
Bloomberg
(share)
Any litigation (dummy) -0.511 -0.914
(0.681) (0.726)
Attachment attempt (dummy) -4.008*** -3.140**
(1.341) (1.258)
Litigation (claims to -0.733*** -1.103* -1.086** -0.991*** -0.714*** -0.603** -0.840**
total debt restructured) (0.261) (0.659) (0.440) (0.307) (0.261) (0.276) (0.372)
GDP/capita (log) 0.663 0.312 0.285 0.562 0.280 0.241 0.373 0.231 1.081** 0.826 0.767
(0.500) (0.522) (0.520) (0.553) (0.647) (0.736) (0.526) (0.517) (0.540) (0.554) (0.557)
Debt/GDP -0.018** -0.015* -0.016** -0.017* -0.035*** -0.039*** -0.017** -0.017** -0.013 -0.011 -0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Reserves/Imports 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Short term/total debt -0.767 -0.610 -0.680 -0.563 -1.278** -1.135** -0.610 -0.687 -0.990* -0.894* -0.909*
(0.486) (0.468) (0.471) (0.478) (0.545) (0.564) (0.474) (0.478) (0.539) (0.527) (0.523)
GDP growth (real yoy) -0.007 -0.008 0.001 0.005 -0.012 0.038 -0.007 0.011 0.003 0.001 0.007
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Trade/GDP -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.009 -0.038*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.029***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Political Risk (ICRG) 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.009 -0.038 -0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.001
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.032) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
IMF program (start) -0.062 -0.101 -0.122 -0.289 -0.061 -0.298 -0.078 -0.204 -0.029 -0.066 -0.076
(0.296) (0.301) (0.300) (0.339) (0.334) (0.351) (0.302) (0.289) (0.301) (0.304) (0.303)
Default (ongoing) -1.755*** -1.908*** -2.004*** -1.271** -2.453*** -2.013*** -2.075*** -2.216*** -2.440***
(0.507) (0.527) (0.535) (0.625) (0.820) (0.536) (0.543) (0.552) (0.578)
Default (lag for years -0.827** -0.782** -0.857** -0.857** -0.649 -0.620 -0.809** -0.645* -0.634* -0.751**
1 to 3 after) (0.383) (0.391) (0.381) (0.410) (0.417) (0.470) (0.384) (0.374) (0.374) (0.368)
II Rating Residual -0.032
(0.023)
Haircut size (for entire default spell) -0.036***
(0.012)
Haircut size (lag for years 1 to 3 after) -0.029***
(0.011)
Adj. Pseudo R2 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.24 0.20 0.43 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.35
Obs 954 954 954 746 663 773 949 988 895 895 895
No. Countries 43 43 43 41 40 35 43 44 40 40 40
p>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.7: Estimation results on H1: Litigation and foreign credit (II)
This table shows results on the determinants of market access following equation 3.1 and including country and year fixed effects. Columns (1)-(3) report coefficients from
logit fixed effects models. Column (1) uses a bond issuance dummy that includes government-owned companies and agencies. Column (2) uses an indicator that also includes
sovereign syndicated bank loans. The “full access” dummy used in column (3) is coded as 1 if the volume of bonds issued in that year exceeds 1% of GDP (and 0 otherwise). The
specifications in columns (4)-(6) show OLS regression results using bond issuance to GDP (in %) as dependent variable. Column (4) reports the results in the full sample, column
(5) excludes Argentina, Brazil, and Peru and column (6) focuses on corporate bond issuance to GDP. Columns (7)-(9) report results from a fractional response model including
country and year fixed effects (see Papke and Wooldridge (1996, 2008), displayed are average marginal effects). The dependent variable in these regressions is the ratio of the
volume of domestic bonds issued to the total volume of bonds issued (domestic and foreign) per year; the columns show results for the binary litigation indicator, the indicator for
pending attachment proceedings, and the share of debt litigated relative to debt restructured.
Alternative dependent variables on market access
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Incl. ac-
cess by pub-
lic firms
Bonds or
loans
Full access
(> 1%
GDP)
Issuance to
GDP
Without
Arg, Bra,
Per
Access by
private
firms
Domestic
Bonds/ To-
tal Issuance
Domestic
Bonds/ To-
tal Issuance
Domestic
Bonds/ To-
tal Issuance
Any litigation (dummy) 0.514***
(0.120)
Attachment attempt (dummy) 1.661***
(0.328)
Litigation (claims to -0.697*** -0.296* -0.588** -0.047*** -0.041*** -0.002 0.940**
total debt restructured (0.269) (0.171) (0.277) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.456)
GDP/capita (log) 1.850*** 1.234*** 0.110 0.684** 0.613** 0.188** 0.025 0.026 0.039
(0.562) (0.404) (0.451) (0.261) (0.255) (0.085) (0.064) (0.078) (0.068)
Debt/GDP -0.005 -0.005 -0.010* 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.004* -0.002
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Reserves/Imports 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Short term/total debt -0.152 -0.558* -0.233 -1.310** -1.322** -0.071 0.109 0.073 0.124
(0.426) (0.310) (0.370) (0.550) (0.546) (0.054) (0.080) (0.071) (0.083)
GDP growth (real yoy) 0.002 0.008 0.029 -0.022 -0.023 -0.007* 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.030) (0.021) (0.026) (0.015) (0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Trade/GDP -0.031*** -0.014* -0.025*** -0.009 -0.009 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Political Risk (ICRG) 0.054** 0.021 0.009 0.013 0.012 0.004 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF program (start) -0.046 0.062 0.392 -0.024 -0.033 0.089 -0.067 -0.079 -0.044
(0.302) (0.217) (0.250) (0.119) (0.125) (0.107) (0.058) (0.061) (0.069)
Default (ongoing) -2.983*** -1.761*** -2.209*** -0.459** -0.412* -0.210** 0.103 0.042 0.078
(0.574) (0.333) (0.456) (0.217) (0.234) (0.095) (0.110) (0.179) (0.115)
Default (lag for years -1.160*** -0.786*** -1.208*** -0.218 -0.184 -0.036 0.103 0.147** 0.068
1 to 3 after) (0.423) (0.298) (0.357) (0.168) (0.174) (0.048) (0.070) (0.073) (0.072)
Constant -3.344 -2.594 -1.258
(2.214) (2.153) (0.913)
Adj. Pseudo R2 0.36 0.23 0.23 0.55 0.57 0.56
Adj. R2 0.08 0.08 0.02
Obs 964 1258 1146 1531 1455 1531 414 414 414
No. Countries 43 58 54 78 75 78 47 47 47
p>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered on country where applicable.
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Table 3.8: Estimation results on H2: Litigation and international trade
This table shows the results from the trade gravity model of equation 3.2, including country fixed effects. The dependent variable is the annual average real bilateral trade
between two countries. All regressions include lags of the debt restructuring and IMF agreement variables, although their coefficients are not reported for the sake of brevity.
Columns (1)-(3) show results in the baseline model using three different measures of creditor litigation – a dummy for any litigation, the share of litigated claims to total debt
restructured (in %), and a dummy for pending attachment attempts, which is the most relevant variable in the context of international trade as we explain in the paper. Column
(4) adds a general indicator of debt restructurings, in addition to the bilateral restructuring measure. Column (5) accounts for the severity of the default by including the size of
haircuts towards foreign banks and bondholders. Column (6) includes decade fixed effects to capture time trends. Column (7) restricts the sample to the period after 2000, and
column (8) excludes Argentina, Brazil and Peru. The model in column (9) controls for the rating residual.
Dependent variable: Log(Average bilateral trade)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Baseline
(dummy)
Baseline
(share)
Baseline (at-
tachment)
Martinez/
Sandleris
With hair-
cuts
Decade FE Post 2000 Without
Arg, Bra,
Per
With credit
ratings
Any litigation (dummy) -0.030
(0.030)
Litigation (average claims to total 0.023***
debt restructured, in %) (0.007)
Attachment attempt (dummy) -0.111*** -0.115*** -0.095** -0.036 -0.201* -0.110*** -0.226***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.115) (0.041) (0.044)
Debt restructuring -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.058*** 0.018 -0.030* -0.060*** 0.032 -0.058*** -0.002
(bilateral) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.027) (0.016) (0.016)
IMF agreement pair -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.062*** -0.067*** -0.073*** -0.045*** -0.080*** -0.081***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009)
Real GDP (log of product) 0.023 0.004 0.026 0.051 -0.005 0.271*** 1.785*** 0.025 0.229***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.139) (0.047) (0.055)
Real GDP/capita (log 0.617*** 0.640*** 0.613*** 0.588*** 0.635*** 0.459*** -0.609*** 0.613*** 0.501***
of product) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.168) (0.061) (0.071)
Current colony 0.597** 0.600** 0.595** 0.602** 0.577** 0.565** 0.595**
(0.261) (0.262) (0.260) (0.259) (0.262) (0.242) (0.260)
Currency union -0.129** -0.131** -0.128** -0.128** -0.109* -0.127** -0.127** -0.123***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.043)
Regional trade agreement 0.245*** 0.243*** 0.246*** 0.246*** 0.240*** 0.260*** 0.172*** 0.242*** 0.270***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.033) (0.049) (0.039)
Debt restructuring -0.088***
(general) (0.013)
Haircut (Average) -0.008***
(0.001)
Haircut (Average, -0.003***
3 year lag) (0.001)
Decade Fixed Effects Yes
II rating (residual, 0.503***
log of product) (0.022)
Constant 2.474* 2.979** 2.420* 1.624 3.584*** -6.753*** -64.15*** 2.426* -5.169***
(1.306) (1.313) (1.309) (1.320) (1.316) (1.420) (4.076) (1.309) (1.572)
Debt restructuring (bilateral) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
10 Lags
Debt restructuring (general) Yes
10 Lags
IMF agreement pair Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 Lags
R2 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.16 0.47 0.47 0.20 0.44
Obs 214072 214072 214072 214072 214072 214072 61250 213988 156036
Country pairs 11992 11992 11992 11992 11992 11992 10920 11989 10224
p>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered on country dyad.
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Table 3.9: Estimation results on H3: Litigation and negotiation delays
The table reports coefficients from a Cox proportional hazard model described in equation 3.3. The left panel focuses on the duration of negotiations, ranging from the start of
negotiations until the final debt exchange. All models are estimated using monthly data and include year fixed effects. Columns (1)-(3) show results in our baseline model and
three different measures of creditor litigation – a dummy for any litigation, a dummy for pending attachment attempts, and the share of litigated claims to total debt restructured.
Columns (4) restricts the sample to the period after 1992, while column (5) excludes Argentina, Brazil and Peru. Column (6) includes the haircut suffered by investors in the
respective restructuring. Column (7) includes the country credit ratings. Column (8) controls for GDP per capita and includes a proxy for GDP growth forecasts. The last
specification in column (9) uses total restructuring duration, from start of distress (month of default or announcement of debt restructuring) until the final debt exchange
Negotiation Duration Total Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Baseline
(dummy)
Baseline (at-
tachment)
Baseline
(share)
Post 1992 Without
Arg, Bra,
Per
With hair-
cuts
With rat-
ings
Growth
& GDP/
capita
Baseline
(dummy)
Any litigation (dummy) -0.91*** -0.94**
(0.32) (0.39)
Attachment attempt (dummy) -0.98**
(0.46)
Litigation (claims to total -0.41*** -0.44*** -0.19** -0.40*** -0.37*** -0.86**
debt restructured, in %) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.42)
IMF Program (ongoing) 0.07 0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.14 0.06 0.63 0.67* 0.67***
(0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.43) (0.29) (0.26) (0.45) (0.34) (0.24)
Recognized Creditor -0.86** -0.71* -0.74** -0.95*** -0.36 -0.69* -0.48 -0.63 -0.40
Committee (0.42) (0.38) (0.37) (0.28) (0.41) (0.38) (0.33) (0.52) (0.35)
Bond restructuring 0.11 0.12 -0.10 0.21 0.16 -0.08 -0.04 -0.47 0.18
(0.43) (0.42) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.34) (0.50) (0.45)
Previous restructuring 0.13** 0.11** 0.11** -0.13 0.12* 0.12** 0.00 0.05 0.18***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
HIPC and World Bank -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 0.16 0.11 -0.87 0.32 -0.99 -1.34***
supported restructuring (0.66) (0.67) (0.66) (0.80) (0.68) (0.64) (0.71) (0.71) (0.20)
Global interest rate -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 0.11 -0.05 -0.10 0.17 0.06 -0.06
(Moody’s corporate yields) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.49) (0.18) (0.20) (0.42) (0.29) (0.16)
Haircut size -0.03***
(0.01)
Country Credit Rating 0.06*
(II) (0.03)
GDP growth forecast 0.27**
(ICRG monthly index) (0.11)
GDP/Capita (Log) 0.20
(0.17)
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.08
Obs 2390 2390 2390 763 2390 2263 1171 1624 7230
Log Likelihood -474.11 -475.17 -473.35 -85.01 -464.43 -451.80 -133.59 -236.86 -683.70
BIC 1220.49 1222.60 1218.97 302.76 1208.91 1173.96 436.75 688.11 1731.72
p>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PH-Test 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50
Note: ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered on country.
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Appendix
A Case studies on the cost of litigation
(i) Case studies on H1: disruption of market access
• Argentina 2002-2013: Argentina’s 2002 default triggered dozens of creditor lawsuits
and related attachment attempts. One important consequence of these ongoing
legal disputes is that the government is effectively excluded from foreign bond
markets, a major source of government financing during the 1990s (see e.g. Reuters,
07 November 2006; Euroweek, 20 July 2007; Dow Jones International News, 13
January 2009; The Economist, 20 October 2011). For more than 10 years now,
Argentina has mostly borrowed domestically and did not place a single sovereign
bond in financial centers such as London or New York (Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2011, p. 155).
Argentina’s bond market access was first disrupted in the spring of 2005, when the
government attempted to resolve its debt crisis with a global bond restructuring
offer. The offer was accepted by bondholders holding instruments worth USD
62.3bn and the exchange was scheduled to close on 01 April 2005. However,
litigating creditors obtained attachment orders on those bonds tendered in the
exchange (in the amount of USD 7bn), which prevented Argentina from exchanging
the tendered bonds and making any payments on newly restructured bonds (see
S.D.N.Y., 02 Civ. 3804, 29 March 2005). Settlement was only possible 3 months later,
in June 2005. Ever since, Argentina would have to expect to face similar attachment
attempts on any new bond issuances it would attempt in New York (Euromoney, 1
July 2005).
Most recently, in 2012, a group of creditors obtained a court order which, if upheld,
will prevent Argentina from servicing its existing bonds (and, by extension, also any
new bonds issued). Specifically, the order blocks Argentina from using US-based
payment agents to repay its bonds unless it also repays the litigating holdouts
at the same rate (S.D.N.Y., 09 Civ. 1708, 23 February 2012; 2nd Circ., 12 Civ.
105, 26 October 2012). The former IMF first deputy managing director Anne
Krueger expressed in her opinion to the court that the “ratability requirements
would certainly delay the point at which the country could re-access the private
international capital market, because the costs of any new borrowing would include
payments under ratability to holdouts.” (2nd Circ., 12 Civ. 105, 4 January 2013
(Amicus Brief by Anne Krueger)).
Besides court action, litigious bondholders have also coordinated themselves to
lobby for new laws that would legally restrict Argentina’s bond market access. One
example is the “Judgment Evading Foreign States Accountability Act” (introduced
in the US Congress under S.912 and H.R.1798 in May 2011). The Act would disallow
debt issuances by foreign states that face US court judgments totaling more than
USD 100m (SEC 2011, Argentina Annual Report, 18-K). So far, Congress has not
taken action on this and similar proposals.
• Peru 1997-2000: Between 1996 and 2000, Peru’s bond issuance plans were severely
disrupted by a series of judgments and attachment attempts. The dispute goes
back to 1995, when Peru initiated its Brady debt restructuring and the distressed
debt fund Elliott started to purchase Peruvian debt worth USD 20.6m on the
secondary market. Shortly before the scheduled settlement of the Brady exchange
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in October 1996, “Elliott filed suit [. . . ] in New York Supreme Court and sought
[. . . ] prejudgment attachment.” (2nd Circ., 98 Civ. 9268/9319, 20 October 1999).
As a result, the exchange and issuance of the new bonds were delayed, but the
restructuring could eventually be closed in March 1997.
However, even after the restructuring the lawsuit continued to endanger Peru’s
bond market access. In October 1999, Elliott obtained the right to collect the full
amount claimed and it received an attachment order one month later (2nd Circ., 98
Civ. 9268/9319, S.D.N.Y. 96 Civ. 7916). The case became even more disruptive for
Peru’s capital market access when US-based banks were temporarily prohibited
from transferring interest payments due on Peru’s newly issued Brady bonds
(S.D.N.Y. 96 Civ. 7916, 25 September 2000). Being unable to pay its creditors via
the US, Peru missed a scheduled coupon payment in early September 2000 and
also failed in its attempt to transfer payments through the Belgium-based Euroclear
instead (Hof van Beroep te Brussel, A.R. Nr. 2000/QR/92, 26 September 2000; own
translation).
To avoid an outright default, Peru therefore decided to settle with Elliott, which
allowed the government to resume payments on the Brady bonds only days before
the bonds grace period ended in late September (Reuters, 29 September 2000).
During the legal dispute, Peru did not issue any new sovereign bonds, despite
earlier plans to do so (15 January 1997, Reuters, Investment Dealers Digest, 26 July
1999, “Peru eyes Morgan and BancBoston to lead bond deal”). It was only in 2002
that Peru started to regularly place sovereign bonds in international markets again.
• Panama 1996-1997: In Panama litigating creditors explicitly targeted the proceed-
ings from a sovereign bond issuance in 1997, thus disrupting a public offering
that was about to be launched. The dispute goes back to the mid-1990s when the
distressed debt fund Elliott purchased USD 28.8m of debt on the secondary market
in 1995 (96 Civ. 5295, 96 Civ. 5514). Panama successfully closed its Brady deal in
April of 1996, but Elliott refused to participate and filed two suits in New York in
July 1996.
Panama publicly announced to re-access international capital markets soon after
the Brady restructuring (Reuters, 17 April 1996). It did so successfully in February
1997 with a debut USD 500m bond placement (Emerging Markets Debt Report, 10
February 1997 and LatinFinance, April 1997). However, the placement of a second
global bond, planned for September 1997, was effectively blocked by litigation (Dow
Jones Newswires, 18 September 1997). The reason were two judgments in favor of
Elliott in May and September 1997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. No. 603615/1996, 15 May 1997,
S.D.N.Y., 96 Civ. 5514, 18 September 1997). To avoid disruptions, Panama appealed
and even posted a supersedeas bond with the court over the full amount.47 However,
Elliott still threatened to obtain restraining and attachment orders specifically
targeted at the September bond offering. The orders could have allowed Elliott
to prevent bond settlement or to seize its proceedings (S.D.N.Y., 96 Civ. 5514, 23
September 1997; Dow Jones Newswires, 18 September 1997; Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer 2007).
In light of this situation, Panama dropped its appeal and settled with Elliott in
early October (S.D.N.Y., 96 Civ. 5514, 7 October 1997). Some reports suggest a
47A supersedeas bond is collateral that must be posted with the court by the defendant if he appeals and
does not want to satisfy the judgment before the final ruling.
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payment of up to USD 71m, much more than the original judgment claims obtained
by Elliott (Dow Jones Newswires, 6 October 1997; Cymrot (2002)).
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(ii) Case studies on H2: disruption of international trade
• Republic of Congo 2006-2007: Since the early 2000s, several US-based debt funds
have sued the Republic of Congo for repayment on its defaulted debt and launched
a series of attachment attempts. The main target of seizures has been the crude oil
trade, the country’s main export and most important source of foreign exchange.
In response to the lawsuits in New York and London, the Congolese government
set up a network of subsidiary companies in several countries so as to conceal its
oil transactions and prevent attachment. In early 2006, Congo’s Prime Minister
Isidore Mvouba openly admitted to the press that the government has been hiding
oil revenues from the litigating creditors and resorted to “slightly unorthodox”
accounting methods for this purpose (Global Insight Daily Analysis, 23 January
2006).
However, Congo’s strategy to shield its assets did eventually not succeed. In 2006
litigating creditors achieved a victory in a Houston court when garnishment orders
on more than 500,000 barrels of oil were issued against several public and private
companies dealing with Congo’s oil exports in the US and abroad (TX.S.D., 02 Civ.
4261, 5 April 2006; Platts, 7 April 2006). The orders effectively blocked Congo from
receiving royalties or export revenues from its oil trade. One plaintiff, Kensington
International, a fund controlled by Elliott, went one step further. It filed corruption
charges against one of Congo’s main relationship banks, BNP Paribas in New York,
claiming that the bank had helped to set up a money laundering scheme to shield
oil revenues from attachment (05 Civ. 5101 S.D.N.Y.; Euromoney, September 2006).
BNP denied these claims, but the development significantly hampered Congo’s
relationship with foreign banks and the execution of its international oil sales.
In 2007 and 2008, after more than six years of legal disputes, Congo gave in and
agreed to out-of-court settlements with FG Hemishphere, Walker International,
Kensington and other litigating creditors (The Sunday Times, 15 June 2008). The
payment amounts have remained confidential, but the terms are estimated to have
been more favorable than the 85.8% haircut faced by creditors who agreed to
participate in Congo’s 2007 buy back, which was administered and financed by the
World Bank’s Debt Reduction Facility (American Lawyer, 1 September 2008)
• Ecuador 1993: Ecuador is a second case in which litigating creditors successfully
attached revenues from the country’s oil trade. The case was initiated by We-
ston Compagnie de Finance et d’Investissement, a Swiss investment fund, which
purchased defaulted Ecuadorian debt on the secondary market and filed suit in
April 1993 (S.D.N.Y., 93 Civ. 2698). Weston immediately obtained a pre-judgment
attachment order, and successfully froze funds by Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana, a
state-owned company that is responsible for shipping the country’s petroleum
exports abroad. The funds remained frozen for more than four months in Flota’s
Citibank account in the United States (S.D.N.Y., 93 Civ. 2698; Reuters, 30 April 1993,
LDC Debt Report, 2 August 1993). The seizure ended when Ecuador settled with
Weston in late July of 1993 (LDC Debt Report, September 7, 1993).48
48The outcome of the settlement is undisclosed. Ultimately, however, the judge appears to have freed the
funds and Weston seems to have backed away without receiving any cash, according to reports by LDC
Debt Report of 25 October 1993 and 1 November 1993. This is in line with Buchheit (1999), who states that
the case ended with a lifting of the pre-judgment attachment order.
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• Zambia 1995-1997: In Zambia during the mid-1990s, a litigating creditor success-
fully seized revenues from the country’s main international trade: copper. Camdex
International, a distressed fund, had purchased defaulted Zambian debt on the
secondary market and filed suit against the country’s central bank in May 1995
in the UK. Four months later, Camdex obtained a summary judgment, and later
on also attachment orders on revenues by Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
(ZCCM), a government-owned mining company and the “most important, if not
the only, source of foreign exchange for the Zambian economy” (UK Queen’s Bench
Division, 24 May 1996 Judgment; see also: S.D.N.Y., 96 Civ. 7034). The attachment
orders blocked the transfer of ZCCM’s payments to Zambia’s government accounts
at Central Bank of Zambia (UK Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 17 January 1997).
Ultimately, however, the UK orders were dismissed, and Camdex moved on to US
courts, where it filed suit in 1996. The second, New York-based case ended with an
out-of-court settlement in June 1997 (S.D.N.Y., 96 Civ. 7034, 4 June 1997).
(iii) Case studies on H3: restructuring delay
• Costa Rica 1981-1983: Costa Rica’s first debt rescheduling in the early 1980s took
more than two years to conclude, from the start of negotiations in September 1981
until September 1983. This delay is unusually long for a London Club deal of the
early 1980s, when most governments successfully rolled over their debt in less than
a year. Indeed, Costa Rica’s debt restructuring is the one with the longest duration
among 20 other sovereign debt restructurings that were concluded in 1982 and 1983
Trebesch (2013). An important reason for the unusual delay was a lawsuit filed
by Libra Bank of London, National Bank of Washington and six further banks in
November of 1981. The litigating banks sought an attachment order on assets of
the state owned Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which was granted in June of 1982
(S.D.N.Y., 81 Civ. 7624, 08 July 1983). In addition, a second lawsuit was filed in
February 1982 by a group of 39 banks, this time headed by Allied Bank.
Press reports at the time describe that the two lawsuits resulted in a deadlock in
the negotiations and significantly “hampered” settlement efforts in late 1981 and
throughout 1982 (FT, 30 Sept. 1981; NYT, 11 Dec. 1981; FT, 2 Nov. 1982; FT, 2 Nov.
1982; FT, 25 Jan. 1983; Latin American Weekly Report, 13 Nov. 1982; FT, 25 Jan.
1983; Latin American Weekly Report, 5 Febr. 1983; FT, 22 Febr 1983). Costa Rica
eventually managed to reschedule its debt in September of 1983, but only after
both lawsuits came to an end, at least temporarily. The government settled with
all litigating banks in the Libra case shortly before the restructuring (Zaitzeff and
Kunz, 1985, p.470), while the Allied lawsuit was rejected in the New York district
court in July 1983 (S.D.N.Y., 82 Civ. 0664, 8 July 1983).49
• Peru 1990-1994: The implementation of Peru’s Brady deal in the mid-1990s took
more than five years, and this delay can be partly attributed to creditor lawsuits. A
first lawsuit on USD 1.2 bn was filed in March 1990 by a group of major international
banks, led by Bank of America (S.D.N.Y., 90 Civ. 1409). Shortly afterwards, more
than 30 additional banks and other investors filed lawsuits (alone or as plaintiff
groups). The initial purpose of these suits was to increase pressure on Peru to start
49One bank, Fidelity Trust Union, appealed this ruling and continued to litigate until 1985, eventually
overturning the district court ruling and achieving a judgment in its favor (2nd Circ., 83 Civ. 7714, 18 March
1985; Finnigan (1986).
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negotiations (American Banker 1990, 7 May 1990), but the litigation quickly turned
into a major obstacle for a debt restructuring agreement, resulting in more, instead
of less, delay (Reuters, 6 July 1993): Between 1992 and 1994, the government and
Peru’s Bank Advisory Committee (BAC) decided to postpone a compromise on
the ongoing lawsuits five times in a row (Reuters, 13 September 1994). During
this period, Economy Minister Jorge Camet took a strong stance and asked the
litigious banks to drop their lawsuit as a condition for starting serious negotiations
with the rest of the committee (“We would not want to sit down and negotiate
with creditors with whom we have matters pending in court”, Reuters, 6 October
1994). To resolve the deadlock, most banks finally agreed to discontinue their
lawsuits as of December 1994 (Reuters, 16 December 1994, S.D.N.Y., 90 Civ. 1409,
15 December 1994). This was seen as removing the “final obstacle for talks on
restructuring the country’s commercial debt” (Reuters, 16 December 1994). Indeed,
a few months later, in September of 1995, the London Club and Peru agreed on
a principal agreement on debt restructuring, the first such compromise since the
country’s debt moratorium of 1985.
• Dominica 2003-2006: Dominica’s debt restructuring of 2004 is regarded as one of
the few “messy” sovereign bond exchanges of the past decade (Moody’s, 2013).
The deal took more than a year to finalize, despite the fact that Dominica adopted
a very creditor-friendly stance and engaged with its major creditor banks and
bondholders early on (Das et al., 2012). The government officially announced
its restructuring plans in December 2003 and then launched a preemptive debt
exchange offer in April of 2004, with the intention of avoiding a payment default.
The restructuring was officially closed in mid-June of 2004. By that time, however,
only 72% of creditors had agreed to participate, a rate which is lower than in
most other restructurings since the mid-1990s. The offer was therefore unofficially
opened again and negotiations with non-participating creditors continued (IMF
Country Report No. 04/286).
Three large commercial creditors, including the Export-Import Bank of Taiwan,
could however not be convinced and continued to hold out (IMF Country Report
No. 04/286; IMF Country Report No. 05/384). In accordance with the terms of the
debt restructuring offer, Dominica stopped interest payments on its “old” creditors
in June 2004, channeling the foregone payments into an escrow account instead.
In reaction to the technical default, Exim Bank filed suit in New York in July 2005
(S.D.N.Y., 05 Civ. 6698), a step that was seen as considerably delaying Dominica’s
exit from its debt crisis. The IMF, which is typically cautious on matters of sovereign
debt litigation, went as far as noting that the “debt restructuring [has] been stymied”
by Exim’s “problematic” litigation (IMF Country Report No. 06/291). In September
2006, more than two years after the official closure of the deal, Dominica and Exim
Bank finally reached a settlement to end the dispute (S.D.N.Y., 05 Civ. 6698, 22
September 2006), a “significant progress” that brought Dominica’s debt troubles to
an end (IMF Country Report No. 07/1).
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B Creditor returns to litigation
This Appendix lists selected litigation cases that have been (i) particularly lucrative
for litigating creditors, or (ii) litigation failures, meaning that lawsuits resulted in a
loss for the plaintiffs. The reported figures should be taken with care, as they are not
based on official court documents only (our main source in the rest of the paper), but
also on anecdotes and rumors mentioned in the financial press and previous research.
Importantly, the returns do not account for procedural costs, in particular funding costs
and legal costs.
(i) Selected litigation successes:
• In 1996, Elliott purchased USD 28.8m of Panamaian debt for USD 17.6 m and filed
suit in New York (96 Civ. 7917, 7 August 1998). The final judgment amounted to
USD 26.3m (full principal amount less interim payments), which was paid in full
(96 Civ. 5514, Pacer History). This implies a gross return of 60% on investment.
• In early 1996, Elliott bought Peruvian debt with face value of USD 20.7 m for USD
11.3m. (96 Civ. 7917, 7 August 1998). The final judgment amounted to USD 56.3m
(96 Civ. 7917, September 9, 2000). Facing impending attachments, Peru settled at
the full amount (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006), which implied a gross return
of 400% for Elliott.
• In 1996, Abbotsford Investment bought USD 1.5m of defaulted sovereign loans issued
by Vietnam, which traded at 60-75 cents on the dollar (Financial Times 25 January
1996; Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 December 1995). Reportedly, Vietnam
settled out of court at 100 cents on the dollar, thereby upsetting the London Club
negotiations (Dow Jones Newswires, 12 April 1996). These press-reported figures
imply a gross return of between 33 and 40%.
• During the 1990s, Kensington bought USD 13.5m of a defaulted loan to the Republic of
Congo, dating back to 1984. After multiple demands to obtain payments, Kensington
filed suit in England in October 2002 and obtained a judgment over USD 56m two
months later (03 Civ. 4578 29 March 2007). The case was continued in the US, and
in February 2008, Kensington reported the judgment as fully satisfied (03 Civ. 4578,
Pacer History).
• In 2000, Cardinal Financial Investment Corporation bought promissory notes issued
by Yemen with a face value of USD 8.2m on the secondary market, allegedly for 12
cents on the dollar (EWCA, Case No: A3/2000/0433). In 2001 Cardinal settled out
of court, against a reported payment of USD 2.7m. If both figures are correct, the
gross return would have been 270% (sources: Singh, 2003; Alfaro, 2007; Gueye et al.,
2007).
• In 2001, FG Hemisphere filed suit against the Republic of Congo in 2001. The original
claim amounted to USD 35.9m (IMF 2006). In 2002, FG was awarded a judgment
amounting to USD 151.9 m (01 Civ. 8700, Pacer History). In April 2007, FG reported
full satisfaction of the judgment (01 Civ. 8700, 12 April 2007).
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(ii) Selected litigation failures:
• In 1986, LNC Investment bought bank loans by Nicaragua with face value totaling
USD 26.3 m for a market value of USD 1.1m (96 Civ. 6360, 19 February 1999). LNC
filed suit in 1996 and obtained a judgment over USD 86.9m in 1999 (96 Civ. 6360,
Pacer History). Ten years later, the case was settled under Nicargua’s debt relief
initiative (IMF 2008), and was subsequently designated as closed (96 Civ. 6360,
Pacer History). It can be assumed that LNC received the same terms as other
creditors participating in the donor-funded buyback, ca. 4.5 cent on the dollar. This
implies a modest gross return of 7% after 20 years of litigation.
• In the early 2000s, SIFIDA and FH International bought Liberian debt with a face
value of about USD 6.5m (BBC, 26 November 2009). The creditors filed suit in
New York in 2002 and soon thereafter, a judgment of USD 18.4m was awarded (02
Civ. 1246, Pacer History). After multiple re-assignments of the claims, Hamsah
Investment and Wall Capital continued the case, which was settled in December
2010 (02 Civ. 1246, Pacer History). Press reports suggest that the settlement terms
were no better than the HIPC buy back terms of 3% of face value, despite 8 years of
litigation (BBC, 23 November 2010).
• After Argentina’s default of 2001, Vegas Game, an Italian corporation, bought Ar-
gentine bonds worth USD 2.4m for about 31 cents on the dollar (06 Civ. 13084, 9
November 2006; Bloomberg). After the restructuring offer in 2005, Vegas joined a
large number of litigating creditors and filed suit. However, after three years of
fruitless litigation, Vegas abandoned the case even before Argentina re-opened its
offer at the original terms in 2010 (06 Civ. 13084, 21 January 2009).
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C How can litigation occur in equilibrium?
Why do we observe litigation at all, when governments can anticipate “legal punishment”
by creditors? One reason why litigation can occur in equilibrium is that governments
can only make a single take-it-or-leave it offer to all creditors at the same time. If there
is heterogeneity among the creditors, some of them will find it optimal to go to court,
while others will accept the restructuring. This section gives a simple formulation of
our argument, inspired by the frameworks in Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989); Spier (2007);
Bolton and Jeanne (2007); and Bolton and Jeanne (2009).
Suppose a government owes an aggregate debt of D. For some exogenous reason,
e.g. a negative income shock, the government defaults and needs to restructure its debt,
which implies an exchange offer to reduce the outstanding debt by a haircut h ∈ [0, 1] to
(1− h)D. Crucially, the government can only make one unique offer h to all creditors, and
not discriminate among them by offering individual haircuts.
The government proposes the haircut to n distinct creditors. After receiving the offer,
creditors have a choice: they can either accept the haircut or they can reject it and try
to recover the full claim by legal means. Litigating involves legal costs, which differ
across creditors. For instance, highly specialized distressed investors might have more
experience in suing debtor governments and in locating attachable assets, and thus face
lower costs of rejecting the offer. The individual litigation cost is defined as ci ∈ [¯c, c¯]. f (c)and F(c) describe the density and cumulative distribution functions of c, respectively,
and creditors are denoted by subscript i. Every creditor holds an identical part of the
aggregate debt d = D/n.
Accepting the restructuring offer lowers the claim of individual creditors to the
recovery value (1− h)d, which will be paid out for sure. Rejecting the offer means
litigating against the government for full repayment. A lawsuit succeeds with probability
p ∈ [0, 1] to return the full claim d. If the lawsuit fails, the creditor receives nothing,
which occurs with probability (1− p). Independently of the lawsuit’s outcome, creditors
have to pay the litigation cost proportional to their claims, cid. A creditor thus only goes
to court if
pd− cid ≥ (1− h)d (3.4)
Conditional on h and p, there can be a creditor for which equation (3.4) holds with
equality. This marginal creditor, i∗, is indifferent between litigating and accepting the
haircut so that:
c∗i = p− (1− h) (3.5)
The intuition is that for this marginal creditor, the probability of winning has to exactly
offset the loss from accepting the offer, in order to induce him to be indifferent between
his two options.
In case c∗i < ¯
c, it is not optimal for any existing creditor to file suit, resulting in full
participation. However, if there is a c∗i ≥ ¯c such that equation (3.5) is fulfilled, there willalso be a non-negative share of litigating creditors. This creditor group, with costs smaller
than the marginal creditor i∗, is equal to Prob(ci ≤ c∗i ) = F(c∗i ) ≡ φ. Put differently, φ is
the share of creditors that will reject the restructuring offer and litigate instead, while
(1− φ) = Prob(ci > c∗i ) is the share of creditors that accept the haircut.
Litigation is not only costly for creditors, but also inflicts a cost on the government.
Besides legal fees, these might result from losing access to international capital markets,
delay in crisis resolution, or as a result of asset seizures abroad (see main paper). The
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government incorporates these costs cg as well as the creditors’ reaction when choosing
the optimal haircut to offer its creditors. Its objective is given by maximizing the available
resources:
max
h
y− D
( ∫ c∗i
¯
c
f (c)p dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repayment
to holdouts
−
∫ c∗i
¯
c
f (c)cg dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gov’t cost
of litigation
−
∫ c¯
c∗i
f (c)(1− h) dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repayment to
participants
)
=y− D (φ(p+ cg)− (1− φ)(1− h)) (3.6)
where y denotes the government’s exogenous income. The second term in equation (3.6)
represents the combined expected repayments resulting from litigating creditors (consist-
ing of the probability of full repayment plus the litigation expenses) and participating
creditors (who accept the haircut).
The cost from litigating creditors is unanimously increasing in the haircut h. This
is the result of an increase in the share of holdout creditors φ if the offer becomes less
attractive. Here, the government wants to decrease h, in order to avoid spending money
on repaying an increasing share of holdouts.
The cost from repaying participating creditors is characterized by two opposing
effects: on the one hand, the government wants to increase h in order to maximize its
“savings” from repaying less to the participating creditors. But on the other hand, an
increase in h will also decrease the share of creditors who accept the haircut φ, and thus
reduce the share of debt to which the restructuring terms can be applied.
Solving a parametrized version of this problem for the optimal haircut h allows
interior solutions in which a non-negative share of creditors litigate in equilibrium.
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Chapter 4
Coordination Problems in Sovereign
Debt Restructurings:
Holdouts and Litigation in
Argentina1
The 2001/02 Argentine default and the resulting “rush to the courthouse” by some
creditors have triggered many calls for a fundamental reform of the international financial
architecture. I argue that the decisions about participating in a restructuring offer
and litigating for full repayment need to be analyzed separately, thus requiring more
careful policy prescriptions. A newly coded dataset of participation and litigation rates
in the Argentine 2005 restructuring reveals two stylized facts: (i) holdout rates were
particularly high in securities targeted at retail investors (ii) litigation efforts were strongly
concentrated on a small set of specialized investors. Only 12 plaintiffs held more than
70% of the litigated debt, and focused on securities sold mostly to institutional investors.
I explain these findings with a simple model of heterogeneous speculation in distressed
markets and provide empirical evidence consistent with its predictions. These findings
have implications for the design of government bonds by debt managers.
Keywords: Sovereign default; Argentina; Litigation; Creditor coordination
JEL classification: F34, K12, H63
1I greatly appreciate, without implicating, the helpful comments and assistance by Elliott Ash, Lee
Buchheit, Henrik Enderlein, Diego Ferro, Hans Humes, Theresa Pfeifle, Katia Porcezanski, Felix Salmon,
Robert Scott, and Christoph Trebesch. I thank Mitu Gulati and Jeromin Zettelmeyer for kindly sharing data.
Parts of this paper were written while I was visiting Columbia University. I gratefully acknowledge financial
support by the German National Academic Foundation.
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We note that Argentina has made many contributions to the law of foreign
insolvency through its numerous defaults on its sovereign obligations, as well
as through what we might term a diplomacy of default.
EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463 (2d Cir.)
4.1 Introduction
The Republic of Argentina has a long history of defaults on its public financial liabilities.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) count seven separate incidents of external default between
1827 and 2002. On July 30, 2014, the eighth addition to this inglorious list arrived –
provoked by a failure to comply with judgments in lawsuits related to its previous
default in 2001/02. While the Second Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the already
significant implications of previous legal battles with creditors for the law of public
debt and sovereign insolvency,2 the “massive litigation” (Shleifer, 2003) that followed
the country’s 2001/02 default proved to be exceptional even by Argentina’s standards.
The “diplomacy of default” between Argentina and its creditors at times looked just shy
of legal warfare, when creditors seized the nation’s warships in foreign ports, and the
president claimed that the suing bondholders were seeking “financial world domination,
forcing people to their knees” and committing “economic terrorism” on her country.3
Creditor coordination problems have been at the core of many recent policy discus-
sions on reforming the international framework for sovereign debt restucturings (Gianviti
et al., 2010; UNCTAD, 2012; Mody, 2013; Buchheit et al., 2013; Fuest et al., 2014; Pâris
and Wyplosz, 2014). While some observers have argued that creditor coordination is
less problematic than commmonly thought and participation rates in debt restructurings
have generally been very high (Bi et al., 2011; Moody’s, 2013), recent empirical evidence
shows that investor litigation has been on the rise (Schumacher et al., 2014a,b).
These seemingly contradictory findings may partially be explained by the fact that
rejecting a sovereign debt restructuring offer and litigating for full repayment are distinct
decisions. In Argentina, the legal actions of the most aggressive creditors are hardly
representative of those 24% of all creditors who did not accept the initial debt exchange
offer in 2005. Most holdout creditors did not engage in litigation, but were betting on a
better deal from subsequent negotiations with Argentina out of court. On the other hand,
some investors who bought Argentine bonds immediately filed suit without waiting for
negotiations to come under way. The decisions to hold out and to litigate were driven by
2Most notably the case Weltover v. Republic of Argentina, in which issuing sovereign debt on US capital
markets was recognized as a commercial activity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Even
broader than this, the mere denomination of defaulted debt in USD was argued to be sufficient to grant US
courts jurisdiction over foreign governments.
3“Está claro que se está convalidando una forma de dominación mundial financiera de derivados para
arrodillar a los pueblos”, own translation from Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s speech, 16 June 2014,
available at http://www.presidencia.gob.ar/discursos/27626-mensaje-por-cadena-nacional-palabras-de-la-
presidenta-de-la-nacion; and “[t]hose ’vulture funds’ [amount] to economic terrorism”, speech at the 68th UN
General Assembly, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/24sep/argentina.shtml.
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different factors, but are likely confused in the public debate.
This paper makes two main contributions. It first aims at providing a more objective
and quantitative perspective on the conflict between Argentina and its creditors. I
provide a unique new dataset of the bond-by-bond participation and litigation rates
related to Argentina’s exchange offers. Two main stylized facts emerge from the data.
First, participation was especially low in securities that were targeted at retail investors.
Using different bond characteristics to distinguish between “retail” and “professional”
bonds, I find that participation in the retail bonds was on average 72.1%, while 82.9%
of the professional bonds were tendered on average (difference significant at 1% level).
Second, the data reveal that only a small subset of investors was responsible for the
overwhelming majority of the lawsuits. Only 12 investors held more than 70% of the
litigated bonds, and focused on only 12 securities (out of 145 restructured bonds).
The second contribution is to provide a more general understanding of the determi-
nants of holdouts and litigation. Debt managers need to find an optimal trade-off between
minimizing borrowing costs by yielding attractive creditor rights as well as appealing
to different investor groups on the one hand, against safe-guarding debt instruments
against coordination problems in case of defaults on the other. The empirical evidence
from Argentina suggests that bonds tailored to the demands of retail investors were more
likely to see low participation rates, but were less likely to be litigated. Bonds marketed
to professional investors, and those governed by US and English law, had higher partici-
pation rates, but also a higher probability of being subject to holdout litigation. Beyond
the empirical evidence, I rationalize these findings in a simple model of heterogeneous
speculation in distressed sovereign debt markets. Extending the framework in Schu-
macher et al. (2014b) by a dimension of heterogeneous beliefs as, for instance, in Kandel
and Pearson (1995) or Harris and Raviv (1993),4 I show that especially less sophisticated
(or very optimistic investors) would have been induced to hold out from a debt exchange
offer. This is true even if they would not want to litigate against the government in case
they do not receive a better offer. Investors with a more realistic valuation, on the other
hand, are less likely to hold-out, since they are better at anticipating the outcome of
future negotiations. But conditional on having refused the initial offer, they are more
likely to file a lawsuit.
Keeping in mind the limitations of a case study approach, these results can have
implications for the design of sovereign bonds and public debt management. While
targeting the sale of government debt to retail investors may open up additional sources
of funding, these bonds might be harder to coordinate into a restructuring. This finding
may be especially relevant for future debt restructurings in the Eurozone, in which many
governments have marketed their bonds specifically to retail investors.
4See Hong and Stein (2007) for a survey.
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Related literature A considerable theoretical literature has analyzed the creditor co-
ordination problem in sovereign debt restructurings.5 Miller and Zhang (2000) argue
that mandatory payment moratoria should be imposed in the case of liquidity crises.
Ghosal and Miller (2003), Weinschelbaum and Wynne (2005), Haldane et al. (2005), and
Lanau (2011) analyze the effects of contractual innovations (specifically collective action
clauses, CACs) and statutory solutions (insolvency regimes) to minimize coordination
problems. Engelen and Lambsdorff (2009) tailor their model to the Argentine restruc-
turing’s characteristics and analyze the effects of a most-favored creditor clause and a
significant “sweetener” (GDP-linked warrants). Bi et al. (2011) argue that the use of exit
consents and minimum participation constraints should suffice to eliminate coordination
problems in most circumstances, making the use of CACs unnecessary. In an elaborate
model of strategic delay, Pitchford and Wright (2012) argue that CACs can even aggravate
coordination failures. The papers by Bolton and Jeanne (2007, 2009), taking into account
the ex ante incentives of coordination problems, find that excessively “hard-to-restructure”
debt may be counter-productive and that a statutory insolvency regime could improve
welfare. This stands in contrast to the policy papers by Dooley (2000) and Shleifer (2003)
who argue that coordination problems are a necessary default penalty in sovereign
debt markets. In the toy model in Schumacher et al. (2014b), this default penalty leads
governments to impose lower losses on creditors, even though some creditors may not be
prevented from holding out. However, none of these papers makes a distinction between
creditors holding out, and litigating for full repayment. This paper contributes a small
model in which creditors take these decisions separately and sequentially.
In contrast to this rich theoretical literature, empirical evidence on the topic is
scarce. Schumacher et al. (2014a) show that creditor litigation has risen significantly
since the 1980s, but do not distinguish between participation and litigation. They find
that while the frequency of litigation has significantly increased, the involved amounts
are still relatively small – on average, legal disputes accounted for only about 3% of
restructured debt in the 2000s. More empirical evidence exists in the corporate finance
literature. A fundamental difference to sovereign debt restructurings is that companies
in many jurisdictions have the option to restructure their debt under orderly bankruptcy
proceedings, such as Chapter 11 in the US. In these instances, a stay on creditor litigation
is imposed and workouts become binding, effectively eliminating coordination problems.
But bankruptcy proceedings can be costly, and companies frequently offer voluntary
debt exchanges instead, with similar incentives for participating or holding out as in the
sovereign context. Asquith et al. (1994) find that the capital structure of companies is
an important determinant of the choice between bankruptcy and exchange offers, and
that the presence of large bondholders and the legal subordination of holdouts increases
the chances of a successful exchange. Further factors increasing the risk of holdouts
are presented by Gilson et al. (1990) who show that holdout problems are less severe if
5General analyses of the problem can be found in Grossman and Hart (1980), Gertner and Scharfstein
(1991), and Detragiache and Garella (1996).
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the creditor structure contains more banks, and a lower number of separate securities,
while Chatterjee et al. (1995) find that holdout problems are less severe in buyback offers,
compared to debt exchanges. Daniels and Ramirez (2007), in a sample of more than
2,000 voluntary debt exchanges by US firms between 1986-97, provide evidence that
restructurings with a high risk of holdouts are more likely to be designed with legally
coercive elements such as exit consents. This paper is the first to offer a systematic
empirical assessment of the holdout and litigation decisions in the context of one of the
largest sovereign debt restructurings in history.
Finally, Argentina is one of the most widely used cases in models of sovereign default.
Among many others, Arellano (2008), Mendoza and Yue (2012), Sandleris and Wright
(2014), and Asonuma and Trebesch (2014) use Argentine macroeconomic data to calibrate
their models. While macroeconomic data is publicly accessible, little systematic data
has been available on the also widely researched creditor coordination problem. This
paper fills a gap in documenting investor decisions on a granular level for one of the
most widely-researched government debt restructurings.
4.2 Background: default and restructuring offers6
4.2.1 The financial crisis and default
How did Argentina become a “uniquely recalcitrant debtor” (NML Capital v. Argentina,
12-105, 2nd Circ.), mired in decade-long litigation across the world? For much of the
1990s, Argentina was seen as an exemplary success story of financial globalization. The
country had emerged from the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s with two major
policy initiatives. First, it introduced a fixed exchange rate of the Argentine Peso (ARS)
to the USD at a rate of 1:1 in 1991. This rigid currency peg, a monetary policy turned
into public legislation with the “convertibility law”, helped to persistently bring down
inflation rates to single-digit levels. Second, it negotiated a 33% reduction of its USD
28bn external debt (in net present value terms) under the Brady initiative in April 1993
(Cruces and Trebesch, 2013). These successful financial policies, coupled with a set of
economic liberalization policies, helped Argentina to sustain high economic growth for a
large part of the 1990s. The average annual GDP growth rate amounted to 5.9% between
1991-1998 (see Figure 4.1).
The country’s fiscal policy, however, was marked by an average overall deficit of 2.5%
even in this expansionary period. The debt/GDP ratio moved back to the level from
before the sweeping debt restructuring of 1993.7 Much of the public deficit was bridged
6For the summary of the Argentine crisis, this section relies on the detailed case descriptions in Hausman
and Velasco (2003); Independent Evaluation Office (2004); Blustein (2006), and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2006). All macroeconomic data are from the IMF World Economic Outlook database, except where otherwise
noted.
7It should be noted that the increase was also partially caused by judicial decisions increasing the
government liabilities to pensioners (Blustein, 2006, p. 47-49).
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by borrowing in foreign currencies, turning Argentina into the largest emerging market
borrower by issue volume.
Figure 4.2 shows the issuance of the more than USD 90bn foreign bonds that eventually
ended up in default after 2001. Except for a brief period around the Mexican currency
crisis (“Tequila crisis”) in December 1994, Argentina continuously issued foreign bonds,
mostly at favorable conditions: the spread over US treasuries was below a “critical” level
of 1,000bps (Pescatori and Sy, 2007) until the end of 2000, despite the fact that early signs
of a looming crisis had become evident in the late 1990s. Growth slowed down, and the
financial crises in Asia and Russia of 1997-98 increased investors’ awareness of the risks
in emerging economies’ debt markets (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2006).
In February 1998, Argentina acknowledged this risk by entering a precautionary
credit line in form of an Extended Fund Facility with the IMF (worth USD 2.8bn). But
the recession continued and, in light of the worsening fiscal position, default could only
be averted through additional borrowing at increasingly punitive rates (see Figure 4.2),
and a significant IMF Standby Arrangement worth USD 22.8bn.8
The government implemented various “voluntary” debt exchanges and further fi-
nancially repressive policies in the second half of 2001 to avoid default. But the IMF
refused to transfer a scheduled loan disbursal in December over the failure to achieve
sufficient policy progress under the program’s conditionality. In light of increasing social
unrest, including the deaths of numerous protesters, Argentina announced a unilateral
moratorium on its sovereign debt on 24 December. The first missed payment was a
coupon due in January 2002, and the USD/ARS exchange rate was floated shortly after.
4.2.2 Restructuring offers and creditor participation
The restructuring negotiations between the Argentine government and its private cred-
itors turned out exceptionally harsh. Enderlein et al. (2012), who measure the “coer-
civeness” of sovereign debt renegotiations, find that Argentina was the most aggressive
debtor of 31 defaulting countries between 1980 and 2010. Negotiations did not start until
March 2003 (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006), and the terms of the first, informal
bond exchange offer (presented at the World Economic Forum in Dubai) proposed a
net present value reduction (NPV) of 90% (Hornbeck, 2004, p. 7). While the final offer,
published in November 2004, had more creditor-friendly terms, the average NPV haircut
for investors was still estimated at between 71-77% (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006;
Cruces and Trebesch, 2013).
The submission period for tendering bonds into the proposed exchange was scheduled
from 14 January through 25 February 2005. The implementation of the exchange,
originally set for 1 April, was delayed until 10 June (IMF, 2005): NML Capital, a hedge
fund that had already initiated legal proceedings against Argentina and obtained a
8The SBA for Argentina, agreed in March 2000 and increased in January 2001, marked one of the IMF’s
largest exposure to a single country, on par with the programs for Turkey and Brazil during the 2000s. The
largest IMF programme to date is the USD 40.4bn package to Greece, decided in May 2010.
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judgment, tried to attach the bonds that participating creditors had delivered to Bank
of New York, the bank serving as exchange agent for the offer, in order to receive the
exchange bonds (NML Capital v. Rep. of Argentina, SDNY, 03 Civ. 8845, order signed 21
March 2005). NML’s attachment attempts were subsequently overturned in the same
district court and the vacatur confirmed on appeal (EM & NML Capital v. Republic of
Argentina, 131 Fed. Appx. 745; 2nd Circ., 05 Civ. 1525), so that the exchange could be
completed with three months delay.
An important legal feature of the debt exchange was that it explicitly promised to
make any future offers available to all creditors if they contained better terms than the
2005 deal. This promise, valid until 31 December 2014, should increase the incentives to
participate in the first offer (“rights upon future offers”, or RUFO, clause).9 Furthermore,
domestic legislation was passed to bind future governments to the non-negotiation
stance, the so-called “Lock law” (Hornbeck, 2013). Combined, these measures should
reassure creditors that they could not be better off by rejecting the offer. Nevertheless,
the aggregate participation rate amounted to only 76.2% (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer,
2006, p. 192).
In 2010, Argentina did indeed make a second offer to the remaining holdout-creditors,
to further decrease the amount of outstanding debt in default. However, the offer came
with the identical terms as in 2005. This ensured that neither the RUFO clause in the
exchange bonds, nor the “Lock law” were violated. A significant share of the holdout
creditors accepted the second offer, bringing the overall participation rate to more than
92.6%; but even with this combined figure, the Argentine exchanges achieved one of the
lowest participation rates in bond restructurings since 1997 (Moody’s, 2013, p. 9).
4.3 The ensuing litigation: Data and descriptive statistics
The following section presents a new micro-level dataset on the Argentine debt restruc-
turing process. The two main variables of interest are the bond-by-bond participation
and litigation rates. All data were coded from two main primary sources: the appendices
to the offer memoranda of the 2005 and 2010 exchange offer, and the complaints filed by
creditors litigating in the US Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York
(SDNY).
The sample of bonds includes 145 distinct securities.10 Of these, 16 bonds were
completely tendered into the exchange offer, meaning that no principal was outstanding
in 2010. Table 4.4 provides the list of bonds included in the analysis.
9While not common under New York law, similar provisions had come up in some of the Brady exchanges
in the 1990s (e.g. in Poland, see Buchheit, 2002). More recently, Belize included similar “Most Favored
Creditor” clauses in its debt restructurings in 2007 and 2013 (Government of Belize, 2006, 2013, p. 11, 12).
10From the 315 eligible securities registered with an ISIN that are listed in the restructuring offers, I
exclude 170 “exotic” instruments. The vast majority of these dropped securities (156) are stripped coupons
and stripped amortization payments, where I only keep the “mother” bond in my sample to avoid double-
counting. The remainder are securities for which no information is available on Bloomberg or Datastream.
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46% of the bonds were denominated in USD, and 24% in EUR; the remaining bonds
were issued in JPY, GBP, CHF, and pre-Euro national currencies. 90 bonds had fixed
coupons, 40 bonds had floating rates, and 14 were zero coupon bonds. The average
principal per bond eligible for tender in the exchange offer was USD 650m. The earliest
maturity dates affected by the default had been bonds due in February 2002, and the
longest-running defaulted bonds had an original maturity date in June 2031. 47 of the
defaulted bonds were placed under the laws of the State of New York, 34 under English
law, 28 under Argentine law, and the remainder under German, Japanese, Italian, Swiss,
Luxembourg, or Spanish law.
One reason for this large variance in structure and currency is the government’s aim
to reach different investor groups. In particular, the Argentine government designed
a subset of their bonds with the explicit intent to broaden their creditor structure by
appealing to retail investors (Blustein, 2006, p. 74). The bonds can be categorized into
“retail” and “professional” bonds using two different definitions: first, if the bonds are
denominated in currencies other than USD and have a fixed rate coupon; and second, if
the bonds are denominated in currencies other than USD and the minimum denomination
unit is USD 10,000 or less. The rationale behind the first retail indicator is that fixed
coupon bonds sold in currencies such as JPY, EUR, or CHF were particularly attractive
for investors who wanted to achieve relatively high yields while at the same time limiting
exchange rate and interest rate risk. The indicator based on the minimum denomination
unit captures the fact that bonds with low minimum investment amounts allowed retail
creditors to invest in Argentine bonds even with relatively small amounts. Since I could
only gather data on the minimum denomination units on a subset of the full sample
of bonds from Bloomberg, and not from primary documents (bond prospectuses or
exchange offers), I use the currency and coupon based retail indicator as the benchmark
definition unless otherwise noted (all results are very similar using either definition).
Participation The 2005 holdout rates for each bond could be imputed from the fact
that the first exchange offer of 2005 was re-opened in 2010. Each of these two offer
documents contains a detailed list of eligible securities, including data on the outstanding
eligible principal amounts (EA) before the respective offers opened. By definition, the
outstanding amount eligible for the 2010 offer (EA2010) must reflect the face value of the
bonds not tendered into the 2005 exchange. The non-participation rate for each bond
in the initial 2005 offer can thus be computed as EA2010/EA2005. Further data on bond
characteristics, such as the currency denomination, maturity, and coupon rates were also
coded from the exchange offers.11
The median non-participation (holdout) rate by bond was 16.2% (mean 21.9%), and
62 bonds had hold-out rates exceeding 25%. This implies that even if these bonds
had contained standard non-aggregation collective action clauses, the participation rate
11A cross-check with Bloomberg reveals a significant degree of errors, especially with respect to coupon
rates for floating-rate instruments and some maturity dates.
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would not have cleared the often-used voting threshold of 75% needed to wipe out the
claims of any non-participating creditors. While data on recent bond exchanges has
indicated that aggregate participation rates were high enough to clear typical voting
thresholds in collective action clauses (Moody’s, 2013), some observers have already
noted that lower instrument-specific participation rates could still endanger the successful
implementation of an exchange (Gelpern and Gulati, 2013; Zettelmeyer et al., 2013). The
data for Argentina clearly supports this view. Assuming the observed participation rates,
the overall participation rate under the standard CACs with bond-by-bond voting and a
75% threshold would have reached only 83% (see Figure 4.3). Under a two-limb voting
procedure, with a bond-specific 50% threshold and an aggregate majority of 66 2/3%,
a significantly higher share of more than 98% could have been restructured. Finally, a
voting procedure with a required 75% majority on aggregate would have been sufficient
to wipe out the claims of all holdout creditors. This is what the IMF (2014) and the
International Capital Markets Association (2014) have suggested as standard clauses for
future bond documentation.
Participation was significantly lower in retail bonds than in professional bonds. The
average hold-out rate in retail bonds of 27.9% compares to 17.1% for professional bonds;
the difference is even more pronounced when comparing median values (32.7% to
10.9%) This skew suggests that while the holdout rate among professional investors
was concentrated on a few bonds, it was a much more widely distributed phenomenon
among retail investors.
Litigation The litigation rates were coded from a collection of all cases filed in the
SDNY between 1 January 2002, and 31 July 2014. All cases were obtained by searching
the Public Access to Electronic Court Records (PACER) database for cases in which
the Republic of Argentina or the provinces of Mendoza and Buenos Aires were named
as defendants. For each of the 182 distinct actions such identified, I coded the initial
complaint of the plaintiff, containing the creditor’s claim, and the docket history which
summarizes the progress of each case. Table 4.3 lists the plaintiffs, their claims, and the
date they filed suit. A complaint in US litigation must contain the cause of the action – in
this case, the precise security which was not serviced as promised – and the damage to
the creditor, reflecting his principal investment.12 This allows matching creditor-specific
bond holdings to the bond-specific participation rates as described above.
I focus on the SDNY since it has been the predominant venue for Argentine sovereign
debt litigation. Importantly, any defaulted Argentine bond could be litigated in the
SDNY, also those issued in currencies other than the USD, or not governed by US law.
Argentina’s broad submission to foreign courts contained in the documents describing the
defaulted bonds has been interpreted as granting US courts jurisdiction over the default
even if they are not explicitly named as the appropriate venue.13 A number of lawsuits
12Figure A1 in the appendix shows an example of a complaint.
13This decision itself was subject to litigation, but eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the
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were in fact filed in other jurisdictions, including Germany, Italy, Japan, France, Belgium,
Switzerland, Luxemburg, and Argentina (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2011).
The only jurisdiction of these in which notable volumes were litigated was Germany, but
even there the total principal under litigation was only USD 0.23bn (about 6.5% of the
litigation sum in the US). Since the data quality in these jurisdictions is considerably less
detailed, I only consider cases filed in the SDNY.
The data reveal a number of noteworthy stylized facts (see Table 4.1 for summary
statistics):
• Case numbers and creditor type: Some creditors filed multiple suits, and some
suits were filed by multiple creditors. There were 137 unique first-named plaintiffs,
and 101 cases were filed by more than one creditor. 59 cases were filed by retail
investors only, 90 cases by institutional investors (banks, hedge funds, or companies),
and 26 cases by a mix of retail and institutional investors.
• Plaintiffs: Table 4.2 shows the largest litigating creditors, ordered by the sum of
face value of all claims in their lawsuits. It shows a strong concentration on a small
group of creditors: 12 investors brought more than 70% of all litigated claims. The
single largest plaintiff by claim is NML Capital, with more than USD 600m, the
same firm forcing Argentina into renewed default in 2014 by bringing the pari passu
argument to court (SDNY 08 Civ. 6978, 09 Civ. 1707, and 09 Civ. 1708).
• Volumes: The average case volume is USD 23m, with a considerable variation and
skew. The median case volume is just USD 5.3m, and 24 cases claimed a principal
in excess of USD 50m. Pure retail cases had an average volume of just USD 6.1m,
with the smallest claims coming from German and Italian retail investors litigating
for USD 30-80,000. Institutional investors filed significantly larger claims of USD
37.3m on average. Aggregating these values confirms that the bulk of litigation
came from institutional investors: bonds worth USD 2.87bn were brought to court
by hedge funds and banks (83.7% of total), as opposed to USD 290m by retailers
(8.5%), with the remaining 7.8% claimed in cases by a combination of the two (see
also Figure 4.4).
• Litigation rates: The mean litigation rate per bond, defined as Volume litigatedOriginal principal , is
3.6%. But only about one third of all bonds were litigated at all (47 out of 145),
meaning that the median bond had no litigation at all. Five bonds bonds stand out
with very high litigation rates exceeding 25% of face value; all three of which are
classified as bonds targeted at professional investors. On average, a lawsuit dealt
with 4.1 different bonds. Institutional investors focused on slightly less securities,
on average 3.2 bonds per action; the largest number of different bonds (7.8) was
brought in cases litigated by both creditor types.
Second Circuit: “Section 13(4) of the offering circulars [...] clearly and unambiguously waives Argentina’s
‘immunity (sovereign or otherwise)’ in ’any court.”’ Capital Ventures Int’l v. Republic of Argentina, 552 F.3d 289,
at 291 (2nd Circ., 07 Civ. 1551), emphasis in the original document.
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• Time of filing and duration: The first case was filed on 6March 2002, only 10weeks
after the government had declared the moratorium on its external debt. However,
an early “rush to the courthouse” could not be observed: The vast majority of
cases (78%) was filed only after the publication of the final exchange offer on 1
November 2004 (see Figure 4.5). Only 6% of all cases were brought to court before
the government had published their first offer, known as the “Dubai proposal” in
September 2003. The average duration of cases (as of July 31, 2014) was 3.3 years,
with no significant differences between the different creditor types.
• Outcome: 67% of cases had been awarded a judgment by the end of the sample
period. 45 cases (26%) were still pending, and 6% had either been abandoned or
been voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff. Only two cases were outright dismissed,
both on jurisdictional grounds and not led against the central government, but
against the Province of Mendoza, and the public energy provider Energia Argentina.
• Law firms: 30 different law firms (and individual lawyers) acted as litigators on
behalf of the creditors; on Argentina’s side, all cases were defended by Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. 5 law firms in particular shared about two thirds of
the creditor mandates between them: almost exclusively on behalf of institutional
creditors acted Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP (representing the hedge funds GMO,
Gramercy, and Greylock, as well as the French bank BNP Paribas); Dechert LLP
(representing NML Capital, a subsidiary of Elliott Management, and EM, related to
the Dart family); and Paul Weiss LLP (for Aurelius Capital). For retail investors,
Dreier LLP and the independent attorney Guillermo Ariel Gleizer represented the
plaintiffs in 69% of the cases involving at least one retail investor.14
How do the participation rates compare to litigation rates? Figure 4.6 visualizes the
participation and litigation rates for all restructured bonds that had a positive amount
of litigation, ordered by hold-out rates. The graph shows a significant variation in
creditor decision making: few bonds had very high litigation and non-participation rates;
others had high hold-out rates, but saw only very little litigation; finally, some bonds had
relatively few hold-outs, but many of them went to court. The descriptive data thus reveal
a considerable variation in the participation and litigation decisions between the different
bonds and creditor types. While bonds targeted at retail investors had high hold-out rates,
on average exceeding 25% of face value, the litigation rates were very low, at only 0.6%.
On the other hand, bonds that were specifically targeted at institutional investors had
significantly higher participation rates of about 83%; but also much higher litigation rates,
on average 6.2% of face value. The following section uses a more systematic approach to
uncover empirical regularities with respect to the participation and litigation decisions.
14Dreier LLP was a New York based law firm that was liquidated after its founder Marc Dreier was
sentenced to 20 years in prison over financial fraud (“Argentina Debt War Lawyers Spend Decade Before
Judge”, Bloomberg, 19 December 2012.
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4.4 Empirical evidence
What explains this variation in hold-out and litigation rates across debt securities? In
a first step, I employ an agnostic approach and add bond-specific features to a cross-
sectional regression model of the variables of interest:
yi = α+ β1Retaili + β2Exchangei + β3Bradyi + β4Couponi + β5Principali (4.1)
+ β6Maturityi + β7NY lawi + β8English lawi + ϵi
where yi represents the outcome variables: the hold-out rate, the litigation rate, or the
ratio of the litigation rate to holdout rate (from now called litigation ratio), each per bond.
The βs represent the coefficients of interest. “Retail” denotes the binary retail bond
indicator as explained above. “Exchange” denotes if a bond was listed on an exchange
or traded on private markets only. “Brady” bonds were the securities issued as part of
the country’s previous 1993 restructuring, whose principal was backed by collateral.15
“Coupon” represents the coupon rate; for floating rate notes, I use the average rate until
the closing of the exchange on 10 June 2005. “Principal” and “Maturity” denote the face
value (in USD million) and time to maturity at the date of the exchange (note that this
value can be negative for bonds that had an original maturity date between the default
in 2002 and the exchange in 2005). “NY law” and “English law” are indicator variables
denoting if the bond was issued under the laws of New York (32% of bonds) or England
(23%). This leaves the bonds issued under the laws of “other” countries as the benchmark
category against which the coefficients should be interpreted (44%), including the laws
of Argentina, Germany, Japan, Italy, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Spain.
For simplicity in a first step, I estimate the coefficients in equation (4.1) by OLS,
computing Hubert-White standard errors for inference. However, since the dependent
variables represent a fraction (hold-out and litigation rate per face value, and litigation
rate per hold-out rate) and are thus bounded between 0 and 1, a linear model may not
provide the best fit to the data. Following Papke and Wooldridge (1996), I therefore also
estimate the benchmark model in a generalized linear model with a probit link function
(I report average marginal effects in the tables for easier interpretation).
Table 4.6 shows results for the correlation of bond characteristics with hold-out
rates. As already seen in the descriptive statistics, retail bonds had significantly lower
participation rates, of about 11 percentage points (column 1). Likewise, exchange listed
securities had about 11% higher holdout rates (column 2). Brady bonds, on the other
hand, had a significantly higher participation rate (column 3). This is possibly due to the
collateral attached to these bonds, which implied a higher recovery value independent
of the restructuring. While the retail indicator alone already explains about 8% in the
variation of holdout rates, standard bond characteristics including time to maturity,
15The bonds offered in exchange for defaulted bank debt had a (reduced) principal that was fully
collateralized with US treasuries, see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) or Rieffel (2003).
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coupon rate, and outstanding principal are virtually orthogonal to the participation
rates (column 4). Similarly, taken at face value, the governing law of the bond did not
play a role for the participation decision. Bonds governed by New York and English
law, the two predominant places for legal sovereign debt enforcement, do not display a
significantly higher holdout rate than those governed under miscellaneous other laws
(column 5). However, this picture changes when controlling for all previously considered
variables. Column (6) shows the results including all variables together as in equation
(4.1). Bonds targeted at retail investors, listed on exchanges, and governed by US law
were particularly likely to have low participation rates in the 2005 exchange. Brady bonds,
on the other hand, saw relatively low levels of holdouts. Column (7) shows the results in
a fractional response model (displayed are the average marginal effects). The results are
quantitatively and qualitatively very similar to the OLS results, increasing the confidence
in the simpler estimation technique.16
Table 4.7 presents the analogous results for litigation rates, expressed as the principal
under litigation as a share of eligible principal in the 2005 restructuring. Column
(1) presents a striking difference to the results for holdout rates: Retail bonds were
significantly less likely to be litigated, on the order of ca. 6%. This implies that even
though relatively more investors in these bonds rejected the proposal, they did not
enter a “race to the courthouse”; on the contrary, unconditionally, these bonds were less
likely to end up in court. This result is even starker in contrast to the other variables
used, all of which show similar correlations as with respect to the participation decision.
Exchange listed bonds were slightly more likely to be litigated (column 2), as were bonds
governed by New York or English, relative to other law bonds (column 5). Brady bonds
were considerably less often subject to legal actions. This finding also holds in the full
model including all variables (column 6) and in the fractional response model (column
7), although the retail bond indicator does not make a significant difference here.
The results are similar when considering different types of creditors and time periods.
Table 4.8 shows results from running the full model in different subsamples. Column (1)
uses as the dependent variable the litigation rate accounting only for those cases filed
by retail investors. It appears that for individual retail investors, the type of bond did
not play a role in determining their litigation decision. This suggests that for the subset
of retail investors filing suit, retail bonds were not especially sought after; if anything,
the sign of the coefficient suggests that even litigating retail investors rather litigated
based on bonds aimed at professional investors. Bonds that were closer to maturity
at the time of restructuring, and governed by New York law, were more likely to be
litigated. For institutional investors, retail bonds were signifcantly less attractive to be
used for litigation (column 2). Furthermore, compared to retail investors, governing law
played a much more important role for the litigation decision. The remaining estimates
consider different time periods. Column (3) looks only at those cases filed prior to
16Note that while the main results are expressed in percent, the fractional model uses fractions, hence the
coefficient magnitude is reduced by a factor of 100.
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the completion of the restructuring in 2005. The model does not fit the data well in
this period, suggesting that most of the pre-restructuring cases were filed with little
systematic correlation with the bond characteristics. Column (4) presents evidence that
the results were not driven by the new litigation instances since the October 2012 pari
passu decision by the Second Circuit.
By definition, litigating a defaulted bond is conditional on not participating in the
exchange. The results in Table 4.9 take this explicitly into account. The dependent
variable in these models is the litigation ratio, defined as the litigation rate as a share
of the holdout rate. The results are again strikingly different from the holdout rates.
Retail bonds had about a 16% lower litigation ratio than other bonds (column 1). It is
also worth noting that higher coupon rates, larger principals, and longer dated bonds
displayed higher litigation-to-holdout ratios (column 4). The effects of the governing law
on the litigation ratio, on the other hand, are consistent with the holdout rates reported
in Table 4.6: the New York law governed bonds had also higher litigation ratios of about
27 percentage points, as compared to other governing laws; the comparable figure for
English law bonds is a still significant 5.5 percentage point effect. The full model, reported
in column (6), is mostly consistent with the individual variable regressions. Retail bonds
had about a 6% lower litigation ratio. New York (English) law bonds showed a 16% (8%)
higher litigation ratio. The model fit of 42% is quite considerable, especially given that
it is estimated in a cross-sectional dataset. As before, the results are not dependent on
the econometric model and are similar when estimated in a fractional response setting
(column 7).
Looking at different subsets of lawsuit filings reveals comparable insights to the raw
litigation rates (Table 4.10). Among cases filed by retail creditors (column 1), the types of
bonds were not systematically differently distributed. Exchange listed bonds, for which
presumably a more liquid secondary market for retail investors exists, were however
slightly more likely to be litigated. New York law bonds also had a higher risk of being
litigated by retail investors, although the effect is notably smaller than for institutional
investors. This class of creditors (column 2), consistent with previous evidence, was
significantly less likely to litigate on retail and Brady bonds. In line with the findings
in the full sample, English and New York law bonds were particularly attractive for
litigation by professional creditors. Generally, the model fit is much better for institutional
investors (38%) than for retail investors (21%), suggesting that the litigation decision by
retail investors was more noisy. Similarly, the lawsuits filed before the exchange offer in
2005 can be less well explained by the empirical model than the full sample (column 3),
while excluding the post-pari passu time (column 4) does not change the main insights
reported.
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 offer results from a range of further robustness checks. The
models in Table 4.11 are equivalent to the benchmark equations in the previous tables,
but use the minimum denomination unit-based indicator for retail bonds instead. All
main results remain virtually equivalent.
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Table 4.12 includes two additional variables. Column (1) uses an indicator if the
respective bond was litigated by NML Capital, the single largest plaintiff, and changes
the dependent variable to exclude all claims filed by NML. The coefficient indicates that
bonds litigated by NML were also significantly more likely to be subject to other plaintiffs’
legal actions. While the causality may run both ways, one possible interpretation is that
other creditors exihibited free-riding on the spearheaded legal efforts by NML. Finally,
column (2) shows results when controlling for the bond-specific haircut (using data from
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2005).17 Since the “exchange menu” allowed investors
only to choose between a range of bonds with two possible maturities (in 2033 or 2038),
the net present value losses between different original bonds varied considerably, from
38% to more than 87%. The results in column (2) suggest for a one percentage point
increase in the haircut, the litigation ratio increased by 1.3 percentage points. This is
consistent with the evidence in Schumacher et al. (2014b), who find that haircuts are a
significant predictor of litigation in a cross section of 176 debt restructurings.
Summarizing the stylized regressions establishes three main results. First, holdout and
litigation decisions are systematically different. While retail bonds were especially likely
to have high holdout rates, they were significantly less likely to be litigated. This suggests
that some degree of heterogeneity exists between retail and professional investors with
respect to the decisions to participate in a restructuring offer, and conditional on this
decision to file a lawsuit.
Second, the empirical model explains particularly well the variation in the litigation
ratio for institutional creditors. Using the model only on data on retail investors’ decisions
has a considerably lower explanatory power. The fact that there is more noise in the
litigation ratios by retail investors may be evidence of a higher degree of uncertainty in
their decision making.
Third, New York and English law bonds were especially likely to have high holdout
rates, litigation rates, and litigation-to-holdout ratios. A possible explanation is that the
probability of enforcement was higher for these type of bonds. While all bonds were
eligible for litigation in the US, and especially in New York, legal questions about the
enforceability of judgments in these jurisdictions remain.18
4.5 Theoretical framework
The following section develops a simple model to rationalize the above findings. The
model relies on elements in Haldane et al. (2005) and Schumacher et al. (2014a,b) for
the optimal creditor decision in defaulted sovereign debt markets, and on Kandel and
Pearson (1995) for heterogeneous interpretation of uncertain signals about future payoffs.
17I thank Jeromin Zettelmeyer for kindly sharing this data. Note that the haircut data exist only for
the subset of USD denominated bonds, which is why I cannot include the retail bond indicators in this
specification.
18See the discussion NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, SDNY 08 Civ. 6978, about the applicability of
injunctions to European bondholders who do not receive their payments through US based clearing systems.
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Intuitively, consider a market in which a government offers to exchange its bonds for
new securities with a lower value. Creditors can either accept the offer and receive a
certain payout, or hold out and wait for a revised offer. The government will certainly
make a second proposal in the future, but the terms are unknown when the initial
decision takes place. After the initial decision about participating in the first offer,
the second “holdout” offer is revealed. The remaining holdout creditors who did not
participate in the first offer now have the choice of either accepting the revised proposal,
or going to court and file for their full original claim. There is a cost attached to litigating,
but with a certain probability the full amount is recovered. Creditors who accepted the
first offer do not have the chance to later try to receive their original claims by litigation,
but they can reinvest their proceeds from the initial offer and receive interest. Figure 4.7
outlines the time-line of the model, which is solved by backwards induction.
4.5.1 Exogenous debt holdings
Formally, the model consists of a single sequence of three periods, t = {1, 2, 3}, where in
the third period only the consumption of final accumulated wealth takes place. In t = 1,
the government proposes its first offer. This would lower the individual claims to 1− h1
for those investors who accept these terms.
There are n creditors who display heterogeneity along two dimensions. The first
source of heterogeneity is with respect to the legal costs of pursuing sovereign debt
litigation in period 2. Every creditor draws a specific litigation cost ci from a uniform
distribution bounded between 0 and 1, such that each i uniquely identifies an investor
on the cost dimension. Creditors differ with respect to their cost of litigation since
legal challenges to sovereign debt exchanges are protracted and require expensive legal
expertise, as shown by Schumacher et al. (2014a). Some investors may also be more
experienced in conducting sovereign debt lawsuits and thus face lower legal costs than
others.
Second, investors differ with respect to the precision of their expectations about the
conditions of the second offer. All creditors know the government will return with a
second “holdout” offer, but they cannot perfectly anticipate its terms. They know the
distribution of h2, which is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Furthermore, everyone
observes a signal about the true future haircut h2: hS2 = h2 + ϵ, where ϵ is a measure of
imprecision. While every creditor sees the same signal, they differ in its interpretation: as
in Kandel and Pearson (1995), some investors are more sophisticated in the interpretation
of the signal than others, which is reflected in ϵ ∼ (µi, σϵ), where µi ∈ [0, hS2 ]. Creditors
also know the distribution of the second offer. Hence, the expectation in period 1 about
h2 is given by:
E1(h2) = hS2 − µi (4.2)
This implies that creditors with higher µi are less sophisticated in their expectations
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about the future offer: They expect h2 to be lower, and thus the recovery value to be
higher, than more sophisticated creditors with a more realistic estimate in form of a
lower µi. Linking this to the empirical findings above, we may think about institutional
investors as “sophisticated” creditors, with a µi closer to 0, as opposed to retail investors,
who may have more uncertainty in estimating the future value of a defaulted bond.
In period t = 2, the government exchanges the bonds for the participating creditors,
paying them 1− h1 while holdout creditors receive nothing. It also reveals its revised
“holdout” offer h2. The holdout creditors can now decide whether they want to accept
this second offer, or try to recover their full claim in court. The expected value of
litigating, conditional on having held out in the first period, is given by p− ci, where p
denotes the probability of winning the lawsuit and successfully enforcing it, and ci is
the creditor-specific cost of going to court. Hence, creditors will go to court only if the
second offer is sufficiently bad:
h2 ≥ 1− p+ ci (4.3)
If the second offer h2 is sufficiently good (lower haircut, h2 < 1− p+ ci), they will accept
the offer and not file a lawsuit. Hence, for any individual creditor, the probability of going
to court in period 2 conditional on the realized second offer is given by 1− Prob(h2 <
1− p + ci) ≡ 1− ϕi. Even though creditors do not know the true h2 in t = 1, they
know the distribution of h2. They can therefore anticipate the probability of the “cut-off”
haircut after which they will go to court, conditional on their own individual litigation
cost ci. The game ends in period 3, when the government exchanges the bonds to the
holdout creditors who want to participate in the second offer, paying them 1− h2. The
litigating creditors receive the expected returns of the lawsuits.
When deciding about participating or rejecting the initial offer, creditors need to
compare the expected value of holding out and participating. The expected value of
holding out as anticipated in period 1 is given by the weighted sum of litigating and
accepting the revised offer:
VHi = (1− ϕi)(p− ci) + ϕi(1− h2) (4.4)
Also in period 3, the creditors that participated in period 1 receive the interest r ∼ (µr, σr)
on their re-investments, which determines the value of accepting the offer in period 1:
VPi = (1− h1)(1+ r) (4.5)
All creditors compare E1(VHi ) to E1(V
P
i ) in the first period to decide whether to hold out
or to participate in the initial offer. Solving this comparison for the marginal creditor c∗i
who is indifferent between accepting or rejecting h1, defines the share of creditors who
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hold out and wait for the revelation of h2:
Γ(p, h1, hS2 , r, µi) ≡
∫ c∗i
0
f (ci) dci (4.6)
Lemma 4.1. More sophisticated investors are less likely to hold out, but more likely to litigate.
A higher probability of success in litigation will increase both the holdout rate and the litigation
ratio.
Proof. See the appendix for details. The first part follows immediately from eq. (4.6), since
∂c∗i
∂µi
> 0. This implies that Γ increases, too. The share of litigating creditors conditional
on holding out is given by (1− ∫ c∗i ϕidci)/Γ, which by the same logic is decreasing in µi.
Since both c∗i and Γ are increasing in p, but ϕi is decreasing in p, both the holdout rate
and the litigation ratio will rise with a higher litigation success probability.
The lemma rationalizes the stylized insights from the empirical analysis. Intuitively,
the decision is determined by creditors’ estimated likelihood of having to go to court,
and from the expected value of that possibility. If the success probability of litigation
increases, the overall value of holding out in the first period rises - independent of the
actual realization of the second offer. Clearly, conditional on holding out, an increase
in the success probability induces more creditors to file a lawsuit rather than accepting
the offer. Therefore, bonds with higher probability of successful litigation, such as those
governed by US or UK law, should both have a higher share of holdouts and a larger
litigation ratio. This is consistent with the empirical evidence presented above.
Sophisticated investors, who can estimate future offers of the government more
precisely, can anticipate the probability with which they will rationally litigate in t = 2.
Therefore, of the sophisticated investors, only those with relatively low litigation costs
will hold out in t = 1. They are less afraid of the prospect of litigation since it would
come at a low cost. The case is different for less sophisticated investors. In t = 1, they
anticipate a better offer in the future, and thereby underestimate the probability with
which they will rationally file a lawsuit in t = 2. Thus, of the less sophisticated investors,
those with relatively high litigation costs will still be induced to hold out. This means
that the marginal unsophisticated creditor on the litigation cost dimension who rejects the
first offer has a higher cost than the marginal sophisticated creditor. If the second offer
is then disappointing (relative to their imprecise estimates), litigation is an unprofitable
choice and they accept the revised offer instead, even though they now realize that they
would have been better off accepting the first offer.
Figure 4.8 visualizes these insights from lemma 4.1 for the specific case in which the
signal hS2 promises to be slightly more creditor-friendly than the original offer (Panel A).
It shows the share of creditors rejecting the first offer as a function of the probability of
success in subsequent litigation and the average precision of the interpretation of the
signal about the second offer. Creditors who are more sophisticated in anticipating the
true second offer h2 will be less likely to hold out for a given probability of successful
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litigation than their less sophisticated counterparts. Formally, this is because they attach
a lower probability ϕi to the fact that they will indeed participate in the second offer, and
thus discount the relevance of the success probability in case of litigation. The marginal
litigation cost after which accepting the initial offer is rational is therefore higher for less
sophisticated creditors.
Panel B shows the litigation decision in t = 2 from a revelation of the second offer
that is disappointing for creditors who expected an improvement because it contains
the same terms as the initial offer. Conditional on having held out in the first period,
the more sophisticated creditors are more likely to file suit for any given probability of
success. This is because of the sophisticated creditors, only those with lower costs of
litigating were tempted to reject the initial offer; since they were more realistic about
the possibility that they might actually be inclined to litigate, those with relatively low
costs of litigating became holdout creditors. They are therefore more prone to file a
lawsuit. The less sophisticated creditors, on the other hand, discounted the probability
ϕi of actually having to go to court and were therefore more likely to become holdout
creditors even with high costs of litigating.
4.5.2 Effect of secondary markets
The previous argument assumed that despite heterogeneous valuation of the bonds, no
trade could take place between creditors. If there is a secondary market for distressed
bonds in t = 1 before creditors make their decision about accepting the first offer, they
will adjust their holdings according to their respective valuation. The aggregate supply
of debt on this market is zero, so that the sum of the aggregate demand schedules for
holdout and participating investors must net out:
ΓdHi (q) + (1− Γ)dPi (q) = 0 (4.7)
where dji , j = {H, P} denotes the demand functions (positive if the agent wants to
purchase bonds, and negative if she wants to sell), and q represents the equilibrium price.
This is derived from the agents’ utility optimization. Investors have exponential utility
and maximize their terminal wealth in t = 3 over their demand schedule dji :
max
di
Ei = e−d
j
i(V
j
i −q) (4.8)
The standard optimization for exponential utility functions implies that the individual
demand functions are given by
dHi = (V
H
i − q)σ2Vh , dPi = (VPi − q)σ2Vp (4.9)
where σ2Vh = ϕ
2σ2ϵ , σ
2
Vp = (1− h1)2σ2r
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Inserting the demand functions into (4.7) allows solving for the market clearing price q∗
at which the aggregate equilibrium demands are filled. Inserting q∗ back into (4.9) gives
the aggregate demand by holdout and accepting creditors:
d˜iH =
σ2Vhσ
2
Vp(1− Γ)
Γσ2Vh + (1− Γ)σ2Vp
(VHi −VPi ) , d˜iP =
σ2Vhσ
2
VpΓ
Γσ2Vh + (1− Γ)σ2Vp
(VHi −VPi ) (4.10)
d˜iH is clearly positive for holdout creditors, since for them VHi > V
P
i . Their demand
will be filled by creditors who had otherwise participated in the restructuring, since d˜iP
is negative for them. The total debt holdings of the holdout creditors after these trade
adjustments is then given by:
ΓSec.Mkt. ≡
∫ c∗i
0
f (ci)(1+ d˜iH) dci (4.11)
Lemma 4.2. If secondary markets exist, a higher share of creditors will hold out.
Proof. Only the subset of creditors with ci < c∗i values the holdout option higher than
participating in the initial offer, i.e. VHi ≥ VPi ∀ ci ≤ c∗i . Only these creditors will have
a positive demand dHi ≥ 0, which will be satisfied by participants who do not want to
hold out, dPi ≤ 0 (eq. 4.10). This implies that ΓSec.Mkt. ≥ Γ (eq. 4.11) which means that the
holdout rates will be larger in the presence of secondary markets.
Note that this does not imply that nobody accepts the restructuring. The exponential
functional form of investors’ utility implies risk aversion, which is why holdout creditors
have a limited demand. Furthermore, a simple extension that would justify limited
re-allocation of bonds on secondary markets would be to impose borrowing constraints
on creditors. Frictions limiting the demand for investments into defaulted bonds could
come from public regulation, such as high capital weights on distressed debt, or political
pressure.19 Finally, many professional investors are prohibited by private regulations
from investing too much of the assets under their management into distressed debt,
further limiting demand. But as long as these restrictions do not drop demand to zero,
secondary markets will increase the likelihood of holdouts.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper provides systematic evidence on creditor participation and litigation in one of
the most widely researched sovereign debt restructurings. Using a novel dataset, it shows
that while the holdout rate was relatively high, the share of creditors litigating against
19Gordon Brown, former UK chancellor and prime minister, publicly insulted the actions of distressed
sovereign debt funds as “morally outrageous” (BBC, May 10, 2002). His US colleague Hank Paulson stated
he “deplored” the business of distressed funds (Bloomberg, January 8, 2008). Political initiatives in both
countries have tried to limit the profitability of investing in distressed sovereign debt (see Schumacher et al.
(2014b) for details).
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the government in court was significantly lower and highly concentrated. Empirical
correlations show that especially bonds targeted at retail investors had high holdout,
but low litigation rates. Bonds governed by US and UK law, on the other hand, were
particularly likely to be kept out of the restructuring and brought to court. A highly
stylized model of heterogeneous creditors can rationalize these facts.
Recent developments in one of the Argentine litigation cases have renewed interest
in the legal actions by creditors. The interpretation of the pari passu clause in sovereign
bonds as prohibiting the government from paying participating creditors’ new claims in
full if not at the same time ratably repaying holdout creditors their old claims in full could
increase the holdout incentives for any individual investor. In the context of the model,
this could be seen as a strong rise in the success probability of litigation. This would raise
both the holdout rate in future restructurings, but could also have significant implications
for the remaining Argentine holdout creditors: Conditional on having held out, this will
increase the value of litigating vis-à-vis accepting a future offer by Argentina at the same
terms as before. Hence, if the court’s interpretation of pari passu stands, this may induce
many of the remaining holdout creditors to follow the more aggressive investors’ lead
who have already initiated lawsuits in the past.
But the results may also have implications outside the Argentine context. Appealing
diverse groups of investors may be seen as beneficial in calm times. However, it carries the
risk of increased coordination problems in case a debt restructuring becomes necessary
in the future. While this may be a useful commitment device to overcome the time
inconsistency problem inherent in sovereign debt markets, debt managers should consider
if the Argentine experience is a worthwhile way of achieving this goal.
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Figures
Figure 4.1: Macroeconomic developments in the run-up to the crisis
The graph shows the annual growth in GDP (WEO data, left axis, in %), the structural budget balance
(GFS data, left axis), and the debt to GDP ratio (Abbas et al., 2010, right axis, in %). Except for 1995, when
the fallout from the Mexican “Tequila crisis” dragged down growth throughout Latin America, Argentina
experienced high growth rate exceeding 4% for largest part of the 1990s. The structural budget balance,
however, was negative except for one balanced budget in 1993. Not surprisingly, the debt/GDP ratio
increased continuously after the debt restructuring of 1993; but the debt dynamics got especially out of hand
when the country entered a recession in the aftermath of the Russian and Asian financial crises of 1997/98.
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Figure 4.2: Issuance of government debt in the 1990-2000s
The graph depicts the issue dates and volumes of the sovereign bonds that were restructured in 2005/10.
The three large outliers to the right are the result of the so-called “mega-swap”, a voluntary exchange of
bonds worth about USD 29bn for three large, consolidated bonds due in 2008, 2018, and 2031. They thus
reflect only a restructuring of previously accumulated liabilities. The dark line shows the JP Morgan EMBI
index for Argentina, a face value-weighted average of the spread between a basket of Argentine bonds and
US treasuries (stripped of the value of collateral attached to Brady bonds).
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Figure 4.3: Hypothetical restructuring outcome with different CACs
The figure displays how different versions of collective action clauses (CAC) would have affected the
restructuring outcome, given the observed participation rates. In the 2005 restructuring, no CACs were
applied, leading to a participation rate of 76%. With a bond-by-bond specific threshold of 75% (CAC #1),
83% of the aggregate debt stock could have been exchanged. Under CAC #2, where a bond-specific majority
of 50% and an aggregate majority of 66.67% need to be reached in order to eliminate bond-specific holdouts,
98% of the eligible debt could have been restructured. Finally, under an aggregate CAC #3, with only a
single vote across all bonds and an aggregate majority requirement of 75%, the entire debt could have been
exchanged.
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Figure 4.4: Plaintiffs with largest claims
The graph shows the 12 plaintiffs with the largest claims (by face value of disputed bonds, excluding accrued
and penalty interest; blue bars, left axis). It also compares the sum of all claims by these plaintiffs with the
sum of all other plaintiffs who filed lawsuits (red bars, right axis). The 12 largest plaintiffs accounted for
more than 70% of the entire litigated volume, ca. USD 2.6bn out of USD 3.7bn.
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Figure 4.5: Filing of lawsuits
The graph shows the volume (face value of claims) of 182 lawsuits by date of filing. The red lines mark (1)
the announcement of the first proposed restructuring terms (“Dubai proposal”) in September 2003, which
would have implied a NPV reduction of about 90%, (2) the eventually realized debt exchange in June 2005
with an average haircut of ca. 75% (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006), and (3) the affirmation of the
SDNY’s pari passu order by the 2nd Circuit. Almost all cases were filed after the initial Dubai proposal
(94%), and the majority only after the 2005 debt exchange (65%). While a few cases stand out (notably by
a small set of creditors, see also figure 4.4), 113 cases had claims of less than USD 25m. About half of all
cases were filed by individual retail investors alone (59 cases) or a mix of retail and institutional investors
(26 cases). These cases involved significantly lower sums of just USD 7.7m on average, as compared to USD
37.3m in those cases filed by institutional investors only.
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Figure 4.6: Bonds: holdout and litigation rates
The figure shows the set of bonds subject to litigation in the SDNY, ordered by the share of principal not tendered into the 2005 debt exchange. The dark blue bars indicate the share of principal not tendered
into the 2005 exchange, and the turquoise bars the share of principal subject to legal actions.
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Figure 4.7: Model outline
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Figure 4.8: Holdout rate and litigation ratio
The graphs show the relationships between the holdout rate and litigation ratio with the precision of
the signal (or sophistication of investors) µ and the probability of successful litigation p. Parametrical
assumptions are h1 = 0.77, hS2 = 0.5, h2 = 0.77, r = 0.1, and a uniform distribution of ci over [0,1]. The
upper part of panel A shows the share of creditors (sorted along their cost of litigation ci) who reject the
initial proposal in t = 1 as a function of the precision of their estimate of future offers for two probabilities of
success in litigation. The holdout rate is increasing in both the imprecision of the signal µ and the probability
of success p. The lower part shows the interaction between p and µ over the whole support of p. Panel
B shows the share of litigating creditors as a proportion of holdouts (litigation ratio), again sorted along
the cost of litigation. While the litigation ratio is decreasing in the imprecision of the signal µ, it is still
increasing in the probability of success.
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4.7 Tables
Table 4.1: Overview case dataset
The table reports summary statistics on the cross-section of cases filed in the SDNY between 2002-14. Note
that the number of actions exceeds the number of plaintiffs since some creditors filed multiple distinct cases
(Notably, NML Capital, Aurelius, and Gramercy filed 12, 9, and 6 cases, respectively.) Furthermore, the
case number refers to actions which sought to obtain a judgment, rather than seeking enforcement. The
total volume represents the sum of the face value of claims, excluding accrued or penalty interest. The
duration reflects the time from filing suit to termination of the case as indicated in the docket (typically by a
judgment). Note that this variable is right-censored.
No. actions 182
No. lead plaintiffs 137
Total volume (USD m) 3,745.1
Mean Min Max
Duration of cases (years) 3.19 0.02 12.03
Number of bonds per action 4.23 1 20
Volume per action (USD m) 22.84 0.03 203.35
Table 4.2: Plaintiffs with largest claims
The table lists the 12 largest plaintiffs by face value in litigation. Note that this set of creditors holds 72% of
the entire litigated claims.
Plaintiff Volume (Mn USD) % of total Cumulative
NML Capital 614.8 16.4% 16%
Gramercy 335.4 9.0% 25%
Aurelius Capital 282.9 7.6% 33%
Greylock 205.9 5.5% 38%
EM Ltd. 203.3 5.4% 44%
GMO Emerging Country 197.0 5.3% 49%
Blue Angel Capital 176.9 4.7% 54%
Capital Markets Financial Services 172.5 4.6% 58%
BNP Paribas 147.9 4.0% 62%
FFI Fund 115.4 3.1% 65%
Artal Alternative Treasury Management 103.8 2.8% 68%
Capital Ventures International 84.5 2.3% 70%
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Table 4.3: List of cases filed in the SDNY
The table lists all lawsuits filed by investors against the Republic of Argentina in the Southern District of
New York federal district court based on the 2001/02 default between 1 January 2002 and 31 July 2014. All
data were obtained from the PACER database of electronic court records. The lead plaintiff is the first named
plaintiff on the docket. Creditor type was coded according to the plaintiff’s complaint. The face value does
not include additional damage claimed by the investors, such as past due interest, or penalty interest.
Case number Lead plaintiff Date filed Creditor type Face value (Mn
USD)
08 Civ. 09506 A. Gandola & C. S.P.A. 11/5/2009 Institutional .
06 Civ. 03197 Abel Amoroso 4/25/2006 Retail & Institutional 1.63
05 Civ. 00177 Agostino Consolini 1/7/2005 Retail & Institutional 1.61
06 Civ. 15393 Agritech S.R.L. 12/22/2006 Institutional .
08 Civ. 04902 Alejandro Alberto Etcheto 5/27/2008 Retail 0.94
07 Civ. 07248 Alesia Milanesi 8/14/2007 Retail 1.48
04 Civ. 03314 Alessandro Morata 4/30/2004 Retail & Institutional 22.15
02 Civ. 01773 Allan Applestein Guarantor Trust 3/6/2002 Institutional 0.16
02 Civ. 04124 Allan Applestein Guarantor Trust 5/31/2002 Institutional 0.25
03 Civ. 06268 Allan Applestein Guarantor Trust 8/20/2003 Institutional 0.86
08 Civ. 00440 Amber Reed Corp 1/17/2008 Institutional 1.45
05 Civ. 02159 Ana Laura Bonvecchi 2/16/2005 Retail & Institutional 2.99
07 Civ. 05593 Andrarex 6/12/2007 Institutional 2.63
06 Civ. 03976 Andrea Jacinto Alzugaray 5/24/2006 Retail 3.49
05 Civ. 02943 Anna Ferri 3/17/2005 Retail 1.38
06 Civ. 15171 Antonio Forgione 12/15/2006 Retail 2.20
11 Civ. 04223 Anye Salinovich 6/21/2011 Retail 0.89
05 Civ. 09072 Armando Ruben Fazzolari 10/25/2005 Retail 0.19
06 Civ. 01839 Artal 3/8/2006 Institutional 103.80
07 Civ. 02715 Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. 4/3/2007 Institutional 98.57
07 Civ. 11327 Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. 12/17/2007 Institutional 40.97
09 Civ. 08757 Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. 10/15/2009 Institutional 29.95
09 Civ. 10620 Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. 12/31/2009 Institutional 54.09
10 Civ. 01602 Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. 2/26/2010 Institutional 6.86
10 Civ. 03507 Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. 4/27/2010 Institutional 20.57
10 Civ. 03970 Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. 5/13/2010 Institutional 21.28
10 Civ. 08339 Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. 11/4/2010 Institutional 10.64
06 Civ. 14339 BNP Paribas 12/12/2006 Institutional 147.94
05 Civ. 00277 Banca Arner 1/12/2005 Institutional .
07 Civ. 08000 Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro 9/12/2007 Institutional 22.03
06 Civ. 03198 Bliway International 4/25/2006 Institutional 1.29
07 Civ. 02693 Blue Angel Capital I LLC 4/2/2007 Institutional 119.36
10 Civ. 04101 Blue Angel Capital I LLC 5/19/2010 Institutional 11.52
10 Civ. 04782 Blue Angel Capital I LLC 6/18/2010 Institutional 46.04
06 Civ. 15301 Capital Markets Financial Services 12/19/2006 Institutional 172.46
05 Civ. 04085 Capital Ventures International 4/25/2005 Institutional 29.50
06 Civ. 00207 Capital Ventures International 1/11/2006 Institutional 54.98
05 Civ. 04128 Carlos Alberto Marangoni 4/26/2005 Retail 0.17
05 Civ. 02521 Carlos Alberto Martinez 3/3/2005 Retail & Institutional 2.35
06 Civ. 15316 Caronte Ltd. S.A. 12/19/2006 Institutional 12.07
04 Civ. 00506 Cesar Raul Castro 1/22/2004 Retail 63.92
04 Civ. 00746 Cesar Raul Castro 2/2/2004 Retail Class action
06 Civ. 13675 Claren Corporation 12/1/2006 Institutional 4.00
06 Civ. 05887 Cordoba Capital 8/3/2006 Institutional 10.29
08 Civ. 06625 Crista Irene Brandes 7/24/2008 Retail 2.51
03 Civ. 09538 Denchu Investment Corporation 12/1/2003 Institutional 9.63
05 Civ. 06599 Diana Klein 7/21/2005 Retail & Institutional 4.92
10 Civ. 01598 Diocesi Patriarcato di Venezia 2/25/2010 Retail .
07 Civ. 02792 Dralli LLC 4/6/2007 Institutional 79.08
07 Civ. 04606 Dralli LLC 5/31/2007 Institutional .
09 Civ. 08299 Drawrah Ltd. 9/30/2009 Institutional 16.47
03 Civ. 02507 EM Ltd. 4/10/2003 Institutional 203.35
06 Civ. 14299 Ebrahim Tadayon 12/8/2006 Retail 6.95
03 Civ. 04693 Eduardo Andres Franceschi 6/25/2003 Retail & Institutional 4.84
04 Civ. 02117 Eduardo Puricelli 3/17/2004 Retail 41.28 (class action)
04 Civ. 00937 Elizabeth Andrea Azza 2/4/2004 Retail & Institutional 30.50 (class action)
04 Civ. 01085 Elizabeth Andrea Azza 2/10/2004 Retail & Institutional 51.83 (class action)
continues on next page
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Table 4.3: List of cases filed in the SDNY (continued)
Case number Lead plaintiff Date filed Creditor type Face value (Mn
USD)
04 Civ. 07056 Elvira Dagmar Buczat 9/2/2004 Retail & Institutional 4.71
05 Civ. 08687 Emanuele Botti 10/11/2005 Retail & Institutional 4.93
07 Civ. 06426 Ernst Ritoper 7/16/2007 Retail 0.26
05 Civ. 03328 FFI Fund Ltd. 3/29/2005 Institutional 115.38
06 Civ. 15300 Fernando Crostelli 12/19/2006 Retail 5.78
07 Civ. 02788 Franco Baccanelli 4/5/2007 Retail 13.10
07 Civ. 03851 Franco Baccanelli 5/16/2007 Retail 1.31
05 Civ. 10383 GMO Emerging Country Debt Fund 12/12/2005 Institutional 138.58
05 Civ. 10382 GMO Emerging Country Debt Fund 12/12/2005 Institutional 14.71
05 Civ. 10380 GMO Emerging Country Debt Fund 12/12/2005 Institutional 43.71
12 Civ. 09364 Gerhard Tenner 12/26/2012 Retail 0.39
04 Civ. 09788 Giorgio Scappini 12/13/2004 Retail Class action
07 Civ. 11492 Gramercy Emerging Markets Fund 12/21/2007 Institutional 87.13
08 Civ. 00041 Gramercy Emerging Markets Fund 1/3/2008 Institutional 7.95
08 Civ. 00164 Gramercy Emerging Markets Fund 1/8/2008 Institutional 83.85
08 Civ. 01113 Gramercy Emerging Markets Fund 2/4/2008 Institutional 16.29
08 Civ. 01722 Gramercy Emerging Markets Fund 2/21/2008 Institutional 36.40
08 Civ. 02865 Gramercy Emerging Markets Fund 3/18/2008 Institutional 52.67
08 Civ. 04814 Gramercy Emerging Markets Fund 5/23/2008 Institutional 51.07
04 Civ. 07643 Greylock Master Fund 9/27/2004 Institutional 2.57
05 Civ. 04246 Greylock Master Fund 4/28/2005 Institutional 198.04
08 Civ. 08689 Greylock Master Fund 10/10/2008 Institutional 5.25
03 Civ. 09537 Guillermo Franco 12/1/2003 Retail & Institutional .
02 Civ. 05699 H.W. Urban GmbH 7/22/2002 Institutional 1.15 (class action)
07 Civ. 10657 HWB Victoria Strategies Portfolio 11/28/2007 Institutional 49.58
07 Civ. 11382 HWB Victoria Strategies Portfolio 12/19/2007 Institutional 5.62
04 Civ. 06137 Hector Manuel Moldes 8/6/2004 Retail 2.61
08 Civ. 05436 Helmut Hagemann 6/12/2008 Retail 0.78
07 Civ. 00098 Hendrik Beyer 1/5/2007 Retail 6.32
06 Civ. 15297 Henry Brecher 12/19/2006 Retail Class action
03 Civ. 08531 Hernan Lopez Fontana 10/29/2003 Retail .
04 Civ. 00936 Hickory Sec., Ltd. 2/4/2004 Institutional 69.35 (class action)
07 Civ. 06231 Hillside Ltd. 7/5/2007 Institutional 5.60
07 Civ. 11457 Horacio Alberto Crespo 12/18/2007 Retail 0.89
11 Civ. 04908 Horacio Guibelalde 7/18/2011 Retail 0.12
06 Civ. 07100 Ivelo Holding 9/15/2006 Institutional 7.99
05 Civ. 03825 Jorge Bechara 4/14/2005 Retail & Institutional 1.73
03 Civ. 08120 Jorge Marcelo Mazzini 10/15/2003 Retail & Institutional 8.18
06 Civ. 01590 Jose Pedro Angulo 2/28/2006 Retail 4.44
05 Civ. 04149 Jose Strugo 4/26/2005 Retail 1.34
06 Civ. 06032 Josef Schwald 8/8/2006 Retail & Institutional 2.17
06 Civ. 01091 Klaus Wagner 2/14/2006 Retail 3.45
03 Civ. 08528 Latinburg 10/29/2003 Institutional 1.44
05 Civ. 06200 Laura Rossini 7/5/2005 Retail & Institutional 1.60
02 Civ. 03804 Lightwater 5/17/2002 Institutional 7.00
05 Civ. 02275 Lino Luis Arrigoni 2/18/2005 Retail 2.95
05 Civ. 10201 Los Angeles Capital 12/5/2005 Institutional 6.45
07 Civ. 02349 Los Angeles Capital 3/21/2007 Institutional 7.73
05 Civ. 03095 Luigi Daelli 3/22/2005 Retail 1.00 (class action)
02 Civ. 05932 Macrotecnic 7/26/2002 Institutional 0.45
07 Civ. 02607 Marcella Dolcetti 3/29/2007 Retail 2.08
06 Civ. 05157 Marcello Barboni 7/7/2006 Retail 0.03 (class action)
04 Civ. 01077 Marcelo Eduardo Prima 2/5/2004 Retail 45.46
05 Civ. 03089 Marcelo Ruben Rigueiro 3/22/2005 Retail 7.87
07 Civ. 05807 Marco Borgra 6/19/2007 Retail 0.82
05 Civ. 01033 Maria Consiglia Daho 1/31/2005 Retail Class action
04 Civ. 06594 Maria Fausta Cilli 8/13/2004 Retail 1.89
06 Civ. 13085 Maria Lauretta Dussault 11/9/2006 Retail 3.74 (class action)
11 Civ. 02864 Maria Lauretta Dussault 4/28/2011 Retail 0.96
04 Civ. 00508 Mario Alberto Cooke 1/22/2004 Retail .
05 Civ. 04299 Massimo Bettoni 5/2/2005 Retail .
04 Civ. 03313 Mazoral 4/30/2004 Institutional 20.21
05 Civ. 05197 Meridian Investments 6/1/2005 Institutional 10.76
07 Civ. 10656 Michael Heeb 11/28/2007 Retail & Institutional 2.89
continues on next page
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Table 4.3: List of cases filed in the SDNY (continued)
Case number Lead plaintiff Date filed Creditor type Face value (Mn
USD)
09 Civ. 07059 Michael Schmidt 8/10/2009 Retail & Institutional 8.35
04 Civ. 02710 Michelle Colella 4/9/2004 Retail 4.55
04 Civ. 01048 Million Air Corp 2/9/2004 Institutional 0.32
06 Civ. 03276 Mohammad Ladjevardian 4/21/2006 Retail & Institutional 73.52
05 Civ. 04239 Montreux Partners L.P. 4/28/2005 Institutional 5.00
05 Civ. 00178 Moreno Legnaro 1/7/2005 Retail 0.85
03 Civ. 08845 NML Capital 11/7/2003 Institutional 172.15
05 Civ. 02434 NML Capital 2/28/2005 Institutional 32.00
06 Civ. 06466 NML Capital 8/25/2006 Institutional 54.85
07 Civ. 01910 NML Capital 3/5/2007 Institutional 71.60
07 Civ. 02690 NML Capital 4/2/2007 Institutional 15.30
07 Civ. 06563 NML Capital 7/20/2007 Institutional 0.30
08 Civ. 02541 NML Capital 3/13/2008 Institutional 16.72
08 Civ. 03302 NML Capital 4/2/2008 Institutional 29.85
08 Civ. 06978 NML Capital 8/5/2008 Institutional 81.08 (pari passu)
09 Civ. 01708 NML Capital 2/24/2009 Institutional 140.89 (pari passu)
09 Civ. 01707 NML Capital 2/24/2009 Institutional 0.03 (pari passu)
10 Civ. 04656 NW Global Strategy 6/15/2010 Institutional 4.04
06 Civ. 15337 Nakiga Holdings 12/20/2006 Institutional 0.45
07 Civ. 01938 Newbadem Investments S.A. 3/6/2007 Institutional Class action
02 Civ. 03808 Old Castle 5/17/2002 Institutional 0.70
10 Civ. 09587 Olifant Fund 12/23/2010 Institutional 5.00
07 Civ. 11591 Oscar Luis Cavero 12/27/2007 Retail Class action
09 Civ. 08275 Oscar Reinaldo Carabajal 9/29/2009 Retail & Institutional 0.73
05 Civ. 03955 Osvaldo Lorenzo Sauco 4/19/2005 Retail 2.22
04 Civ. 05068 Otavio Lavaggi 6/4/2004 Retail Class action
10 Civ. 05338 Pablo Alberto Varela 7/13/2010 Retail 0.28
04 Civ. 07504 Paola Rosa 9/22/2004 Retail 2.56
05 Civ. 06002 Paolo Lisi 6/28/2005 Retail 1.23
06 Civ. 15293 Patricio Hansen 12/19/2006 Retail 0.34
07 Civ. 00937 Pier Luigi Catto 2/8/2007 Retail 12.99
06 Civ. 03068 Rafael Settin 4/21/2006 Retail 2.14
07 Civ. 00689 Renato Palladini 1/29/2007 Retail & Institutional 5.73
06 Civ. 07151 Renzo Beltramo 9/18/2006 Retail & Institutional 21.64
13 Civ. 08887 Ricardo Pons 12/16/2013 Retail & Institutional 0.21
05 Civ. 04466 Roberto Fedecostante 5/6/2005 Retail & Institutional 2.24
07 Civ. 11331 Romano Organizzazione 12/17/2007 Institutional 12.44
04 Civ. 02118 Ruben Chorny 3/17/2004 Retail 2.88 (class action)
07 Civ. 11495 Rudolf Erb 12/20/2007 Retail 1.38
05 Civ. 08195 Sergio Lovati 9/23/2005 Retail .
04 Civ. 00400 Silvia Seijas 1/16/2004 Retail 14.01
04 Civ. 00401 Silvia Seijas 1/26/2004 Retail 12.80
05 Civ. 10636 Socrate Pasquali 12/19/2005 Retail & Institutional 3.12
03 Civ. 01680 Susana Etevob 3/11/2003 Retail & Institutional .
07 Civ. 07351 Sylvia Dina Fernandez 8/17/2007 Retail 0.86
06 Civ. 06221 Teachers Insurance and Annuity Associ-
ation of America
8/16/2006 Institutional 58.02
07 Civ. 02016 Thomas Herb 3/8/2007 Retail 0.09
07 Civ. 02015 Thomas Herb 3/8/2007 Retail 0.23
13 Civ. 08595 Tortus Capital Master Fund 12/3/2013 Institutional 0.67
14 Civ. 01109 Tortus Capital Master Fund 2/21/2014 Institutional 3.43
14 Civ. 03127 Tortus Capital Master Fund 5/2/2014 Institutional 1.03
07 Civ. 11497 UVA Vaduz 12/21/2007 Institutional 7.50
11 Civ. 08817 VR Global Partners 12/2/2011 Institutional 22.23
11 Civ. 09719 VR Global Partners 12/30/2011 Institutional 10.97
04 Civ. 03639 Vanina Andrea Exposito 5/12/2004 Retail 0.13
06 Civ. 13084 Vegas Games 11/9/2006 Institutional 2.30
07 Civ. 01797 Wilton Capital 3/1/2007 Institutional 4.10
09 Civ. 00401 Wilton Capital 1/14/2009 Institutional 3.05
06 Civ. 03196 Wolfgang Bolland 4/25/2006 Retail & Institutional 2.90
14 Civ. 05675 Yellow Crane Holdings 7/24/2014 Institutional 43.71
07 Civ. 11496 Zylberberg Fein 12/21/2007 Institutional 6.39
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Table 4.4: Argentine defaulted bonds
The table lists the bonds that were eligible to being tendered into the 2005 debt exchange. Name, ISIN,
coupon, maturity and face value are extracted from the offer memorandum (Republic of Argentina, 2005).
The data on holdouts are computed as the ratio of the eligible amount in the 2010 debt exchange over the
eligible amount in the 2005 debt exchange. Data on litigated face value are extracted from the lawsuit
complaints, and in this table represented as a share of the face value.
Name ISIN Coupon (%) Maturity Face value Holdouts Litigation
(Mn USD)
Ferrobonos ARARGE030056 . 5.5 3.8% 0.0%
Bonex 92 ARARGE030122 6m LIBOR 9/15/2002 1,199.7 11.3% 0.0%
Bontes ARARGE031633 8.75 5/9/2002 1,513.4 10.2% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARARGE031773 1m LIBOR 12/28/2010 364.4 12.9% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARARGE031781 1m CD 12/28/2010 0.9 5.5% 0.0%
Bontes ARARGE032086 ENCUESTA+ 3.2 7/21/2003 143.1 4.2% 0.0%
Bontes ARARGE032136 9.9375 9/19/2027 3.4 0.0% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARARGE032177 3m LIBOR 4/15/2007 628.1 13.0% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARARGE032185 1m CD 4/15/2007 114.9 4.8% 0.0%
Bontes ARARGE032409 11.25 5/24/2001 508.7 10.3% 0.0%
Bontes ARARGE032573 11.75 5/21/2003 732.9 10.7% 0.0%
Bontes ARARGE032581 12.125 5/21/2005 759.5 9.1% 0.0%
Bono Pagare ARARGE032714 ENCUESTA + 4 4/24/2002 4.0 14.2% 0.0%
Bono Pagare ARARGE032862 ENCUESTA + 3.3 8/22/2002 11.3 12.2% 0.0%
Bono Pagare ARARGE032953 ENCUESTA + 5.8 10/30/2002 1.4 12.1% 0.0%
Bontes ARARGE033076 11.75 5/15/2006 225.2 8.3% 0.0%
Bono Pagare ARARGE033084 ENCUESTA + 4.35 2/16/2004 20.7 0.8% 0.0%
Letra del Tesoro ARARGE033134 0 3/15/2002 448.5 5.9% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARARGE033183 1m LIBOR 1/1/2010 66.3 3.5% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARARGE033191 1m LIBOR 1/1/2016 13.3 8.3% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARARGE033217 3m LIBOR 4/15/2007 51.5 11.6% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARARGE033225 1m CD 4/15/2007 30.2 14.0% 0.0%
Bono Gobierno Nacional ARARGE033233 9 4/16/2002 561.8 1.1% 0.0%
Pagares ARARGE033266 BADLAR + 4.05 4/24/2003 349.5 0.0% 0.0%
Pagares ARARGE033274 BADLAR + 4.05 5/28/2003 351.7 0.0% 0.0%
Pagares ARARGE033340 ENCUESTA + 5.8 6/19/2006 14.6 0.0% 0.0%
Pagares ARARGE033415 BADLAR + 4.5 7/24/2006 361.9 0.0% 0.0%
Pagares ARARGE033431 BADLAR + 4.5 8/8/2006 232.0 0.0% 0.0%
Bono Pagare ARARGE033449 ENCUESTA + 5.8 8/7/2002 197.8 0.0% 0.0%
Bono Pagare ARARGE033456 BADLAR + 3 8/7/2002 130.0 0.0% 0.0%
Bono Pagare ARARGE033464 BADLAR + 0.75 8/7/2002 75.0 0.0% 0.0%
Pagares ARARGE033472 BADLAR + 4.5 8/23/2007 186.0 0.0% 0.0%
Pagares ARARGE033480 BADLAR + 4.5 9/4/2007 279.1 0.0% 0.0%
Pagares ARARGE033522 BADLAR + 4 9/27/2005 464.1 0.0% 0.0%
Letra del Tesoro ARARGE033738 0 2/15/2002 119.7 10.7% 0.0%
Letra del Tesoro ARARGE033746 0 3/8/2002 116.8 10.9% 0.0%
Letra del Tesoro ARARGE033795 0 2/22/2002 25.0 15.7% 0.0%
Letra del Tesoro ARARGE033803 0 3/22/2002 30.8 13.0% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARARGE043836 0 4/15/2007 51.5 11.6% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARP04981BA66 1m LIBOR 4/1/2007 496.5 11.1% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARP04981BV04 1m CD 4/1/2007 55.9 18.7% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARP04981DG19 1m LIBOR 9/1/2002 1,533.1 16.2% 0.0%
Debt Consolidation Bonds ARP04981DH91 1m CD 9/1/2002 61.5 17.8% 0.0%
ATS Letras Externas AT0001912331 7 3/18/2004 94.8 15.3% 0.4%
CHF Bonds CH0005458101 7 12/4/2003 253.6 25.5% 0.0%
DEM Bonds DE0001300200 10.5 11/14/2002 667.2 27.6% 0.0%
DEM Bonds DE0001308609 10.25 2/6/2003 667.2 24.5% 0.0%
DEM Bonds DE0001319507 11.25 4/10/2006 667.2 36.1% 0.0%
DEM Bonds DE0001325017 11.75 5/20/2011 667.2 50.3% 0.2%
DEM Bonds DE0001340909 9 9/19/2003 250.2 23.3% 0.6%
DEM Bonds DE0001340917 12 9/19/2016 250.2 35.3% 0.4%
DEM Bonds DE0001348100 11.75 11/13/2026 333.6 37.1% 0.2%
DEM Bonds DE0001354751 8.5 2/23/2005 667.2 26.1% 0.0%
DEM Bonds DE0001767101 9 11/19/2008 333.6 29.8% 0.9%
DEM Bonds DE0001904308 7 3/18/2004 1,000.8 24.7% 0.2%
DEM Bonds DE0001954907 8 10/30/2009 667.2 31.5% 0.2%
EUR Bonds DE0001974608 8 2/26/2008 1,000.8 33.5% 0.2%
continues on next page
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Table 4.4: Argentine defaulted bonds (continued)
Name ISIN Coupon (%) Maturity Face value Holdouts Litigation
(Mn USD)
EUR Bonds DE0002466208 9 6/20/2003 1,305.0 45.5% 0.0%
EUR Bonds DE0002483203 9 7/6/2010 667.2 33.9% 0.2%
DEM Bonds DE0002488509 7.875 7/29/2005 500.4 11.2% 0.0%
EUR Bonds DE0002923851 8 2/26/2008 456.7 37.0% 0.2%
EUR Bonds DE0002929452 9.5 3/4/2004 522.0 36.4% 0.0%
EUR Bonds DE0002966900 8 2/26/2008 326.2 37.8% 0.0%
EUR Bonds DE0002998952 9 4/26/2006 587.2 40.2% 0.1%
EUR Bonds DE0003045357 9 5/26/2009 848.2 42.1% 0.2%
EUR Bonds DE0003089850 8.5 7/1/2004 848.2 46.0% 0.0%
EUR Bonds DE0003527966 9.25 10/21/2002 652.5 52.3% 0.1%
EUR Bonds DE0003538914 9.75 11/26/2003 326.2 44.3% 0.0%
Par Bonds DE0004103007 5.87 3/31/2023 189.8 31.9% 0.0%
Discount Bonds DE0004103015 LIBOR + 0.8125 3/31/2023 188.1 5.4% 0.0%
EUR Bonds DE0004500558 10 12/7/2004 522.0 43.1% 0.0%
EUR Bonds DE0004509005 10.25 1/26/2007 978.7 43.1% 0.4%
EUR Bonds DE0005450258 10 9/7/2007 652.5 31.9% 0.1%
ESP Bonds ES0273541013 7.5 5/23/2002 156.9 25.7% 0.0%
Samurai Bonds IT0006527292 8 2/25/2002 195.7 57.2% 0.0%
EUR Bonds IT0006529769 EURIBOR + 4 7/22/2003 130.5 31.2% 0.0%
Samurai Bonds JP503200A061 5.125 6/14/2004 584.8 0.0% 0.0%
Samurai Bonds JP503200A095 4.85 9/26/2005 599.4 0.0% 0.0%
Samurai Bonds JP503200ASC0 5 12/20/2002 487.3 0.0% 0.0%
Samurai Bonds JP503200AWC2 5.4 12/17/2003 194.9 0.0% 0.0%
Global Bonds US040114AH34 8.375 12/20/2003 1,794.4 26.5% 6.0%
Global Bonds US040114AN02 11 10/9/2006 1,185.4 39.7% 18.9%
Global Bonds US040114AR16 11.375 1/30/2017 1,903.7 28.6% 11.2%
Global Bonds US040114AV28 9.75 9/19/2027 809.5 24.3% 7.4%
Adjustable Margin Bonds US040114AW01 14.25 11/30/2002 130.1 63.3% 8.9%
FRAN Bonds US040114AX83 FRAN 4/10/2005 383.5 78.4% 78.4%
Global Bonds US040114AZ32 11 12/4/2005 821.6 36.6% 11.2%
Global Bonds US040114BC38 12.125 2/25/2019 146.8 40.4% 33.9%
Global Bonds US040114BD11 8.875 3/1/2029 125.0 27.4% 16.3%
Global Bonds US040114BE93 11.75 4/7/2009 1,197.0 32.1% 17.5%
Global Bonds US040114BK53 0 10/15/2003 250.0 13.5% 0.0%
Global Bonds US040114BL37 0 10/15/2004 250.0 54.5% 0.0%
Global Bonds US040114FB19 12 2/1/2020 121.7 69.2% 61.2%
Global Bonds US040114FC91 11.375 3/15/2010 775.0 25.9% 15.1%
Global Bonds US040114GA27 11.75 6/15/2015 718.2 23.6% 5.2%
Global Bonds US040114GB00 10.25 7/21/2030 166.0 74.9% 73.0%
Global Bonds US040114GD65 12.375 2/21/2012 465.3 36.1% 25.6%
Global Bonds US040114GF14 15.5 12/19/2008 5,024.7 8.8% 3.8%
Global Bonds US040114GG96 12.25 6/19/2018 5,480.6 8.2% 7.0%
Global Bonds US040114GH79 12 6/19/2031 8,108.6 5.5% 5.0%
Strip Coupon US04011NAL29 0 5/28/2006 464.9 11.1% 3.1%
Strip Coupon US04011NAM02 0 5/28/2011 464.9 4.2% 2.6%
Strip Coupon US04011NAN84 0 5/28/2016 464.9 22.5% 0.0%
Strip Coupon US04011NAP33 0 5/28/2021 464.9 1.1% 0.0%
Strip Coupon US04011NAQ16 0 5/28/2026 464.9 3.5% 0.0%
Letras Externas US04011NAR98 0 5/28/2028 978.7 8.9% 0.0%
Letras Externas US04011NAS71 6.9 4/6/2004 225.9 34.7% 0.0%
Letras Externas USP0450KAB90 11.75 2/12/2007 5.8 3.7% 0.0%
Letras Externas USP8055KAP05 8.75 7/10/2002 20.2 18.3% 0.0%
Letras Externas USP8055KFQ33 9 5/24/2005 978.7 40.3% 5.2%
Global Bonds USP8055KGV19 12 1/31/2031 13.2 0.2% 0.0%
Discount Bonds XS0043118172 LIBOR + 0.8125 3/31/2023 800.5 9.7% 4.8%
Discount Bonds XS0043118339 LIBOR + 0.8125 3/31/2023 800.5 9.7% 0.0%
Par Bonds XS0043119147 6 3/31/2023 2,259.6 8.2% 4.1%
Par Bonds XS0043119576 6 3/31/2023 2,259.6 8.2% 0.0%
USD Bonds XS0043120236 LIBOR + 0.8125 3/29/2005 2,923.5 6.6% 0.3%
USD Bonds XS0043120582 LIBOR + 0.8125 3/29/2005 2,923.5 6.6% 0.4%
USD Bonds XS0043120822 LIBOR + 0.8125 3/29/2005 2,923.5 6.6% 0.0%
Letras Externas XS0064910812 7.4 4/4/2006 68.2 3.3% 0.0%
Letras Externas XS0065490988 7.4 4/25/2006 78.0 12.5% 0.0%
Letras Externas XS0066125559 7.4 5/15/2006 78.0 1.3% 0.0%
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Table 4.4: Argentine defaulted bonds (continued)
Name ISIN Coupon (%) Maturity Face value Holdouts Litigation
(Mn USD)
Letras Externas XS0070531420 11 11/5/2003 337.0 46.6% 0.2%
Letras Externas XS0070808166 6 3/24/2005 487.3 1.9% 0.0%
Letras Externas XS0071898349 10 1/3/2007 404.4 43.4% 2.2%
Letras Externas XS0076249308 4.4 5/27/2004 487.3 3.9% 0.0%
Letras Externas XS0076397248 LIBOR + 1.6 5/27/2004 337.0 38.1% 4.8%
Letras Externas XS0077243730 10 6/25/2007 376.2 16.4% 0.0%
Letras Externas XS0078502399 7.625 8/11/2007 505.5 45.6% 0.3%
Letras Externas XS0080809253 7 3/18/2004 505.5 44.2% 4.7%
Letras Externas XS0081057589 7 3/18/2004 252.7 45.4% 2.3%
Letras Externas XS0084071421 8.75 2/4/2003 783.0 38.8% 2.1%
Letras Externas XS0084832483 8 10/30/2009 505.5 43.0% 0.3%
Global Bonds XS0086333472 8.125 4/21/2008 978.7 41.7% 3.5%
Letras Externas XS0088590863 LIBOR + 2.5 7/13/2005 674.0 40.5% 4.8%
Letras Externas XS0089277825 8.5 7/30/2010 652.5 39.1% 0.3%
Letras Externas XS0096960751 7 3/18/2004 521.5 43.2% 4.4%
Letras Externas XS0098314874 7.125 6/10/2002 261.0 38.6% 0.0%
Letras Externas XS0100354066 3.5 8/11/2009 175.4 14.1% 0.0%
EUR Bonds XS0103457585 8 2/26/2008 594.5 28.3% 0.1%
Letras Externas XS0105224470 EURIBOR + 5.10 12/22/2004 261.0 30.2% 6.1%
Letras Externas XS0105694789 10 1/7/2005 848.1 44.5% 6.2%
Letras Externas XS0109203298 8.125 10/4/2004 652.5 46.4% 0.0%
Letras Externas XS0113833510 9.25 7/20/2004 1,305.0 41.2% 0.0%
Letras Externas XS0124528703 10 2/22/2007 652.5 35.9% 3.7%
Global Bonds XS0130278467 4 9/19/2008 247.7 82.1% 82.1%
Table 4.5: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Source
Holdout rate 145 22.50 18.82 0.00 82.09 Republic of Argentina (2005,
2010)
Litigation rate 145 3.85 12.80 0.00 82.09 Court documents
Litigation rate (retail) 145 0.19 0.68 0.00 5.12 Court documents
Litigation rate (professional) 145 3.62 12.64 0.00 82.09 Court documents
Litigation rate (pre 2005) 145 1.88 10.25 0.00 82.09 Court documents
Litigation rate (pre pari passu) 145 3.79 12.75 0.00 82.09 Court documents
Litigation/Holdout rate 129 11.50 24.65 0.00 100.00 Court documents
Litigation/Holdout rate (retail) 129 0.82 2.48 0.00 14.18 Court documents
Litigation/Holdout rate (professional) 129 10.499 23.443 0 100.00 Court documents
Litigation/Holdout rate (pre 2005) 129 3.37 14.30 0.00 100.00 Court documents
Litigation/Holdout rate (pre pari passu) 129 11.23 24.24 0.00 100.00 Court documents
Retail bond (coupon) 145 0.455 0.5 0 1 Prospectus, Bloomberg
Retail bond (min. increment) 145 0.51 0.502 0 1 Prospectus, Bloomberg
Exchange listed 145 0.848 0.36 0 1 Bloomberg
Brady bond 145 0.041 0.2 0 1 Republic of Argentina (2005)
Coupon 144 10.04 8.51 0.00 44.82 Bloomberg, Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer (2005)
Principal (USD mn) 145 650.40 999.67 0.89 8108.63 Republic of Argentina (2005)
Time to maturity (years) 144 3.09 7.34 -4.05 26.04 Prospectus, Bloomberg
Gov. law NY 145 0.32 0.47 0 1 Prospectus, Bloomberg,
Dealogic
Gov. law UK 145 0.23 0.43 0 1 Prospectus, Bloomberg,
Dealogic
Gov. law other 145 0.44 0.50 0 1 Prospectus, Bloomberg,
Dealogic
NPV haircut 63 68.82 7.42 37.82 87.26 Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2005)
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Table 4.6: Determinants of holdout rates
The table shows regressions in a cross-section of restructured Argentine bonds. The dependent variable in
all specifications is the holdout rate, defined as the share of eligible principal not tendered into the 2005
debt exchange. Columns (1)-(6) are estimated using OLS. Column (7) is estimated in a fractional response
GLM. Note that all standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Retail Listing Brady Bond Govern- Full Fraction.
bonds bonds parameters ing law model response
Retail bond 10.745*** 19.393*** 0.195***
(2.973) (3.401) (0.033)
Exchange listed 10.630*** 19.459*** 0.200***
(3.875) (4.961) (0.054)
Brady bond -10.750*** -10.262* -0.145**
(4.015) (6.044) (0.058)
Coupon -0.190 -0.066 -0.125
(0.271) (0.246) (0.295)
Principal (USD mn) -0.002 -0.003** -0.000**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Years to maturity -0.048 0.168 0.002
(0.266) (0.289) (0.003)
Gov. law NY 4.029 15.760*** 0.170***
(3.907) (4.421) (0.043)
Gov. law UK 4.731 3.957 0.047
(3.506) (3.672) (0.034)
Constant 17.604*** 13.478*** 22.940*** 25.677*** 20.080*** -6.296
(2.183) (3.483) (1.617) (3.033) (2.163) (6.195)
Adj. R2 0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.23
Obs 145 145 145 144 145 144 144
p > χ2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.34 0.00 0.00
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Table 4.7: Determinants of litigation rates
The table shows regressions in a cross-section of restructured Argentine bonds. The dependent variable in
all specifications is the litigation rate, defined as the share of eligible principal that was subject to litigation in
the SDNY between 2002-14. Columns (1)-(6) are estimated using OLS. Column (7) is estimated in a fractional
response GLM. Note that all standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Retail Listing Brady Bond Govern- Full Fraction.
bonds bonds parameters ing law model response
Retail bond -5.899*** -0.067 -0.013
(1.908) (1.365) (0.013)
Exchange listed 2.954** 3.573 0.048*
(1.455) (2.224) (0.025)
Brady bond -2.467* -12.392** -0.062***
(1.410) (5.075) (0.023)
Coupon 0.303 0.240 0.178
(0.246) (0.249) (0.120)
Principal (USD mn) -0.001 -0.002** -0.000**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Years to maturity 0.502** 0.492* 0.003***
(0.237) (0.261) (0.001)
Gov. law NY 10.660*** 11.157*** 0.117***
(3.048) (3.579) (0.029)
Gov. law UK 1.274*** 2.678** 0.085***
(0.358) (1.301) (0.024)
Constant 6.538*** 1.347* 3.955*** -0.140 0.099*** -5.320
(1.900) (0.752) (1.111) (2.288) (0.038) (3.622)
Adj. R2 0.05 -0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.13 0.21
Obs 145 145 145 144 145 144 144
p > χ2 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.8: Determinants of litigation rates (sub-samples)
The table shows results from exchanging the dependent variable but keeping the rest of the model based on
column 6 in Table 4.7. Column (1) defines the litigation rate only taking into account claims filed by retail
investors. Column 2 only considers claims brought by institutional investors. Columns (3) and (4) use time
subsamples, considering only the claims filed prior to the 2005 debt restructuring, or the 2012 pari passu
affirmation by the Second Circuit appeals court.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Retail credi-
tors
Institutional
creditors
Pre 2005 Pre Pari
Passu
Retail bond -0.017 -0.028 -0.063 -0.037
(0.044) (1.358) (0.874) (1.364)
Exchange listed 0.167** 3.371 2.811 3.523
(0.072) (2.200) (1.876) (2.219)
Brady bond -0.484** -11.928** -8.562* -12.348**
(0.200) (5.063) (4.742) (5.069)
Coupon 0.000 0.241 0.092 0.241
(0.004) (0.251) (0.147) (0.250)
Principal (USD mn) 0.000 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years to maturity 0.005 0.491* 0.345 0.494*
(0.007) (0.262) (0.248) (0.261)
Gov. law NY 0.480*** 10.523*** 6.287** 10.963***
(0.179) (3.563) (2.774) (3.573)
Gov. law UK 0.028 2.634** 0.706 2.657**
(0.037) (1.296) (0.746) (1.302)
Constant -0.133 -5.177 -3.034 -5.292
(0.082) (3.630) (2.375) (3.629)
Adj. R2 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.21
Obs 144 144 144 144
p > χ2 0.18 0.00 0.45 0.00
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Table 4.9: Determinants of litigation ratios
The table shows regressions in a cross-section of restructured Argentine bonds. The dependent variable in
all specifications is the litigation ratio, defined as the ratio of litigation to holdout rates. Note that since 16
bonds were completely tendered into the 2005 exchange, the number of observations is lower than in the
previous tables. Columns (1)-(6) are estimated using OLS. Column (7) is estimated in a fractional response
GLM. Note that all standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Retail Listing Brady Bond Govern- Full Fraction.
bonds bonds parameters ing law model response
Retail bond -16.485*** -5.854*** -0.046*
(3.975) (2.156) (0.028)
Exchange listed 2.503 6.558 0.055
(5.226) (6.333) (0.053)
Brady bond 5.381 -20.179* -0.094*
(9.930) (11.023) (0.056)
Coupon 1.159** 0.788 0.395
(0.522) (0.558) (0.272)
Principal (USD mn) 0.006*** 0.004** 0.000*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Years to maturity 1.271*** 1.343*** 0.008***
(0.378) (0.394) (0.002)
Gov. law NY 27.194*** 16.232*** 0.218***
(5.103) (4.546) (0.046)
Gov. law UK 5.459** 8.258*** 0.184***
(2.088) (2.628) (0.039)
Constant 19.425*** 9.349** 11.252*** -6.730 0.367*** -12.211*
(3.807) (4.634) (2.233) (4.311) (0.127) (7.068)
Adj. R2 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 0.31 0.23 0.41
Obs 129 129 129 128 129 128 128
p > χ2 0.00 0.63 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 4.10: Determinants of litigation ratios (sub-samples)
The table shows results from exchanging the dependent variable but keeping the rest of the model based on
column (6) in Table 4.9. Column (1) defines the litigation rate only taking into account claims filed by retail
investors. Column (2) only considers claims brought by institutional investors. Columns (3) and (4) use time
subsamples, considering only the claims filed prior to the 2005 debt restructuring, or the 2012 pari passu
affirmation by the Second Circuit appeals court.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Retail credi-
tors
Institutional
creditors
Pre 2005 Pre Pari
Passu
Retail bond -0.259 -5.536*** -1.704 -5.728***
(0.180) (2.099) (1.040) (2.130)
Exchange listed 0.632** 5.669 5.976 6.216
(0.311) (6.248) (3.730) (6.286)
Brady bond -1.713** -19.412* -14.038** -20.664*
(0.769) (10.716) (6.854) (10.697)
Coupon 0.017 0.773 0.301 0.786
(0.030) (0.570) (0.353) (0.561)
Principal (USD mn) 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003*
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Years to maturity 0.017 1.336*** 0.620* 1.335***
(0.031) (0.399) (0.365) (0.395)
Gov. law NY 1.486*** 14.319*** 8.507** 15.791***
(0.556) (4.377) (3.902) (4.494)
Gov. law UK 0.161 7.968*** 1.953 8.105***
(0.155) (2.573) (1.186) (2.609)
Constant -0.762* -11.213 -6.912* -11.750*
(0.399) (6.997) (3.635) (7.014)
Adj. R2 0.21 0.38 0.17 0.40
Obs 128 128 128 128
p > χ2 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.11: Robustness: Alternative retail bond indicator
The table presents the main models from tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.9 but exchanges the previously used retail
bond indicator (based on coupon structure) by a retail indicator based on the minimum tradeable unit.
A retail bond is defined as a bond with a minimum denomination unit of less than USD 10,000 which is
denominated in a currency other than the USD.
(1) (2) (3)
Holdouts Litigation
share
Litigation/
Holdouts
Retail 20.770*** 0.128 -6.547**
(3.499) (1.889) (3.059)
Coupon 0.016 0.264 0.876
(0.245) (0.254) (0.540)
Principal (USD mn) -0.002* -0.002** 0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Years to maturity 0.002 0.364 1.147***
(0.261) (0.223) (0.336)
Gov. law NY 17.599*** 10.832*** 14.292***
(4.716) (3.674) (4.630)
Gov. law UK 3.361 3.239*** 9.582***
(3.483) (1.217) (2.819)
Exchange listed 16.530*** 3.910* 8.007
(4.212) (2.356) (6.692)
Constant -7.137 -6.150 -13.437*
(5.358) (3.869) (7.353)
Adj. R2 0.23 0.18 0.39
Obs 144 144 128
p > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 4.12: Robustness: Other determinants of litigation rates
This table presents robustness checks by adding more variables which might affect the litigation ratio.
Column (1) uses as the dependent variable the litigation ratio without the cases filed by NML Capital, the
largest individual plaintiff (see Table 4.2).
(1) (2)
NML lead Haircut
Litigated by NML 21.791**
(8.455)
NPV Haircut 1.259**
(0.555)
Exchange listed -3.313**
(1.614)
Retail -1.196 55.965*
(5.494) (31.412)
Brady bond -0.391
(11.577)
Coupon 0.145 0.399
(0.269) (0.554)
Principal (USD mn) 0.006*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Years to maturity 0.338 2.346***
(0.316) (0.524)
Gov. law NY 7.073 14.384**
(4.556) (6.189)
Gov. law UK 5.513*** 2.567
(1.944) (3.294)
Constant -0.802 -141.200***
(5.706) (49.418)
Adj. R2 0.38 0.56
Obs 128 53
p > χ2 0.00 0.00
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 4.1
Proof. All creditors compare the expected value of VHi to V
P
i in the first period to decide
whether to hold out or to participate in the initial offer. They become holdout creditors
only if:
E1
(
VHi
)
> E1
(
VPi
)
(4.12)
Solving this expression for ci returns:
ci < p+
1
2
hS2 + µi − 1+
√
(hS2 + µi)2 + 2(h
S
2 + µi − 2h1 + 2r− 2h1r) + 1 (4.13)
Let c∗i be the marginal ci for which this inequality is equalized. This defines the share of
creditors who hold out: ∫ c∗i
0
f (ci) dci ≡ Γ(p, h1, hS2 , r, µi) (4.14)
c∗i is increasing in p and µ, and hence is Γ.
Figure A1: Exemplary complaint
This is an excerpt from the complaint by two subordinates of the hedge fund Aurelius, filed in February
2010 in the SDNY. It exemplifies the legal basis of the lawsuits and the basis for the data coding. Paragraph
§4 explains the the cause of the action. The following paragraphs list which bonds the plaintiffs owns. The
case is Aurelius Opportunities Fund II and Aurelius Capital Master v. The Republic of Argentina, 10 Civ. 1602,
SDNY.  
 
 
[…] 
 
[…] 
 
[…] 
 
162
Chapter 5
Sovereign Debt Crises and Bond
Market Liquidity1
How liquid are sovereign bond markets during distress? And what impact does mar-
ket liquidity have on sovereign spreads? Using a comprehensive dataset of emerging
economies’ actively traded sovereign bonds, this paper analyzes these questions for
countries experiencing a sovereign debt crisis between 1998-2012. I find that bid-ask
spreads rise significantly in the run-up to sovereign defaults and with increasing return
volatility, but market conditions improve after debt exchanges take place. In a second step,
I estimate how much of the sovereign spread can be attributed to liquidity risk. During
calm times, liquidity risk is negligible, but during periods of distress, it contributes
significantly to the spread over risk-free bonds relative to credit risk. These findings are
consistent with predictions from inventory-based as well as more recent search-based
theories.
Keywords: Sovereign Bonds, Market Liquidity, Debt Crisis
JEL classification: G12, F34
1I gratefully acknowledge financial support by the German Research Foundation (DFG) under the Special
Research Area 700 on Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood. I further thank Christoph Trebesch and
Barclay’s Capital for sharing data. I would also like to thank seminar participants at Columbia University,
the 2013 SMYE, CESifo/University of Munich, and the DIW Berlin as well as Spiros Bougheas, Till Cordes,
Marcel Fratzscher, Henrik Enderlein, Christoph Grosse Steffen, Martin Oehmke, Christoph Trebesch and
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5.1 Introduction
In spring 2010, concerns about the lack of market liquidity led the European Central Bank
(ECB) to an unprecedented intervention in markets for sovereign bonds of peripheral
European governments: in order to ensure “depth and liquidity” in these markets, the
ECB bought sovereign debt worth more than EUR 200bn (Trebesch and Zettelmeyer, 2013).
While the ECB’s actions may have had various unofficial reasons, the publicly stated
rationale for the implementation of the Securities Markets Programme was to ensure
sufficiently liquid market conditions, so that the transmission of policy rates would not
be hampered in the Eurozone’s crisis countries.2 However, illiquidity in government
bond markets not only impairs monetary policy transmission. It also contributes to
government borrowing rates and thereby skews the country risk perception of investors
(Alquist, 2010; Lesmond, 2005; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Duffie et al., 2003). A number
of recent theories predict negative feedback loops in which a lack of market liquidity
can even trigger earlier endogenous defaults in the economy (He and Milbradt, 2014;
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009)
What is meant by market liquidity? The textbook understanding of trading on mar-
kets, financial and otherwise, is that supply and demand determine a unique equilibrium
price which depends on the quantities offered and requested by market participants. At
this unique price, markets clear – i.e., buyers purchase and sellers supply their desired
quantity of the good or asset. In practice, however, sellers and buyers often do not meet
directly, but rely on intermediaries for facilitating the actual trade instead. Car dealers,
for instance, assume this role for used cars: they take up cars offered by sellers wishing
to liquidate their vehicles, and keep it in their inventory until a buyer demands it. The
car dealer receives compensation for this inventory role by paying less to sellers than
charging to buyers. This is where market liquidity becomes important: the more liquid
the market for used cars is, the smaller this price difference will be, and thus the more
efficient the resource allocation. In the case of financial assets, the equivalent service is
offered by investment banks and other so-called market makers. Their inventories, the
trading books, provide market liquidity, i.e. they allow for swift and easy trading among
market participants who do not meet directly. Market makers generate compensation
for this service by paying a lower price to investors who want to sell (bid price) and
demanding a higher price from investors who want to buy an asset (ask or offer price).
The spread between these bid and ask prices is a common measure for the liquidity
of a market since it directly reflects the transaction costs between market participants
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 1991). Thus, market liquidity describes market conditions,
not agent endowments; it is therefore a distinct concept from funding liquidity, which
describes the capital endowment of an economic agent in the form of equity or debt
2See ECB (2010): “In view of the current exceptional circumstances prevailing in the market, the
Governing Council decided (...) [t]o conduct interventions in the euro area public and private debt securities
markets (Securities Markets Programme) to ensure depth and liquidity in those market segments which are
dysfunctional.” For an analysis of the effects of this programme see De Pooter et al. (2013).
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(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).
Sufficient market liquidity in the form of narrow bid-ask spreads therefore lies at the
core of smooth and efficient risk allocation on financial markets. When market liquidity
dries up, investors are no longer able to quickly adjust their portfolios to newly arriving
information, or to correctly price the assets they hold on their balance sheet. Furthermore,
if bid-ask spreads increase, investors will demand a larger premium upfront in order to
compensate for the higher transaction costs from paying larger fees to market makers.
This becomes particularly problematic during financial crises, when reliable prices are
most needed to judge the value of current positions, allocate risk efficiently, and when
issuers need market access the most.
Despite a vast literature on the topic in corporate finance, there is little evidence on
the dynamics of sovereign debt market liquidity, particularly in times of distress. How
liquid are markets during debt crises? And what is the impact of market liquidity on
sovereign spreads? This paper analyzes these questions for sovereign debt crises of
emerging economies between 1998-2012 using a previously unexploited data set of daily
bond-by-bond price quotes underlying JP Morgan’s widely used Emerging Markets Bond
Index (EMBI). More specifically, I estimate the impact of the probability of default and
return volatility on bid-ask spreads as predicted by simple inventory-based models akin
to Stoll (1978) or Ho and Stoll (1981). In the second part of the analysis, I estimate the
impact of liquidity risk relative to credit risk on government borrowing costs, measured
as the spread between the yield to maturity on risky government bonds and risk-free
bonds.
My main finding is that markets become increasingly illiquid as a debt crisis worsens
and uncertainty about the bonds’ value increases. Following a stylized time line of typical
crisis events, distressed sovereign bond markets remain significantly less liquid than
non-distressed markets from the first negative return shocks until bonds are exchanged
for new instruments. Estimates from event studies indicate that bid-ask spreads rise
significantly by 2.7 percentage points in response to large and persistent negative return
shocks. After payment defaults or the announcement of restructuring negotiations, bid-
ask spreads widen by 2.9 percentage points. Liquidity only returns to the market once
debt restructurings take place, with bid-ask spreads narrowing by 2.6 percentage points
immediately after an exchange. The data also reveal dynamic effects surrounding these
crisis events: while return shocks seem to come unexpected and impact market liquidity
only in the aftermath of the event, defaults are anticipated and thus are correlated with
widening bid-ask spreads up to two weeks before the actual event.
These indicative findings are confirmed using a broad panel encompassing the bonds
of 79 emerging economies, including both defaulting and non-defaulting crisis countries.
Computing market-implied default probabilities based on credit default swaps (CDS)
premia and empirically observed recovery values from Cruces and Trebesch (2013), I
find that a 10 percentage point increase in the risk of default is correlated with a bid-ask
spread widening of 50 basis points (bps). Similarly, more volatile bonds are significantly
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less liquid. These findings hold under control for a number of bond-specific variables as
well as global risk developments.
These results are in line with predictions from inventory-based theories of market
liquidity (Stoll, 1978; Ho and Stoll, 1981). If a bond is more volatile, the additional price
risk which the market maker takes in his portfolio through his trading book will lead
him to increase the spread. A simple extension of the original model makes similar
predictions about the impact of rising default risk. More broadly, the results are also
consistent with more recent search-based theories, which predict adverse feedback loops
from default risk and market illiquidity (He and Milbradt, 2014).
In the second part of the empirical analysis, I estimate how much of the sovereign
spread over risk-free assets can be attributed to liquidity concerns. Following the
methodology of Beber et al. (2009), I find that during non-crisis times, the contribution
of market liquidity risk relative to credit risk is negligible, accounting for less than
five percent of the spread. However, this changes considerably depending on the risk
environment. For low-risk states, with sovereign spreads below 5%, liquidity risk is
essentially irrelevant. For crisis states, with spreads above 10% (Pescatori and Sy, 2007),
the contribution of liquidty risk relative to credit risk almost doubles as compared to
the full sample. The relation holds not only over time between high- and low-risk
environments, but also across defaulting and non-defaulting countries. The results are
furthermore consistent with previous studies on the role of market liquidity as a priced
risk factor (Duffie et al., 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Levy Yeyati et al., 2008; Beber
et al., 2009; Favero et al., 2010; Ejsing et al., 2012; De Pooter et al., 2013; Schwarz, 2014).
Related Literature The findings in this paper contribute to the intersection of finance
and international economics and therefore relate to at least two strands of the literature.
First, there is a vast pricing literature on the role of market liquidity as a priced risk factor
(for extensive reviews, see Amihud et al., 2005; Vayanos and Wang, 2013). Theoretically,
less liquid markets imply higher transaction costs for investors, since they represent the
present value of a stream of costs associated with trading over the lifetime of a bond.
Thus, larger bid-ask spreads should be related to higher yields. Theoretical asset pricing
models explicitly accounting for this factor are presented e.g. by Duffie et al. (2003) or
Acharya and Pedersen (2005).3 Empirically, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) were the first
to establish the negative relation between liquidity and prices for government bonds.
They compared the yields on US Treasury bills with the yield on otherwise equivalent
notes with the same maturity date in the final six months before the principal was due;
they found that treasury notes shortly before maturity are less liquid, and indeed trade
at lower prices. A similar analysis with more recent data is done by Musto et al. (2014).
They explicitly look at distress during the financial crisis and find that investors put
a larger premium on liquidity during market turmoil. Longstaff (2004), Ejsing et al.
3At the margin, this could even give rise to adverse liquidity spirals, as suggested by Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009).
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(2012), and Schwarz (2014) identify liquidity premia by comparing US and European
government bonds with bonds of identical credit risk issued by government-backed state
agencies, with similar findings. Duffie et al. (2003), Hund and Lesmond (2008), Beber
et al. (2009), Alquist (2010), Favero et al. (2010) and Longstaff et al. (2011), among others,
find additional support for the significant impact of market liquidity on debt prices. The
findings in the second part of this paper are in line with these studies, but reveal that
liquidity risk can be a state-dependent risk factor, with a much stronger impact during
crisis periods than during calm times.
With respect to sources of market illiquidity, Fleming and Remolona (1999) show that
US Treasuries become less liquid in response to the release of public announcements on
macroeconomic variables, possibly due to information-processing time. Chordia et al.
(2005) find that return volatility shocks are good predictors of liquidity shocks, in line
with the evidence found in this analysis. Levy Yeyati et al. (2008) show the impact of
stock market and exchange rate crisis events on stock market liquidity in an emerging
market sample. Similar to the results of this study, their main finding is a run-up effect
in the sense of initially stable or even improved liquidity conditions immediately prior to
a crisis event with a subsequent increase in bid-ask spreads.
Second, this paper relates to the international finance literature on capital flows. This
literature has frequently ignored market microstructure, despite an increasing focus on
this type of market frictions in macroeconomic modeling (see Shleifer and Vishny, 2011;
Brunnermeier et al., 2012). Many studies on determinants of international capital flows
thus abstract from the underlying transactions which constitute them (exceptions can be
found in Jotikasthira et al., 2012, Fratzscher, 2011, or Forbes et al., 2012, among others).
With respect to the results of this paper, this is particularly important since government
debt often makes up the largest part of capital flows for a country (Henry, 2007; Tomz
and Wright, 2013). Broner et al. (2013) find that gross capital flows increase during times
of financial distress.
A number of theoretical contributions depend on the assumption of the existence
(and persistence) of liquid secondary markets and unhindered capital flows to explain
why governments may choose not to default on their debt (Kremer and Mehta, 2000;
Guembel and Sussman, 2009; Broner et al., 2010). The underlying motivation of these
papers is that governments will distinguish between domestic and foreign investors –
and only default on foreign-held bonds. Hence, in the wake of rising sovereign risk,
foreign investors should seek to sell their assets on secondary markets to domestic agents,
which can in turn expect full repayment. Increasing illiquidity of sovereign bonds during
periods of heightened distress serves as a substantial friction to this type of capital flows
and thus hampers secondary markets’ role as an enforcement device.
Finally, the results also stand in stark contrast with the simplifying assumption that
government bond yields are an unbiased measure of country interest rates or default
risk. Theoretical studies which use emerging markets’ sovereign spreads such as EMBI
country indices to calibrate their models (e.g. Arellano, 2008; Mendoza and Yue, 2012)
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often ignore liquidity as an additional priced risk factor, which is particularly important
during crises.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 derives the hypotheses.
Section 3 descibes the data. Section 4 reports the estimation approach and results. Section
5 concludes.
5.2 Hypotheses
The following section gives an intuitive theoretical motivation guiding the empirical
analysis. Emerging economies’ government bonds are traded in dealer markets, where
market makers take up bonds in their inventory when investors want to reduce their
exposure, and sell the asset to the market when there is demand for it. Market making
implies the risk that the price changes while the bonds are kept in the trading book,
which leaves room for dealer compensation in the form of bid-ask spreads. Accordingly,
if the asset is volatile and price changes are frequent and large, the dealer will ask for
a higher compensation. In the case of sovereign bonds, there is the additional risk that
the borrower unilaterally defaults on her obligations and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
This typically happens in form of an exchange for a new bond with a lower present value
than the “old” instrument. A debt crisis typically increases the volatility in sovereign
bond markets, which in turn induces market makers to charge wider bid-ask spreads
(see Figure 5.2). Hence, if the risk of default increases, or if there is additional uncertainty
about the terms of the restructuring offer (the recovery value of the bond), this should
decrease market liquidity.
These considerations can be easily formalized in an inventory model akin to the
seminal contributions by Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981). The following exposition of
the model follows closely the representation in Foucault et al. (2013). The only addition I
make here is to explicitly model a risk of sovereign default.4
Suppose a market maker maximizes tomorrow’s wealth, wt+1, in a two-period world.
The dealer specializes in providing liquidity in one government bond market, by quoting
bid and ask prices, pBt and p
A
t . The debt can be of two types: it can either be a performing
bond with underlying value p ∼ (µp, σp), or a defaulting bond with recovery value
r ∼ (µr, σr). In period t, both types are indistinguishable for all agents in the economy;
the type is only revealed in t+ 1. The government’s decision about default is exogenous
to the market maker’s decision problem. Default occurs with probability δ. I assume
that σr > σp, meaning that there is less uncertainty about the underlying value of
non-defaulting bonds than about the recovery value in case of a default.5
4Foucault et al. (2013) also present a multi-period extension of the model. For alternative overviews of
this and other liquidity models see also O’Hara (1997); de Jong and Rindi (2009); and Vayanos and Wang
(2013).
5This is also supported by the descriptive data, see Table 5.5. Another way of justifying this assumption
is to think of the two bonds as being one-period zero coupon bonds with maturity in t+ 1. In that case,
conditional on surviving to the next period without default, there is no uncertainty about a non-defaulting
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Initially, the dealer has an inventory of the bond of size qt, and holds the rest of his
wealth in a liquid asset ct, like cash or risk-free treasury bonds, which trades at par. The
initial inventory {qt, ct} before acting as a market maker is optimal given the dealer’s
individual portfolio optimization. Hence, his wealth today is reflected in his budget
constraint wt = qtpt + ct.
Using the budget constraint, we can also describe his wealth tomorrow after any
market making activities. Suppose a client wants to trade the bond in quantity bt. The
dealer has to fulfill all incoming orders at the prices he quotes. Dealing with clients
thus means moving away from the optimal initial portfolio to the size of the client’s
desired trade size bt. The dealer’s next period inventory will consist of his initial position
plus the order, qt+1 = qt + bt (from the perspective of the market maker’s inventory,
bt < 0 for a client buy order, reducing the dealer’s own portfolio, and vice versa bt > 0
for a sell order). Likewise, his cash position will be the sum of his initial cash and the
amount spent or earned from trading with the client, executed at the specified bid or
ask prices, ct+1 = ct − btpA,Bt . The dealer’s terminal wealth tomorrow is thus given by
the probability-weighted realized value of the bond in t+ 1 times the size of his position
after fulfilling client orders, and the cash position after trading:
wt+1 = ((1− δ)pt+1 + δrt+1) (qt + bt) + ct − btpA,Bt (5.1)
where pA,Bt = p
A
t if bt < 0 and p
A,B
t = p
B
t if bt > 0. Suppose that the dealer has expo-
nential utility and his objective can hence be described with mean-variance preferences.
Then his problem reduces to6
max
pA,Bt
((1− δ)E[pt+1] + δE[rt+1])(qt + bt) (5.2)
+ ct − btpA,Bt −
1
2
(
(1− δ)σp + δσr
)2
The dealer maximizes this objective function by choosing the optimal price for an
incoming marginal client order. Solving the first-order condition with respect to a
marginal client order, ∂U∂bt , for p
A,B
t and collecting the terms independent of the order sign
as the mid-quote mt yields the optimal bid and ask prices:
pA,Bt =
pAt = mt +
(
(1− δ)σp + δσr
)2 if bt < 0
pBt = mt −
(
(1− δ)σp + δσr
)2 if bt > 0 (5.3)
where the sign in front of the second term depends on the sign of bt, i.e. if the client
submits a buy order (bt < 0), the ask price becomes effective, and the bid price in case of
a sell order (bt > 0). The bid-ask spread is then given by the difference between these
bond any more: it will always repay the principal in full, and hence σp = 0. However, conditional on a
default, the government has considerable discretion in deciding about how much to repay, implying σr > 0.
6Assume for notational simplicity that the coefficient of risk aversion is 1.
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two prices,
pAt − pBt = 2
(
(1− δ)σp + δσr
)2 (5.4)
Note that in this simple version of the model, the optimal bid-ask spread is independent
of the portfolio and order size, and only depends on the volatility and default risk. These
considerations lead to the first set of hypotheses on the expected determinants of market
liquidity. They follow directly from the comparative statics on the expression for the
optimal bid-ask spread: liquidity is decreasing in (H1) the probability of default, δ, and (H2)
the bond’s volatility, σr,p. For higher default probabilities, the larger uncertainty about the
recovery value of a defaulting bond looms larger, increasing the spread. But since market
makers are averse to volatility anyway, an increase in both the uncertainty about the
value of a performing as well as a defaulting bond will likewise imply less liquid market.
The first part of the analysis thus estimates if bid-ask spreads are indeed correlated with
default risk and volatility.
Market liquidity is also relevant for the pricing of sovereign bonds. The third
hypothesis therefore considers the consequences of bid-ask spreads on the yields which
investors demand, and follows directly from a simple asset pricing argument. Bid-ask
spreads represent transaction costs from the investors’ perspective, since they have to
factor in the cost of entering and leaving the market. When pricing the value of a bond
today, the present value of theses future costs has to be subtracted from the present value
of the expected cash flow consisting of coupons and principal repayments (Amihud and
Mendelson, 1991). Hence, financial assets that are less liquid should trade at a discount.
In the present context, this implies that (H3) governments with illiquid sovereign bond markets
face higher borrowing costs which not only depend on their creditworthiness, but also on
the illiquidity premium that investors put on their bonds. If markets become indeed
less liquid in distress, this could even give rise to adverse liquidity spirals, in which
decreasing market liquidity decreases the borrower’s solvency by increasing borrowing
costs, further impairing liquidity conditions (an argument made by He and Milbradt,
2014; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). In the second part of the analysis, I will thus
estimate the impact of bid-ask spreads on interest differentials to risk-free treasury bonds.
5.3 Data
Reliable and comprehensive pricing data on individual government bonds are hard to
obtain since no centralized market places exist for sovereign debt, as is the case with
exchanges for stocks and some derivatives.7 This might be surprising at first, given the
7This has not always been the case. Foucault et al. (2013) explain that in fact, the original purpose of
some exchanges was exclusively trading government bonds, e.g. the Vienne and Milan exchanges in the
18th and 19th century. Alquist (2010) points out that the London stock exchange concentrated large parts of
sovereign debt trading in the late 19th and early 20th centrury. For some developed countries’ markets, there
are again more centralized markets today. European government bond trading, for instance, is increasingly
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size of the market. However, after World War II, most developing countries re-financed
by bilateral official loans; later on, for most of the 1980s and early 1990s, the market for
sovereign borrowing was largely dominated by syndicated bank loans which changed
hands infrequently (Rieffel, 2003; Cline, 1995). Data on market prices for that period are
available only for a small sample of countries and instruments (see Edwards, 1984, 1986;
Boehmer and Megginson, 1990; Sawada, 2001).
This changed with the Brady initiative of the early 1990s which aimed at ending the
decade-long Latin American debt crisis. Without a liquid market for the large, syndicated
loans, banks and other investors had been forced to keep their exposure to maturity,
or accept significant illiquidity discounts when trying to sell them. The Brady policy
forced banks to eventually realize losses on their sovereign loan portfolios which had
previously been restructured without adjusting the book value to market prices. The
Brady-type restructurings typically prescribed the loans to be exchanged for multiple
bond series with different payment profiles, such as shorter-dated discount bonds with
significant reductions in principal or par bonds with long maturity extensions (Rieffel,
2003; Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006). This gave rise to a fundamental shift in
emerging market funding away from bank loans to bonds placed directly on capital
markets. However, despite the subsequent expansion in secondary market trading,
even today sovereign debt is still typically traded over-the-counter, which complicates
comprehensive data collection.
5.3.1 Market data
In this paper I therefore use a previously unexploited data set of bond-by-bond data on
instruments for which reliable market quotes exist from a single market maker. More
specifically, I use the constituent instruments of the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI)
by JP Morgan. The company has a long-standing reputation as being the largest market
maker in emerging market debt for more than a century (Flandreau et al., 2009). While
the widely used EMBI country indices are weighted averages of an issuer’s outstanding
tradable debt, I use daily data on the complete underlying bond population. This allows
drawing a much more detailed picture of the market than using aggregate country-level
indices.
For a debt instrument to be included in the sample, daily price information needs
to be available. The data set encompasses bid and ask price quotes, yield spreads over
comparable US treasuries, and daily total returns. Price quotes either reflect interdealer
broker prices or quotes by JP Morgan traders, if the former are unavailable. Unlike many
standard sources such as Bloomberg or Datastream, these quotes represent executable
prices.8 They are recorded daily at 3:00pm New York time. The price observations
concentrated on the MTS trading platform (Pelizzon et al., 2013). However, for the most part sovereign debt
is still traded in a dealer market.
8Unfortunately, no information is available on the “depth” of these quotes, i.e. for how much volume the
dealers stand ready to fulfill orders at the quoted prices.
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range from 5 January 1994 to 31 December 2012.9 I match the data set with bond
characteristics on maturity, coupon, volume, currency, governing law, and exchange
listings from Bloomberg.
The data set comprises 721 foreign bonds, issued by 79 governments under the
jurisdiction of a G7 member state.10 Table 5.1 reports the number of bonds and total
volume issued by country. The median principal amount is USD 1.25bn, with a median
time to maturity at issue of 10 years. 83% of the bonds are denominated in USD, and
15% in EUR. The United States is also the most important venue for issues, with 68%
of the bonds governed by New York law, and 27% by English law. The remainder is
governed by Japanese or German law. Circa 63% of the issued bonds were rated below
investment grade (BB+ or lower) by the rating agency Standard & Poor’s at the time of
issue. More than 90% of the instruments are listed on an exchange. Table 5.2 reports
more descriptive statistics on the characteristics of the included instruments, and Figure
5.1 plots the sample over time. It shows a steady increase in the number of outstanding
issues since the mid 1990s, with a brief disruption of the trend during the financial crisis
in 2007-09.
To approximate market liquidity, I rely on the percentage bid-ask spread11 in the
following form:
sit =
pAit − pBit
1
2 (p
A
it + p
B
it)
(5.5)
where sit denotes the bid-ask spread of bond i at time t, and superscripts A and B denote
the ask and bid prices, respectively. sit ≥ 0 must hold since the market maker would lose
money and be driven out of the market by offering pAit < p
B
it .
Figure 5.2 provides a descriptive impression of market liquidity for emerging economies’
sovereign debt through the sample period. The graph depicts the market wide volume-
weighted average bid-ask spread, st = ∑i sit
voli
∑i voli
. In calm times, the average bid-ask
spread is usually less than 1% of the mid-price. However, a few peaks stand out, whose
dates are almost perfectly aligned with especially severe distress in financial markets.
The first peak marks the days after Mexico devalued the Peso, on 20 December 1994,
followed by the Russian default on 17 August 1998. st almost passes the 5% mark in the
aftermath of the Argentine default in late 2001. The market then remains relatively liquid
until the bankruptcy filing of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers on 15 September
2008 heralded the most distressed phase of the financial crisis. However, after each of
9The only exception are quotes for Greek bonds, for which JP Morgan does not continuously provide
separate bid and ask quotes since the country was not a member of the EMBI index during the mid-2000s. I
therefore use data from Bloomberg for these bonds. However, I specify Bloomberg Trader as the data source
in order to get executable quotes that are comparable to the JPM data.
10I exclude bonds issued by state-owned companies and special purpose vehicles and focus on instruments
issued by the central government only.
11Roll (1984) argues that the percentage bid-ask spread is preferable to the absolute spread between bid
and ask prices. However, the results are similar in every respect when I use the absolute bid-ask spread
instead.
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these events, st falls back to pre-event levels within 12 months. That is not the case after
the first Greek bailout package was announced on 2 May 2010; here it takes more than 2
years for the spread to fall below 3% again (coinciding with the Greek debt exchange in
March 2012).
While the bid-ask spread can be seen critically as a measure of market liquidity, since
it does not take trading volume and turnover into account, it has been widely shown
to be closely correlated with alternative indicators, and is in some aspects the superior
measure for bond markets (Lesmond, 2005; Chordia et al., 2001; Fleming, 2003). Most
importantly, volume or turnover can be particularly misleading for government bonds
if banks conduct multiple trades among their affiliates for purposes of adjusting their
balance sheet to regulatory requirements (Barrios et al., 2009). Furthermore, given the
opaque market for sovereign debt where no centralized information about alternative
indicators is available, the bid-ask spread emerges as the indicator most reliably capturing
overall market conditions. As an alternative in the robustness checks, and to mitigate
concerns that changes in the denominator are driving the results, I also consider the
absolute bid-ask spread, pAit − pBit.
Table 5.5 displays summary statistics for key variables both for the full sample,
for countries undergoing a debt restructuring during the sample period, and for non-
defaulting countries. The sample for restructuring countries has a considerably larger
average bid-ask spread than the sample of non-defaulting countries. Likewise, the
proability of default and return volatility are considerably higher, as are sovereign
(stripped) spreads.12
5.3.2 Crisis events
The pricing data are complemented by newly coded data on crisis events in the major
sovereign bond restructurings which fall into the sample period. Using this data, I can
identify the developments in market liquidity around the major events of the debt crises
in the sample. To identify the relevant bond exchanges, I rely on the lists of sovereign
debt restructurings by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) and Cruces and Trebesch
(2013). The definition of a restructuring follows the concept employed by Standard &
Poor’s: a distressed debt exchange is defined as an exchange of bonds in which, first,
holders of the restructured debt receive new instruments which have a lower value than
under the original terms and, second, the continuation of debt service under the original
terms is in question if creditors do not participate in the exchange offer (Standard &
Poor’s, 2009). Regular debt management operations which are routinely conducted,
especially for instruments with short maturities, are not considered as distressed unless
there is serious doubt about the ability to pay of the debtor government. From this list, I
focus on those 10 debt crises of nine emerging market economies for which a secondary
12For Brady bonds, stripped spreads are a more common measure of the risk spread over the assumed
risk-free US Treasury zero-coupon bonds since they discount off the value of the collateral which was
attached through the Brady initiative.
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market with reliable pricing data existed since 1998. They include the defaults of Russia
1998, Ecuador 2000, Argentina 2001, Uruguay 2003, Grenada 2005, Dominican Republic
2005, Belize 2006, Ecuador 2008, Cote d’Ivoire 2010, and Greece 2012. Table 5.4 reports
the bonds in my sample which were subject to a default and subsequent restructuring,
and the instruments that resulted from the respective debt exchanges.
For each of the defaults, I code event dates for three key steps typically involved in a
sovereign debt restructuring. The first event is a payment default or default announce-
ment by a government official. This captures if an interest or principal payment on a
bond was missed, or if a government official (such as the prime minister, finance minister
or central bank president) announced that future payments would not be honored as
originally scheduled. Following a default, creditors and debtor government usually
enter a bargaining process in which they determine the terms of a restructuring of the
defaulted debt. The announcement of the final restructuring offer with the exact payment
terms of the resolution between creditors and government is the second event which
I take into account. Finally, the actual debt exchange marks the third step. This is
defined as the closing of the tendering period or the date when the exchange is officially
conducted. Table 5.3 reports the event dates for each step, brief explanations of each
event and sources for each of the debt crises. Wherever possible, I coded the data from
the original debt exchange offers. I complemented the data with information that was
extracted from the financial press and the academic literature.13
While these events exclusively apply to defaulting governments, I additionally con-
sider broader “crisis” events based on significant negative returns, which can also occur
in countries that do not end up in a default. For this market-based crisis measure, I
identify dates on which the daily total return on a bond was -10% or less, and the
cumulative return over the next three days was -15% or less:14
1
[
(Rit < −0.1) ∪ ∑3n=1 Ri,t+n < −0.15
]
(5.6)
where Rit denotes the total return of bond i on day t. This is similar to the idea used by
Mauro et al. (2002), who identify breaks in the time series of sovereign bonds by structural
changes in the spread without a priori knowledge about specific historical events. This
measure thus accounts for the arrival of negative information about the creditworthiness
of a government which was unexpected by the market, and thus resulted in a rapid
adjustment of the bond valuation. To eliminate confounding the negative return dates
with the other events, I do not take into account negative return events that took place in
the same month as another event.
13The financial press was systematically searched through the database Factiva. Additional data were
coded from the detailed crises summaries in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006). Finally, I thank Christoph
Trebesch for providing the detailed data from Trebesch (2010).
14For robustness, I also considered -5%, -15% and -20%, with similar results to those reported here.
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5.4 Methods & results
5.4.1 Stylized facts
As a first take in describing the data, I exploit the high frequency of daily observations
in the data set to conduct an event study of the correlation of the crisis events with
secondary market liquidity. As Bessembinder et al. (2009) note, event studies for bond
markets must take particular care of the fact that the same issuer has often multiple bonds
on the market at the same time. The definition of a benchmark bond as representative for
a country’s debt market is necessarily ad hoc. Culminating multiple bonds into country
portfolios loses all information about instrument-specific variables. The unit of analysis
is therefore the individual bonds issued.
The event study follows the standard methodology suggested by Campbell et al.
(1997). I compare the “abnormal" liquidity following an event with the “expected"
liquidity derived from a preceding estimation period. Suppose t describes the time index
in trading days. Then t0 marks the beginning of this estimation window, and t1 marks
the end of it. The event window starts at t2 and ends at t3. For the results presented here,
I set t0 = −50, t1 = −2, t2 = −1 and t3 = 0 or t3 = 10.15 In other words, the estimation
window comprises 50 days and the event window either one or eleven days, starting
the day prior to and incorporating two weeks following the event. However, since I am
testing multiple subsequently occurring events, I adjust t0 in case a previous event falls
into the estimation window in order to exclude the previous event from the estimation
period.16
The abnormal illiquidity, Âsit for a bond is estimated as the difference between the
observed liquidity, sit, and the expected liquidity, E(sit) derived from the estimation
window: Âsit = sit − E(sit). To approximate E(sit), I assume constant mean liquidity,
in which the mean bid-ask spread in the designated estimation window is used as
the expected liquidity for the following event window, i.e. E(sit) = (t1 − t0)−1∑t1t0 sit.
After computing the abnormal liquidity during the event windows in response to the
restructuring events, I test H0 : N−1(t2 − t1)−1∑N ∑t3t2 Âsit = 0, where N denotes the
number of bonds affected by the respective event. To test this hypothesis, I report results
from t-tests, which are appropriate for an estimation window of this size (Campbell et al.,
1997), and from non-parametric sign tests which do not require assumptions about the
distribution of the bid-ask spreads.
Table 5.7 gives the results. For unexpected negative return shocks, the unconditional
15The choice of the length of the event and estimation windows follows the literature. The results are not
sensitive to choosing t3 = 3 or t3 = 5.
16For example, suppose a country defaults, but only 40 days after this default announces a restructuring
offer to its creditors. In this case, I cannot extend the estimation window for the offer event to 50 days,
since it would contain the default event. Instead, I would start the estimation window for the offer event
30 days prior to the offer and 10 days after the default, in order to exclude the default event window.
Formally, for this specific example I would set tde f ault0 = −50, t
de f ault
1 = −2, t
de f ault
2 = −1, t
de f ault
3 = 10;
to f f er0 = 11, t
o f f er
1 = 38, t
o f f er
2 = 39, t
o f f er
3 = 50 with t = 0 indicating the default date.
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difference between expected and observed bid-ask spreads amounts to 3.5 percentage
points on the event day itself, and 2.7 percentage points when looking at the post-event
window. The difference is significant in both cases, and not sensitive to using the t-
statistic or a sign test. The results are similarly significant when looking at the impact of
defaults, albeit the magnitude is longer lasting. On the day of a default, bid-ask spreads
are more than 2.6 percentage points wider than during the pre-event estimation window;
looking at the ten days following the event, the difference is almost 2.9 percentage points.
Considering the mean bid-ask spread of 1.4%, with a standard deviation of 2.4%, these
differences are also strong in terms of economic magnitude. This is in line with the
theoretical prior that market liquidity will decrease if the default risk is increasing and
the uncertainty about the recovery value becomes more prevalent.
The results for subsequent steps during a restructuring are also in line with expec-
tations. Once information arrives in the market about the future payment profile of
the securities, liquidity returns. The publication of exchange offers is associated with
significantly narrower bid-ask spreads. The spread drops by 0.8 percentage points on
the day of the agreement itself, although the difference is no longer significant when
looking at the post-event window, indicating that the effect is short-lived. On the other
hand, newly exchanged bonds immediately after the exchange display significantly lower
bid-ask spreads than the old, pre-exchange instruments. The mean bid-ask spread on
the day of the exchange is 2.8% lower than it was for the old bonds in the estimation
window, and the effect lasts on a similar magnitude through the event window.
As an alternative way of looking at the dynamics around these events and in order to
condition the effect on bond-specific features, I run the following regression:
sit = α+ δ′Xit +ϕ′Zit + ηi + θy + λc + ϵit (5.7)
δ is a vector of coefficients capturing the impact of the same events as in the event studies
before. Xit accordingly contains a set of weekly indicator variables marking the run up
to each of these events, and the time after them.
Zit is a set of bond-specific as well as global control variables, reflected in the
coefficient vector ϕ. They include the remaining time to maturity, the amount issued, the
coupon rate, and binary indicator variables for USD denomination, New York governing
law as well as exchange listed bonds.
In order to control for broader market conditions, I also include the bid-ask spread
of the benchmark EMBIG index, sEMBIG,t. The EMBIG is a volume-weighted index of
all outstanding bonds in the sample. This variable hence captures overall liquidity
conditions in the market for emerging economies’ government bonds. Everything else
equal, I expect a positive relation with the individual bonds’ bid-ask spreads.
There could be concerns that the global risk perception changes with events exogenous
to the country-specifc risk of default. If this changes the investors’ discount factor, they
would revalue all assets, including the bonds in my sample. In order to correct for these
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effects, I include the average borrowing rate for US non-investment grade rated corporate
issuers, as measured by the Lehman/Barclay’s Corporate High Yield index. This is an
exogenous measure of the global interest rate for non-investment grade issuers (see e.g.
Cruces and Trebesch, 2013). For robustness, I also used the TED spread and the VIX index
as measures of global volatility instead of the Barclay’s index, with virtually identical
results (not reported).
Finally, ηi, θy, and λc are bond, year and country fixed effects, and ϵit captures the
residual. All reported standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedas-
ticity and clustered on the country level. While I include θy in all specifications, I alternate
between using λc and ηi. This allows estimating the correlations of the time-invariant
bond-specific variables in those specifications with λc and the assumption that all bond-
specific effects are random. Any country-specific effects are absorbed by the bond-fixed
effects in the regressions including ηi.
Table 5.8 reports the results from the regressions. Figure 5.4 displays the results
graphically by plotting the coefficients of the weekly indicator variables in δ around
the crisis events (based on the bond fixed effects regression columns). Turning to the
effect of negative return shocks first, it shows that bonds have significantly lower bid-ask
spreads in the weeks before the return shock occurs. From that week onwards, bid-ask
spreads are more than 2 percentage points higher than before, increasing over time. The
effects are not dependent on including bond fixed or random effects. Looking at payment
defaults and restructuring announcements, the tendency is similar, although the level is
more pronounced and the development appears more anticipated. Bid-ask spreads start
to rise in the weeks before defaults occur, and are between 3-5 percentage points wider
than for non-defaulting bonds from week 2 after the event. The effect is long-lasting and
does not recede even when estimating longer lags (not reported).
As indicated in the event studies, the effect of the publication of restructuring offers
is ambiguous and does not show any clear direction. Similarly, the actual debt exchanges
do not exhibit a strong effect once estimated in a more controlled setting. If anything,
trading new bonds immediately after an exchange takes place under somewhat less
liquid conditions, but gradually returns to levels indistinguishable from non-restructured
bonds.
The coefficients of the additional variables included are largely in line with expecta-
tions. Bonds with larger outstanding amounts and those listed on at least one exchange
are significantly more liquid. If “global” liquidity conditions worsen as measured by the
EMBIG, the bond-specific bid-ask spreads decrease at a similar rate.
These results give some indicative evidence on the role that distress and default play
for market conditions, supporting hypothesis (i) and (ii). When returns are volatile and
repayment comes increasingly in question, market liquidity deteriorates.
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5.4.2 Determinants of market liquidity
The previous section provided results using discrete events typically observed in sovereign
debt crises. However, the risk of default and price volatility are better described as con-
tinuous variables. Not all countries which experience a sovereign debt crisis end up
defaulting and restructuring their outstanding bonds. Well-known examples of govern-
ments experiencing significant financial distress without defaulting are Brazil and Turkey
in the early 2000s (Pescatori and Sy, 2007).
In the benchmark regressions for testing hypotheses (i) and (ii), I thus include
measures of default risk and return volatility that are observable for all countries in the
sample:
sit = α+ βPDct + γVolit +ϕ′Zit + ηi + θy + λc + ϵit (5.8)
In line with the hypotheses H1 and H2, the main parameters of interest are β and γ.
First, β captures the marginal effect of a change in the probability of default PDct17 on
the bid-ask spread, sit. Second, γ is the coefficient on the return volatility of the bond. As
before, ϕ contains the coefficients related to the control variables contained in Zit, and
the remaining terms represent the various fixed effects and error terms.
In discussing the results, I will treat the version including bond-fixed effects as the
benchmark specification. All estimates are obtained by OLS. As before, all errors are
corrected for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.18
The expected probability of default is backed out from CDS premia with a 5 year
tenor, the duration for which the largest number of reliable quotes exist (Figure 5.3 shows
the aggregate time series in the sample). The probability of default is then computed
as PD = CDS/(1− Recovery), where I use data from Cruces and Trebesch (2013) to
approximate expected recovery rates (for details on how to evaluate default probabilities
from sovereign CDS spreads see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006). For defaulting
countries, I use the actual ex-post realized recovery rate ranging from 23.2% (Argentina
2005) to 91.2% (Uruguay 2003). For non-defaulting countries, I use the average recovery
rate since 1980 of 62%. All results are robust to using the average recovery rate for all
countries, or assuming flat 25% / 50% / 75% recovery rates for all countries, shifting
the implied default probability only in levels but not in differences. To measure Volit, I
compute the empirically observed standard deviation of total returns in a rolling window
of the 30 prior trading days. This makes the regression essentially similar to an ARCH
model in which every past observation has a unit weight (see Engle, 2001).
Table 5.9 reports the regression results. Turning to the impact of default risk first, the
results confirm the prior of a positive correlation. For a 10 percentage points increase
17Note that the default probability is a country-level variable, as indicated by the subscript.
18I refrain from first-differencing the data or running GLS regressions in order to conserve the most
relevant source of variation in the data, see Cochrane (2012). Besides, the main variables do not exhibit
evidence of a unit root, see Table 5.6.
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in the probability of default, roughly equal to one standard deviation, bid-ask spreads
rise between 40-70 basis points, depending on the inclusion of other variables in the
regression. This is an economically significant effect relative to the sample mean bid-ask
spread of 1.36%.
Return volatility is also strongly positively correlated with illiquidity. A one-standard
deviation increase in the volatility (0.93%) translates into a wider bid-ask spread of
between 90-100 basis points. The results are stable irrespective of including bond or
country fixed effects (column 6), or any of the control variables (columns 4-5). Most of the
control variables do not display significant effects, with the exception of exchange-listed
bonds which are found to be significantly more liquid. The coefficients on the global
control variables are neither significant in the benchmark specification in column (6) nor
in the random effects specifications.
For robustness, I expose the benchmark specification to a set of further checks. Table
5.10 gives the results. Column (1) excludes the defaulting countries and only looks
at the non-restructuring sample. The results are similar to before, indicating that the
relationship between market liquidity and default risk is also present in cases that do not
end up in a default. I furthermore distinguish between high and low risk environments
by dividing the sample into distressed periods with high sovereign spreads, and normal
periods, according to the crisis definition of Pescatori and Sy (2007). The results hold both
in crisis periods as well as “normal” times. Column (2) restricts the sample to non-crisis
periods with sovereign spreads below 10%, and column (3) shows results from the sample
with spreads above 10%. The coefficients on the risk of default and on return volatility
decrease in the low-risk environment as compared to the full sample, but still remain
significantly related to the bid-ask spread. In the high-risk state, on the other hand, the
default risk coefficient is considerably higher than in the benchmark sample. Column
(4) uses the absolute instead of relative bid-ask spread as the dependent variable. This
alternative measure does not produce qualitatively different results from the benchmark
specifications. A ten percentage point increase in default probability is associated with
bid-ask spreads wider by about 10 cents. Again, this is significant compared to a median
absolute bid-ask spread of 75 cents (mean of 103 cents). Finally, remaining concerns about
misspecification of the error terms do not appear to be warranted. Column (5) shows
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors which additionally correct for cross-sectional
auto-correlation, and column (6) presents Newey and West (1987) standard errors. In
both cases the test-statistics do not decrease noticeably. Explicitly modeling an AR(1)
process in the error term, as done in column (7), slightly reduces the coefficient on return
volatility but does not materially change the main results.
The results so far have established evidence in support of hypothesis (i) and (ii).
Market liquidity is strongly correlated with financial distress. Both default risk and
return volatility are positively correlated with wider bid-ask spreads, both for high and
low risk environments.
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5.4.3 Illiquidity premia in sovereign bond yields
The following section turns towards quantifying the importance of liquidity risk for
borrowing costs. Under hypothesis H3, I expect market liquidity to be negatively
correlated with government borrowing costs. As a first step, I estimate the following
regression:
Sovereign spread ≡ yit − yUS,t = α+ β1(PDct − PDUS,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Credit Risk
) + β2(sit − sEMBIG,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Liquidity Risk
+ϕ′Zit + ηi + λc + θy + ϵit (5.9)
where the sovereign spread is given by the difference between yit, the yield to maturity
on the bond, and yUS,t, the yield to maturity on a US treasury bond of similar maturity.
PDUS,t and sEMBIG,t denote the implicit default probabilities from US CDS and the bid-ask
spread of the EMBIG index. Differencing out these “global” conditions allows focusing
on the country-specific element of borrowing rates, default probability, and illiquidity.
As before, the remaining terms again represent control variables, fixed effects, and the
error term.
Results are reported in Table 5.11. The first observation in columns (1) to (3) is that
both measures of credit and liquidity risk positively contribute to government borrowing
costs. For a 10 percentage points increase in the risk of default, sovereign spreads
increase by more than 300bps. Liquidity risk is likewise an important factor in explaining
sovereign spreads, though not as strong as credit risk. A one-standard deviation increase
in the liquidity risk factor (1.2%) corresponds to a sovereign spread increase of about
50bps. Again, the results are not sensitive to including control variables or bond fixed
effects, as shown in columns (2) to (3).
However, the results appear to be dependent on the state of the risk environment.
Columns (4) to (7) show the results in different subsamples. If spreads are below 5%,
representing a very calm period, both coefficients on default risk and on liquidity risk
decrease considerably. While the probability of default continues to be significantly
correlated with borrowing rates even in this low risk sample, at about half the magni-
tude as before, liquidity risk seems to be virtually irrelevant, with the coefficient both
economically and statistically insignificant.
This impression changes remarkably when looking at higher risk subsamples. Succes-
sively considering periods with spreads above 5%, 7% and finally 10%, the coefficient on
default risk remains constant (if anything, decreasing slightly). However, the importance
of liquidity risk increases strongly when looking at the different risk states. In the highest
risk scenario with spreads above 10%, a one-standard deviation increase in liquidity risk
translates into a spread increase of 100bps. This implies that the borrowing cost premium
related to the liquidity risk factor almost doubles in crisis periods as compared to the
estimates obtained from the full sample.
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An alternative way of looking at the interaction of distress and liquidity is to consider
the interaction between the probability of default and the liquidity risk measure. Column
(8) reports the result. Interpreting the coefficients is not straightforward since the
conditional effects need to be accounted for. Figure 5.5 therefore plots the marginal effect
of a change in the liquidity spread on the sovereign spread, conditional on the default
risk. The result is in line with the previously obtained estimates: For low probabilities of
default, the marginal effect is negligible and insignificant. However, even for seemingly
modest default probabilities above 10% the effect becomes significant, and remains so for
higher values of default risk. Importantly, this is not driven by the defaulting countries
only. Estimating the regression in a sample without defaulting countries results in a
similar effect, albeit at a somewhat lower level of statistical significance.
As an additional exercise in quantifying the relative importance of credit and liquidity
risk, I rely on the approach suggested by Beber et al. (2009). They estimate effectively
identical regressions as in equation (5.9), but on a sample of Eurozone government bond
markets between 2003-04, an arguably relatively calm period in developed sovereign
debt markets. In contrast to their time period, my sample exhibits considerably more
variation in crisis intensity.
They suggest a methodology which allows comparing the relative weight given to
the credit and liquidity risk factors based on the regression coefficients:
Credit risk contributioni = βˆ1
[
1
t2 − t1
t2
∑
t1
(PDct − PDUS,t)
]
(5.10)
Liquidity risk contributioni = βˆ2
[
1
t2 − t1
t2
∑
τ=t1
(si,t − sEMBIG,t)
]
(5.11)
where βˆ1 and βˆ2 are the estimated coefficients from equation (5.9). The average contri-
bution values are given by their predicted part of the sovereign spread, based on the
average observed values of the two risk factors in a given period between t1 and t2, in
percentage points. Furthermore, this allows to consider the relative weight given to these
two factors:
Credit risk (share)i =
|Credit risk contribi|
|Credit risk contribi|+ |Liquidity risk contribi|
(5.12)
Liquidity risk (share)i =
|Liquidity risk contrib|
|Credit risk contribi|+ |Liquidity risk contribi|
(5.13)
Table 5.12 report the results for this exercise. In the full sample, the average contribution
for credit and liquidity risk is 96% and 4%, respectively. However, this changes depending
on the risk environment. Excluding the periods when countries are in default reduces the
relative impact of liquidity risk slightly (column 2), and estimating the contribution for
non-defaulting countries only results in a negligible share of just above 1% (column 3).
The differential impact of liquidity risk is not only due to cross-sectional variation,
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but can also be observed within countries over time. During calm times with spreads
below 5%, liquidity risk is irrelevant, relative to credit risk. This holds for both the non-
defaulting countries as well as when looking at all countries outside of default episodes.
Looking at more risky environments though, spreads are increasingly explained with
larger contributions of liquidity risk. In the samples with spreads above 5 and 10%,
liquidity risk contributes about 7% of the interest rate difference to risk-free bonds, or
between 100-150bps. Importantly, this is also true when excluding default periods and
when looking at non-defaulting countries only, although at lower levels. But the general
finding that investors tend to put higher premia on liquidity risk during distress periods
can be confirmed.
These results are consistent with previous findings in the literature on the “flight to
liquidity vs. flight to quality” debate, which has also shown that the liquidity premium
on bond prices is conditional on the risk environment (e.g. Beber et al., 2009; Ejsing et al.,
2012; Musto et al., 2014). When a bond becomes relatively more information-sensitive, as
during a default episode or when sovereign spreads are large, liquidity is much more
important compared to an information-insensitive asset whose value typically changes
little with the arrival of new information.
5.5 Conclusion
Using a previously little used data source, this paper establishes two key findings related
to secondary markets for sovereign debt. First, market liquidity dries up during crises.
Increases in default probability and return volatility are significantly related to market
illiquidity, suggesting that market makers are averse to holding risky bonds in their trad-
ing books. Second, liquidity risk contributes considerably to borrowing costs. Sovereign
spreads not only depend on credit quality, but also include a significant liquidity risk
factor. Furthermore, the relation is state-dependent. For low-risk environments, liquidity
plays a negligible role. However, once government debt markets come into distress, the
relative weight given to liquidity risk rises substantially. These findings are in line with
theoretical predictions inventory-based market microstructure models, and also with
asset pricing models explicitly accounting for liquidity risk.
These results have broader implications. Retaining a liquid secondary market for
sovereign debt instruments is a desirable feature for governments in order to minimize
borrowing costs. This is particularly important during distressed times, when endogenous
liquidity spirals are looming. Moving sovereign bond trading to less opaque market
places could thus possibly provide an improvement not only in transparency, but also in
making risk allocation more efficient and improving market conditions during distress.
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Figures
Figure 5.1: The market for EME sovereign bonds
The figure plots the number of outstanding emerging market bonds included in the sample over time.
Jan−94 Jan−96 Jan−98 Jan−00 Jan−02 Jan−04 Jan−06 Jan−08 Jan−10 Jan−12
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
N
o.
 b
on
ds
Student Version of MATLAB
187
Figure 5.2: Market liquidity for EME sovereign bonds
The figure plots the daily average bid-ask spreads over time. The data are weighted by the bonds’ nominal face value amount
outstanding. The blue lines indicate selected crisis events from between 1994 and 2012.
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Figure 5.3: Probability of default
The figure plots the daily mean and median implied default probabilities in the sample. The variable is computed
using CDS premia (5yr tenor). Conditional on the recovery rate RR, the market-implied probability of default can be
backed out as PD = CDS/(1− RR). To approximate the expected recovery rate in case of default I use the creditor
loss data (in present value terms) from Cruces and Trebesch (2013). For non-defaulting countries, I use the mean
recovery rate of 62%. For defaulting countries, I use the ex-post realized recovery rates. Note that using the mean
recovery rate for the entire sample, or using flat expected recovery rates of 25%/50%/75% does not noticably change
the results, since it only affects the level of the default probability, but not the changes over time.
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Figure 5.4: Run-up and off-effects around crisis events
The figure plots the coefficients on the weekly indicators around the four crisis events from the regressions based on equation
5.7 reported in Table 5.8. The red line connects the point estimates of the weekly indicators, and the blue line represents the
95% confidence interval around these point estimates.
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Figure 5.5: Impact of illiquidity on interest spreads
The figure plots the marginal effect of a change in the illiquidity spread (difference between the bond’s bid-ask spread and
the average bid-ask spread in the market) on the interest spread (spread between the yield to maturity on the bond and a
US treasury bond of comparable maturity), conditional on the default probability of the country. The dashed blue lines
indicate the 90% confidence interval (the dotted blue lines mark the 95% CI). The positive slope indicates that for higher
default probabilities, the impact of illiquidity on spreads is increasing, while it is insignificant for very safe bonds. The cyan
line shows the empirical density estimate of the default probability, indicating a bimodal distribution. For robustness, the
lower panel thus excludes the defaulting countries. The interacting effect also holds when excluding defaulting countries,
albeit at a lower level of significance.
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Tables
Table 5.1: Bonds by country
The table reports the distribution of bonds in the sample by country. All bonds were issued by the central
government, and governed under the laws of a G7 member state. The total volume reported is the sum of
all bonds in the sample by country, in nominal USD at the time of issue.
Country No. bonds Total (Bn USD) Country No. bonds Total (Bn USD)
Albania 1 0.43 Latvia 4 3.23
Algeria 2 1.27 Lebanon 35 32.04
Angola 1 1 Lithuania 8 11.25
Argentina 46 144.95 Macedonia 1 0.23
Armenia 1 0.7 Malaysia 2 3.25
Aruba 5 0.51 Mexico 43 110.75
Bahamas 3 0.6 Mongolia 2 1.5
Barbados 3 0.6 Montenegro 1 0.26
Belarus 2 1.8 Morocco 5 6.71
Belize 3 1.2 Namibia 1 0.5
Bermuda 3 1.73 Nicaragua 1 0.19
Bolivia 2 1 Nigeria 5 8.35
Brazil 49 136.55 Pakistan 5 2.64
Bulgaria 7 7.56 Panama 18 15.4
Chile 9 6.95 Paraguay 1 0.5
China 9 19.59 Peru 14 16.74
Colombia 23 22.6 Philippines 30 38.56
Congo, Republic Of 1 0.48 Poland 25 55.37
Costa Rica 9 3.46 Qatar 9 16.4
Cote D’Ivoire 3 3.77 Romania 7 14.17
Croatia 10 11.43 Russian Federation 20 66.13
Czech Republic 6 14.57 Rwanda 1 0.4
Dominican Republic 9 5.8 Senegal 1 0.5
Ecuador 6 10.35 Serbia 4 5.33
Egypt 4 3 Slovakia 5 8.03
El Salvador 8 5.49 Slovenia 2 4.75
Gabon 1 1 South Africa 12 14.92
Georgia 2 1 South Korea 10 11.5
Ghana 2 1.75 Sri Lanka 5 4
Greece 39 241.89 Tanzania 1 0.6
Grenada 2 0.29 Thailand 1 0.04
Guatemala 5 2.36 Trinidad And Tobago 2 0.4
Honduras 1 0.5 Turkey 38 61.12
Hong Kong 1 1.25 Ukraine 15 17.4
Hungary 14 21.99 United Arab Emirates 8 7.52
Indonesia 18 27.95 Uruguay 14 11.45
Iraq 1 2.7 Venezuela 27 53.76
Israel 9 10.2 Viet Nam 4 2.27
Jamaica 9 3.32 Zambia 1 0.75
Jordan 3 1.36
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Table 5.2: Bond characteristics
The table reports characteristics of the bonds contained in the sample, as reported by Bloomberg.
Value No. Bonds Share
Currency
EUR 107 14.9%
USD 605 84.1%
Other 7 1.0%
Governing law
New York 400 67.8%
England 161 27.3%
Other 29 4.9%
Rating at issue BB+ and below 419 63.0%BBB- and above 246 37.0%
Exchange listed Not listed 64 9.0%Listed 646 91.0%
No. Observations Mean SD
Time to maturity (years) 713 14.6 9.6
Coupon 686 6.8 2.7
Principal (Bn USD) 718 1.9 2.1
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Table 5.3: List of debt crisis events
Country Date Event Details Source
Argentina 11/23/2001 Default Domestic debt exchange implies technical default as de-
fined by Standard and Poors
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006)
11/01/2004 Restructuring
Offer
Final debt exchange offer announced. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006)
06/10/2005 Debt Exchange Exchange completed, after the implementation had been
be delayed by holdout creditors.
IMF (2005)
Belize 08/04/2006 Default Government announces it is going to seek a debt restruc-
turing.
Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2006, “Belize to Redo Ex-
ternal Debt”
12/18/2006 Restructuring
Offer
Revised agreement with creditors published. Reuters, 19 December 2006, “Belize launches final debt
exchange offer”
02/20/2007 Debt Exchange After multiple extensions, debt exchange closes. Reuters, 20 February 2007, “Belize restructures debt, most
creditors on board”
Cote d’Ivoire 05/01/2000 Default Ivory Coast makes only partial payment on its outstand-
ing Brady bonds.
Reuters, 28 April 2000, “Ivory Coast near Brady default as
payments stalled”; Reuters, 04 May 2000, “BNP confirms
partial Ivory Coast Brady payment”
09/28/2009 Restructuring
Offer
Almost ten years after the default and after a previous
Paris Club deal, Cote d’Ivoire announces an agreement
with its private creditors.
Reuters, 28 September 2009, “Ivory Coast reaches deal on
debt restructure offer”
04/08/2010 Debt Exchange Debt exchange period closes after initial period was ex-
tended by one week.
Reuters, 07 April 2010, “Ivory Coast extends deadline on
debt exchange”
Domincan Re-
public
01/23/2004 Default First payment default on bond. Although partially cured
within the grace period, the government made a num-
ber of late payments again within weeks, and finally an-
nounced a restructuring.
Dow Jones Emerging Markets Report, 29 January 2004,
“Dominican Republic Missed $27M Payment On ’13 Bond”
04/20/2005 Restructuring
Offer
Government announces restructuring offer. Dow Jones Newswires, 20 April 2005, “Dominican Repub-
lic Launches Debt Exchange Offer”
05/05/2005 Debt Exchange Exchange offer closes. Euroweek, 06 May 2005, “Dominican Rep escapes default
with popular exchange”
Ecuador 08/25/1999 Default After weeks of rumours, Ecuador announces a bond re-
structuring and payment halt.
AP, 25 August 1999, “Ecuador’s president defers $96 mil-
lion Brady interest payment for 30 days”
07/27/2000 Restructuring
Offer
After a year of negotiations, the offer is announced. AP, 27 July 2000, “Ecuador offers foreign creditors ambi-
tious bond swap”
08/23/2000 Debt Exchange Exchange is conducted. Reuters, 23 August 2000, “Ecuador swaps 97 pct of Brady,
Euro debt”
continues on next page
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Table 5.3: List of debt crisis events (continued)
Country Date Event Details Source
Ecuador 12/12/2008 Default Outstanding foreign debt is declared ’illegal’ and coupon
payment missed.
Reuters, 12 December 2008, “Ecuador defaults, says to
fight ’monster’ creditors”
04/20/2009 Restructuring
Offer
Ecuador offers to buy back the outstanding bonds at a
steep discount of 35 cents on the dollar.
Reuters, 20 April 2009, “Ecuador offers defaulted debt
buyback, big discount”
06/03/2009 Debt Exchange Buyback deadline closes after extension. Reuters, 11 June 2009, “Ecuador buys back most debt,
rekindles threats”
Greece 07/21/2011 Default After months of rumors since late 2010, the EU summit
finally announces that a “private sector involvement” will
be negotiated.
Zettelmeyer et al. (2013)
02/21/2012 Restructuring
Offer
The creditor committee and Greek government announce
the terms of the debt restructuring.
Zettelmeyer et al. (2013)
03/12/2012 Debt Exchange The largest sovereign debt exchange in history takes place. Zettelmeyer et al. (2013)
Grenada 12/29/2004 Default Government misses coupon payment and announces it
seeks a debt restructuring following the severe recession
due to hurricane “Ivan”.
BBC, 30 December 2004, “Grenada moves to restructure
external debt”; Standard and Poor’s, 30 December 2004,
Rating Update
09/09/2005 Restructuring
Offer
Grenada publishes the restructuring offer, delayed by
almost three months due to the hurricane “Emily”
Grenada Offering Memorandum, 09 September 2004
11/15/2005 Debt Exchange Grenada exchanges its USD and ECD denominated bonds
for new instruments with a 20 year extended maturity.
Dow Jones Newswires, 17 November 2005, “Grenada suc-
cessfully restructures overseas, local debt”
Russia 08/17/1998 Default Default on primarily foreign held local-law GKO instru-
ments. Defaults on additional instruments, including
Soviet-era debt and Eurobonds, followed in the coming
months.
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006)
02/01/2000 Restructuring
Offer
After months of negotiations, details of the restructuring
of outstanding eurobonds are revealed.
Reuters, 01 February 2000, “Russia to announce MinFin 3
bonds swap details Tuesday”
11/30/2000 Debt Exchange Last exchange of foreign debt closes. Standard and Poor’s, 8 December 2000, Rating Update
Uruguay 03/11/2003 Default After a few weeks of discussions, the government an-
nounces it will make a voluntary debt restructuring offer.
Reuters, 11 March 2003, “Uruguay proposes voluntary
debt restructuring”
04/10/2003 Restructuring
Offer
Details of the restructuring offer announced. Reuters, 10 April 2003, “Uruguay gives creditors two
options in debt swap”
05/29/2003 Debt Exchange Completion of the debt exchange. Standard and Poor’s, 02 June 2003, Rating Update
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Table 5.4: Pre- and post-restructuring bonds by country
The table lists the bonds in the sample that were exchanged in the course of a debt restructuring, and the resulting “new”
bonds. The data were collected from the original debt restructuring agreements wherever possible, and complemented
by information from various IMF country reports and data in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006). Note that I include
only those bonds in the sample for which reliable and continuous price quotes are available. In the cases of Argentina
and Greece, this excludes a range of bonds that were placed in private markets or too small to be traded regularly.
Country Pre-restructuring bonds Post-restructuring bonds
Instrument ISIN Instrument ISIN
Argentina Bontes due 2002 ARARGE031633 Discount 8.28% due 2033 US040114GL81
Bontes due 2003 ARARGE032573 Par Step up due 2038 US040114GK09
Bontes due 2004 ARARGE032409
Bontes due 2005 ARARGE032581
Bontes due 2006 ARARGE033076
Bontes FRN due 2003 ARARGE032086
Discount Bonds XS0043118172
FRBs XS0043120236
Par Bonds XS0043119147
10.25% due 2030 US040114GB00
11.75% due 2009 US040114BE93
11.75% due 2015 US040114GA27
11.375% due 2010 US040114FC91
11.375% due 2017 US040114AR16
11% due 2005 US040114AZ32
11% due 2006 US040114AN02
12.25% due 2018 US040114GG96
12.125% due 2019 US040114BC38
12.375% due 2012 US040114GD65
12% due 2031 US040114GH79
12% due 2020 US040114FB19
12% due 2031 USP8055KGV19
8.375% due 2003 US040114AH34
9.75% due 2027 US040114AV28
Step up due 2008 US040114GF14
Pro 2 (Series 1) ARP04981BA66
Pre 4 (Series 2) ARP04981DG19
Belize 9.5% due 2012 USP16394AC58 4.25% due 2029 USP16394AF89
Cote d’Ivoire FLIRbs FRN due 2018 XS0075820133 Step up due 2032 XS0496488395
PDI FRN due 2018 XS0075803477
Dominican Republic 9.5% due 2006 USP3579EAA57 9.5% due 2006 USP3579EAC14
9.04% due 2013 USP3579EAB31 9.04% due 2018 USP3579EAD96
Ecuador I Discount Bonds XS0055571789 12% due 2012 XS0115748401
Par Bonds XS0055572084 Step up due 2030 XS0115743519
PDI Bonds XS0055571433
Ecuador II 12% due 2012 XS0115748401 None (Buyback)
Step up due 2030 XS0115743519 None (Buyback)
Grenada 9.375% due 2012 USP48863AA55 Step up due 2025 USP48863AC12
Greece 2.3% due 2030 GR0338002547 Step up due 2023 GR0128010676
3.6% due 2016 GR0124028623 Step up due 2024 GR0128011682
3.7% due 2015 GR0124026601 Step up due 2025 GR0128012698
4.5% due 2014 GR0124024580 Step up due 2026 GR0128013704
4.5% due 2037 GR0138001673 Step up due 2027 GR0128014710
4.3% due 2017 GR0124029639 Step up due 2028 GR0133006198
4.6% due 2018 GR0124030645 Step up due 2029 GR0133007204
4.6% due 2040 GR0138002689 Step up due 2030 GR0133008210
4.7% due 2024 GR0133003161 Step up due 2031 GR0133009226
5.5% due 2014 GR0114022479 Step up due 2032 GR0133010232
5.3% due 2026 GR0133004177 Step up due 2033 GR0138005716
5.9% due 2017 GR0118012609 Step up due 2034 GR0138006722
5.9% due 2022 GR0133002155 Step up due 2035 GR0138007738
6.5% due 2019 GR0133001140 Step up due 2036 GR0138008744
6.25% due 2020 GR0124032666 Step up due 2037 GR0138009759
6.1% due 2015 GR0114023485 Step up due 2038 GR0138010765
6.95% due 2008 US423324AC66 Step up due 2039 GR0138011771
6% due 2019 GR0124031650 Step up due 2040 GR0138012787
Step up due 2041 GR0138013793
Step up due 2042 GR0138014809
Russia Interest Accrual Note (IAN) XS0082144923 8.25% due 2010 XS0114295560
Principal Note (PRIN) TT3294119 Step up due 2030 XS0114288789
Uruguay Par Bonds XS0030490782 7.875% due 2033 US917288BA96
7.625% due 2012 US917288AJ15 7.5% due 2015 US917288AZ56
7.875% due 2027 US760942AE20 7.25% due 2011 US917288AY81
7% due 2019 XS0167137834
7% due 2019 XS0167137834
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Table 5.5: Descriptives statistics of main variables
Full sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Bid-ask spread (%) 1.36 2.44 0 100 1045443
Stripped Spread (%) 5.32 8.05 -3 99.99 1030395
Default Probability (%) 12.78 20.06 0 100 809340
Volatility (Rolling, %) 0.68 0.93 0 27.84 1006184
Liquidity Spread (%) 0.47 1.36 -1.22 10.19 1005097
Time to maturity (Days) 4405.31 3557.2 0 36530 1044157
Principal (Bn USD) 1.88 2.2 0.02 20.17 1042883
Coupon (%) 7.46 2.67 0 18.92 963355
NY law 0.77 0.42 0 1 794968
Exchange-listed 0.84 0.36 0 1 1027351
Bid-ask EMBIG (%) 0.75 0.37 0.22 3.54 1025609
US HY Rate (%) 9.64 2.8 6.06 22.97 1045443
Non-defaulting countries sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Bid-ask spread (%) 1.09 1.27 0 50.79 869728
Stripped Spread (%) 3.91 3.8 -3 95.07 866317
Default Probability (%) 8.71 10.12 0 100 679813
Volatility (Rolling, %) 0.56 0.64 0 17.01 850311
Liquidity Spread (%) 0.34 1.07 -1.22 10.19 844423
Time to maturity (Days) 4364.01 3604.39 0 36530 869728
Principal (Bn USD) 1.57 1.61 0.02 11.66 869728
Coupon (%) 7.53 2.39 0 14.5 795653
NY law 0.81 0.39 0 1 663977
Exchange-listed 0.83 0.38 0 1 859447
Bid-ask EMBIG (%) 0.75 0.37 0.22 3.54 853538
US HY Rate (%) 9.59 2.83 6.06 22.97 869728
Defaulting countries sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Bid-ask spread (%) 2.68 5.02 0 100 175715
Stripped Spread (%) 12.76 16.29 -3 99.99 164078
Default Probability (%) 34.13 37.89 0 100 129527
Volatility (Rolling, %) 1.31 1.68 0 27.84 155873
Liquidity Spread (%) 1.12 2.23 -1.22 10.19 160674
Time to maturity (Days) 4611.23 3304.21 0 12274 174429
Principal (Bn USD) 3.43 3.63 0.1 20.17 173155
Coupon (%) 7.14 3.69 0 18.92 167702
NY law 0.58 0.49 0 1 130991
Exchange-listed 0.91 0.28 0 1 167904
Bid-ask EMBIG (%) 0.76 0.37 0.22 3.54 172071
US HY Rate (%) 9.9 2.66 6.06 22.97 175715
197
Table 5.6: Stationarity tests of main variables
Variable Fisher-type Meta test of I(1)
Bid/Ask spread -131.302∗∗∗
Default probability -6.884∗∗∗
Return volatility -36.1503∗∗∗
Sovereign spread -14.1661∗∗∗
Liquidity spread -142.3638∗∗∗
Variable DF-GLS
Bid/Ask spread EMBIG -4.171∗∗∗
US HY rate (Barclays/Lehman) -2.848∗∗
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05.
Table 5.7: Event study results
The table reports results from event studies around the events indicated in the column headers. The “excess
bid-ask spread” denotes the difference between the observed bid-ask spread during the post-event time
(on the event day itself in the “Day” column, and the trading 10 days following the event in the “Window”
column), and the mean bid-ask spread in the pre-event window (50 trading days prior to the event). The
third row reports the probability of observing the difference under the null that the median excess bid-ask
spread is zero based on a binomial distribution (sign test), while the fourth row reports the results from
a t-test with the null that the mean excess bid-ask spread is zero. The results indicate significantly larger
bid-ask spreads on and after negative return shocks as well as payment defaults than during the pre-event
windows, and significantly lower bid-ask spreads on and after the publication of restructuring offers as well
as debt exchanges than during the pre-event windows.
Return shock Default Offer Exchange
Day Window Day Window Day Window Day Window
Excess bid-ask spread (mean) 3.451 2.662 2.669 2.889 -0.790 0.181 -2.836 -2.636
Standard deviation 4.716 4.836 3.506 4.423 1.804 3.404 4.656 4.723
p under H0 (Sign test) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.161 0.011 0.000
p under H0 (t-test) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Observations 44 427 68 514 64 533 21 166
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Table 5.8: Market liquidity during distress (I)
The table reports results from regressions based on equation (5.7). The dependent variable in all specifications is the percentage
bid-ask spread as defined in 5.5. The coefficients t− 8 . . . t+ 8 are related to binary indicators marking the weeks before and
after the respective event noted in the column header. The time-invariant bond characteristics are absorbed by the bond fixed
effects in the respective specifications, as are the country fixed effects. All specifications include year indicators to capture
possible time trends. All standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error terms. The results
are in line with the findings from the event studies. For negative return shocks (columns 1-2), bid-ask spreads are significantly
lower in the weeks before the events. For payment defaults and restructuring announcements (columns 3-4), markets turn
increasingly illiquid even in the weeks before the actual default indicating an anticipation effect that starts about 5 weeks prior
to the event. The results for the publication of exchange offers (columns 5-6) and the actual debt exchanges (columns 7-8) are
somewhat inconclusive, but indicate that the events do not have considerable influence on market conditions.
Return shock Default Offer Exchange
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Random
Effects
Fixed Ef-
fects
Random
Effects
Fixed Ef-
fects
Random
Effects
Fixed Ef-
fects
Random
Effects
Fixed Ef-
fects
t-8 -1.62*** -1.71*** -1.01*** -1.07*** 5.34 4.38 -0.84 -0.60
(0.17) (0.32) (0.31) (0.37) (4.10) (3.19) (0.75) (0.74)
t-7 -1.76*** -1.83*** -1.03*** -1.03*** 4.81 4.01 -0.70 -0.46
(0.23) (0.33) (0.31) (0.35) (4.16) (3.10) (0.72) (0.70)
t-6 -1.88*** -1.79*** -0.71** -0.66* 5.85 4.69 -0.22 -0.12
(0.20) (0.31) (0.33) (0.35) (4.62) (3.63) (0.71) (0.62)
t-5 -1.86*** -1.88*** -0.51 -0.57 5.14 3.86 -0.97 -0.73
(0.20) (0.36) (0.50) (0.48) (4.32) (3.37) (0.89) (0.83)
t-4 -1.77*** -1.85*** -0.02 -0.15 5.72 4.38 -0.16 -0.12
(0.18) (0.34) (0.63) (0.63) (4.65) (3.74) (0.42) (0.38)
t-3 -1.68*** -1.71*** 0.24 0.07 6.42 4.84 -0.49 -0.44
(0.19) (0.19) (0.36) (0.38) (4.62) (3.86) (0.59) (0.50)
t-2 -1.52*** -1.62*** 0.05 0.09 5.21 3.91 -0.44 -0.42
(0.27) (0.23) (0.34) (0.30) (4.20) (3.42) (0.53) (0.44)
t-1 -1.36*** -1.28*** 1.13** 1.03*** 5.47 4.10 -0.67 -0.61
(0.22) (0.19) (0.46) (0.36) (4.51) (3.65) (0.57) (0.50)
t -0.82 -0.45 2.08*** 2.03*** 4.79 3.53 0.10 -0.05
(0.60) (0.36) (0.28) (0.23) (4.43) (3.43) (0.31) (0.19)
t+1 0.06 0.48 2.01*** 2.11*** 6.56 4.85 0.45** 0.27
(0.61) (0.36) (0.54) (0.50) (5.57) (4.52) (0.21) (0.21)
t+2 -0.15 0.72 3.60** 3.88*** 11.49 8.40 1.10*** 0.87**
(0.91) (0.68) (1.61) (1.43) (8.49) (7.05) (0.36) (0.44)
t+3 0.17 1.19 3.11** 3.39** -0.95*** -0.68* 1.41** 1.10*
(0.93) (0.85) (1.45) (1.33) (0.32) (0.35) (0.55) (0.64)
t+4 0.43 1.40** 4.25** 4.17** -1.03** -0.88** 0.89*** 0.68*
(0.74) (0.63) (1.94) (1.59) (0.41) (0.35) (0.32) (0.39)
t+5 1.56 1.90** 5.13** 4.99** -1.24*** -1.14*** 0.23 0.11
(1.11) (0.92) (2.41) (2.14) (0.34) (0.26) (0.23) (0.25)
t+6 1.76 2.14* 3.36*** 3.87*** -1.20*** -1.09*** 0.05 -0.06
(1.47) (1.17) (0.67) (1.01) (0.29) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
t+7 1.51 2.02* 4.39*** 4.30*** -0.89* -0.89** 0.01 -0.09
(1.15) (1.02) (0.64) (0.57) (0.46) (0.36) (0.20) (0.20)
t+8 1.81 2.05* 6.20*** 5.77*** -0.11 -0.28 0.67* 0.54
(1.35) (1.16) (0.62) (0.92) (1.21) (0.95) (0.40) (0.42)
Time to maturity 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Principal (Bn USD) -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.23***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Coupon 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
NY law -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.12
(0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26)
Exchange-listed -0.66** -0.66** -0.68** -0.66**
(0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31)
Bid-ask EMBIG 1.25*** 1.30*** 1.22*** 1.30*** 1.30*** 1.36*** 1.27*** 1.34***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
US HY Rate -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant 1.37*** 0.44 1.41*** 0.40 1.49*** 0.43 1.38*** 0.44
(0.35) (0.38) (0.36) (0.38) (0.45) (0.45) (0.37) (0.39)
Bond fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country fixed effects Yes n/a Yes n/a Yes n/a Ye n/a
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 B 0.77 0.04 0.78 0.06 0.78 0.08 0.77 0.04
R2 W 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07
R2 O 0.19 0.06 0.19 0.07 0.21 0.08 0.18 0.06
Obs 788,805 1,024,625 788,805 1,024,625 788,805 1,024,625 788,805 1,024,625
No. Bonds 541 666 541 666 541 666 541 666
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
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Table 5.9: Market liquidity during distress (II)
The table reports results based on equation (5.8). The dependent variable in all specifications is the percentage
bid-ask spread as defined in 5.5. The specifications with respect to fixed effects and disturbances are as
before (see Table 5.8). Columns 1 and 2 introduce the main variables of interest. They indicate that default
risk and volatility are indeed positively correlated with bid-ask spreads, as predicted by the theoretical
considerations. The effect also holds up concurrently (column 3), although at a somewhat weaker level due
to the collinearity between the two variables. Including controls for bond characteristics and global risk
developments (columns 4 and 5) does not change the results. Finally, the benchmark specification in column
6 including bond fixed effects reports a large and significant correlation with market illiquidity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PD Volit Main vari-
ables
Bond fea-
tures
Global
vars.
Benchmark
Random
Effects
Random
Effects
Random
Effects
Random
Effects
Random
Effects
Fixed Ef-
fects
Default Probability (%) 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Volatility (%) 1.05*** 0.78*** 0.91*** 0.92*** 0.77***
(0.16) (0.21) (0.25) (0.29) (0.24)
Time to maturity (days) -0.00* -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Principal (Bn USD) 0.16** 0.17**
(0.07) (0.07)
Coupon (%) 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
NY law 0.21 0.21
(0.16) (0.16)
Exchange-listed -1.20*** -1.22***
(0.44) (0.45)
Bid-ask EMBIG (%) -0.09 0.04
(0.28) (0.25)
US HY Rate (%) 0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.70*** 1.68*** 0.67*** 1.27** 1.31** 0.62**
(0.15) (0.21) (0.17) (0.54) (0.61) (0.24)
Bond fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes n/a
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.32
Obs 809340 1006184 781411 640540 640540 781031
No. Bonds 586 652 574 470 470 573
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
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Table 5.10: Market liquidity during distress (robustness)
The table exposes the benchmark specification in column 6 of Table 5.9 to a number of alternative specifica-
tions. Column 1 restricts the sample to non-defaulting countries only. Compared to the full sample, the
coefficients are considerably smaller, but still on a level both economically and statistically significant. The
finding is similar when excluding high-distress periods with sovereign spreads above 10%, or when looking
at crisis periods only (columns 2-3). Column 4 uses the absolute bid-ask spread as the dependent variable
instead of the percentage version used as the benchmark definition. Columns 5 and 6 report results when
assuming cross-sectional autocorrelation (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998) or computing the Newey and West (1987)
covariance matrix. Note that this only affects the standard errors, not the coefficient estimates as compared
to the benchmark specification. Column 7 explicitly models the disturbances as an AR(1) process, which
also impacts the point estimates of the coefficients. However, the results remain robust to this alternative
specification.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exclude
defaulters
Spread <
10%
Spread >
10%
Absolute
bid-ask
spreads
Driscoll-
Kraay
SE
Newey-
West
SE
AR(1) dis-
turbances
Default Probability (%) 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Volatility (%) 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.38*** 0.12*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.53***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.02) (0.09) (0.05) (0.01)
Time to maturity (days) 0.00* 0.00 0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Bid-ask EMBIG 0.80*** 0.76*** -0.12 0.60*** 0.04 0.04 0.77***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.23) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.01)
US HY Rate -0.02** -0.03*** -0.09 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.07 0.15 -0.04 0.66*** 0.62*** 0.18***
(0.11) (0.11) (2.49) (0.09) (0.13) (0.00)
R2 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.04 0.27 0.27 0.31
Obs 666302 696850 75159 780943 781031 781030 780458
No. Bonds 456 566 233 573 573 572 572
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
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Table 5.11: Credit and liquidity risk in sovereign spreads
The table reports results based on equation (5.9). Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
The dependent variable in all specifications is the sovereign spread, defined as the difference between the bonds’ yields
to maturity and US treasuries with corresponding maturities. Default probability here measures the difference between
the implied country default risk and the implied US default risk (which is close to zero throughout the sample). The
liquidity spread is defined as the difference between the bid-ask spread on the bond and the bid-ask spread on the
EMBIG index. Columns 1-2 specify random effects, and the model in column 3 is the benchmark specification including
bond fixed effects. All main specifications indicate a significant positive correlation of the two risk factors with the
spread. Looking at exceptionally calm periods, with spreads below 5% (column 4), the liquidity risk factor appears
almost irrelevant both in terms of size and statistical significance. This changes when restricting the sample to higher
risk environments, as in columns 5-7. While the default risk factor is similar to the estimate obtained from the full
sample, liquidity risk becomes more dominant, with the coefficient almost doubling in size relative to the benchmark
specification. This is further strengthened in the interaction specification in column 8, the results of which are plotted
in figure 5.5.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sam-
ple
Full sam-
ple + con-
trols
Full sam-
ple
Spread <
5%
Spread >
5%
Spread >
7%
Spread >
10%
Interaction
Default Probability 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.20*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.35***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Liquidity Spread 0.42*** 0.47*** 0.43*** 0.03 0.62*** 0.71*** 0.79*** 0.06
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.05) (0.19) (0.19) (0.12) (0.13)
Time to maturity -0.00 -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Principal (Bn USD) 1.02
(0.72)
Coupon 0.34
(0.29)
NY law 0.33
(0.34)
Exchange-listed -1.47
(1.43)
Bid-ask EMBIG -0.50 -0.55 -0.02 -1.03 -1.02 -1.10 -0.44
(0.35) (0.41) (0.10) (0.66) (0.91) (0.80) (0.39)
US HY Rate -0.02 0.03 0.07*** -0.02 0.05 0.34 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.16) (0.26) (0.41) (0.04)
PD x Liquidity 0.01**
(0.00)
Constant -0.24 -0.75 1.63 -0.48* 9.07*** 10.58*** 15.05*** 1.69
(0.71) (3.97) (1.28) (0.25) (2.71) (3.81) (4.84) (1.29)
Bond fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.71 0.74 0.68 0.42 0.57 0.55 0.45 0.68
Obs 782621 644948 782269 582695 199573 129489 70912 782269
No. Bonds 585 479 584 539 418 335 234 584
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
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Table 5.12: Contribution
The table reports the average and relative contributions of liquidity and credit risk to the sovereign spread
based on equation 5.11 and 5.13. All computations are based on the specification in column 3 of Table 5.11
in different subsamples indicated in the rows and columns. The full sample/full sample results indicate
that the average overall contribution of the liquidity risk factor to sovereign borrowing rates is about 4%.
However, the number is lower for non-defaulting countries and when spreads are low. But it almost doubles
in distressed periods, both for defaulting and non-defaulting countries.
Full sample Not in default No defaulters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contr. Share Contr. Share Contr. Share
Full sample Credit Risk 4.73 96% 2.65 97% 2.29 99%Liquidity risk 0.20 4% 0.07 3% 0.02 1%
Spread < 5% Credit Risk 1.13 100% 1.13 100% 1.32 100%Liquidity risk 0.01 0% 0.01 0% 0.00 0%
Spread > 5% Credit Risk 11.81 94% 5.58 97% 4.92 99%Liquidity risk 0.73 6% 0.17 3% 0.06 1%
Spread > 7% Credit Risk 14.69 94% 6.52 96% 5.80 99%Liquidity risk 1.02 6% 0.29 4% 0.07 1%
Spread > 10% Credit Risk 18.09 93% 8.39 94% 7.02Liquidity risk 1.43 7% 0.57 6% 0.22 3%
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Chapter 6
Foreign Law Bonds:
Can They Reduce Sovereign
Borrowing Costs?1
Joint work with
Marcos Chamon2
Christoph Trebesch3
The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 has shown that the legal terms of sovereign bonds
can protect creditors against losses, in particular the type of governing law. This paper
studies whether sovereign bonds that are issued in foreign jurisdictions trade at a
premium vis-á-vis domestic law bonds. We use the Eurozone between 2006 and 2014
as a unique testing ground to assess this “legal safety premium” and collect secondary
market bond yield data for the near-universe of Eurozone government bonds issued in
foreign jurisdictions. Controlling for currency risk, liquidity risk, and term structure, we
find that foreign law bonds indeed carry lower yields on average. But a sizable premium
only emerges for large values of credit risk (CDS spreads beyond 500bps). At those levels,
a 100bp increase in CDS spreads is associated with a 30-80bp larger yield premium on
foreign law bonds. In contrast, we do not find a premium for countries with low credit
risk. These results indicate that sovereigns in distress can, at the margin, borrow at lower
rates under foreign law, but that the ex ante benefits in normal times are likely limited.
Keywords: Sovereign debt; Creditor rights; Seniority; Law and finance
JEL classification: F34, G12, K22
1The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
IMF, or its policies. We benefited from helpful comments by Wenxin Du and Luc Everaert, and seminar
participants at the 2014 NBER IFM meeting.
2International Monetary Fund, Research Department, mchamon@imf.org
3University of Munich, Department of Economics, christoph.trebesch@lmu.de
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6.1 Introduction
This paper studies the role of law in sovereign debt markets, in particular the price
impact of different governing laws under which sovereign bonds can be issued. We
test whether sovereign bonds that submit the issuer to foreign jurisdictions, e.g. under
English law or New York law, trade at a premium compared to domestic law bonds.
The intuition behind this test is simple. The terms of domestic law bonds can be easier
amended ex post by domestic legislation, and there have been cases where their terms
were altered retroactively by the debtor country by an act of parliament.4 For instance,
amendments could take the form of inserting additional covenants which make the
implementation of a restructuring easier, changing the currency denomination, or even
altering the payment terms. Thus, at least in principle, sovereigns are in a stronger
bargaining position vis-á-vis the holders of their domestic bonds relative to bonds issued
under a foreign jurisdiction. Foreign law bonds are also increasingly prone to litigation
and attachment orders in foreign courts, possibly making them better shielded against
default and unilateral default (see IMF, 2013; Schumacher et al., 2014; Frankel, 2014).
This paper explores the price impact of this “legal safety premium”. How do markets
value bonds that are protected by the rule of law abroad?
Our study is motivated by recent events, in particular the Greek restructuring of
2012, which showed that governing law can play a crucial role in sovereign debt markets.
On 23 February 2012, the Greek parliament passed the “Greek Bondholder Act”, which
retroactively introduced collective action clauses (CACs) with aggregation features into
its outstanding domestic law sovereign bonds.5 After the offer was launched, more than
66% of domestic law bonds were tendered into the exchange. This forced minority
holders to also restructure and accept the associated haircut, even if they voted against.
In contrast, Greece did not have the possibility to change the terms of its foreign law
bonds by domestic legislation. The aggregation CACs were consequently not inserted,
which allowed investors in those bonds to reject the exchange offer more easily and hold
out instead. The result was that more than 50% of Greek bonds under English, Swiss
and Japanese law were not restructured and have since been serviced in full and on
time.6 The foreign law clause thus protected these investors from deep losses, i.e. the
65% haircut suffered by all domestic law bond investors (for a detailed assessment of
the case see Choi et al., 2011; Gulati and Zettelmeyer, 2012; IMF, 2013; Zettelmeyer et al.,
2013).
After the Greek experience of 2012, many observers suggested that bonds with foreign
4Constitutions often prevent laws from retroactively impairing contract rights (in the US by Article I,
section 10, clause I). Nevertheless, in a crisis or war situation, even constitutions can be altered.
5Greek law no. 4050/2012 “Rules of amendment of titles issued or guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic
with the Bondholder’s agreement”, see Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance Press Release (9 March 2012),
online available at http://www.minfin.gr/portal/en/resource/contentObject/id/baba4f3e-da88-491c-9c61-
ce1fd030edf6.
6Holdouts made up a total of EUR 6.4bn in face value or 3.1% of total debt exchanged (Zettelmeyer et al.,
2013).
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governing laws are preferable from a creditor perspective. For example, the New York
Times speculated that “investors might think twice before investing in those local-law
bonds, no matter how high the yield” (Thomas, 2012). Similarly, the Wall Street Journal
reported analyst recommendations to sell domestic law Portuguese government bonds
and buy foreign law securities instead (Stevis, 2012). Gulati and Zettelmeyer (2012) even
suggest to use differences in governing law as a policy tool to address the debt overhang
problem in crisis countries. Specifically, they propose voluntary debt restructurings in
which holders of local-law bonds swap these against foreign law bonds with longer
maturities, i.e. with a present value haircut. Such voluntary swaps could be mutually
beneficial since investors receive a safer asset while countries receive debt relief. A first
application of this idea was the Greek debt exchange proposal itself, since all Greek-
law bonds were exchanged into new English-law bonds – a carrot to induce investors’
participation in the exchange.
The potential advantages of foreign law bonds have also come to the attention of debt
managers. Cyprus, Greece and Portugal all returned to the international bond market by
issuing English-law instruments in 2014, and other small crisis countries, such as Latvia
or Slovenia, also shifted their sovereign bond issuance patterns from domestic to foreign
law according to data by Dealogic. We generally find foreign law bonds to account for a
substantial share of public sector borrowing in the last decade, both in Europe and in
Emerging Markets (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2).
Despite the widespread use of foreign law bonds, there is still limited evidence on
the price impact of legal clauses and governing law in sovereign debt markets. Few
rigorous empirical studies exist and theory is ambiguous whether and how sovereign
bond contract design matters. On the one hand, Roubini (2000) and Weinschelbaum and
Wynne (2005) argue that contractual bond clauses such as CACs or governing law are
likely to be irrelevant, both ex-ante and once the country enters financial distress.7 On
the other hand, the work by Bolton and Jeanne (2007, 2009) suggests that debt which is
harder to restructure, in legal terms, will effectively be senior and therefore have lower
yields ex-ante (a similar argument is made by Pitchford and Wright, 2007).8 Our aim is to
exploit a large sample of bonds and the unique Eurozone setting with multiple sovereign
issuers in the same currency to understand whether foreign law debt is indeed priced at
a premium, and how large this premium is across countries and time.9
7Roubini (2000) argues that initial contractual terms are likely to be irrelevant since creditors and
sovereigns can find ways to work around them ex-post, as shown by a number of actual cases. Weinschelbaum
and Wynne (2005) emphasize that governments have a variety of different debt contracts outstanding and
that the relevance of contract design in individual portions of the debt will decrease the more diversified the
debt stock is. Moreover, they argue that the implicit guarantee of official sector bailouts in case of distress
makes investors ignore contractual clauses.
8There is a large related body of theory work studying the ex-ante and ex-post effects of easy versus hard
to restructure debt and the economic consequences of sovereign bond contracts and creditor behavior during
debt crises, see Miller and Zhang (2000), Ghosal and Miller (2003), Gai et al. (2004), Haldane et al. (2005),
Engelen and Lambsdorff (2009), Bi et al. (2011), Lanau (2011), Pitchford and Wright (2012) and Ghosal and
Thampanishvong (2013).
9Note that the focus is on debt issued under foreign law, and not necessarily external debt issued to
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We use the Eurozone crisis as a laboratory since it provides the cleanest setting with
which to study a premium on hard to restructure debt. In emerging markets, it is very
difficult to find local- and foreign law bonds denominated in the same currency. Disen-
tangling the currency risk premium from a jurisdiction premium is further complicated
because there is no domestic currency risk-free yield curve. This is not a problem in
the case of the Euro area because the credit risk-free yield curve of Germany can be
used to separate currency from credit risk. Identification in our paper thus comes from
comparing bonds from the same sovereign issued under different jurisdiction, e.g. an
Italian local-law bond and one under New York law, and using local and foreign currency
credit risk-free benchmark yield curves to correct for currency risk. More generally,
our approach accounts for term structure effects, bond liquidity, currency risk, and
country-level default risk. Our time window is 2006-2014 and we cover the near-universe
of foreign law bonds in the Eurozone.
As an add-on to our main analysis, we also show two simpler case studies from
emerging market countries, namely Argentina and Russia. These sovereigns are the only
ones for which we could identify sovereign “twin bonds” (domestic law and foreign
law bonds by the same government issued in USD) to proxy the jurisdiction premium,
although in a more simplistic way than for the Eurozone.
Our main result is that a foreign law premium exists, but it only becomes significant
and sizable in periods of severe debt distress, with a likely debt restructuring on the
horizon. For the Eurozone we define “severe distress” as CDS spreads rising over 500bps.
Under these circumstances, an increase in the CDS spread of 1 percentage point is related
to an increase in the foreign law premium of 0.27%; this effect rises to 0.74% at CDS
spreads of 1,000bps, and even more than 1% for very high risk levels with CDS spreads
of about 1,500bps, before flattening out beyond this level. In contrast, during times
of low CDS premia (below 5%), foreign law bonds do not trade at a premium, ceteris
paribus. We conclude that the legal features of sovereign bonds are not a dominant
driver of bond prices and debt servicing costs in normal times, but they seem to matter
in periods of distress and for countries with a high risk of default. Thus, we find that
the ex-ante pricing effects of easy versus hard to restructure debt are limited, and only
become relevant during crises. These results can be relevant for debt managers looking
at diversifying their investor base, as well as investors holding distressed government
bonds.
One interpretation of our findings is a “flight to safety” effect in the run up to a
default and/or debt restructuring (see e.g. Beber et al., 2009). In a high-risk environment,
investors start valuing contractual terms, in particular the choice of jurisdiction. With
foreigners. The resulting premium is likely to be the result of differences in a restructuring technology asso-
ciated with foreign law, but may also be affected by differences in the willingness to impose different losses
on creditors situated in different jurisdictions. There have been cases in which governments discriminated
against foreign investors in favor of domestic creditors. But this is not a general pattern, and there have
been numerous cases in which the opposite was true (Erce, 2012). The Eurozone restructurings in Cyprus
and Greece both discriminated against domestic law bonds. Finally, secondary markets can blur the relation
between jurisdiction and residency, as argued in Broner et al. (2010).
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increasing default risk, more and more investors exit local-law bonds: bonds issued in a
foreign country may be less likely to be restructured, or subject to other value-depreciating
action, such as currency redenomination (see Krishnamurthy et al., 2014). Currency
redenomination was seen as a possible risk factor in the event of a country leaving the
Eurozone. For domestic law bonds, exiting countries could have achieved this through
legislation; but for foreign law bonds, a debt exchange into securities denominated in the
new currency would have been required. In our setting, we therefore cannot distinguish
between the price impact of discrimination in terms of a restructuring, redenomination,
retroactive insertion of contract terms, etc. Our premium should be broadly interpreted
as a premium on the legal protection against all possible ex post contract amendments.
The result is a widening foreign law premium as default approaches. Another, closely
related interpretation of our findings is a change in the investor base. As yields continue
to rise, buy-and-hold investors exit the market and professional distressed debt funds
enter. These specialized investors may be more prone to value investor-friendly contract
language such as foreign governing law, also because they may keep these bonds until
the restructuring occurs and potentially hold out. Finally, there may be a dilution effect
at play, to the extent that foreign law bonds are harder to restructure than their domestic
law counterparts (Bolton and Jeanne, 2007, 2009).
The paper contributes to research in law and finance, in particular to the literature
studying how legal conditions affect bond prices and lending.10 In this body of work,
there are only few studies on sovereign debt markets and almost all of them focus on
one specific contractual dimension: CACs.11 Early studies on the price impact of CACs
exploit the cross-sectional variation in emerging market bonds, by comparing primary
or secondary market yield spreads of English law bonds, which typically contain CACs,
to those of New York law bonds, which usually did not contain CACs prior to 2003.
Using this strategy and different data sources and samples, Tsatsaronis (1999), Becker
et al. (2003), and Richards and Gugiatti (2003) do not find a significant pricing impact of
bonds that include CACs. In contrast, Eichengreen and Mody (2000, 2004), and the more
recent bond-by-bond analyses by Bradley and Gulati (2013) and Bardozzetti and Dottori
(2014) find that CACs significantly reduce bond yields, but that this result depends on
the creditworthiness of countries.
To our knowledge, only two previous studies analyze the price impact of governing
law choice in sovereign bonds. Choi et al. (2011) compare yields of a single pair of
Greek bonds: one bond issued under English law (maturing in April 2016 with a floating
coupon rate of 6m EURIBOR + 0.075%) and one issued under Greek law (maturing in
July 2016 with a coupon of 3.6%). They find that the English law bond trades about 200
10A large literature in finance studies how debt contract design, bond covenants and creditor rights
influence borrowing and bond yields of firms. Two recent examples include Haselmann et al. (2010) and
Miller and Reisel (2012) (see also references cited therein).
11Bradley et al. (2010) show evidence that bonds containing a pari passu provision increased in price
following the Elliott vs. Peru court ruling that implied a novel, creditor-friendly interpretation of the pari
passu clause.
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basis points (bps) lower than its English law twin in mid-2009 and up to 400bps lower
in mid-2010, and interpret this as evidence that markets price in a smaller likelihood
of default for English-law governed bonds. The paper by Clare and Schmidlin (2014),
written in parallel to our paper, uses a large sample of 400 European bonds, including
from non-Eurozone countries such as the Czech Republic, Sweden or Turkey, of which 64
bonds are governed by foreign law. They then run cross-sectional regressions of bond
yields on a set of explanatory variables, including bond maturity and a dummy for
foreign law bonds, for each quarter between Q3 2008 and Q4 2012. Identification in the
paper largely comes from cross-country variation, since 7 out of the 14 countries feature
only foreign law bonds in the sample used.
We add to this literature by being the first to apply methods from the finance literature
to cleanly identify yield premia associated with contractual bond features in sovereign
debt markets. This allows us to take into account the contribution of currency risk and
maturity (given the country’s yield curve) to the price of each foreign bond at every point
time when constructing the jurisdiction premium. We use a large, representative sample
of Eurozone sovereign bonds and identify effects from the within-country variation in
sovereign bond issues. This reduces potential selection and endogeneity effects, such as
the choice of governing law.
6.2 Theoretical prior
This section gives a formal representation of our hypothesis by comparing the risk-neutral
prices for a bond placed under domestic law with an otherwise equivalent bond governed
by a foreign jurisdiction. We use prices instead of yields for simplicity. Consider first a
domestic bond D with K annual coupon payments c at dates: τk, k = 1, 2, ...K. Given a
discount function d(m) for each date m, we assume the price of that bond is given by the
net present value of its payment stream consisting of K coupons and the principal:
PD =
K
∑
k=1
cd(τk) + 100d(τK) (6.1)
Now compare this to a foreign law bond F with the same coupon, principal, and maturity.
Suppose that with probability pi the country will stick to the original terms of its foreign
law bonds, even as it reduces the value of the domestic law obligations, and with
probability 1− pi those bonds will receive the same treatment as the domestic bonds.
Moreover, for simplicity, suppose that this uncertainty over their treatment is resolved
before the next coupon payment. That is, while the uncertainty over whether the country
will change the domestic law bond is not resolved before τ1, the uncertainty related to a
differentiated treatment of foreign bonds is. The price of the foreign bond will then be
given by a weighted average of the two possible payment streams. With probability pi its
future cashflows can be discounted by the risk-free discount function dr f (·) since there is
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no risk within this stream, and with probability 1− pi the cashflows are discounted by
the same discount function d(·) used for the domestic bonds:
PF = pi
(
K
∑
k=1
cdr f (τk) + 100dr f (τK)
)
+ (1− pi)
(
K
∑
k=1
cd(τk) + 100d(τK)
)
(6.2)
We assume that the risk-free discount rate is smaller for at least some dates during the
lifetime of the bonds, i.e. d(τ) ≤ dr f (τ) for all τ, with strict inequality for some τk. This
means that the domestic law bond will always have a lower present value than the foreign
law bond. Intuitively, one can think of dr f (τ)− d(τ) as a function of the sovereign spread
over a risk-free benchmark, where the difference increases with a country’s government
credit risk. Under these assumptions we can show:
Lemma 6.1. The premium PF − PD increases with credit risk dr f (τk)− d(τk) if pi > 0.
Proof. Let PAF and P
A
D denote the initial prices under the discount function d
A(·). Consider
a discount function dB(·) where dB(τ) ≤ dA(τ) for all τ with strict inequality for some
τk, hence PAD > P
B
D. Equations (6.1) and (6.2) imply:
PAF − PBF = (1− pi)(PAD − PBD) (6.3)
so:
PBF − PBD = PAF − PAD + pi(PAD − PBD) (6.4)
and since PAD > P
B
D, equation (6.4) implies:
PBF − PBD > PAF − PAD (6.5)
which means that the premium is larger under discount function dB(·) than under dA(·),
with a larger spread dA(τ)− dB(τ) for at least some τ.
Lemma 6.2. B) The premium PF − PD increases with the probability pi.
Proof. Since d(τ) ≤ dr f (τ) for all τ, with strict inequality for some τk, (6.2) implies
∂PF/∂pi > 0.
6.3 Data and methods
6.3.1 Data
We start by compiling a list of foreign law bonds and consider all Eurozone countries.
Our selection criteria are simple. First, we consider all bonds maturing after January
2006 and listed on Bloomberg. Second, we include bonds for which sufficient price
information is available on Bloomberg. Third, we drop floating rate bonds. Table 6.11
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shows the resulting sample of 100 fixed-rate foreign law bonds outstanding by Eurozone
countries between 2006 and 2014. Most of the bonds in our analysis are from Southern
European crisis countries: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. But the sample also includes
foreign law bonds issued by Austria, Belgium, Finland, and Slovakia for which there
was reasonable coverage in Bloomberg. For all other Eurozone countries, e.g. Germany,
France or Ireland, we could not find foreign law bonds to be included in the analysis.12
The price data are recorded with daily frequency. The price observations are based on
mid prices (average of bid and ask) at market closing time. Wherever possible, we rely
on transaction-based price data from the Bloomberg trading platform (CBBT). If these
are not available, we use composite Bloomberg pricing data, i.e. the standard Bloomberg
data that most researchers use. These are computed as an average of price quotes across
dealers reporting to Bloomberg, but the quotes were not necessarily executed and are
therefore not always based on actual transactions.
We also collect data on domestic benchmark yield curves. We rely on the benchmark
zero curves constructed by Bloomberg which are based on the most liquid bonds (all
domestic law bonds). For each country in our sample, the benchmark curve is available
at 3, 6, and 12 month maturities, and 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 30 year maturities. We
use these benchmark curves when deriving the theoretical price of the bonds in the
countries which we analyze. We also use the US, UK, Germany, Switzerland and Japan
benchmark curves when pricing bonds issued in a foreign currency, as described in the
next subsection.
6.3.2 Extracting foreign law premia
For each of the bonds, we estimate the foreign law premium by comparing the observed
yield to maturity to a theoretically expected yield, by pricing a theoretical bond with
the same characteristics as the foreign law bond using the domestic law benchmark
yield curve. We discount the stream of payments given the foreign law bond’s maturity
and coupon structure using the domestic benchmark yield curve, thus reflecting the
country-specific credit risk.13
Since the benchmark curve is only available at given maturities we linearly interpolate
it when pricing the coupon and bond repayments. For example, if a bond has a coupon
payment 8 months from the current date, the value of that payment is discounted using
an interpolation of the 6 and 9 month benchmark yield. Similarly, if that bond matures in
7 years, that payment is discounted using an interpolation of the 5 and 10 year benchmark
12The only foreign law bond issued by Ireland for which pricing data is available matures in early 2010,
dropping Ireland from most of our sample period.
13One alternative to using the domestic benchmark curve is to directly estimate a foreign law yield curve
from the available bond price data. We tried estimating yield curves using the approaches described in
Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Svensson (1994) but found the results to be excessively noisy during times of
distress. This is in line with Härdle and Majer (2014) who show that standard yield curve models perform
badly in the recent Eurozone crisis. Given our focus on distress episodes we prefer using Bloomberg’s
benchmark curves as a simpler and more transparent way to price the bonds.
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yield. Hence, the discounting yield is derived as:
Yi,j,t,m =
m−m
m−mYi,j,t,m +
(
1− m−m
m−m
)
Yi,j,t,m (6.6)
Yi,j,t,m denotes the interpolated domestic yield for bond i, issued by country j, at date
t, maturing on m, and Yi,j,t,m and Yi,j,t,m represent the corresponding yields on the
benchmark curve with the closest available maturities before and after m.
Foreign law bonds are often priced in a foreign currency. Of the 100 foreign law
bonds, only 18% are issued in EUR. The most common currency is the USD, which
accounts for 49% of bonds issued, while the JPY, CHF and GBP account for 18, 11 and 4%,
respectively. For these bonds, we construct a foreign currency benchmark yield for the
country using the benchmark yields for countries whose bonds are considered risk-free
in the respective currencies. Specifically, we rely on Germany as the risk-free EUR issuer;
the US as the risk-free USD issuer; Japan as the risk-free JPY issuer; Switzerland as the
risk-free CHF issuer; and the UK as the risk-free GBP issuer. None of these countries
has defaulted on their debt in the post-WW II era, and all are rated AA or above by the
major rating agencies. For example, we construct the benchmark dollar yield for Spain
by multiplying its benchmark EUR yield by the US benchmark yield (risk-free yield in
USD) and dividing by the German benchmark yield (risk-free yield in EUR). Generally,
Yi∗,j,t,m = (1+Yi,j,t,m)× 1+Yi,FC,t,m1+Yi,GER,t,m (6.7)
Where Yi,FC,t,m denotes the yield to maturity date m for Germany, US, UK, Japan, or
Switzerland in their respective currencies, and Yi,GER,t,m represents the German yield to
maturity in EUR.14 Note that for EUR denominated bonds, the second term reduces to 1
(i.e. no currency adjustment is necessary, and Yi∗,j,t,m = Yi,j,t,m).
We then use the maturity- and currency-adjusted theoretical yield of a domestic law
bond to discount all promised cash flows on the foreign law bond. This net present value
corresponds to the theoretical price of the foreign law bond if it had been issued under
domestic law:
Ptheoreticali,j,t = Present Valuei,j,t =
m
∑
k=t
Cash Flowk
(1+Yi∗,j,t,m)k
(6.8)
This implied net present value corresponds to the theoretical price in the domestic market
of a bond with the same characteristics as the foreign law bond.15 By comparing that
theoretical price with the actual bond price we can obtain a measure of the premium (or
14Using currency swaps would in principle provide a better measure of the market’s price for converting
a stream of payments across different currencies. But the liquidity of these swaps varies with the horizon.
Using the benchmark curves for the US and Germany provides an excellent approximation, and are likely a
less noisy measure than swaps at longer horizons.
15Note that even when we use benchmark curves of third countries, these are only used to adjust the
risk-free yields for the currency risk between the euro and a foreign currency. Credit risk is entirely
determined by the domestic benchmark yield curve.
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discount) associated with a foreign jurisdiction. Similarly, we can compute the yield to
maturity based on that theoretical price and compare it to the yield to maturity based on
the observed price. This difference in yield to maturity represents the annual premium
placed on the different jurisdiction:
Premiumi,j,t = Ytheoreticali,j,t,m −Yobservedi,j,t,m (6.9)
This premium is our variable of interest. It represents the yield differential that countries
“save” on their foreign law bonds, vis-á-vis a hypothetical identical bond placed under
domestic jurisdiction. On average, this premium amounts to 0.24 percentage points;
however, there are considerable differences between countries. For Austria, Belgium,
Finland, Italy, and Spain, the mean premium is negative, ranging between -0.72 (Belgium)
and -0.24 (Italy); only for Greece, Portugal, and Slovakia we observe a positive average
premium of between 0.14 (Slovakia) and 2.56 (Greece) percentage points.
Besides this cross-sectional variation, the foreign law premium also changes consid-
erably over time. Figure 6.3 plots the average premium by country (weighted by the
bonds’ principal) throughout the sample period. For the early period of the crisis in
2010, the premium is close to zero for all countries and does not change much. However,
the premium increases in line with the rising distress in the coming months, evidenced
by rising CDS spreads particularly during 2011-12. The co-movement is particularly
pronounced for Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain; the premium changes much
less for Austria, Belgium, and Finland.
This considerable variance, both within as well as between countries, suggests that not
only credit risk is driving the existence of the premium. Non-EUR denominated foreign
law bonds make up only a small segment of most Eurozone government borrowing
(see Figure 6.1). This suggests that they are less actively traded than their domestic
law benchmark counterparts and subject to a liquidity premium, reducing the observed
credit risk discount. Indeed, for foreign law bonds, we find an average bid-ask spread of
around 50bps relative to the mid-quote. In addition, foreign currency bonds were not
eligible for use as collateral with the ECB during a large part of our sample period (see
Corradin and Rodriguez-Moreno, 2014). This further reduces the value of foreign law
bonds for market participants. Both market liquidity risk and the lack of ECB eligibility
should lead us to underestimate the jurisdiction premium we find.
We do not have a theoretical prior for the shape of the relationship between credit
risk and the legal premium. We therefore employ a two-step approach: we first start with
a visual exploration of the data by plotting non-parametrically and semi-parametrically
estimated relationships, and then continue with a more systematic econometric analysis.
6.3.3 Data exploration
In order to get a visual representation of the relationship, we first estimate the relationship
between the foreign law premium and CDS spreads non-parametrically. Suppose that
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relationship is given by a function f (·) :
Premiumi,j,t = f (CDSj,t) + ε i,j,t (6.10)
where Premiumi,j,t is the foreign law premium at which bond i issued by country j trades
at date t, and CDSj,t is the 5-year CDS spread for country j at t. We estimate f (·) using
Fan’s (1992) locally weighted regression, with quartic kernel weights. Our estimates at a
point with CDS spread CDS1 are based on a linear regression that weights an observation
with spread CDS2 by:
wCDS1(CDS2) =

15
16
(
1−
(
CDS1−CDS2
λ
)2)2
if |CDS1 −CDS2| < λ
0 otherwise
(6.11)
We estimate this non-linear regression for each country, pooling observations from all
of their bonds.16 We also estimate this relationship in a semi-parametric specification,
controlling for differences in time to maturity (in years) and the percentage bid-ask
spreads:
Premiumi,j,t = f (CDSj,t) + βBABid-Aski,j,t + βTMTime to Maturityi,j,t + ϵi,j,t (6.12)
We estimate the parametric terms βBA and βTM using the differencing method described
in Yatchew (1998). We initially order the observations in increasing CDS spreads. Let
k denote that ordering. Under the assumption that f (CDSk)− f (CDSk−1) ≈ 0, we can
difference (6.12) in order to eliminate the non-parametric term and estimate:
Premiumk − Premiumk−1 = (6.13)
βBA(Bid-Askk − Bid-Askk−1) + βTM(Time to Maturityk − Time to Maturityk−1) + υk
Once β̂BA and β̂TM have been estimated, we can estimate the non-parametric term:
f (CDSj,t) = Premiumi,j,t − β̂BABid-Aski,j,t − β̂TMTime to Maturityi,j,t (6.14)
Figure 6.4 reports the results for Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Each panel presents
a scatter plot of the foreign law premium against the CDS spreads, the estimated non-
parametric relationship (solid black line), and the semi-parametric relationship that
controls for differences in the bid-ask spread and time to maturity across bonds (solid
red line). The dashed lines correspond to the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval.
The plot for Greece (Panel A) indicates a relatively flat relationship for low levels
of the CDS spread. But the premium starts rising once the CDS spread grows beyond
around 7.5%. That relationship seems fairly linear until the CDS spread approaches
12.5%. Past that threshold, the plots continue to point to a linear relationship, but at a
16We set the bandwidth parameter δ = 300, 250, and 100 for Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, respectively.
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more moderate slope. The error bands are fairly tight around the point estimates except
for large values of the CDS spread (where we have relatively few observations). The
two estimated specifications move roughly in paralell to each other, with most of the
difference between the two being a level effect.
The plot for Portugal (Panel B) also indicates no relationship between the foreign
law premium and CDS spreads for low levels of the latter, but a positive relationship
once the CDS spread reaches around 4% for the non-parametric curve, and around 10%
for the semi-parametric curve. Our sample includes only two foreign law bonds for
Portugal, one of which had a substantially larger premium than the other (as illustrated
by the two separate clusters of points in the scatter plots for large values of the CDS
premium). The non-parametric results yield a curve that is averaging these two clusters.
The semi-parametric results (red line) follow the lower cluster of points more closely, as
part of the higher premium for one of the bonds is attributed differences in its bid-ask
spread and time to maturity relative to the other bond. The latter specification also points
to a flatter relationship. Whereas moving the CDS spread from 5 to 10% would raise the
premium by 3.7% along the black curve, it would only raise it by 0.4% along the red line.
But eventually both specifications point to a steeper relationship. For example, moving
the CDS spread from 10 to 15% would raise the premia by 8.2 and 7.0%, along those two
respective curves.
Panels D and C show the results for Spain and Italy. The results point to an essentially
flat relationship (note the difference in the scale of the premium relative to the previous
figures). The CDS spread for Spain never reached 6.5%, and the one for Italy never
reached 6% in our sample. Thus, the lack of a relationship between the foreign law
premium and the spreads for these countries is consistent with our previous results for
Greece and Portugal, where a clear relationship did not emerge until spreads reached
higher levels.
6.3.4 Empirical strategy
We next use a more systematic econometric approach to the data and account for
potentially non-linear relationships. As a first step, we estimate the following linear
regression for a panel of bonds:
Premiumi,j,t = β1CDSj,t +∑
j
β2,jDjCDSj,t + β3Bid-Aski,j,t (6.15)
+ β4Time to Maturityi,j,t + θi,j + ϵi,j,t
Dj is a dummy for country j, which we interact with the CDS spread, and θi,j is a bond-
level fixed effect. Our priors are that the foreign law premium is positively correlated
with the CDS spreads, since protection through governing law should become more
important as credit risk rises; and a negative relationship with the bid-ask spread, since
all else equal, a less liquid bond is less attractive. In the case of a compounding default
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probability, a longer time to maturity foreign law bond should have a larger premium.
As a default becomes eminent, the premium should be larger for shorter-term bonds.17
The results from the non-parametric and semi-parametric visual exploration of the
data hint at a non-linear relationship between the premium and credit risk. We therefore
also estimate a cubic model to accomodate such a functional form:
Premiumi,j,t = β1CDSj,t + β2CDS2j,t + β3CDS
3
j,t +∑
j
β2,jDjCDSj,t + β3Bid-Aski,j,t (6.16)
+ β4Time to Maturityi,j,t + θi,j + ϵi,j,t
There are potential concerns that the correlations between CDS spreads and the legal
premium could be spurious if both series are generated by a non-stationary process. Even
though Fisher-type panel unit root tests lead us to reject the hypothesis that the series
in all panels possess a unit root (see Table A1 in the appendix), this may be an overly
permissive null (Ng, 2008). Since the foreign law premium is fairly persistent, and we
cannot reject that it is integrated of order one I(1), we also estimate equations (6.15) and
(6.16) in first differences:
∆Premiumi,j,t = β1∆CDSj,t +∑
j
β2,jDj∆CDSj,t + β3∆Bid-Aski,j,t (6.17)
+ β4Time to Maturityi,j,t + θi,j + ϵi,j,t
∆Premiumi,j,t = β1∆CDSj,t + β2(∆CDSj,t ×CDS) + β3(∆CDSj,t ×CDS2j,t) (6.18)
+∑
j
β2,jDj∆CDSj,t + β3∆Bid-Aski,j,t + β4Time to Maturityi,j,t + θi,j + ϵi,j,t
A large increase in the premium, in the absence of a proportional adjustment in the CDS
spreads, is likely to be reversed over time. In order to allow the model to capture a richer
dynamic relationship between these two variables, we include the lagged levels of the
premium and CDS spread in the regression in differences:18
∆Premiumi,j,t = β1Premiumi,j,t−1 + β2∆CDSj,t + β3CDSj,t−1 (6.19)
+ β4Bid-Aski,j,t + β5Time to Maturityi,j,t + θi,j + ϵi,j,t
This model yields the same point estimates as if we estimated the regression in first dif-
ferences but included a lagged error correction term (from the residuals of the regression
17For example, consider a case where creditors expect a 50% haircut on domestic bonds, but no restruc-
turing of foreign bonds. If a default is eminent, domestic bond prices will converge to 50 cents on the
dollar, and a 1- or a 10-year domestic bond will have similar prices if investors expect both to be accelerated
and receive the same haircut. But the premium on short-term foreign bonds will be much larger than on
long-term bonds. For example, a 1-year bond that is expected to be excluded from the restructuring could
trade at a premium close to 100%, whereas a 10-year zero-coupon bond could at most trade at a premium of
7.2% (since that premium is compounded over a longer maturity).
18Note that the time dimension in our setting is very large relative to the cross-sectional dimension,
mitigating concerns about a bias from including the lagged dependent variable.
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of the level of the premium on the level of the CDS), but it can perform the estimation in
a single regression. Again, we also estimate the model in cubic form:
∆Premiumi,j,t = β1Premiumi,j,t−1 + β2,j∆CDSj,t + β3(∆CDSj,t ×CDS) (6.20)
+ β4(∆CDSj,t ×CDS2j,t) + β5CDSj,t−1 + β6CDS2j,t−1 ++β7CDS3j,t−1
+ β8Bid-Aski,j,t + β9Time to Maturityi,j,t + θi,j + ϵi,j,t
6.4 Results: Eurozone 2006-2014
Table 6.2 reports the first results. Columns (1)-(3) shows the estimates for equations (6.15)
and (6.16) in levels, whereas columns (4)-(6) show the results for equations (6.17) and
(6.18) in first differences. In column (1), the model is estimated in a pooled sample of all
countries, i.e. without the interaction of a country dummy with the CDS spreads. We
find a positive, large and significant correlation between CDS spreads and the level of
the premium of almost one – meaning that a one standard deviation increase in the CDS
premium (5.3 percentage points) is associated with a 5.2 percentage point change in the
difference in yields between foreign and domestic law bonds.
We are concerned that foreign law bonds might be less liquid than their domestic
benchmark counterparts, and therefore carry a liquidity premium. If that were the case,
we would in fact underestimate the premium placed on jurisdiction, since the difference
between the two types of bonds in terms of restructuring risk would be mitigated by the
liquidity risk compensation. Since we include bond fixed effects in all regressions, any
bond-specific average risk premia should already be accounted for; however, liquidity
risk may well be time-varying. However, the coefficient on the bid-ask spread of foreign
bonds turns out small and insignificant, reducing concerns about liquidity.
Column (2) shows a model including country-specific slopes, using Austria as the
benchmark country. The results indicate that the relationship in column (1) is largely
driven by Greece; but the joint effect of an increase in CDS spreads on the premium
is still positive for most countries. The model also has a considerably better fit of the
variance in the premium data.
The cubic model in column (3) performs even better, vindicating the visual impression
from Figure 6.4. The coefficients indicate a decreasing yet insignificant effect in the first
power regressor, a significant increase in the second power, and a small significant
decrease in the third power. This confirms the visual impression that the effect of an
increase in the default probability on the foreign law premium becomes only relevant for
higher levels of credit risk. Indeed, the marginal effect of a change in the CDS spread is
insignifiant for low risk levels (CDS spread = 1%), about 0.27 for heightened risk (CDS
spread = 5%), and 1.07 for very high credit risk (CDS spread = 15%). In this pooled
sample, the marginal effect peaks with 1.28 at a CSS spread of ca. 25% before declining
again.
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Columns (4)-(6) show the results based on the difference equations (6.17) and (6.18).
In line with the results in levels, an increase in default risk in form of a change in the
CDS premium is correlated with a positive change in the premium. The magnitude of the
coefficient with the differenced model is of course smaller than in columns (1) and (2),
but the effect is more robust. The coefficient remains significant when we include country
interaction terms for the change in CDS (column 5). The only country for which that
interaction has a negative and significant effect is Slovakia, although the point estimate
is small, and the joint effect taking into account any change in the CDS premium is
insignificant. It is noteworthy that the point estimate for the interaction for Greece is
relatively small, e.g. smaller than the one for Finland. But one must bear in mind that
the magnitude of the change in spreads was much larger for Greece than for any other
country. A relatively small coefficient can therefore lead to the large observed increase
in foreign law premium for Greece.19 The interaction terms point to a stronger effect of
spreads on the premium for Italy, Portugal and Spain, which are the other periphery
countries that experienced heightened levels of distress. For robustness, we also estimate
a specification in which we use the difference from t− 5 business days to t. The results
are similar to the ones in first differences (not reported). The cubic model in column
(6) indicates that a change in the CDS premium has a fairly constant correlation with
changes in the premium for all risk levels and does not change as the level of the spread
increases.
The pooled results with interaction effects have displayed considerable country
variation. As a next step, we therefore provide a series of estimations in a country-
by-country setting. While Belgium, Finland and Portugal have only 3-5 foreign bonds
outstanding, the other countries have up to 21 (Italy). Besides the time-series variation,
this allows exploiting cross-sectional variation even within the country regressions.
Table 6.3 reports country-by-country results for Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain
(GIPS). We find the strongest effects on the linear model for Greece, but Portugal and
Spain also have a positive and statistically significant effect. The non-linear specifications
point to a stronger relationship for Greece and Portugal. For ease of illustration, Figure
6.5 plots the combined effect of the terms on the CDS, CDS2 and CDS3 terms for different
values of the CDS spread (along with error bands for the 95% confidence interval). In
the case of Greece, the combined effect only becomes statistically significant when the
CDS spread goes beyond 10%. But the foreign law premium eventually reaches a level
close to 10%. For Portugal, the premium initially rises with the CDS spread, and is about
2% for most of the range of CDS spreads, until the CDS spread grows past 10% and the
premium rapidly shoots-up. In the case of Italy, the foreign law premium is typically
small and negative, whereas for Spain the relationship is broadly flat with wide error
bands. The results are very similar if we drop outlier observations (above/below the 99th
19The relationship between CDS spreads and the premium may weaken for very large values of the former.
For example, as the risk of default becomes imminent, bonds are priced based on their expected recovery
values which can have very different implications for the yields on short- vs long-term bonds.
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and 1st percentile of the premium, reported in Table A3).
For the sake of comparison, Table 6.4 reports similar results for Austria, Belgium,
Finnland and Slovakia (ABFS). There are only two instances of a positive and significant
coefficient (quadratic term for Belgium, and linear specification for Slovakia), none of
which would amount to a non-negligible premium given the spreads faced by those
countries. This evidence further supports the finding that markets only worry about the
jurisdiction of issuance when credit risk becomes a concern.
Table 6.5 reports country-by-country results for the regression in first differences
for the GIPS countries. We consider specifications where a change in the CDS spread
affects the change in the premium (equation 6.17), as well as specifications where the
change in the CDS spread is interacted with the level and the squared level of the CDS
(equation 6.18). All of the regressions without this interaction point to a positive and
statistically significant effect, with point estimates of 0.20, 0.49, 0.70 and 0.55 for Greece,
Italy, Portual, and Spain, respectively. The regressions where the change in the CDS
is interacted with its level point to a stronger relationship in changes for Greece and
Portugal, which then declines as the CDS spread rises. These specifications point to
weaker or non-existent effects for Italy and Spain, possibly because there is not much
non-linearity in the relationship at the levels of spreads experienced by those countries.
For ease of illustration, Figure 6.6 plots the estimated relationship in changes for different
levels of the CDS spread. The results are similar (and quantitatively stronger) if we
use a 5-day difference (not reported). The results are also robust to dropping outlier
observations (Table A4).
Table 6.6 is analogous to Table 6.5 but presents the results for the ABFS countries. As
expected, the estimated relationship tends to be much weaker, and never amounts to a
substantial foreign law premium given the much lower CDS spreads for these countries.
The different strands of evidence point to the result that the foreign law premium
is mainly relevant for countries experiencing significant financial distress; in “normal”
times, and for perceived safe issuers, the correlation between default risk and jurisdiction
premium is small. The sharper results from the regression in differences are consistent
with the descriptive evidence from the summary plots. Those plots showed a strong
tendency for co-movement between the premium and CDS spreads, particularly for high-
risk countries, which is consistent with the results in the differences regressions. However,
those plots also point to periods where the premium was high (or low) regardless of the
evolution of the CDS spreads, e.g. when the two lines (in different scales) would cross.
This is consistent with the weaker results for the level regressions.
Table 6.7 presents the results from first difference regressions where we control for
dynamic features of the series by including a lagged term for both the dependent variable
as well as the CDS spreads. This is essentially equivalent to an error correction model in
which the short-run and equilibrium relationship can be inferred from the first-differenced
and level coefficients. Notably, the results with respect to the correlation between changes
in the CDS spread and changes in the foreign law premium remain almost identical to
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those obtained from equation (6), both in the pooled sample as well as in the country-by-
country regressions. The presence of an equilibrium relationship between credit risk and
the foreign law premium is further backed by a set of panel co-integration results, all of
which clearly reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration between the two variables
(see Table A2). We follow the test-procedure suggested by (Westerlund, 2007). Intuitively,
we test the hypothesis that there is no error correction in model (6.19), and hence no
long-term relationship exists.20 We find that in all specifications (with and without trend
and drift) the tests reject the null of no error correction, which is evidence for a structural
long-term equilibrium relationship.
Further evidence of a cointegrating relationship is given in Figure 6.7, which plots
the results of a regression of the foreign law premium on the CDS spreads using only
observations from the current quarter, for every quarter in 2006Q1-2014Q1. The figure
plots the coefficients for each bond in our sample for Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal.
The specification is analogous to the one in Table 6.3. Only coefficients that are significant
at the 5% level are plotted. Prior to 2009, the coefficients are widely dispersed, and
do not suggest any consistent pattern. These results seem strongly driven by noise.21
However, from 2009 onwards, the coefficients on the bonds move tightly closer. The
median coefficient from 2009Q1 onwards is 0.57 (0.53 if we exclude Greece). This suggests
that once credit risk became non-negligible, a stable relationship emerged between credit
risk and the foreign law premium.
We should bear in mind that there are additional contractual differences between
foreign and domestic law bonds beside whose courts have jurisdiction over legal pro-
ceedings. While we have focused our discussion of the legal premium on the potential
benefits from protection against ex-post contract amendments, foreign law bonds tend to
be less liquid. This is partly captured in our regressions by the bid-ask spreads. But one
dimension of liquidity that is not captured by that measure is the ease with which the
bonds can be used as collateral, in particular for repo-operations with the ECB. While
bonds denominated in USD, GBP, and JPY issued and held in the euro area could benefit
from the “Long Term Refinancing Operations” (LTRO), many of the foreign law bonds
considered fell outside the scope of those programs according to the ECB’s eligibility
criteria. These considerations can have a substantial effect on the demand for, and hence
the premium of, foreign law bonds. Indeed, Corradin and Rodriguez-Moreno (2014)
show that a large spread emerged between EUR and USD denominated bonds issued
by the same euro area country. They attribute that spread to ECB liquidity facilities
and non-standard monetary policy measures that impacted euro and foreign currency
20Formally, note that we can write equation 6.19 as
∆Premiumi,j,t = β1(Premiumi,j,t−1 − β∗3CDSj,t−1) + β2,j∆CDSj,t + β4B-Ai,j,t + β5Time Mat.i,j,t + θi,j + ϵi,j,t
for β3 = −β1β∗3. Then β1 corresponds to the error correction rate with which the model converges to the
equilibrium relationship after a shock of (Premiumi,j,t−1 − β∗3CDSj,t−1) (Westerlund, 2007, p. 712). The tests
reported in Table A2 test if the error correction rate β1 is different from zero.
21There was very limited variation in credit risk prior to the crisis, so a large coefficient could result from
a small uptick in credit risk that coincides with an increase in the foreign law premium.
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denominated bonds differently.
We therefore estimate the empirical models controlling for the bonds’ collateral
eligibility with the ECB. Specifically, we use a monthly binary indicator if a bond was
eligible to be used as collateral in credit operations with the ECB between April 2010
and September 2013.22 In this period, Italian foreign law bonds were never eligible
central banking collateral, which is why we cannot estimate the adjusted model for Italy.
Table 6.8 shows the results in levels. The results for Greece and Portugal remain similar
to before, but the results for Spain using the cubic specification become much more
similar to the results obtained for Portugal. This is in line with our argument above that
an omission of a liquidity variable should bias the results against finding a significant
correlation between credit risk and the foreign law premium.
Generally, these considerations would have a much more muted effect on the regres-
sion in changes. For example, large one-off shifts to the foreign law premium for reasons
other than credit risk (e.g. liquidity and ease of discounting) will weaken the estimated
relationship to the CDS spreads. But the same one-off shifts will be confined to relatively
few observations when the regression is estimated in differences, and as a result have a
more modest impact on the estimated relationship with the change in the CDS spreads.
Indeed, the results in Table 6.9 obtained from the corresponding specification support
this reasoning and show less of a difference to the results in Table 6.5 (without eligibility
control variable).
Finally, Table 6.10 shows that our findings remain robust when credit ratings are
used as a measure of credit risk instead of CDS spreads. A regression of the foreign law
premium on ratings indicates that lower ratings are associated with an increase in the
premium. The results are statistically significant both for the regression in levels and in
differences.
6.5 Emerging markets: the case of Argentina and Russia
We do not attempt to estimate foreign law premia in emerging market (EME) bonds in
the same rigorous way as above. This is because it is challenging, if not impossible, to
disentangle currency risk from legal risk in these countries. Moreover, most emerging
markets lack a domestic benchmark yield curve, especially in the 1990s and early 2000s,
when most EME crises occurred.23
Despite this, we conducted an extensive search for “twin bonds”, i.e. bonds issued in
the same currency and with a similar maturity, but with different governing laws. To
do so, we gathered a dataset of all EME sovereign bonds issued since the early 1990s
from the comprehensive Dealogic database and used Bloomberg to search for yield
22Data are from the ECB’s website. Longer back dating information is unfortunately not publicly available.
23A recent paper by Du and Schreger (2013) estimates local currency risk-free curves for emerging markets
beginning in 2005. In theory, their analysis could be extended to the late 1990s/early 2000s. But the noise
involved is likely larger than the jurisdiction premium we are trying to recover, particularly since debt crises
tend to coincide with currency crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).
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data of promising bond pairs. Ultimately, we only found “twin bonds” with reasonable
pricing data in two countries: Argentina and Russia. Both countries floated domestic law
bonds in USD in the wake of sovereign debt restructuring agreements and this allows
us to extract approximate foreign law premia. Specifically, for Russia, we focus on an
English-law, USD-denominated Eurobond issued in 1997 and maturing in 2007 (ISIN:
US78307AAB98) and compare its yield to the average yield of two Russian-law, USD
denominated instruments due in 2006 and 2008: the “MinFin5” and “MinFin6” bonds
with ISIN of RU0001337966 and RU0004146083, respectively. For Argentina, we use an
even cleaner bond pair, since the country issued exactly the same instruments in both
domestic and foreign law in its 2005 bond restructuring. Specifically, we compare the
yields of the so called “Discount Bonds” under New York law with the yield of the
same series under Argentine law (both due 2033 and with ISIN US040114GL81 and
ARARGE03E097, respectively). Another perfect pair are the USD “Par Bonds” due 2033,
which were also issued under New York law as well as under Argentine law.
The resulting yield differences between local-law and foreign law USD bonds are
plotted in Figure 6.8. The upper panel shows the premium of the Russian foreign law
Eurobond vis-á-vis their respective domestic law instruments. The approximate foreign
law premium is largest in 2000-2003, a period with high yields in which Russia was still
recovering from its own 1998-1999 default. The premium then decreases from more than
400bp to close to zero in the boom years of 2004-2006. For Argentina, the lower two
panels show the evolution of the foreign law premium by comparing the yields of New
York law bonds with those of their domestic law twin. The premium is highest after the
outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, reaching up to 600bp. It then decreases strongly and
even turns negative after 26 October 2012, when the New York Second Circuit Court of
Appeals announced a surprise ruling in favor of the hedge fund NML Capital which
prohibited US intermediaries from forwarding payments on the New York law bonds.24
Taken together, these two case studies confirm our findings for the Eurozone: the
foreign law premium is typically small, but it can become quite sizable during periods of
financial distress.
6.6 Conclusion
This paper has estimated the jurisdiction premium associated with foreign law debt.
Our estimates indicate that the premium is small when credit risk is limited, but it can
become significantly larger in crisis times. In calm times, when risk is low, an increase
in credit risk does not go along with a significant increase in the foreign law premium.
However, during crisis times, when CDS premia rise beyond 10%, a change in the CDS
spread of 100bps is associated with an increase in the foreign law premium of 74bps. This
finding is robust to a vast number of variations in the econometric specification, and can
24NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, docket
no. 08 Civ. 6978, 09 Civ. 1707, 09 Civ. 1708.
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be identified both in the cross-sectional as well as in the time dimension. We also find a
notable foreign law premium following the sovereign debt restructurings of Russia 2000
and of Argentina 2005. Our results thus indicate that distressed countries can borrow, at
the margin, at more favorable terms by issuing bonds in a foreign jurisdiction during
distress. The results may be due to a flight-to-safety into harder to restructure debt when
differential treatment becomes likely. Moreover, distressed debt investors may enter the
market and push up the price for foreign law bonds which are more suitable for holdout
strategies.
In crisis times, the findings are thus consistent with the view that issuing foreign
law bonds represents a commitment device: by submitting to foreign jurisdictions and
thereby making the debt harder to restructure, sovereigns send a signal that they are
unlikely to default on these bonds. Dilution considerations can also contribute to a lower
yield of foreign law bonds. As shown by Bolton and Jeanne (2009), the larger the stock of
harder to restructure debt (such as foreign law bonds), the higher the expected haircut on
the easier to restructure debt (such as domestic law bonds). However, there are limits to
a dilution strategy, since the higher the share of foreign law debt, the lower the likelihood
that it will be spared in the event of a default. In that regard, the estimated premium for
peripheral Europe, where the bulk of the debt was issued domestically, may be larger
than what we would observe for an emerging market where the share of foreign currency
debt is higher to begin with and discrimination thus less likely.
In normal times, however, countries do not seem to pay more when issuing debt
with easier to restructure debt. The small foreign law premium that we observe for low
to moderate levels of credit risk suggests that the ex-ante benefits of issuing hard to
restructure debt are small. These results speak to the literature on sovereign default and
debt restructuring procedures, in which ex-ante vs. ex-post considerations play a central
role (see e.g. Dooley, 2000; Pitchford and Wright, 2007; Bolton and Jeanne, 2007, 2009).
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Figures
Figure 6.1: Foreign law bonds in European countries
This figure shows the share of foreign law bonds in total public sector bond issuance between January 2003
and July 2014 for EU countries based on Dealogic data. The shares are calculated using issuance amounts of
sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt in USD, i.e. bonds placed by the central government or by government
owned companies. Only instruments with maturity above 1 year are included.
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Figure 6.2: Foreign law bonds in EMEs
This figure shows the share of foreign law bonds in total public sector bond issuance between January
2003 and July 2014 for selected emerging markets, based on data from Dealogic. The shares are calculated
using issuance amounts of sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt in USD, i.e. bonds placed by the central
government or by government owned companies. Only instruments with maturity above 1 year are included.
The Argentina numbers include the 2005 restructured bonds.
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Figure 6.3: Foreign law premia and CDS spreads
This figure shows the estimated legal premium on foreign law bonds in percent (left axis, country averages
weighted by principal) and the country-level CDS spread in percent (right axis).
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Figure 6.4: Non-parametric relationship between foreign law premium and
CDS spread
This figure shows non-parametric estimates of the relationship between the foreign law premium and
the CDS spreads using a locally-weighted linear regression with quartic kernel weights for Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain, respectively (black line). The red line corresponds to a semi-parametric estimation that
controls for differences in the bid-ask spread and time to maturity. Estimates for Greece, Portugal, Spain
and Italy based on a bandwidth of 300, 250, 100, and 100bps, respectively. The dashed line corresponds to
the bootstrapped 95 percent confidence interval. The scatter plot excludes some outlier observations.
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Figure 6.5: Estimated cubic relationship between foreign law premium and
CDS spread
This figure plots linear combinations of the coefficients from the regressions in levels for different values
of CDS spreads. For example, in panel A, this means that a shift in the CDS spread from 0 to 10% has no
significant effect; from 0 to 15%, it raises the premium by ca. 5%; from 0 to 20, by ca. 8%. The analogous
interpretation holds for the other countries.
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Figure 6.6: Estimated non-linear relationship between change in foreign law premium
and change in CDS spread
This figure plots linear combinations of the coefficients from the regressions in differences for different
values of CDS spreads. For example, in panel A, this means that a shift in the CDS spread at a CDS level of
0% has a smaller effect (ca. 0.2) than at a CDS level of 12% (ca. 0.25). The analogous interpretation holds for
the other countries.
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Figure 6.7: Bond-by-bond relation between credit risk and legal premium
This figure plots the coefficients on the CDS spread from bond-by-bond regressions according to equa-
tion(6.15, with the premium as well as the CDS spread in levels. The coefficients are estimated using only
the data for the current quarter. Only coefficients significant at the 95% level are shown.
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Figure 6.8: Foreign law premia in Russia and Argentina
This figure shows the yield difference between bonds issued by the same government under different
jurisdictions. For Russia, the yield difference is computed between the English-law, USD-denominated
Eurobond (US78307AAB98, due 2007) and the respectively imputed yields of Russian-law, USD denominated
MinFin6 (RU0001337966, due 2006) and MinFin5 (RU0004146083, due 2008) bonds. The bonds for Argentina
are the USD denominated exchange bonds from the 2005 debt restructuring (Discounts due 2033: local law
ARARGE03E113, New York law US040114GL81; Par due 2038: local law ARARGE03E097, New York law
US040114GK09).
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Tables
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics
Observations Mean SD Min Max
Premium 81,824 0.242 5.201 -33.374 98.860
∆Premium 81,724 0.005 0.467 -67.617 25.066
CDS 79,261 2.409 5.326 0.019 50.474
∆CDS 79,164 0.006 0.279 -15.118 9.985
Bid-ask 77,778 0.489 1.156 0.000 29.952
∆Bid-ask 77,678 0.000 0.320 -18.381 27.787
Time to maturity (years) 81,824 5.619 5.992 0.003 35.060
Distress period 81,824 0.124 0.329 0.000 1.000
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Table 6.2: Pooled results
The table reports results from regressions based on equations 6.15 and 6.16. All models include bond fixed
effects, and Hubert-White standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The dependent
variable in columns 1-3 is the legal premium in levels as in equation 6.15. Column 1 presents pooled results
of all countries. Column 2 reports country-specific results by interacting the CDS premium with a country
dummy. Column 3 is the cubic model as in equation 6.16. In columns 4-6, the dependent variable is the first
difference of the premium as in equation 6.17. Column 4 shows pooled results and column 5 results with
interactions and between the countries and CDS spreads. Column 6 reports results from the first-differenced
cubic model as in equation 6.18.
Premium ∆Premium
1 2 3 4 5 6
CDS 0.98*** 0.18 -0.35*
(0.18) (0.11) (0.20)
CDS2 0.07***
(0.02)
CDS3 -0.00***
(0.00)
∆CDS 0.22*** 0.09** 0.55***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
CDS ×∆CDS -0.01
(0.01)
CDS2 × ∆CDS 0.00
(0.00)
Bid-ask 0.09 0.33 0.33
(0.25) (0.29) (0.31)
∆Bid-ask -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Time to maturity 0.45*** 0.13 -0.05 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CDS or ∆CDS ×
Belgium -0.37 0.04
(0.28) (0.06)
Finland -0.16 0.14*
(0.23) (0.08)
Greece 0.81*** 0.11*
(0.16) (0.07)
Italy -0.08 0.41***
(0.08) (0.05)
Portugal -0.06 0.62***
(0.13) (0.04)
Slovakia -0.05 -0.10*
(0.11) (0.06)
Spain -0.27* 0.46***
(0.14) (0.08)
Constant -4.55*** -2.01** -0.26 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(1.13) (0.80) (0.44) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 B 0.32 0.51 0.56 0.01 0.01 0.01
R2 W 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.02 0.02 0.03
R2 O 0.33 0.44 0.54 0.02 0.02 0.03
Obs 75247 75247 75247 75150 75150 75150
No. Bonds 96 96 96 96 96 96
Note: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6.3: Country results: GIPS (levels)
The table shows results from country-by-country regressions similar to the linear model in equation 6.15
(results in uneven column numbers) and the cubic model in equation 6.16 (results in even column numbers),
but without the country interaction term. The dependent variable is the foreign law premium in levels. All
regressions include bond fixed effects, and inference is based on Hubert-White standard errors.
Premium
Greece Italy Portugal Spain
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CDS 1.05*** -0.43 -0.08*** -0.89*** 0.19*** 1.21*** 0.13** 1.23
(0.20) (0.39) (0.02) (0.14) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) (1.15)
CDS2 0.07*** 0.27*** -0.20*** -0.32
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.38)
CDS3 -0.00*** -0.03*** 0.01*** 0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04)
Bid-ask 0.60 0.66 0.22*** 0.11 -0.16*** -0.12*** 0.10 0.10
(0.63) (0.69) (0.05) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07)
Time to maturity 1.10* -0.46 -0.07*** -0.18*** 0.06** 0.10** 0.29 0.46*
(0.56) (0.53) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.23)
Constant -11.75** 0.82 0.22* 1.38*** -0.50*** -1.24*** -3.04* -5.06*
(4.67) (3.17) (0.12) (0.22) (0.03) (0.06) (1.41) (2.40)
R2 B 0.17 0.55 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05
R2 W 0.56 0.57 0.08 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.10 0.14
R2 O 0.29 0.56 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.07
Obs 12560 12560 22002 22002 2346 2346 10111 10111
No. Bonds 18 18 21 21 4 4 12 12
Note: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6.4: Country results: ABFS (levels)
The table shows results from country-by-country regressions similar to the linear model in equation 6.15
(results in uneven column numbers) and the cubic model in equation 6.16 (results in even column numbers),
but without the country interaction term. The dependent variable is the foreign law premium in levels. All
regressions include bond fixed effects, and inference is based on Hubert-White standard errors.
Premium
Austria Belgium Finland Slovakia
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CDS 0.00 -0.96 -0.23 -1.83* 0.11 -1.63 0.12* -0.42
(0.12) (1.43) (0.23) (0.61) (0.07) (1.08) (0.07) (0.40)
CDS2 0.86 1.02* 3.97 0.26
(1.21) (0.32) (2.07) (0.36)
CDS3 -0.20 -0.18 -2.70* -0.03
(0.29) (0.06) (1.20) (0.09)
Bid-ask 0.68 0.48 -3.13 -2.08 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.05
(0.76) (0.52) (2.53) (2.25) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06)
Time to maturity -0.02 -0.06 0.40** 0.20*** 0.08 0.08 0.01 -0.03
(0.08) (0.14) (0.07) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant -0.48* -0.12 -2.50** -0.92 -0.70 -0.46 0.03 0.47*
(0.27) (0.72) (0.43) (0.84) (0.37) (0.44) (0.09) (0.23)
R2 B 0.00 0.08 0.62 0.54 0.75 0.75 0.68 0.44
R2 W 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.05 0.08
R2 O 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.17 0.44 0.43 0.00 0.14
Obs 15983 15983 2116 2116 2922 2922 7207 7207
No. Bonds 20 20 3 3 5 5 13 13
Note: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6.5: Country results: GIPS (first differences)
The table shows results from country-by-country regressions similar to the linear model in equation 6.17
(results in uneven column numbers) and the cubic model in equation 6.18 (results in even column numbers),
but without the country interaction term. The dependent variable is the foreign law premium in first
differences. All regressions include bond fixed effects, and inference is based on Hubert-White standard
errors.
∆Premium
Greece Italy Portugal Spain
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
∆CDS 0.20*** 0.66*** 0.49*** 0.28* 0.70*** 1.85*** 0.55*** 0.31
(0.06) (0.11) (0.04) (0.15) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.22)
CDS ×∆CDS -0.02* 0.02 -0.43*** -0.02
(0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.13)
CDS2 × ∆CDS 0.00 0.01 0.03*** 0.02
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
∆Bid-ask -0.23 -0.24 -0.00 -0.00 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.01
(0.27) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Time to maturity -0.02* -0.02* -0.00 -0.00 -0.02* -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.15** 0.15** 0.00 0.00 0.03* 0.03 0.00 -0.00
(0.06) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 B 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.09
R2 W 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.02
R2 O 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.02
Obs 12542 12542 21981 21981 2342 2342 10098 10098
No. Bonds 18 18 21 21 4 4 12 12
Note: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6.6: Country results: ABFS (first differences)
The table shows results from country-by-country regressions similar to the linear model in equation 6.17
(results in uneven column numbers) and the cubic model in equation 6.18 (results in even column numbers),
but without the country interaction term. The dependent variable is the foreign law premium in first
differences. All regressions include bond fixed effects, and inference is based on Hubert-White standard
errors.
∆Premium
Austria Belgium Finland Slovakia
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
∆CDS 0.09** -0.28*** 0.12 -0.17 0.20** 0.27 -0.02 0.17
(0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.23) (0.05) (0.41) (0.05) (0.14)
CDS ×∆CDS 0.42*** 0.33 -1.02 -0.12
(0.13) (0.16) (1.31) (0.22)
CDS2 × ∆CDS -0.10* -0.08 1.34 0.01
(0.05) (0.03) (1.06) (0.07)
∆Bid-ask 0.02 0.02 -0.24 -0.24 -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.44) (0.44) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Time to maturity -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00** 0.00** -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00** -0.00** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 B 0.11 0.06 0.95 0.94 0.03 0.04 0.27 0.35
R2 W 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
R2 O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Obs 15963 15963 2113 2113 2917 2917 7194 7194
No. Bonds 20 20 3 3 5 5 13 13
Note: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6.7: Error correction model
The table shows results from the cubic error correction model in equation 6.20. The dependent variable is
the foreign law premium in first differences. All regressions include bond fixed effects, and inference is
based on Hubert-White standard errors.
∆Premium
Greece Italy Portugal Spain
1 2 3 4
Premium(t-1) -0.01* -0.10*** -0.09 -0.11
(0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09)
∆CDS 0.80*** 0.07 1.67*** 0.32
(0.11) (0.18) (0.06) (0.24)
∆CDS×CDS(t-1) -0.04*** 0.17 -0.35*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.15)
∆CDS×CDS2(t-1) 0.00*** -0.01 0.02*** 0.02
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
CDS(t-1) -0.02*** -0.12*** 0.18 0.12
(0.01) (0.03) (0.09) (0.15)
CDS2(t-1) 0.00*** 0.04*** -0.03 -0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
CDS3(t-1) -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆Bid-ask -0.24 -0.00 0.04*** 0.01
(0.27) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Time to maturity -0.01 -0.02*** -0.00 0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04)
Constant 0.03 0.17*** -0.15 -0.49
(0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.44)
R2 B 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.00
R2 W 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.08
R2 O 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01
Obs 12542 21981 2342 10098
No. Bonds 18 21 4 12
Note: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6.8: ECB eligibility (levels)
The table reports a similar specification to the one used in Table 6.3. The dependent variable is again the
foreign law premium in levels. The only difference is that we include a binary indicator if a bond was
eligible for credit operations with the ECB in a given month. Since this data is only publicly available from
April 2010 onwards, the sample period is restricted to this period. None of the Italian foreign law bonds in
this period were eligible as collateral with the ECB, which is why we cannot estimate results using Italian
data. The pooled, Greece, and Spain regressions include bond fixed effects; since only one Portuguese
foreign law bond was pending in this period, the Portuguese model cannot include a fixed effect. Inference
in all regressions is based on Hubert-White standard errors.
Premium
Pooled Greece Portugal Spain
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CDS 1.00*** -0.35* 0.92*** -4.67*** 0.22*** 1.47*** 0.06 2.53***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.26) (1.08) (0.02) (0.18) (0.05) (0.63)
CDS2 0.07*** 0.21*** -0.23*** -0.76***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.20)
CDS3 -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.01*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Bid-ask 0.07 0.33 0.38 0.43 -0.15*** -0.11*** 0.06 0.08
(0.23) (0.31) (0.58) (0.65) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Time to maturity 0.15 -0.05 -2.26 -12.62*** 0.07*** 0.10 0.65** 0.67**
(0.12) (0.06) (2.43) (2.34) (0.02) (0.08) (0.26) (0.26)
ECB eligible 0.24 -1.52 -1.30 0.37*** 0.11 0.29 0.29
(1.16) (5.32) (5.25) (0.02) (0.08) (0.18) (0.17)
Constant -4.60*** -0.26 8.56 123.23*** 0.03 -3.42 -6.03** -8.67***
(1.53) (0.44) (20.77) (20.32) (0.03) (0.44) (2.12) (2.58)
R2 B 0.49 0.56 0.22 0.11 n/a n/a 0.13 0.13
R2 W 0.49 0.56 0.52 0.56 0.23 0.34 0.25 0.27
R2 O 0.43 0.54 0.35 0.09 0.23 0.34 0.09 0.09
Obs 35603 75247 5847 5847 892 892 5518 5518
No. Bonds 68 96 13 13 1 1 10 10
Note: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6.9: ECB eligibility (first differences)
The table reports a similar specification to the one used in Table 6.5. The dependent variable is again the
foreign law premium in first differences. The only difference to the previous model is that we include a
binary indicator if a bond was eligible for credit operations with the ECB in a given month. Since this data
is only publicly available from April 2010 onwards, the sample period is restricted to this period. None
of the Italian foreign law bonds in this period were eligible as collateral with the ECB, which is why we
cannot estimate results using Italian data. The pooled, Greece, and Spain regressions include bond fixed
effects; since only one Portuguese foreign law bond was pending in this period, the Portuguese model
cannot include a fixed effect. Inference in all regressions is based on Hubert-White standard errors.
∆Premium
Pooled Greece Portugal Spain
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
∆CDS 0.22*** 0.55*** 0.20*** 0.73*** 0.69*** 1.87*** 0.58*** 1.07***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.51) (0.08) (0.23)
CDS ×∆CDS -0.01 -0.02** -0.01 -0.44*** -0.41**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.13)
CDS2 × ∆CDS 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
∆Bid-ask -0.08 -0.08 -0.24 -0.24 0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.28) (0.28) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Time to maturity -0.01*** -0.00** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.01 -0.00*** -0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
ECB eligible -0.04 -0.10 -0.10 0.04 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00
(0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.07*** 0.02*** 0.94*** 1.03*** 0.03 0.02 0.03*** 0.02*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.22) (0.22) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 B 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07 n/a n/a 0.02 0.02
R2 W 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.22 0.16 0.18
R2 O 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.22 0.14 0.16
Obs 35581 75150 5847 5847 892 892 5514 5514
No. Bonds 68 96 13 13 1 1 10 10
Note: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6.10: Ratings
The table reports regressions as in 6.15 and 6.16, but replacing the CDS spread with credit ratings by Standard
and Poor’s, linearly transformed to a numerical scale. The regressions also do not include country-specific
constants. Column 1 reports results in levels, and column 2 in first differences.
Premium ∆Premium
Rating -1.42***
(0.34)
∆Rating -0.13***
(0.04)
Bid-ask 0.51
(0.47)
∆Bid-ask -0.08
(0.08)
Time to maturity 0.51*** -0.00**
(0.16) (0.00)
Constant 22.02*** 0.02***
(5.25) (0.01)
R2 B 0.25 0.01
R2 W 0.28 0.00
R2 O 0.14 0.00
Obs 77778 77678
No. Bonds 99 99
Note: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6.11: Foreign law bonds
Country ISIN Issue date Maturity date Coupon
(%)
Amount issued
(USD m)
Governing law Currency
Austria XS0048303423 02/03/1994 02/03/2009 3.75 590 England JPY
Austria CH0008375153 01/27/1998 01/27/2006 3.25 2,519 Switzerland CHF
Austria XS0092819753 01/05/1999 10/05/2009 5.25 1,700 England USD
Austria CH0006111394 04/21/1999 08/21/2009 3.00 1,287 Switzerland CHF
Austria XS0096779417 04/28/1999 04/28/2006 5.50 1,000 England USD
Austria XS0136383733 09/28/2001 12/04/2006 4.50 750 England USD
Austria CH0013587024 01/25/2002 01/25/2012 3.38 1,120 England CHF
Austria XS0143275252 02/22/2002 02/22/2012 5.50 600 England USD
Austria XS0143683612 03/07/2002 08/31/2007 5.00 600 England USD
Austria CH0014100918 05/14/2002 05/14/2007 3.00 560 England CHF
Austria XS0153786974 08/30/2002 08/30/2010 4.38 1,200 England USD
Austria XS0155222671 10/04/2002 10/04/2006 3.00 750 England USD
Austria XS0163904617 03/06/2003 03/30/2007 2.63 400 England USD
Austria XS0167894616 05/12/2003 05/12/2010 3.50 500 England USD
Austria XS0170724479 06/25/2003 06/25/2013 3.25 3,100 England USD
Austria XS0186999743 03/03/2004 05/27/2011 3.63 1,250 England USD
Austria US052591AR54 05/19/2004 05/19/2014 5.00 1,300 England USD
Austria XS0372004761 06/25/2008 06/25/2013 3.25 300 England USD
Austria CH0103325715 07/14/2009 07/14/2016 2.50 1,008 England CHF
Austria US052591AW40 06/17/2011 06/17/2016 1.75 1,000 England USD
Austria XS0749005186 02/21/2012 10/19/2029 3.56 148 England EUR
Austria XS0749005343 02/21/2012 10/19/2029 2.45 29 England EUR
Belgium XS0026163435 06/28/1990 06/28/2010 9.20 500 England USD
Belgium BE0364162249 04/05/2002 04/05/2022 0.00 68 England EUR
Belgium BE6254011339 06/14/2013 06/17/2048 3.60 68 Germany EUR
Finland US317873AY36 02/29/1996 02/15/2026 6.95 300 New York USD
Finland US317873BD89 03/06/2002 03/06/2007 4.75 1,500 New York USD
Finland XS0410355365 01/27/2009 05/16/2011 1.50 2,000 England USD
Finland US31788DAA28 10/19/2010 10/19/2015 1.25 2,000 England USD
Finland US31788DAB01 03/17/2011 03/17/2016 2.25 2,000 England USD
Finland FI4000068663 09/04/2013 09/15/2018 1.13 6,802 Germany EUR
Greece GB0000766039 09/06/1985 09/06/2010 10.75 128 England GBP
Greece JP530000CQB3 11/16/1994 11/16/2009 7.10 197 Japan JPY
Greece JP530000CR76 07/14/1995 07/14/2015 5.80 197 Japan JPY
Greece JP530000AS10 01/31/1996 01/31/2006 4.20 394 Japan JPY
Greece JP530000BS19 01/31/1996 02/01/2016 5.25 295 Japan JPY
Greece JP530000CS83 08/22/1996 08/22/2016 5.00 394 Japan JPY
Greece XS0071095045 11/08/1996 11/08/2016 4.50 394 England JPY
Greece XS0078057725 07/03/1997 07/03/2017 4.50 295 England JPY
Greece XS0079012166 08/08/1997 08/08/2017 3.80 492 England JPY
Greece XS0079012679 08/08/1997 08/08/2007 2.90 492 England JPY
Greece US423324AC66 03/04/1998 03/04/2008 6.95 1,750 New York USD
Greece XS0085654068 03/31/1998 03/31/2008 5.75 2,720 England EUR
Greece XS0097010440 04/30/1999 04/30/2019 3.00 246 England JPY
Greece XS0110307930 04/14/2000 04/14/2028 6.14 272 England EUR
Greece CH0018062676 03/18/2004 03/18/2011 2.38 560 Switzerland CHF
Greece XS0191352847 04/30/2004 07/17/2034 5.20 1,360 England EUR
Greece CH0021839524 07/05/2005 07/05/2013 2.13 728 Switzerland CHF
Greece XS0372384064 06/25/2008 06/25/2013 4.63 1,500 England USD
Italy US465410AH18 09/27/1993 09/27/2023 6.88 3,500 New York USD
Italy XS0108238543 02/23/2000 02/23/2010 1.80 984 New York JPY
Italy US465410AW84 02/22/2001 02/22/2011 6.00 2,000 New York USD
Italy US465410AX67 04/05/2001 04/05/2006 5.25 2,000 New York USD
Italy XS0136860920 10/10/2001 10/10/2006 0.38 1,968 New York JPY
Italy XS0137815246 10/25/2001 10/25/2006 4.38 5,000 New York USD
Italy US465410BA55 03/01/2002 06/15/2012 5.63 3,000 New York USD
Italy US465410BD94 09/04/2002 09/14/2007 3.63 3,000 New York USD
Italy US465410BG26 02/27/2003 06/15/2033 5.38 2,000 New York USD
Italy US465410BF43 02/27/2003 06/15/2013 4.38 2,000 New York USD
continues on next page
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Table 4.4: Foreign law bonds (continued)
Country ISIN Issue date Maturity date Coupon
(%)
Amount issued
(USD m)
Governing law Currency
Italy US465410BH09 07/03/2003 07/15/2008 2.50 2,000 New York USD
Italy US465410BK38 03/03/2004 05/15/2009 3.25 2,000 New York USD
Italy US465410BM93 06/30/2004 12/14/2007 3.75 2,000 New York USD
Italy US465410BN76 01/21/2005 01/21/2015 4.50 4,000 New York USD
Italy US465410BP25 05/09/2005 06/16/2008 4.00 3,000 New York USD
Italy US465410BQ08 01/25/2006 01/25/2016 4.75 2,000 New York USD
Italy US465410BS63 06/12/2007 06/12/2017 5.38 2,000 New York USD
Italy US465410BT47 06/04/2008 07/15/2011 3.50 2,500 New York USD
Italy US465410BU10 10/05/2009 10/05/2012 2.13 2,500 New York USD
Italy US465410BV92 01/26/2010 01/26/2015 3.13 2,500 New York USD
Italy US465410BW75 09/16/2010 09/16/2013 2.13 2,000 New York USD
Portugal GB0006964760 05/20/1986 05/20/2016 9.00 257 England GBP
Portugal FR0000108359 05/13/1996 05/13/2008 6.63 829 France EUR
Portugal FR0000583429 04/03/1997 04/03/2007 5.63 1,114 France EUR
Portugal XS0082026054 11/20/1997 03/26/2008 5.75 617 England EUR
Portugal XS0498724888 03/25/2010 03/25/2015 3.50 1,250 England USD
Slovakia DE0003525804 09/28/1999 09/28/2006 9.50 163 Luxembourg EUR
Slovakia DE0001074763 04/14/2000 04/14/2010 7.38 680 England EUR
Slovakia XS0192595873 05/20/2004 05/20/2014 4.50 1,360 England EUR
Slovakia XS0249239830 03/27/2006 03/26/2021 4.00 1,360 England EUR
Slovakia XS0299989813 05/15/2007 05/15/2017 4.38 1,360 England EUR
Slovakia XS0430015742 05/21/2009 01/21/2015 4.38 2,720 England EUR
Slovakia CH0181915585 04/25/2012 04/25/2022 2.75 196 Switzerland CHF
Slovakia CH0181379774 04/25/2012 04/25/2018 2.13 364 Switzerland CHF
Slovakia US831588AB47 05/21/2012 05/21/2022 4.38 1,500 England USD
Slovakia CH0206594498 04/16/2013 10/16/2019 1.38 448 Switzerland CHF
Slovakia CH0206594506 04/16/2013 10/16/2023 2.13 196 Switzerland CHF
Slovakia JP570300AD69 06/25/2013 06/24/2016 0.72 254 Japan JPY
Slovakia JP570300BD68 06/25/2013 06/25/2018 0.99 41 Japan JPY
Spain GB0008326562 02/27/1985 03/24/2010 11.75 103 England GBP
Spain XS0075681345 04/17/1997 04/17/2017 3.13 197 England JPY
Spain XS0075723360 04/21/1997 04/21/2017 3.10 197 England JPY
Spain XS0089378938 07/28/1998 07/28/2008 5.88 1,500 England USD
Spain XS0096272355 04/06/1999 04/06/2029 5.25 342 England GBP
Spain XS0225227528 07/20/2005 07/20/2010 4.13 1,000 England USD
Spain XS0363874081 05/14/2008 06/17/2013 3.63 2,000 England USD
Spain XS0416150950 03/05/2009 03/05/2012 2.75 1,000 England USD
Spain US84633PAA12 09/17/2009 09/17/2012 2.00 2,500 England USD
Spain XS0565340758 12/02/2010 12/02/2030 2.92 197 England JPY
Spain XS0619977258 05/06/2011 05/06/2036 5.60 456 England EUR
Spain US84633PAB94 02/27/2013 03/06/2018 4.00 2,000 England USD
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Appendix
Table A1: Unit root tests
Reported are panel unit root tests as suggested by Choi (2001). H0 in all tests is that all bonds are I(1). The
hypothesis is tested using the Dickey-Fuller procedure with 3 lags.
Premium
No trend, no drift Trend Drift
Statistic p Statistic p Statistic p
Inverse χ2 758.82 0.00 710.93 0.00 1255.17 0.00
Inverse normal -13.80 0.00 -12.27 0.00 -20.02 0.00
Inverse logit t -18.96 0.00 -17.64 0.00 -28.05 0.00
Modified inv. χ2 28.43 0.00 26.01 0.00 53.50 0.00
CDS
No trend, no drift Trend Drift
Statistic p Statistic p Statistic p
Inverse χ2 127.79 1.00 126.46 1.00 447.05 0.00
Inverse normal 3.96 1.00 3.51 1.00 -9.41 0.00
Inverse logit t 3.93 1.00 3.38 1.00 -8.46 0.00
Modified inv. χ2 -3.28 1.00 -3.34 1.00 13.19 0.00
Table A2: Cointegration tests
The table reports results from cointegration tests as suggested by Westerlund (2007) and Persyn and
Westerlund (2008). The test statistics Gτ and Gα are group-mean tests, which test the null that the legal
premium and CDS spread is cointegrated for at least one bond. The panel statistics Pτ and Pα impose that
the cointegrating relationship is common across all bonds.
No trend, no drift Drift Trend
Statistic p Statistic p Statistic p
Gτ -3.58 0.00 -3.90 0.00 -4.12 0.00
Gα -58.70 0.00 -65.45 0.00 -73.76 0.00
Pτ -27.64 0.00 -35.02 0.00 -36.60 0.00
Pα -15.59 0.00 -21.73 0.00 -23.59 0.00
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Table A3: Excluding outliers (levels)
The table shows results from regressions based on equations 6.15 and 6.16 in samples restricted to exclude
outliers. Specifically, for each country, we drop the 1st and 99th percentile of the premium. All regressions
include bond fixed effects, and inference is based on Hubert-White standard errors.
Premium
Greece Italy Portugal Spain
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CDS 0.90*** -0.46 -0.10*** -0.82*** 0.19*** 1.21*** 0.09** 0.83
(0.12) (0.33) (0.02) (0.12) (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) (1.00)
CDS2 0.06*** 0.26*** -0.19*** -0.21
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.34)
CDS3 -0.00*** -0.03*** 0.01*** 0.02
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)
Bid-ask -0.05 0.02 0.21*** 0.11* -0.16*** -0.12*** 0.09 0.09
(0.14) (0.17) (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06)
Time to maturity 1.30*** -0.13 -0.07*** -0.17*** 0.06** 0.10** 0.23 0.35*
(0.32) (0.36) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.18)
Constant -11.36*** 0.09 0.29*** 1.24*** -0.49*** -1.23*** -2.53* -3.97*
(2.56) (2.59) (0.10) (0.20) (0.03) (0.06) (1.17) (1.84)
R2 B 0.20 0.59 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06
R2 W 0.63 0.65 0.09 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.12
R2 O 0.30 0.65 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.09
Obs 12262 12262 21562 21562 2345 2345 9905 9905
No. Bonds 18 18 21 21 4 4 12 12
Note: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A4: Excluding outliers (first differences)
The table shows results from regressions based on equations 6.17 and 6.18 in samples restricted to exclude
outliers. Specifically, for each country, we drop the 1st and 99th percentile of the premium’s first differences.
All regressions include bond fixed effects, and inference is based on Hubert-White standard errors.
∆Premium
Greece Italy Portugal Spain
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
∆CDS 0.21*** 0.70*** 0.47*** 0.21 0.70*** 1.86*** 0.55*** 0.33
(0.06) (0.10) (0.03) (0.14) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19)
CDS ×∆CDS -0.02* 0.08 -0.44*** -0.03
(0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.11)
CDS2 × ∆CDS 0.00 -0.00 0.03*** 0.02
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
∆Bid-ask -0.18 -0.19 -0.01 -0.01 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.01
(0.25) (0.26) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Time to maturity -0.02 -0.02 -0.00** -0.00** -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
ECB eligible 0.16** 0.15* 0.01** 0.00** 0.04* 0.03* -0.02 -0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.21*** 0.70*** 0.47*** 0.21 0.70*** 1.86*** 0.55*** 0.33
(0.06) (0.10) (0.03) (0.14) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19)
R2 B 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06
R2 W 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.04
R2 O 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.03
Obs 12244 12244 21541 21541 2341 2341 9892 9892
No. Bonds 18 18 21 21 4 4 12 12
Note: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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